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Abstract 
In the post-war period, Italy has been plagued by different forms of 
organised crime (such as the Sicilian Mafia, the Neapolitan Canlorra, the 
Calabrian'Ndrangheta and the Pugliese Sacra Corona Unitti) which have 
managed in their individual ways to infiltrate both the State (in the form of 
politi cal parties and local administrations) and society (businesses, cultural 
and voluntary organisations). In Campania, until 1991, the relationship 
between the Camorra and the local political elite (based on the exchange of 
votes for state contracts and protection) was tacitly accepted by the 
population and could not be studied by political scientists due to the lack of 
reliable source material. In 1991, a law was introduced which gave generous 
remission of sentences to criminals who became state-witness. ýIany 
members of the Camorra revealed important aspects of criminal, economic 
aind political activities in Campania. This new material permitted a 
reexamination of the Camorra. 
This thesis on the Camorra hopes to fill a gap in the study of the 
relationship between politics and criminal organisations which so far has 
concentrated on the Sicilian Mafia. Part One is a general introduction and 
presents the theoretical model and methods adopted. The documentation 
available allowed us to adopt an agency-structure approach derived from 
Giddens's structuration theory (1984). This was complemented by Easton's 
systems analysis (1965) to understand the wider, macro-environment. We 
elaborated an 'interaction model' to analyse the changing nature of the 
Camorra's activities: from a simple social-criminal practice in the 1930s to a 
dynamic and secret cartel enacting a political-criminal practice in the 1980s. 
To test this model we applied it to case-studies of criminals using original 
judicial documents. In Part Two we look at the possible motives of people 
who join the Camorra. We analysed the agent's internal and external structure 
in both decades and concluded that the macro-environment as an 
influencing factor had changed more than the individual-agent. Part Three 
exan-dries the lives of camorristi in the 1950s and 1980s in order to determine 
how far their criminal practice has been transformed. Part Four investigates 
the wider picture of system-interaction between the Camorra's social sub- 
system and the political system. Focussing on the relationship between 
camorristi and the political elite in the 1950s and 1980s we highlight the 
radical changes that occurred. 
This thesis presents a theoretical discussion of how to study organised 
crime and social behaviour in general and at the same time a detailed 
empirical study, in particular of the political role of a criminal organisation in a 
concrete historical situation, that of Naples over the last forty years. 
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"Nessun popolo sulla terra ha mai tanto sofferto quanto il popolo 
napoletano. Soffre la farne e la shiavitý da venti secoli, e non si 
lamenta. Non maledice nessuno, non odia nessuno: neppure la 
miseria Cristo era napoletano" 
Malaparte (1991: 7). 
"Napule ý nu sole amaro 
Napule addore e'mare 
Napule na'carta sporca e nisciuno 
se ne importa e 
ognuno aspetta a'ciotta 
Napule e na'camminata 
inte viche miezo all'alto 
Napule ý tutto un suonno e a'sape tutti 
o'niunno ma 
nun sanno averitd' 
Pino Danicle, Napule ý 
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Map 1: Italy and Campania 
"Ora sapevo che si potevc4 che si doveva frodare; la frode mi 
possedeva via via che tentavo di espellerla; tutto era 
organizzato perchd il credito potesse esercitarsi nei margini 
predisposti di una frode" 
Bemari (19G4: 107). 
Preamble: Scove and Aims of the Thesis 
If, walking down Vico Mondragone and crossing Via S. Caterina da 
Siena in the direction of the take-away Da Nennella' at the corner of 
Via Mortelle, a foreign visitor to Naples catches a glimpse of two 
youngsters zooming along on a powerful motorbike, holding a 
Kalashnikov, and feels for the first time a moment of fear and tension, 
with people looking down and trying to ignore the whole scene as if it 
had not happened, s/he may become aware of an invisible reality and 
a form of powerful control or, to use Graham Greene's words, 'the 
dark side of the city' (1982). Obviously like all capitals and major 
towns, Naples (see Map 1) has its underworld and its malavita. But one 
also remembers the numerous references in newspapers and studies 
of Naples to a more structured and formidable form of organised 
crime, the Neapolitan Camorra, l which in the 1980s was most present 
in the form of La Nuova Caniorra Organizzata [NCO] led by Raffaele 
Cutolo and the alliance of rival gangs, La Nuova Famiglia [NFI. 
In a much discussed pamphlet on the French town of Nice, 
J'Accuse, Graham Greene made a powerful indictment against 
organised crime: "I am not exaggerating when I write that there is a 
network in the Nice region which links the inflieu with some of the 
most respected professional circles. Money of course plays its 
corrupting role, but it is not an affair of money only. [ ... I Jaccuse - yes, 
I accuse - but it's not merely a petty criminal I am accusing, a man 
unbalanced, perhaps paranoiac, even pitiable. He would be powerless 
without support, and the support which he has been given by certain 
1 For a historical overview of the Neapolitan Camorra's development see Appendix 
One. 
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without support, and the support which he has been given by certain 
police officers, magistrates and lawyers gives him good reason to 
believe ihat he can obtain any immunity he may need. He feels fully 
justified in his corrupt view of the world" (1982: 7-26). 
These could be the words of the first Camorra state-witness of 
the 1990s, the pentito Pasquale Galasso, against the political ruling 
elite (and in particular, Antonio Gava2) in Campania: "I have touched 
with my own hands this social reality, believe me this group of 
politicians which I have mentioned [ ... ] is organised like our gang. The 
only difference is that in our gang, we risk our lives in the streets. If 
tomorrow morning there was a Camorra war, we are in the front line 
whereas these politicians, they hide behind their desks in their 
comfortable offices" . (CPA1.1: 81). 
However, if one reads the classic text on Naples in the 1950s and 
1960s (Allum, 1973a), the Camorra appears much less organised and 
powerful. This explains why a comparative analysis of the Camorra in 
the 1950s and 1980s is necessary. The purpose of this thesis is to 
analyse the changing nature of the Camorra's impact on Neapolitan 
politics in the post-war period, thus allowing us to answer questions 
such as: what type of 'organisation' was and is the Camorra? Why did 
and do people 'join'? What type of relationship did and does it have 
with politics and business? In short, how can its changing relationship 
with the political elite, from a subordinate to a supraordinate position, 
be explained? Why did it happen at that precise historical moment and 
in those areas? In order to do this, three fundamental issues are 
discussed and analysed: (1) the changing motivations for individual 
membership; (2) the changing objectives, activities and organisation 
of the Camorra and (3) the changing role and presence of the 
Camorra in politics. 
This requires an analytical framework which does three things: 
firstly, which distinguishes the various 'systems' in which the Camorra 
operates (social, economic and political); secondly, which shows the 
articulation and connection between these systems and finally, which 
See Appendix Eight. 
3 
shows how interaction between structural factors and agency is 
important to tell the Camorra's story of change. Our analytical 
framework draws on Easton's systems analysis and a modified 
version of Giddens's structuration theory. In other words, in this 
thesis, Naples is conceived of as a set of interconnecting sub- 
systems (see Figure P. 1) within which behaviour, in our case the 
Camorra and its activities, is the outcome of an interaction between 
structural factors and individual agency. 
Figige P. I: System Interaction 
the poltical system 
the the 
social econaadc system system 
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
ChaiDter One: 
Defining and Studying Organised Crime 
"Whether researching or investigating organised crime, one is faced with 
the problem of defining the phenomenon. Oddly enougba great many 
works on organised crime avoid this problem, as if the obvious need not 
be defined" 
Abadinsky (1990: 2) 
1.1 Definitions 
The next three chapters are dedicated to the theoretical model 
adopted and the methods used. However, before presenting them, it 
is necessary to define organised crime and to consider the e)dsting 
literature on the subject. 
Certainly, defining organised crime is essential to any study of the 
Camorra. However, it soon becomes apparent, when looking at the 
various definitions of organised crime, that, as Albanese points out, 
"there seem to be as many descriptions [definitions] of organised 
crime as there are authors" (1985: 4); hence, this is not a simple and 
straightforward task (Ryan, 1995: 4): "[the term] 'organised crime' has 
long been a source of controversy and contention, probably because 
of differences in the ways of approaching various features of the 
problem" (United Nations, E/CONF. 88/1,1994: 4). Michetek (19943) 
reinforces this view when pointing out that "organised crime is a highly 
complex but not well defined phenomenon". Indeed, the problem of 
definition may primarily lie in the definition one employs for criminals 
and crime in each country. 
Therefore, attempting to define and study organised crime is like 
trying to define such complex and abstract notions as 'democracy', 
'common good' and 'liberty', in that it provokes a contentious and 
polemical debate depending on national conceptions and historieS4. 
The dLfficulty seems to arise for three principal reasons: firstly, 
3 Nikolaus Michalek, Austrian Minister for justice addressing the UN conference on 
fighting organised crime which took place in Naples, Italy 2-11-1994; Soc/cp/133. 
4 Private discussion with the sociologist Dr IC Robertson, Reading University, 1995. 
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The difficulty seems to arise for three principal reasons: firstly, 
because of its multi-faceted nature: all the activities ranging from 
white-collar crime, drug dealing, extortion, prostitution, kidnapping and 
monopoly of the black market can go under the general label of 
"organised crime". This leads us to ask whether what we are talking 
about is "organised crime" (D. C. Smith, jr 1991), "professional crime" 
(Cressey, 1972: 46), "white-collar crime" (Dwight. C. Smith, jr, 1982, 
Ruggiero, 1996) "transnational crime" (Savona, 1995), "repressive 
crime" (Hess, 1986) "broker capitalism" (Schneider and Schneider, 
1973), "capitalist enterprise" (McIntosh, 1973), "criminal enterprise" 
(Maltz, 198S: 24) or "cartels" (Burin des Roziers, 199S). These different 
labels show how many varied visions there are, making it difficult to 
agree on one general coherent definition of organised crime. 
Secondly, the academic and ideological biasess of the different 
approaches that have been adopted complicate the definition of 
organised crime. Should it be studied as a "[ ... I social phenomenon to 
be analysed and understood; as an illegally defined act, or state of 
being for which a person can be prosecuted; or as a popular concept 
to be communicated to the public? " (Dwight. C. Smith, jr; 1975: 4) ? 
Thirdly, it is not clear a priori which elements need to be analysed 
in depth to understand this complex phenomenon: its structural 
characteristics, the professionalism of its participants or the type of 
client involved? For example, both Merton (1968) and Gambetta (1993) 
choose to concentrate on the predominant type of business activities 
that organised crime groups undertake. The large number of possible 
research aspects of organised crime led Ryan to argue that "[ ... I as 
hard as researchers try to solve the problem of defining organised 
5 This ideological bias can be noted in the definition employed by the US President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice- Organised crime is "a 
society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their 
governments. It involves thousands of criminals working within structures as 
complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced 
than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but rather the 
result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over many years and aimed at gaining 
control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits" (The President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration ofJustice. Task Force Report: 
Organised Crime, Annotations and Consultant Papers, Washington, DC, Government 
Printing Office, 1967: 1). 
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crime, some people believe that there is no such thing, saying that 
because the evidence presented is not airtight, organised crime is not 
a problem" (1995: 5). 
As a result of these potential problems, Albanese sought to 
elaborate a possible definition "based on the consensus of writers of 
the last 15 years" which managed to highlight its main tenets: 
"organised crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally 
works to profit from illicit activities that are in great public demand. 
Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, 
threats and/or the corruption of public officials" (1989: 5). 
In contrast, Maltz developed an all- encompassing "tentative 
typology" (1976: 338) based on a functional conception of organised 
crime, highlighting the means, objectives and particular political and 
economic manifestations of organised crimeG. In 1985, although he 
doubted "whether it is worthwhile to attempt to define organised 
crime generally" (1985: 24), he readdressed the question, endeavouring 
to be more specific: "we should focus", he wrote, "on the nature of 
those criminal enterprises agreed by most observers to be part of 
organised crime" (ibid). 
Consequently, he studied the attributes of organised crime 
groupS7 and concluded "we need something more balanced based on 
the characteristics (of organised. crime) [ ... ]"; he, therefore, avoided 
tautological (such as "organised crime is crime that is organised") and 
6 He wrote: "A crime consists of a transaction proscribed by the criminal law 
between offender(s) and victim(s). It is not necessary for the victim to be a 
complainant or to consider himself victimised for a crime to be committed. An 
organised crime is a crime committed by two or more offenders who are or intend 
to remain associated for the purpose of committing crime. The means of execution 
of the crime include violence, theft, corruption, economic power, deception and 
victim collusion or participation, which are not mutually exclusive categories; any 
organised crime may employ a number of means. The objective of most organised 
criminals is power, either- political or economic. These objectives too are not 
mutually exclusive and may co-exist in any organised crime. The objectives may 
take a number of different manifestations when the objective is political power, it 
may be of two types: overthrow of the existing order or illegal use of the political 
process when the objective is economic power, it may manifest itself in three 
ways: through common crime (made in se), through illegal business (made in 
prohibita) or through legitimate business (white collar crime)" (1976: 342). 
7 He highlighted the characteristics that he believes are either central or peripheral 
to organised crime; these are corruption, structure, discipline, multiple enterprise, 
violence, sophistication, continuity, legitimate business, and bonding. 
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narrow definitions ("the Mafia is organised crime") (1985: 34). Maltz, 
therefore, belongs to the school of thought which believes that "I ... I 
organised crime is best defined by its structural features" (Ryan, 
1995: 5). 
Furthermore, Abadinsky made an interesting contribution when he 
followed up this line of thought and looked at the attributes of 
organised crime and its organisational models. Indeed, what he tried 
to do was to produce a workable definition which concentrated on "a 
certain type of behaviour rather than a distinct form of crime - what it 
does, rather than what it is" (Ryan, 1995: 6). 
He pinpointed eight attributes which give a clear definitional 
framework to organised crime because he believed that they "(a) 
provide a basis for determining if a particular group of criminals 
constitutes organised crime and therefore (b) needs to be 
approached in a different way than one would approach other groups 
of criminals" (1990: 4). These attributes are worth examining because 
they help us understand generally what forms of crime we are dealing 
with. 
Thus, according to Abadinsky, the eight basic attributes of 
organised crime are: 1) non-ideological: organised crime has no 
ideological beliefs or objectives, but is interested in money and 
power; as a result, it usually seeks political protection for its illegal 
activities; 2) hierarchical: it has a clear vertical power structure from 
which authority flows; there may be different ranks between the top 
boss, the lieutenants and soldiers; 3) limited or exclusive membership: 
There tend to be some strict requirements for membership of an 
organised crime group, such as ethnic background, kinship or criminal 
record; this attribute is needed for the group to be successful; 4) 
perpetuitous: this means that the group is on-going, and that people 
join to ensure the group's continuity; 5) illegal violence and bribery: in 
these groups, violence is a readily available and accepted resource; 
bribes are used to protect its operations and members; 6) 
specialisation/division of labour: the division of labour occurs for 
functional reasons to make the group more efficient and therefore, 
9 
successful; 7) monopolistic: these groups seek domination over a 
particular territory or industry; to do this they must eliminate 
competition and form a mo nop oly-re straining free trade and 
increasing profit; such a monopolistic position can be maintained by 
the organised crime groups because of their use of violence and their 
relationship with police and law enforcement agencies; 8) government 
by rules and regulations: this means that like all types of legitimate 
organisation, these groups have rules and regulations which must be 
respected by all members. Abadinsky believes that these attributes 
are to be found in organised crime groups and thus enable them to 
pursue their goals of money and power. 
Both Maltz's (1985) and Abadinsky's (1990) approaches of looking 
at the characteristics and attributes of organised crime groups are 
useful because they distinguish between an organised crime group 
and other social and political groups such as trade unions, church 
groups, motor bike groups, sports clubs and political parties. Indeed, 
the positive aspect of these approaches is that they both manage to 
outline and propose a working definition based on the features of 
organised crime. 
In addition, note must be taken of the development of a modem 
school of thought on organised crime which argues that national 
boundaries are no longer applicable as crimes have become 
transnational. Therefore, they must be understood, studied and 
fought as international phenomena. Indeed, it is argued that regional 
labels are no longer appropriate and that the word 'Mafia' should 
apply to all forms of organised crime wherever it develops. Moreover, 
this definition is now adopted by the UN8 which defines transnational 
crime as "[ ... I the movement of information, money, physical objects, 
people or other tangible or intangible items across state boundaries 
when at least one of the actors involved in this movement is non- 
governmental [ ... 
]. Criminal organisations are also increasingly engaged 
in activities that tend to cross national boundaries" (United Nations, 
1994: 5). 
8 This definition was elaborated by professor Ernesto Savona of the Criminal Law 
Department of the University of Trento, Italy, for the United Nations. 
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In conclusion, these definitions remain very general and all- 
inclusive which is constructive but does not help answer the more 
fundamental questions about organised crime groups and politics 
(such as why organised crime groups exist, how they work, how they 
operate in their environment and what type of relationship they have 
with economic and political groups) which are the subject of this 
thesis. 
1.2 How Should the Neapolitan Camorra be Studied: A Review of 
Theoretical AwDroaches. 
We have seen that organised crime is a highly complex social, 
economic and political phenomenon, consisting of organisations, 
structured or unstructured, with families, gangs, clans, bosses, 
(padrini), that undertake secretive, violent and pervasive social 
practices, legal, illegal, paralegal and semi-legal, with political 
protection. This definitional complexity also renders problematic the 
search for the right approach to our study of the Camorra and its 
relationship with politics in the post-war period. 
Journalists (Sterling 1990, Faenza 1993a, and Longrigg 1997), 
politicians (Sales, 1988), historians (Marmo, 1990, Barbagallo, 1990, 
1998,1999), economists, sociologists (Arlacchi, 1983, Lamberti, 1987, 
Ruggiero, 1993) and judges (Mancuso, 1990, Narducci and Marino, 
1990) have among others, all attempted to explain and interpret the 
Camorra phenomenon. But, at the same time, they have contributed to 
"a recurring problem in the study of organised crime [ ... I that is, the 
tension between 'rational' and 'irrational' explanations for its rise and 
operations" (Galeotti, 1997: 99-101), in other words, the contrast 
between the 'irrational' or sociological approach (subcultural theory) 
and the 'rational' or economic approach (rational choice theory). 
Indeed, both these approaches have explanatory potential for 
analysing the Neapolitan Camorra. in the post-war period. 
The so-called 'irrational', sociological or subcultural, approach 
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seeks to explain organised crime in terms of local variables: it 
emphasises the need to look at historical, social, economic, political, 
generational and psychological systems which over time become part 
of a sub-culture. 9 It enables us to study these different systems, how 
they interact and how they may produce other cultural and social 
phenomena. A concrete example of this is, for example, how illegal 
activities have been tolerated in Naples for centuries because the 
police force has felt that this is the best form of social control; this 
contrasts with Genoa, where law and order have been much more 
evident. This indicates a distinct difference between two 
Mediterranean cultures. 
However, this subcultural approach does not explain short-term 
criminal change; it cannot explain the Camorra's rapid transformation 
in the form of its quantum leap, (salto di qualitil), in the 1970-80s, its 
great expansion and transformation from "racketeering clans" into a 
"business Camorra" working also in the legal sector of the economy. It 
gives no indication of how and why the Camorra moved into the 
legitimate business sector in the late 1970s. In addition, it does not 
explain the Camorra's changing relationship with the political and 
business worlds. 
Furthermore, it cannot explain the bitter Camorra wars of the 
1980s which were fought for dominance over the region. The 
subcultural approach may help to explain the origin of the use of 
extreme violence and omertil, but it cannot explain this sudden 
irruption of brutal and strategic in-fighting between clans. Therefore, it 
explains certain aspects of the Camorra but not others. 
The same can be said of the rational choice approach. The 
standard utilitarian rational choice theory is one which applies an 
economic analysis of cost effectiveness to human behaviour and 
politics. Thus, organised crime, murders, illegal business deals and 
political corruption, are explained in terms of rational human 
behaviour: individuals are perceived as rational, always seeking to 
maximise their self-interest above and beyond collective action to be 
9 See Hess and his classical study of the Sicilian Mafia (1973). 
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cost-effective, calculating the potential rewards from their actions 
and acting accordingly; therefore, they always make individual 
strategic decisions, thinking of the individual outcomes rather than 
the collective good. In simple terms, this approach assumes "that 
individuals are rational actors who seek to maximise returns and 
minimise costs in any course of action they undertake" (Seyd and 
Whiteley, 1992: 57). 
Gambetta perfected this narrow economic theory to explain the 
Sicilian Mafia. Indeed, he argued that the Sicilian Mafia is "a specific 
economic enterprise, an industry which produces, promotes and sells 
private protection" (1993: 1) which rational citizens, realising that the 
Italian state is failing to provide, turn to in order to protect 
themselves. He believes that it is the lack of authority of the Italian 
state which creates a demand for security, a space in the market, for 
the Mafia to fill. The individuals respond to a potentially dangerous 
situation (the chaos deriving from the lack of an authoritarian state) 
and calculate rationally that they need the Mafia to protect them. 
The positive aspect of this type of theory, as Ward points out is 
that "it can help to illuminate how structures arise and are 
transformed" (1995: 93), therefore, it can account for short-term 
change and transformation: why certain social movements, 
associations and businesses undergo change and why individuals 
make certain decisions and choices. These are aspects of organised 
crime which otherwise would be difficult to explain, especially the 
change in Camorra businesses and their relationships with politicians 
in the 1980s; why, for example, votes were exchanged for state 
contracts. 
However, Ward suggests that a rational choice theory must 
include some notion of the social structu 
, 
re if it is to have explanatory 
validity: it is not possible, he argues, to "[ ... I conceive of any rational 
choice model that does not introduce some premise about social 
structure from outside" (1995: 93). Indeed, this is where the pure 
rational choice model encounters severe difficulties; if applied to the 
Camorra, it could handicap our analysis by ignoring the social system 
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of which the Camorra is part. 
This type of approach has four basic limitations: firstly, it is 
based on methodological individualism and as a result, produces 
reductive and maybe simplistic explanations. Ostrom (1991) has 
described this as a "deductive" and "normative" approach which 
applies a micro-analysis to a macro-phenomenon in order to 
understand different areas of politics but ends up reducing its 
explanatory value and ignoring other important variables. 
Secondly, it could be argued that rationality is more complex and 
intricate than the mainstream model describes, in that individuals will 
not always be consistent in their rationality; that other psychological 
elements may intervene and dominate. Indeed, psychologists criticise 
the notion of rationality and argue that individuals may not always act 
or react in simple utility-maximising terms because they are much 
more psychologically complex and motivated. Thirdly, as a 
consequence of this, some political scientists argue that the rational 
choice approach ends up making some general and implausible 
conclusions which may turn out to be not very helpful or correct. 
Finally, the sociological critique argues that the rational choice 
model ignores the importance of social structures and their influence 
on individual behaviour: "[ ... I individual 
behaviour is largely a function 
of social structures" (Ward, 1995: 82). Therefore, while these 
sociologists accept that individuals do things on the basis of self- 
interest, they argue, that it is "an individual's structural location that 
generates their interests and does most of the explanatory work 
(ibid). The social and structural context of an individual are thus, just 
as important as his/her rational self interest, if not more, in explaining 
human behaviour. 
We can see the tension between sociological and economic 
explanations resurface within the recently influential new 
institutionalist paradigm. This new institutional approach still forms 
part of an ongoing debate, in that "it is far from coherent or 
consistent; it is not completely legitimate; but neither can it be entirely 
ignored" (March and Olsen; 1984: 734) and would appear to offer a new 
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way of looking at the tensions which exist in trying to explain 
organised crime. 
New institutionalism is a developing approach which "[ ... I 
conceptualises the connection between institutional structures and 
human behaviour in a multidimensional way" (Hall and Taylor, 1994: 3) 
and tries to understand the significance of institutional variables for 
explaining outcomes. The approach is interested primarily in the 
44 outcome- oriented conception of collective action" (March and Olsen, 
1984). In fact, as Thelen and Steinmo point out: "[ ... ] in general, 
institutionalists are interested in the whole range of state and societal 
institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and 
that structure their relations of power to other groups" (1992: 2). 
New institutionalists10 put institutions, in their varying forms, back 
at the core of the political, economic and social analysis to explain 
the extent to which they influence different outcomes and 
relationships in society. They concentrate on several important 
features which may not all be present in other approaches, including: 
"interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political 
institutions; [ ... I relatively complex processes and historical 
inefficiency; [ ... I other logics of action and the centrality of meaning 
and symbolic action" (March and Olsen, 1984: 738). 
As a result, new institutionalism seeks to be less normative and 
descriptive than the old institutionalism. According to Hall and Taylor 
(1994) new institutionalism is made up of four distinct schools of 
thought: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, 
economic institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. 
Sociological institutionalism is the most useful for the present 
analysis and differs from historical institutionalism in that it stresseý 
the significance of culture much more. It accepts that culture is just 
as important as rational choice: "the new institutionalists in sociology 
lu This new analysis can be seen as a reaction against the behavioural, revolution 
of the 1930-60s in America and in comparative politics. Behaviourism ignored the 
role institutions had played in society and politics and which if studied would 
explain the fuller picture of socioeconomic and political structures that shape 
human behaviour in such different ways. 
is 
began to argue that many of the formal attributes of organisations 
were not the expression of a superordinate rationality but a collection 
of culturally- specific practices assimilated into these organisations 
for reasons that often had little to do with the specific functions of 
the organisation itself. [... ] Instead, they saw them as cultural artifacts, 
akin to the myths and ceremonies adopted in other cultural spheres 
and liable to take on a multiplicity of historically-specific forms" (ibid, 
1994: 11). In addition, institutional features and change in particular, 
must be seen as a product of culture. Thus, this theory highlights the 
importance of culture in the formation of the organisation, in its 
interaction and constraint of outcomes, so that "faced with a 
situation, the individual must find a way to recognise it, using the 
symbols and scripts familiar to him and to act searching for and if 
necessary, adapting the routines that seem most appropriate. This 
involves a kind of 'practical reasoning' whereby the individual works 
with the available institutional templates to devise a course of action" 
(ibid-. 13). 
This theory can help us understand how the Camorra, as a social 
institution, affects individual action and collective outcomes. It 
accepts that culture plays a part in explaining outcomes; that culture 
can constrain and restrict individual choices and mass-outcomes, 
goals and strategies as it conceives culture "in more expansive terms, 
as a network of routines, symbols or scripts providing a web for 
meaning, for behaviour and multiple strategies for action" (ibid. 12). 
Aspects of this 'institutional' consideration will form part of the 
analysis. 
All three approaches are interesting because they can give us an 
important insight and understanding into the way different Mafias 
work. However, adopting "a single-factor approach" maybe limiting and 
render our analysis and instruments of research rigid. Dearlove and 
Saunders stress how important it is to accept and use a variety -of 
approaches in political and social analysis since: 
no one perspective enjoys a monopoly over explanatory 
wisdom; nor can understanding be advanced if we are 
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constrained by the limits of any single discipline. [ ... I This is because theories, perspectives and even disciplines often 
differ in what it is they are trying to explain. [ ... I Certainly there is no reason to assume that, if we draw on one of these 
perspectives this rules out the possibility of drawing on any 
other. [ ... I It is clearly the case that different theories which focus on different questions posed at different levels of 
generality may in fact turn out to be to some extent 
complementary. [ ... ] Some theories are more valid than others in respect of the specific questions which they address 
(1991: 10-11). 
Indeed, the great disadvantage of the single-factor approach is 
that it 'does not tell the whole story' and contains some explanatory 
gaps. It tends to analyse and describe moments in time, particular 
events and general characteristics rather than drawing a complete 
picture which takes into account different general aspects. 
These lacunae can be perceived in GambettA's approach, which, 
while producing an elaborate explanation of the Sicilian Mafia's 
activities, does not really explain as coherently its political- 
administrative-bu sines s relationship because, as Chubb points out: 
"by focusing primarily on a micro-analysis of Mafia intermediation in 
economic transactions and dispute settlement at the local level, 
Gambetta disregards the broader structural context within which the 
Mafia has flourished and which until very recently guaranteed 
immunity. Thus, [he] provides no basis for understanding the central 
role played by the Mafia in the power structure of postwar Italy. The 
relationship between the Mafia and politics is only briefly mentioned, 
and is reduced to but another link in the patronage system of 
exchange votes for favours which cuts across all sectors of Southern 
Italian society" (1996: 280). On the other hand, Hess (1973) also 
explains the Sicilian Mafia as a product of a particular subculture, but 
does not manage to account for its economic political business 
activities. However, Arlacchi (1986), by adopting a flexible multi-factor 
approach, has avoided these problems. He portrays the mafioso, as 
Chubb points out, "as a rational economic actor, combining modern 
entrepreneurial activities in the legal sector with traditional cultural 
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values which give Mafia firms important competitive advantages over 
their rivals" (1996: 275). 
Looking at these different approaches has been helpful: the 
sociological approach highlights the important role which culture plays 
in producing organised crime; the rational choice theory shows how 
economic rational choices can explain human behaviour at the 
individual level, while new institutionalism explains behavio ur in terms 
of institutions and their influence on individuals. The shortcomings of 
the single-factor approaches have helped us understand the 
fundamental need for a multi- factor approach which allows 
theoretical pluralism. As our interest is in the Camorra, its 
transformation and its relationship with politics, this kind of approach 
should give us enough flexibility to deal with camorTisti's interaction 
with politicians as well as with their environment and other criminal, 
economic and political groups. In other words, we need "an analysis of 
the interaction between the micro (individual) and macro (structural) 
dimensions of the phenomenon -an analysis which clarifies the 
passage from structural precondition to individual behaviour" (Della 
Porta, 1996a: 350). 
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ChaRter Two: 
The Interaction Model 
"You have no choice: either you succeed in making us 
civilised, or we shall succeed in making you barbarians" 
Villari (1883) 
2.1 The Interaction Model 
While the previously outlined approaches can be helpful for 
analysing the Camorra, it is important to adopt a model which deals 
with the interaction between a camorrista and his/her environment to 
understand the Camorra's relationship with politics in the post-war 
period. In particular, the model needs to allow for the impact of both 
the micro- structural and the macro- structural factors in the 
environment, because while we are concerned with the action by 
individual agents we must also be aware of the broader environment 
within which the Camorra operates and how it can influence and 
constrain the behaviour of individuals. 
Giddens's structuration theory (1984) and Easton's systems 
analysis (1965) are both valuable in constructing such a model which 
can be referred to as the interaction model. This model combines 
elements of Giddens's micro-level analysis, particularly his concept of 
the agent influenced by 'structure', and Easton's concept of a system 
interacting with its macro- environment. It is a central contention of 
this thesis that this model will help explain the 1950s and 1980s 
Camorras and their relationships with politics in a way other theories 
fail to do. 
The model gives greater emphasis to the importance of the 
macro- environment than Giddens does by integrating Easton's 
broader notion of systems. By studying both the agent and the macro- 
environment we seek to understand how they interact to produce the 
19 
Camorra and its activities. It is hoped that this model can also be 
applied to other forms of social behaviour; for example terrorist 
groups because, as Sibeon points out, "an area of investigation that 
opens up exciting new opportunities for interdisciplinary research is 
the the study of interaction between agency, structure and social 
chance" (1999: 143). 
Before developing this model, we need to present the theories 
which inspired it; here we will develop the notion of agent and 
structure which are taken from Giddens's structuration theory (1984) 
and later in the chapter, we will discuss our use of Easton's systems 
analysis (1965). 
2.2 The 'Agent' and Agengy 
Many social theorists have up until now studied the role of 
individuals in terms of groups and group dynamics without theorising 
about their own individuality. Giddens tackles this problem and 
identifies the analytical space of the individual which he calls 'the 
agent'; this allows him to concentrate on different types of micro- 
behaviour (motivations, actions, reactions and consequences) and to 
insist on the role of the 'agent' and especially, its transformative 
capacity in the social process. 
In order to understand the nature of the agent, Giddens 
constructs a stratification model (Figure 2.1) in which he distinguishes 
two different forms of action: (1) the "reflexive-monitoring of action", 
the different monitoring of conduct by individuals of people around 
them and of their physical, social and economic environment; (2) the 
"rationalisation of action", in which the agent knows, understands and 
can explain why s/he is undertaking a course of action and its 
possible consequences. These two forms of behaviour empower the 
agent by giving him/her the potential and capability for action. 
This is a new type of action in social theory because it is one 
which focuses on micro behaviour rather than trying "[ ... 
I to provide a 
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systematic guide to the totality of the social system and history" 
(Cassell, 1993: 7); it tries to understand how the agent can interact with 
other agents and the environment while being able to explain this 
action. The agent in this theory is therefore not passive but active in 
relation to the surrounding world and can explain his/her action. 
Giddens also identifies what produces agent-motivation, which is 
another particular form of action. Motives are different from reasons 
and intentions behind actions because there are a whole series of 
motivations which cannot be explained or rationalised. In this aspect, 
Giddens was much inspired by Goffman's work on the psyche (1968) 
(see below 2.5). Thus, the notion of human agency which Giddens 
elaborates is rather complex in the sense that he seeks to understand 
whether it is to be defined in terms of intentional action or unintended 
consequences. This is a complicated but interesting philosophical 
debate. 
The simple differences between intentional action and unintended 
consequences are that in the first case, the agent knows what is going 
to happen and in the second, s/he does not. Human agency can thus 
be defined in terms of acts "of which an individual is the perpetrator, 
in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given 
sequence of conduct; have acted differently. Whatever happened 
would not have happened if that individual had not intervened" (in 
Cassell, 1993: 96). Human agency produces social practices 
which, according to Giddens, occur "under conditions of 'mixed 
intentionality', which involve both intended and unintended elements 
of social action" (Tucker, 1998: 85). An individual undertakes a social 
practice without knowing what its consequences may or may not be. 
This initial social practice might cause a 'domino effect' of acts which 
the individual did not foresee, Giddens perceives these acts as being 
"regularly 'distributed' as a by-product of regularized behaviour 
reflexively sustained as such by its participants" (in Cassell, 1993: 101). 
In short, the innovative aspect of Giddens's theory lies in his 
concept of the 'agent' where he has constructed an 'agent' which has 
an autonomous capacity for interaction with the macro-environment. 
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2.3 The Production of a 'Recurrine Social Practice' 
In Giddens's theory, the wider environment which produces the 
social practice can be analysed at three different levels: (1) 'the 
structure' - in the shape of rules and resources which exist as internal 
memory traces; (2) 'the social systern' - the overall social practice; and 
(3) 'structuration' - the overall global context in which continuity and 
change of the social practice takes place (see Figure 2.2). 
Giddens calls 'structure' the first level of analysis. This is made 
up of 'structuring properties' which are the ingredients and composing 
elements making up the social practice. According to Giddens, the key 
Istructuring properties' are 'rules' and 'resources' which compose the 
fuller social system and the social relations which 
produce the social practice: he argues that "these properties can be 
understood as rules and resources, recursively implicated in the 
reproduction of social systems" (in Cassell, 1993: 117). 
Giddens's 'rules' structure action. The two main features of these 
social 'rules' are important as they are both 'constitutive' and' 
gregulative'; in other words, they have both enabling and constraining 
powers which influence the agent. On the other hand, 'resources' make 
the execution of power possible. By using and distributing these 
gresources' power is also being distributed among the agents. These 
'rules' and 'resources' are fundamental in his theory but they must be 
interpreted and understood by the agent through accepted meanings 
and norms if they are to produce a social practice. Thus, rules and 
resources in this sense are the potential instruments of power which 
must be used by agents to interact and reproduce social practices. 
Without them social practices cannot exist. However, what is 
important to note is that these 'structuring properties' are not visible, 
they are in-built in the agents like a form of consciousness: structuring 
properties are "'internal' to agents in the form of memory traces" 
(Cassell, 1993: 12). 
These 'structuring properties' in the shape of generative rules 
and resources applied by agents internally in a context of unintended 
outcomes produce what Giddens calls 'structure'. His notion of 
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Figure 2.2: Giddens's Main Concepts in hisStructu ration theory (1984) 
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'structure' differs from previous ones and is rather specific. He is 
against the static notion of 'structure' where the agents are either 
passive or free to act in the present and future without taking into 
consideration the past. 
'Structure' is invisible and in-built in the agent, a form of historical 
memory trace: "it has no reality [... ] it is agents who bring 'structure' 
into being and it is 'structure' which produces the possibility of 
agency" Ubid). It is not the wider socioeconomic consciousness but 
individual experiences assimilated by the agent which produce 
Giddens's 'structure' and consequently the social practice. 
The second level of analysis is the social system. A social 
system, according to Giddens is the result of interaction between 
actors and 'structure' which produces recurring social practices. He 
emphasises three necessary elements that make the reproduction of 
social practices and the existence of a social system possible: (1) the 
constitution of a social practice needs to be meaningful, (2) it needs 
to be part of a moral order and (3) it needs to operate as relations of 
power. What Giddens means by a social practice being 'meaningful' is 
that behaviour not only needs to be understood by all but that it 
cannot be taken for granted. Behaviour needs to be continuously 
negotiated, never relying on set meanings; thus, meanings always need 
to be verified and negotiated. This in turn means that actors are 
continuously producing and reproducing new meanings in their lives. 
For example, in the Camorra, intimidation and violence are forms of 
behaviour which have very clear meanings. 
Secondly, Giddens maintains that the interaction of social 
practices has to be part of a moral order: it needs to contain norms, 
rights, claims, negotiations and sanctions which, subsequently, have 
an impact on interaction. By accepting that the constitution of social 
practices must form part of a moral order, Giddens is arguing that we 
must understand this as the actualisation of rights and the enactment 
of obligations (ie -a system of 'rules' of behaviour for society which 
has a clear morality). 
In this system of moral behaviour Giddens includes: 'norms' (as 
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defined as actions which are both constraining and enabling - 
different from 'moral rules' which are found making up the structure); 
'normative sanctions' (different from transgression of technical or 
utilitarian prescriptions); 'normative claims' (which may be binding as 
the agent will seek to avoid the bad action); 'moral claims' (the same 
as transgression claims, as the individual 'calculates the risk'); 'moral 
obligation' (necessarily implying moral commitment); 'common norms' 
and 'sanctions' (which follow transgression and therefore, involve the 
reaction of others). The social system, thus, has a clear moral order 
whereby the different moral behavioural rules are interconnected and 
must be respected. 
Lastly, the social practice implies as relations of 'power'. 
Giddens's notion of action is linked to that of 'power' because "power 
represents the capacity of the agent to mobilise resources". For 
Giddens, 'power' therefore means "the transformative capacity of 
human action". He adopts the Marxian term of 'power: "power in the 
sense of the transformative capacity of human agency is the 
capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events so as to alter 
their course; as such it is the . 'can' which mediates between intentions 
or wants and the actual realisation of the outcomes sought after" (in 
Cassell, 1993: 110). 'Power', in this sense, therefore means capabilities 
and in particular the possibility of using resources, facilities and skills. 
Agents with this type of 'power' obviously have an advantage over 
others and this leads to an imbalance in society. However, this 
concept of 'power' is an important one in social practices and social 
systems because of the distribution of resources in society. 
The last level of analysis is called by Giddens 'structuration'. 
'Structuration' represents the general situation, the wider context 
within which the social system exists and, therefore, it is here that the 
continuity-or transformation of a social system can be perceived. It is 
at this level that the conditions which affect the reproduction of a 
social system in terms of continuity or change can be pinpointed. This 
is a useful concept because it allows one to understand the general 
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tendencies of continuity and change. 
These three concepts are relevant for analysing the Camorra: for 
example, the rules and resources, the 'structuring properties', which 
enable and constrain behaviour are violence, poverty and silence. 
Moreover, the distribution, use and manipulation of these rules, 
resources, facilities and skills have made the Camorra a powerful and 
dominating force in Campania and in the world. Lastly, the notion of 
'structuration' can help us understand the Camorra's post-war 
transformation; that is show how it has undergone dramatic change 
and become greatly specialised; so that the Camorra is no longer 
dealing in simple rackets but in recycling money and winning public 
contracts. 
2.4 The Interaction Model ApplIed to the Camorra 
Giddens's structuration theory will be used and adapted to 
illustrate the hypothesis that the Neapolitan Camorra in the 1980s was 
a criminal sub-system (in the form of an association, business and 
cartel) which enacted recurring social-criminal, economic-criminal and 
p olitical- criminal practices whereas in the 1950s, the Camorra wa sa 
loose network of isolated criminal agents, guappi, in the social 
system, who enacted a simple recurring social-criminal practice. 
To do this, certain differences from Giddens's theory need to be 
explained, and the interaction model elaborated. The starting point for 
the model is Giddens's definition and analysis of a 'recurring social 
practice'. This is how, in a key passage, he defines it: "social systems 
involve regularised relations of interdependence between individuals 
or groups, that typically can be best analysed as recurrent social 
practices. Social systems are systems of social interaction; as such 
they involve the situated activities of human subjects, and exist 
syntagmatically in the flow of time. Systems, in this terminology, have 
structures, or more accurately, have structural properties; they are 
not structures in themselves. Structures are necessarily (logically) 
properties of systems, or of collectivities and are characterised by 
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the absence of a subject" (Cassell, 1993: 118-9). Examples of 
srecurring social practices' are "the daily trip to work on the train, the 
general election, the weekly seminar, the perfunctory chat, the football 
fixture and so on Ubid. 9). 
Giddens's theory attempts to understand how theýe social 
practices are developed and reproduced through time and space; he 
does this by analysing the structuration of a social system in terms of 
a social practice; therefore, "to study the structuration of a social 
system is to study the ways in which that system, via the application 
of generative rules and resources, and in the context of unintended 
outcomes is produced and reproduced in interaction" (ibid. 119). The 
key to this structuration theory is the relationship and interaction 
between the "application of generative rules and resources" and the 
agent within the context of intended and unintended outcomes which 
produces and reproduces social practices. 
In our model, rules and resources ('structuring properties') 
constitute our recurring social-criminal practice but at the same time, 
they are the inputs from the macro- environment into the social 
system. This practice forms the criminal sub-system, which is the 
Camorra, and is formed by agents from the social system using their 
rules and resources. Inspired by Easton (196S), our macro- 
environment is made up of different systems. Each system is made up 
of different sub-systems which all enact different 'recurring practices' 
that produce them. Moreover, the recurring social-criminal practice is 
the end-product of the interaction between the agent and the 'general 
structure'. Such practices will be behavioural and decisional 
outcomes. 
The role of 'structure' in our model is also different from 
Giddens's. The 'structure' in our model is a more general notion 
referred to as 'general structure' which only comes into being through 
the agent. The agent, we must remember, is autonomous as s/he has 
the transformative capacity for action. Returning to our notion of 
'general structure, it has a unique characteristic as it is both the 
internalised and acquired elements of the agent (mainly psychological 
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and personal memory traces, education and past experiences up until 
that moment), 'internal structure' and the 'external structure' which is 
the concrete macro- environment, other agents, different systems and 
institutions. The general structure only exits through the agent. Action, 
is, therefore, the interaction between the agent and this 'general 
structure'. In this way, we have sought to emphasise the role of 
macro- environment (external structure) to a larger extent. This 
'general structure' is both visible and invisible and plays a major role 
in influencing and shaping agent behaviour (see Figure 2.3). We also 
use Giddens's notion of structuration in order to understand the 
overall change and modification through time and space. This will be 
investigated in part three. 
Moreover, we must also note that this action does not take place 
in a "context of unintended consequences" but in a mixed context of 
intentional and unintentional consequences where it is possible to 
know the reactions which some acts will provoke, but not possible to 
know the consequence of other acts. For example, a boss might know 
the likely consequences of some important strategic business, 
political and criminal decisions. 
We may note that this kind of approach has already been 
adopted by others who have stressed the role of the agent/structure 
relationship to understand complex situations. Pardo (1996) for 
example, sought to analyse the Neapolitan sub-proletariat, the so- 
called 'popolino', and its economic survival strategy. But, but it has 
been criticised (Behan, 1996) as limiting and narrow because it over- 
stresses the importance of the agent. 
However, this new model stresses the significance of both the 
macro- environment and micro- structures because the notion of 
ggeneral structure' provides us with a more solid framework within 
which to understand the various aspects of the Camorra than if we 
had used a one discipline approach. It enables us to understand: (1) 
why people adopt this practice (their motivations); (2) how it is 
reproduced, how it changes and is transformed; and (3) what elements 
make up this social practice. This new model gives us flexibility and 
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thereby a greater understanding of the agent/structure relationship 
which will hopefully permit us to test our hypothesis and answer our 
questions. 
2.5 Motives for Enactina a 'Social-Criminal Practice' 
Another useful aspect of Giddens's structuration theory is his 
explanation of agent motivation for enacting social practices. This is 
interesting since it facilitates the understanding of the motives behind 
individual agents enacting a recurring social-criminal practice in the 
1950s and in the 1980s. The empirical detail is discussed in part two 
of this thesis. 
I believe that the 'general structure' influences agent motivation in 
the initial phase of action. Unlike Giddens, and as I have already 
contended, the 'general structure' is made up of two spheres, these 
are: (1) the 'internal structure', the agent's past experiences, 
subjectivity or psychological sphere and (2) the 'external structure', 
the collective macro- environment, the sociological sphere. 
Human behaviour, using Giddens's categorisation of action, can 
be split into two forms of behaviour: (1) the agent pre-action, where 
motives can be diagnosed; and (2) the agent in action. We are 
interested in the agent as s/he is about to undertake action and the 
motives for this; this is pre-action or in our model, the initial phase of 
action when motives are also produced. This we have modified from 
Giddens's theory. Giddens presents and analyses the agent in terms 
of his psyche, that is to say the internal functioning of his brain which 
produces his/her way of thinking and behaving. He elaborates a 
picture of the agent's psyche, distinguishing three different sub-levels 
of pre-action as the agent goes into action; in the initial phase of 
action: at level (1) the unconscious motives; at level (2) the practical 
consciousness; and at level (3) the discursive consciousness. The 
latter two are flexible and can influence each other, but there exists a 
clearer barrier between these forms of consciousness and the 
unconscious motives. 
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The first level of the motivation is the 'unconscious motives'. The 
'unconscious' is an abstract concept found in psychology that was 
originally researched by Freud who analysed certain aspects of human 
behaviour which could not be directly and visibly explained. He carried 
out important tests on individuals to show that when they were, for 
example, daydreaming, sleeping, forgetting things, or mispronouncing 
a word, this could not be explained by anything else but the 
unconscious. The unconscious, is, thus, "the part of the psychic 
apparatus that does not ordinarily enter the individual's awareness 
and that is manifested especially by slips of the tongue or dissociated 
acts or in dreams" (the Webster, 1991: 1285). It is a system within 
individuals which "may affect [their] behaviour even though [they] 
cannot report on them" or "are unaware of them" (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 1975: 254). 
It is assumed that the unconscious retains a lot of different 
information (or example, details, historical facts and memories) which 
may manifest itself through different forms of behaviour but which 
the individual will not be able to explain rationally. For example, an 
individual may go to the bank instead of the post office, as planned, 
(an acte manqui) because he wants some money and not to send his 
letter. 
In Giddens's theory the 'unconscious' refers to motives which are 
"within an individual that proceed without his awareness" (the Webster, 
1991: 128S) or his possible rational explanation; they are thus feelings 
and desires that the individual cannot explain or express. They can be 
very complex or very vague which means that we must be very careful 
when trying to pinpoint unconscious motives as we can be criticised 
for inventing what we want or read the meanings we want to into 
certain forms of behaviour. The particular types of unconscious 
motives could be, for example: the influence of the environment, the 
desire for survival, a violent temperament or weak personality. 
The second and third levels are practical and discursive 
consciousness. By consciousness, we understand "the quality [ ... 
I of 
being aware especially something within oneself" (the Webster, 
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1991: 279). Practical consciousness is complex to define as it is not 
what an individual says about but what s/he does practically. 
Therefore, it is a level of action which is simply enacted without being 
explained. It is more complicated to define and give examples of 
discursive consciousness (see Figure 2.4). 
Unconscious motives 
Discursive 
consciousness 
Th 
Practical consciousness 
Discursive consciousness is what an individual can say, what he 
can talk about, what can be said. For example, individuals can talk 
about their feelings of hatred towards a person, a feeling of vendetta 
or the sense of loss after the death of someone. It is important to 
note that discursive consciousness is closely connected with an 
individual's culture. In the case of the Camorra, its sub-culture draws 
heavily on Neapolitan culture but represents a distortion of it. As 
Judge Falcone has argued there exists no straightforward criminal 
organisation, but a general "ideology" which, has many elements in 
common with the rest of civil society (1992; 1993) but is a clear 
distortion of it. Siebert reinforces this when she argues that organised 
crime gangs have "a mechanism of appropriation, perversion and 
manipulation ( ... ) [of] popular cultural codes" (1996: 38). 
Practical consciousness will reflect certain implicit cultural values 
which are difficult to articulate, whereas discursive consciousness will 
reflect to a greater extent the dominant cultural values that 
individuals explicitly respect such as hate, love, the family, loyalty, 
revenge, etc. For example, at times killing an individual is an act which 
is committed without discussion. 
Giddens's notions of practical and discursive consciousness are 
distinct but useful as in the case of the Camorra, whose members live 
and work in a world of omend and secrecy, and cannot openly talk 
about their social-criminal practice. Oniertil and secrecy (not 
verbalising their social-criminal practice) is part of the Camorra's 
survival strategy which needs to be perpetuated among members if 
the Camorra is to persist and prosper. 
It would seem that practical consciousness can at times 
transform itself into discursive consciousness when camorristi turn 
state-witness, pentito and develop a coherent relationship with their 
criminal past. This obliges them to articulate publicly discursive 
consciousness. Much more information is available on their discursive 
consciousness than on the other two forms of consciousness 
because a lot of the material that will be used in this thesis comes 
from oral interrogations of state witnesses who have thought about 
their situation and tried to explain it. Practical consciousness Will be 
explored both through oral testimonies during trials and an analysis of 
behaviour described in newspaper articles and legal documents. 
In Chapter Five, these two different levels of the agent's psyche 
are analysed to highlight the internal structure in the initial phase of 
action which explains agent motivation. To do this we use trial 
transcripts and interrogations to examine both discursive and 
practical consciousness to understand agents' motives and potential 
for action. Discursive consciousness is what they clearly say whereas 
practical consciousness will be the acts that they describe. For 
example, when they do not ansiyer the question directly but describe 
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the situation, this will be taken as practical consciousness. For 
obvious reasons, unconscious motivations cannot be studied. It 
should be noted that these possible explanations are not exclusive, 
but inclusive, which is to say that possible motives may overlap and 
there may not be only one motive but many emerging from the 
different levels of the agent's psyche as well as the external structure. 
Chapter Six examines the weight of the macro-environment and in 
particular, the milieu within which the agent's motives are produced. 
This is the aspect of Giddens's theory which we have modified. The 
agent in our analysis does not move, live or become motivated in a 
vacuum but in a specific macro-structure which is important for us to 
study, in this case Neapolitan society in the 1950s and 1980s. Giddens 
pinpoints three different aspects of the agent's relationship with the 
macro-environment, which we will elaborate and adapt: (1) the agent 
has 'knowledge' (both practical and discursive) of institutional 
practices); (2) the agent is one among others in society; and (3) the 
parameters of practical and discursive consciousness are bounded 
by and connected to agents' activities. Thus, the agent interýcts with 
the context. These three aspects, especially the context, are just as 
important as the agent and as each other. However, in this thesis, the 
focus is on two areas of the macro-environment (external structure): 
(1) the general context which includes other systems and sub-systems 
(made up of agents, practices, history, ideologies etc); and (2) the 
institutional practices present in the different systems that function in 
society. 
The general context which surrounds agents has a huge impact 
on their behaviour. By the context, we mean that which is part of the 
social, economic and political systems that lie outside the boundaries 
of our criminal sub-system, the Camorra and yet that which is within 
the same society and influences the Camorra. Easton calls this the 
'intrasocietal' part of the environment. Indeed, the interaction between 
the agent and society plays a significant role in explaining motives. It 
is important to stress that the agent is completely aware of his/her 
surroundings and knows them well. Furthermore, all actors have some 
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understanding of the rules of society, the power games and 
relationships that exist. Moreover, not only do they co-habit with other 
agents in society, but they also have knowledge of their history and 
time, and know more than just their day-to-day activities. In this sense, 
they are very knowledgeable. 
The general context in our analysis is organised as the properties 
of the different systems. By properties, we mean the diverse elements 
which make up the different systems and interactions which exist in 
society. For our analysis, it is the general context with all its 
properties within which the agent moves. This is fundamental to the 
whole theory and here is taken to include the general social, economic 
and political systems of society and their sub-systems. More 
specifically, the general properties of the context are the social, 
economic and political systems of Naples in 1950s and 1980s. This is 
different from the dominant institutional practices because it is the 
overall framework within which agents and institutions operate. 
In addition, agents are also aware of the key institutional 
practices which surround them because they have "knowledge", built 
upon their discursive and practical consciousness which means that 
they have a very good understanding of the different institutional 
practices. Society in our model is made up of different systems which 
contain institutions. Therefore, institutional practices are the other 
element which we believe have a role in the agents's motives and 
action: the agent is conscious and knows his/her surroundings well: 
s/he understands the functioning of institutional practices, their 
implications and can be influenced by them. 
By institutional practices, we mean a set of social practices which 
over time have become institutionalised within their different systems, 
that is to say, as that which "includes both formal organisations and 
informal rules and procedures that structure conduct" (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992: 3). We may note that institutional practices have a 
varying impact on different individuals, therefore, not all institutional 
practices will be relevant for all agents. In our case, the predominant 
institutional practices present in the different systems are the state 
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from the political system and the family and the Camorra from the 
social system. By the 1980s, we can see the Camorra acting as a 
social institution and having the same kind of impact as the family. We 
believe that these are important and influential institutional practices 
that can constrain agent motivation. 
In conclusion, this discussion has allowed us to understand and 
explain the agent motivation aspect of our model. We have seen how 
the agent interacts with the 'general structure' (both internal and 
external 'structure' made up of criminal values and the macro- 
environment) which influences possible motives for joining the 
Camorra (see Figure 2.5). In Chapters Five and Six, we apply this model 
and look at the possible motives for becoming a camorrista in the 
1950s and 1980s. 
2.6 The Camorra's Interaction with Politics 
Part three tackles the question of the Camorra's relationship with 
the political elite in the 1950s and 1980s to see whether these 
relationships have changed in any way. To examine these different 
relationships, the interaction model is extended by the application of 
systems analysis. This should allow us to move beyond the social sub- 
system. 
We are no longer dealing with the agent's interaction with the 
social system or other criminal agents from the criminal sub-system 
to produce a 'recurring' social-criminal practice, but with the 
interaction of agents' within and across different sub-systems: mainly 
the political and the economic systems. These systems are similar to 
the social system in so far as they comprise different recurring 
practices and sub-systems as explained in the previous sections. 
In theoretical terms, we wish to understand the nature of the 
relationship across systems and the type of exchanges which took 
place. In our model the ýamorra's relationship with the political elite is 
what we call 'systems interaction': in other words, the interaction 
between a representative of a criminal sub-system, a camor7lsta and a 
37 
FiLruxe 2.5: Our Explanation of Agent Motivation 
A j, ý j, -, I (x c 4; ov, 
Unconscious motives 
Political 
Discursive System 
........ 
Conscioun3ness AML 
=iri 
El 
Qp Agent 
Practical 
Consciousness I 
Ah 
w 
rr--r" qp 
El. 
LA 
Economic 
Social System system 
__j L Macro-Environment 
L(2ty; 
other agents Systems 
Institutional 
practices 
38 
politician from a political sub-system (see Figure P. 1). This relationship 
changes as the systems themselves change and this is what we are 
interested in understanding. 
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Chavter Three: 
Data and Method 
"Les faits sociaux consistent en repr6sentations" mais 
"il faut traiter les faits sociaux comme des choses" 
Durkheim (189S in Combessie, 199G: 3) 
3.1 Methodological Ouestions 
The majority of studies which deal with organised crime and the 
Mafia have been carried out by anthropologists and sociologists who 
have sought to understand these phenomena as social and cultural 
problems. In these studies, they encountered key social research 
problems such as accessibility to material, representativity and bias. 
Although this study will concentrate on the political perspective, some 
of these sociological problems are also relevant. 
Researchers who have undertaken this type of investigation (see 
lanni and Reuss lanni, 1972; Kelly, 1982; Reuter, 1984) have noted 
important methodological difficulties, and in particular that of access 
to material because of the secrecy cultivated by such organisations. 
This creates a dual problem: firstly, information on members, their 
activities and infiltration into markets is protected by magistrates 
who are reluctant to furnish material; secondly, the other major 
sources tend to be official government documents which usually have 
a political bias. 
Kelly notes that "technical advances in the study of organised 
crime have progressed. Innovations and sophisticated research 
techniques such as network analysis, computer simulations and 
application of macroeconomic models of illegal market dynamics, 
among others have appeared to augment rather than replace more 
traditional treatment based on law enforcement pictures of organised 
crime" (1982/6b: 10). Gambetta cautions that: "it is difficult to 
approach the best direct sources or to gain access to the most 
interesting areas of inquiry. This is one of the reasons why virtually no 
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study of the mafia is based on field work" (1993: 9). Hence, the most 
traditional research technique used by anthropologists to study 
organised crime is the participant observation method, even if it is 
considered dangerous. 
In general terms, the success of anthropological studies would 
seem to be based largely on chance. While lanni (1972) and Kelly (1982) 
encountered difficulties integrating into their targeted community, W. 
Foote Whyte (1981) managed to overcome his moral dilemmas (see 
his annex 1) to produce a classic and unique example of a successful 
participant observation study of the political machine in the Italian 
slums of Boston in the late 1930s. Blok (1974) also managed to live in 
a rural Sicilian village for about two and half years for his study. 
However, it would appear that Reuter (1984) changed the nature 
of his study in anticipation of methodological problems. Indeed, he 
chose not to focus on a group or its activities but rather on their 
potential market which he argues would be more stable over the long 
term. He points out the three main difficulties he encountered: in the 
first place, contact with individuals who are members of criminal 
clans. He insists that it depends on pure chance or opportunity to 
make that initial contact with a clan member and then be able to build 
upon it. In the second place, the need for more information than the 
participants can provide. Clearly, it is very dangerous for a member of 
a clan to give detailed information about its illegal activities and its 
contacts with politicians. Finally, his greatest difficulty concerned the 
representativity of the group. He was aware of the possible instability 
and unrepresentativity of the group he wished to study. Consequently, 
he decided to study an illegal market believing that it would be less 
challenging in terms of accessibility, representativity and personal 
safety. 
In this analysis of the Camorra in the 1950s and 1980s, the main 
problems have also been of access to material, representativity and 
bias. In this respect, we have been rather fortunate in meeting Public 
Prosecutors who were keen to distribute as much material as possible 
about this form of organised crime in order to combat the omerni 
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which surrounds it. As a result of this good contact with the legal 
community in Naples, I have had access to good primary sources on 
the 1980s: four in-depth interviews with pentitill, official testimonies 
(verbali12), trial transcripts, judgments (sentenze) and other legal and 
police documents. This was helpful because, as Hufton stresses, "to 
read and interpret a text like a lawsuit or a set of memoirs can shed 
immense light on how ideas [ ... J influenced an individual life or a 
particular event in the field of micro-history" (1997: 4). 
I have also visited the Naples Courthouse many times during my 
research visits to attend trials, to observe the proceedings, the 
pentiti, the prisoners and their families. For material on the 1950s, I 
have consulted both the Naples Courthouse archive13 and I'Emeroteca, 
the Newspaper and Periodical Library. 14 Moreover, we have used in- 
depth interviews with judges, public prosecutors, politicians, 
journalists, privileged and personal observerss and consulted daily 
newspapers and the National Library. We were also fortunateIG that 
the Parliamentary Antimafta Committee and Parliamentary Archive were 
very efficient in their distribution of material. 
Representativity and bias are problematic. Representativity 
because it is generally difficult to have access to criminals, let alone a 
good sample. I have interviewed in-depth four ex-carhorristi and feel 
that this has given me a good insight into their criminal visions and 
culture. Bias is also a problem because there are two opposite views: 
the criminal's vision and that of the magistrates who Pursue the 
11 See bibliography. 
12 Verbali are of particular interest in so far as they are the documents in which 
pentiti tell their detailed criminal life story, confess their crimes and reveal their 
clan's intimate relationships with the political and business world (see the 
importance of the Sicilian Mafia state witness Tommaso Buscetta in the early 
1980s). It is these documents which will allow us to produce a fuller picture of 
the Camorra, its behaviour and structures. 
13 Access to this State archive required a long and very bureaucratic process which 
I managed to overcome. 
14 Access to 1930s newspapers was also difficult because one could only consult 
2 months of newspapers in a visit (between 15.00-18.00 hrs) that required an 
official letter explaining the newspapers required. Spontaneous research and 
requesting a different newspaper was thus limited. 
IS See bibliography. 
16 1 have also been very fortunate to have had access to the personal archive of 
Vito Faenza, Naples correspondent of L'UnitA. 
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official government line. Monzini points out the possible limitations of 
using judicial material (1999: 28-9). However, even in the official 
documents the criminal's view point tends to appear clearly and can 
be juxtaposed with further evidence, such as in-depth interviews, as 
we have done, to produce a full and balanced picture of the situation. 
Not only is collecting material problematic but so is the analysing 
and studying of this form of criminal activity. Indeed, one has to ask 
oneself which is the best way to tackle this delicate subject-matter 
and to maximise the analytical output from the material available. 
Sutherland and Cressey (1960) suggest that there are two main ways 
of doing this: (1) the general method; and (2) the detailed method. 
The first method seeks to gain a general picture from collecting 
and studying significant data from a set group. This method, used by 
historians and social scientists, tends however, to be "impressionistic 
and deal with general tendencies rather than with specific 
interpretations" (1960: 62). The second method is one which 
concentrates on studying systematically statistics of crimes and 
convicts. It tends to be "'more precise' and 'scientific' than the first; it 
deals with specific variables and, usually, specific types of criminal 
behaviour" (1960: 62-3). However, this method has the limitation of 
being narrowly quantitative and not qualitative, therefore helps us to 
understand who the criminals are, but not why they are criminals. 
Choosing the most suitable method for studying and analysing 
crime is, at best, a difficult methodological task. In order to decide, it 
is necessary to consider the material available; the main objective of 
our study (the Camorra in the 1950s and the 1980s and its relationship 
with politics); and our interaction model (which stresses the agent- 
structure dimension). 
With this in mind, the method adopted will be that which 
Sunderland and Cressey (1960) highlight as producing an overall vision 
of behaviour: the "case-studies method" is the main instrument of 
research17 complemented by two other methods: statistical data to 
17 1 would like to thank Prof LeHo Mezzacane, Professor of Anthropology at Naples 
University for this suggestion and a general discussion about methods and 
approaches towards organised crime (meeting on 3 January 1997). 
43 
back-up explanations where poSSjble18 and interviews (on family, work 
values and attitudes towards politics) to confirm impressions already 
derived from anthropological studies (for example, Parsons (1969), 
Belmonte (1979) and Goddard (1996)). 
Sunderland and Cressey explained of the case-study approach: 
the method involves case studies, directed by explicit 
hypotheses, of rigorously defined categories of behaviour 
It combines the individual case-study method and the method 
of statistical examination of traits of criminals, for it 
examines individual cases of criminality in the light of a 
hypothesis and then, for purposes of proof, attempts to 
determine whether or not that hypothesis also pertains to 
cases of non-criminality. At the same time, however, it differs 
from either of these methods: it does not attempt to secure 
a general picture of the person but only such facts as bear 
on the hypothesis, and it attempts to go beyond statistical 
tendencies to a theoretical explanation" (1960: 68-9). 
Nonetheless, the method has been criticised for not concentrating 
enough on causal explanations of behaviour, an aspect which needs 
to be borne in mind. We could also be criticised for, and accused of, 
looking only at micro-behaviour and not explaining the macro and 
collective behaviour of the Camorra. This criticism is considered 
below in 3.3. 
3.2 Using Case-Studies: "the Biographical Tale" 
There are many different types of case-study which can be used 
as Lijphart's classification (1971) demonstrates: atheoretical case- 
studies; interpretative case-studies; hypothesis-generating case- 
studies; theory- confirming case-studies; theory-infirming case-studies 
and deviant case-studies. Most relevant to this thesis is the "theory- 
confirming case-study" because "the case-study is a test of the 
proposition, which may turn out to be confirmed or infirmed" 
(1971: 692), so we will test the theory that the Camorra in the 1950s 
consisted of relatively isolated criminals undertaking a social-criminal 
18 In particular in relation to socioeconomic factors like age, education or crime 
statistics like murder-rates. 
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practice, whereas by the 1980s it had become an association, 
business or cartel which enacted a recurring social, economic, and 
political-criminal practice and which had a functional exchange with 
politicians. The use of case-studies will either confirm or infirm this 
hypothesis. Thus, we have endeavoured to avoid choosing case- 
studies simply to confirm our hypotheses because this would make 
our case-studies "one shot case-studies" which are of almost no 
scientific value. 
The use of case-studies of camorristi as a research tool is an 
important step forward as it makes the complex, ever-changing and 
multi-faceted phenomenon of the Camorra manageable. Based mainly 
on oral material, the case-studies are the life stories (Marcus, 1995) of 
camorristi. They combine the 'biographical method' (la nigthode 
biographique) with 'the biographical approach' (I'approche 
biographique) (Peneff, 1995): these incorporate both precise personal 
facts (background, education, job, marriage, etc) and the subject's 
emotions, values, and opinions about life. 
In this way, we are 'letting the agent back in' in order to gain a 
fuller and more balanced vision of the Camorra and its relations with 
politics, as Preston did to understand the Spanish Civil war, its 
"calamitous process of the breakdown of peace, the course of the 
war, and its appalling consequences" (1999: 5). Landesco (1968) also 
used this method with success in his chapter 'The Gangster's apologia 
pro vita sua': thus, we understand the gangster (his values, motives, 
education) in the context of his macro-environment. These combined 
approaches should allow us to explain many aspects of the Camorras. 
In Part Two, we study the lives and backgrounds of specific 
camorristi because we wish to understand their motives for becoming 
involved with the Camorra. These case-studies are elaborated on the 
basis of oral interrogations of camorTisti where they explain their lives 
and motives, their responses to the ques tions of judges who ask 
them to explain their motives and life stories, and a variety of 
newspapers and court documents. The oral material is analysed in a 
retrospective mode considering the camorristi's criminal life as a life in 
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the past, a closed life from which we can understand their motives, 
value systems and life stories. Here, we have used as many case- 
studies as possible to generate some general findings. Obviously, 
more material was available for the 1980s than the 1950s. 19 But, the 
general findings of this thesis are confirmed by other studies. 
For Part Three, which tackles the transformation of the Camorra 
in the post-war period, we concentrate on the life stories of camorristi 
because 
biographic history, above all, allows us to highlight the 
dgenerational' aspects of the development of the 'mafioso', 
his life experience within a specific culture, which also takes 
place within his family and which allows him to have 
relationships and behave in a certain way expressing values, 
traditions, customs, language and memories. [ ... I In this sense 
the biography runs along the spatio-temporal axis of a more 
complex reality which isn't the reality of the single individual. 
Indeed, the individual's history can always be identified in 
terms of collective history in the sense that an individual 
episode is also social and can therefore be conceived in 
terms of its continuous interaction with all that expresses it, 
over and above the simple event (Casarrubea and Blandano, 
1991: 54-55). 
We have chosen specific camor? lsti because of the significant role 
they played in the Camorra but also because they represent different 
zones, grades and affiliations. Each camor? lsta here encapsulates 
some characteristic of their Camorra and is representative of many 
camorristL Thus, the choice was not arbitrary. We looked at their 
adolescence, their social background, their first criminal and prison 
experience, their joining the clan, their different roles and activities 
undertaken in the clan and their relations with politicians. By studying 
these different lives, it is hoped to provide a different perspective 
and insight on the Camorra's transformation in terms of social, 
economic and political activities: "When seen from this perspective, 
we can treat the biographies as a useful starting point in that they 
illustrate the transition from rural society to a technically orientated 
industrial society. I have argued that when seen through the 
19 See Appendix Two. 
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biographies this transition was no longer a mere abstract concept or 
a purely analytical term, but rather, so to speak, a term which was 
personified and embodied by 'specific types' from which the 
biographical elements provided specific sociological subject matter. 
This subject matter was provided by the biographies which I consider 
to be illustrative" (Ferrarotti, '1981: 28). The lives recounted here are 
used to relate their personal experience to the collective Camorra 
experience and its transformation, or to use Le Goff's words "we 
must use biographies as [ ... ]a globalising object" (Libiration, 7-11- 
99: IX) which enables us to illustrate aspects of the Neapolitan 
Camorra on the basis of a single subject of study. In part four, we 
concentrate less on life stories of individuals than on case-studies of 
political events and elections, in other words, concrete examples of 
the Camorra's exchange with politics in the 1950s and 1980s. 
All the case-studies used in this thesis, like that of Jacquemet's, 
are "a personal collage and patchwork" (1996: 66) which will vary 
according to the importance of the criminal in the clan and material 
available: some case-studies are very detailed from adolescence while 
others are more sketchy. As he warns there must be "a great deal of 
latitude allowed in the reconstruction of hagiographies" (ibid). 
3.3 Methodological Problems and Limitations of Material 
As has already been mentioned, the material and method 
adopted do pose some serious methodological problems. Three are 
of particular note: (1) the potential for subjective interpretation; (2) 
the reliability, bias and credibility of the sources; and (3) the 
representativity of the material/s ample. 
First, how far can the researcher remain objective and not feel 
sympathy for these case-studies? There is no doubt that during this 
study there have been moments when the criminal agent became a 
friendlier and more positive agent that he probably should have been. 
But, an effort has been made to use as many sources as possible to 
present each case-study with a balanced vision, to find the golden 
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mean between the "insensitivity, of treating people as objects, of 
hearing words but not the music [ ... I" and the "impressionism, of 
treating people as puppets, of hearing music that does not exist 
(Geertz, 1989: 10). 
Another serious problem is the reliability, bias and credibility of 
the main source: the interrogations of pentiti during the investigative 
phase and trials. For example, how far do pentiti tell the truth, rewrite 
history or wrongly accuse other camorristi? How far are they 
manipulated by public prosecutors to say what they want them to 
say? For instance, in one case, a camorKsta, (Domenico Cuomo), 
accuses another camorrista (Luigi Moccia) who answers by stating that 
he has never met his accuser (CD'Al7p). Who are we to believe? 
In this respect, Allum (1997b) has pinpointed three of the 
problems which pentiti present us and the Italian legal system: first, 
pentiti tend to talk about episodes of which they have no direct 
knowledge, that is, it is only second hand knowledge from other 
criminals; second, many pentit4 who are only soldiers, are told all the 
information by the leaders, thus, they tend to reduce facts and events 
according to their cultural codes. Lastly, and more damagingly, some 
mafiosi like Giovanni Brusca have started to invent stories and wrongly 
accuse politicians (Lodato, 1999). They thus manipulate the situation 
and at the same time lose credibility. This threatens the generality of 
the research findings. But we must also remember the words of one 
pentito and important witness to certain events, Mannoia, who during 
the Andreotti trial in 1996 when asked whether he had the monopoly 
of the truth, answered "no, sir, I do not claim to have a monopoly of 
the truth. I know that I have a monopoly of knowledge (in Allum 
1997b: 232). 
These are significant problems which could damage the 
conclusions of this research but I have sought to overcome them by 
using pentiti material as a starting point on which I built with 
newspaper articles, in-depth interviews, and statistical data. I have 
also used judgments to act as a filter to what has been said and 
confirm or reject the information. This applies particularly to Part 
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Four. As far as the pentiti's own personal stories are concerned, there 
is no real reason to question their values, emotions and interpretation 
because it is their direct experiences they are verbalising. In some 
instances, they may exaggerate slightly when they recount heroic 
episodes but it is their direct experience and visions which we are 
interested in, however distorted and exaggerated. 
Gribaudi and Musella (1997) have raised another question 
regarding pentiti material and the Gava trial (see Chapters Eleven and 
Twelve): they argue that judges set up an explanatory framework for 
understanding the links between the Camorra and politics before they 
had the instruments and pentiti to prove that this intricate relationship 
actually existed. This objection is refuted if only because judges had 
many other sources of evidence: for example, many politicians have 
confirmed these episodes; moreover, concrete evidence such as 
election results sometimes come into play as corroboration. 
The representativity and sample of the case-studies which have 
been used is also a potential problem. How can we be sure that the 
camorristi who were chosen are representative of a group of 
criminals? In Parts Two and Three, we have sought to use as many 
criminals as possible to confirm the 'interaction model'. There are 15 
case-studies of the 1950s and 40 of the 1980s. In section three, the 
same number were chosen from each clan with a representative from 
each rank and zone. 
3.4 General Conclusion 
These three chapters have explained the theoretical model on 
which this thesis is based, the interaction model. We have explained 
why and how this model is applied to case-studies to analyse the 
motives for joining the Camorra in the 1950s and 1980s, its post-war 
transformation and relationship with politics. We also discussed the 
methodological problems we encountered. Having established the 
theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis, we now turn 
to a description of the general macro-environment of Campania to 
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provide a general background to our study before we deal with our 
first area of interest, motives for joining the Camorra in the 1930s and 
1980s in Chapter Five. 
so 
PART TWO: MOTTVES FOR CAMORRA MIMMERSHIP 
IN Mý 1950s AND THE 1980s 
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Chavter Four 
The Macro-Envirotument: the Place. Identity and Territory 
"Despite these contradictions, in spite of disintegration, Neapolitan 
society appears to have changed little over the centuries, because 
its continuity is founded on the very instability of its component 
parts, on a sort of balance between unstable components" 
Allum (1973a: 19) 
4.1 Introduction 
In his analysis of a district in Naples, where he seeks to 
understand the relationship between social morality, individual 
choice and action, Pardo stresses that "if micro-level evidence 
is to have theoretical value, more than simply being detailed 
and accurate, it must be set in the broader historical and 
sociological context" (1997: 3). It is clear that to have a full 
understanding of why people join the Camorra, its structure 
and activities, the macro-environment in which it developed 
must be analysed in broad historical and geo-sociological 
terms: the place, territory and identity. With towns such as 
Naples and Caserta and their hinterland (the whole of 
Campania) - which have become the Camorra's stronghold 
from the 1970s onwards (see Map 2) - the general macro- 
environment has to be assessed, but this is not such a 
straightforward task. As Sales insisted: "it has rightly been said 
that it is not the Camorra which explains Naples; if anything, it 
is Naples and the Campania's recent history which explain the 
Camorra"(1993a: 3). 
To understand the Neapolitan macro-environment and 
its main structural aspects Easton's systems analysis (1965) 
was adopted. Three key systems, which make up the 
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Neapolitan macro-environment, were identified as relevant to 
the present enquiry: the social system, the economic system 
and the political system. This chapter thus discusses the main 
structural aspects of Neapolitan society, economy and politics 
as a general background for this study. 
In this process, this chapter constructs also an overall 
sense of NapoletanMA; in other words, clarifies what it means 
to "rare i napoletani", 'to be Neapolitan' (Golino, 1986: 7) and 
provides a background to the analysis of the development of 
organised crime in the region using as wide a range of 
reference books as possible. 1 
4.2 The Contradictions of the Ecolojdca Social and 
Economic Systems. 
As many studies have shown (Parsons, 1969, Allum, 
1973a, Belmonte, 1979, Goddard, 1996, Pardo, 1996), the 
Campania region has been beset by a number of 
contradictions in the post-war period. Geographically, it has 
barren mountains (the Matese) with a dying pastoral economy 
and the most fertile plains (Campania felix) with intensive 
market-gardening and horticulture (tomatoes, citrus fruit, 
vineyards and fruit trees) (see map 3). It is, agriculturally, the 
most productive region of Italy and yet in the 1950s, its 
peasantry remained chronically poor because of the extreme 
fragmentation of the land and the high proportion of landless 
labourers and tenant-farmers subjected to iniquitous lease- 
arrangements. Moreover, they have often had to cope with the 
difficulties and burden of large-family responsibilities. Far from 
the idyllic images of the Neapolitan family banqueting in bucolic 
circumstances, they lived in very basic stark conditions, often 
1 Parsons, 1969; Allum, 1973a; Belmonte, 1979; Goddard, 1996, Pardo, 1996 
as well as statistics and interviews. 
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Map 3: Campania and its Geography 
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locked into a master/servant relationship with their landlords. 
And even when they owned their land, small farmers were 
vulnerable, at the mercy of the weather and of market-prices 
and prey to middlemen and racketeers for the sale of their 
produce. 
As a result, there has been, from the 1950s onwards, a 
clear population movement from the mountains and the 
countryside to Naples, to the province capitals of Caserta and 
Salerno, and to the coastal towns of Torre Annunziata, 
Castellammare di Stabia or Torre del Greco, which have 
become densely and often over-populated areas. Naples, for 
instance, houses over half of the population of its province 
and experienced a population growth of 5% between 1951 and 
1991.2 This important demographic growth created a problem 
for the economy as employment in the region could not keep 
pace with the increase in population, thus exacerbating an 
already serious unemployment problem. 
Industrially, another contradiction must be noted in the 
immediate post-war period period: on the one hand, there 
were a few large modern industrial plants, employing highly 
paid workers (Italsider, Societi) Merldionale d'eletriciftl) while on 
the other, there remained a large number of small artisanal 
family workshops employing many (underpaid) relatives and 
feeding even more. Again, the same fragmentation in this small 
type of industry and the same vulnerability has been found as 
in the agricultural sector. 
However, the major feature of the Neapolitan economy 
since the 1950s is the e3dstence of a large stratum of 'officially' 
unemployed people, most of them unskilled workers, who have 
2 Even so, population growth has not been as important as that of other 
big Italian industrial cities (Turin, Wan and Rome). Indeed, during the 
1930s and 1960s, Neapolitans emigrated to the industrial North and abroad 
and in the 1980s, the immigrants from the hinterland and mountainous 
areas only came to Naples as 'a temporary destination' before moving on 
to the North (Montroni, 1990). 
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to moonlight to survive, in what has been called by Allum, "the 
slum economy" (1973a: 40). Borelli argues that this was due to 
the fact that Naples changed too rapidly from being a 
preindustrial to an industrial city in the first half of the century, 
some socioeconomic features of the preindustrial era 
persisting, while others were transformed and modernised. 
"Changes are taking place which are pushing the sub- 
proletariat into a worse position than before the breaking up 
of the traditional forms of subsistence, with the consequent 
incapacity to take part in the economic life of the city" 
(1972: 18). 
The changing nature of goods and types of exchanges 
did not change attitudes and behaviour greatly in the 1960s, 
apart from the fact that they could no longer guarantee 
survival. Therefore, an 'immersed or black economy, 'the slum 
econoMy'3 persisted among "all these unskilled, unregimented 
and endlessly resourceful masses, labouring here one day and 
there another, idle and then not idle, starving and not starving 
and alternating always between today's life and tomorrow's 
despair (Belmonte, 1979: 139-40). It is this stratum of the 
population which, finding itself economically marginalised, was 
likely to respond to offers from that local 'work agency', the 
Camorra. As Lamberti has pointed out, "officially, in the South, 
there are hundreds of thousands unemployed. In reality, there 
are hundreds of thousands underemployed or employed in the 
black or criminal market" (1999: 29). 
All these contradictions concurred to create a situation 
of precariousness and fragmentation, of vulnerability, 
marginalisation and poverty among the larger part of the 
population in the post-war period and yet, the last but not 
least of contradictions, Neapolitans have always had a wealth 
3 For a description of the slum economy in the 1950s, see Allum (1973a: 
40-1). 
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of liveliness and creativity and a very strong sense of 
historically derived identity. 
4.3 Historical Heritage and Culture. 
Giuseppe Galasso has written: "overall, no former Italian 
capital (apart maybe from Palermo and in some respects 
Venice) feels so much the weight of its political and social past 
as Naples (1987: 3d-xii). In a similar vein, Belmonte says: "the 
poor boys of Naples are the living symbols of its history and 
the carriers of its tradition, much as altar boys mediate the 
flow of grace from deity to worshipper" (1979: 6). Indeed, the 
history of Naples and its region is that of the large capital of 
the Bourbon kingdom of the two Sicilies and its hinterland. It 
has shaped the topographical and architectural appearance of 
the town, with its wealth of palaces, villas and monuments but, 
above all, it has shaped the attitudes and beliefs of all 
Neapolitans, popolino and bourgeois alike. 
Many historians attribute the Neapolitans' hostility 
towards the Italian State and Rome to the bitterness they 
experienced after losing their status at the time of Unification 
(1861). "The decay of Naples, after Unification, was due", 
Barbagallo noted, "essentially to its loss of identity as a capital 
and to its incapacity to forge for itself a new identity as a 
bourgeois city characterised by industry and trade, to 
transform itself into a modern urban centre, capable of taking 
an active and leading role in the development of the region" 
(1990b: 218). This could also explain the predominant feeling of 
alienation from central government and the lack of trust in its 
slow, inefficient and bureaucratic agencies which encouraged 
the recourse to aggressive survival strategies, T arte dell' 
arrangiarsi'(the art of making do), based on personal wits and 
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resources, rather than participation, regulated collective and 
public organisations. In the 1970s, sport and leisure clubs, 
community centres or political associations did not manage to 
recruit many members and when they did, they never really 
succeeded in mustering up much enthusiasm. Indeed, this lack 
of 'associational spirit' was shared by many Southerners and 
can be explained by the lack of education, of information, of 
free time, and too much physical hard work and moonlighting 
usually undertaken to survive. 
In this turning away from the collective public sphere, 
individuals exhibit "inner strength, determination and quickness 
of mind (that rejects ruthlessness)" (Pardo, 1996: 64), 
continuously negotiating the boundaries between individual 
freedom and collective discipline. This vital energy is 
accompanied, in a somewhat contradictory way, by a negative 
and pessimistic vision of the world. Combined with a sense of 
individual powerlessness in the social system, it creates a very 
strong sense of 'private collectivity' which Brandon-Albini 
defined as "the solidarity between poor [which] comes from 
the awareness of their weakness and from their need to help 
each other" (1963: 40). This sense of 'private collectivity' was 
present throughout the period under consideration. However, 
one could argue that from the 1980s onwards, there were signs 
of change with the general increase of many voluntary 
associations, community centres and sport clubs due to the 
rise in education, information, etc (see Diamanti, Ramella and 
Trigilia, 1995). 
This intimate 'private collectivity' generated its own kind 
of social interaction; in particular, the well-known street 
conviviality of Neapolitans. The streets become a very lively 
and theatrical place, full of conversations and story telling. 
Brandon-Albini observed this conviviality and noted: "in the 
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evening, the families chat in the vicolo, on the piazza, with the 
next door neighbour, With those across the road, in an 
atmosphere of trust, gossip, melancholy, cheerful naivete and 
secrecy [ ... 1" (1963: 35). In contrast to the chaotic public sphere, 
the private sphere is highly structured around the family. The 
philosopher Norberto Bobbio recently insisted on the 
differences between public and private spheres: "for the 
family, you give a lot of your time, energy and courage and little 
is left for society and the State" (in L'Europeo of 28 December 
1998, n 52: 107). Although the extended family has evolved in 
postwar Campania towards a more nuclear structure the 
traditional form of familism has nevertheless survived or even, 
as Ginsborg has argued, prospered (1998: 187). 
During the post-war period, the family remained the key 
structure in the private sphere: it ordered and regulated all 
activities, provided safety and psychological support (Drago, 
1971; Lay, 1981), a wide range of social skills and opportunities 
(Brancaccio, 1987), and a pooling system for economic survival 
(artisanal or entrepreneurial skills, network of contacts and 
financial support in the case of unemployment) (Goddard, 
1996). It is clear that this type of family network. facilitated the 
development of clientelism in the public sphere (see below) 
but may have also had, as Brancaccio argued (1987), a counter- 
productive influence acting as an obstacle to social mobility, 
by limiting the potential of each individual, his/her spirit of 
independence and adventure and by holding him/her back, in 
the majority of cases, within the confines of a well-known 
structure . 
In, any event, the family codes are well-known and 
respected by all those involved. On the surface, it would 
appear that all Neapolitan families - proletariat and petty 
bourgeois - are 'patriarchal' (Gribaudi, 1998), but, in reality, as 
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Parsons already noted in 1969, this is not really the case, not 
even in the 1980s. It is the mother who is the "home secretary" 
(Dunglas, 1998: 117) of this "family state", to use Sciascia's 
expression (1987: 95). The father may be the "foreign n-dnister" 
(Dunglas, ibid) but it is the mother who, "through nurturing and 
in particular through providing food, a 'gift' that extends 
beyond childhood and, through hospitality, beyond the 
household as well" (Goddard, 1996: 201), orchestrates family 
activities: using and distributing resources, creating a sense of 
collective togetherness and joyful well-being even in the case 
of the poorest of households (Belmonte, 1979). 
Beyond the boundaries of the family which, in fact, 
extends still quite widely among cousins and relatives, the 
private sphere brims with a sense of solidarity, complicity and 
lively participation, in stark contrast to the hostile, aggressive 
and disrespectful attitudes demonstrated in the public sphere; 
on the one hand, a private sphere full of loyal friends and 
kinsmen who help each other to understand and survive in the 
chaos of everyday life (Alvino, 1993; Gribaudi, 1993); on the 
other, a public sphere full of dangers and incomprehension, a 
dichotomy, to use Goddard's expression (1996: 220), 
characteristic of Neapolitan culture. 
This overview of Neapolitan culture during the post-war 
period, and in particular the relationship of the individual to 
the state and to the family, might be considered too static 
and there is no doubt that one could find elements of change, 
especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, it clearly 
points to important features of Neapolitan life which have 
remained relatively unchanged during the period under 
consideration: a blatant indifference to the constraints of the 
public sphere, a silent toleration of personal clientelistic 
methods and a prevalence of family structures, so that, for 
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example, when a local friendly figure replaces the impersonal 
state agencies and provides work and welfare for the local 
community, he will be gratefully valued and, if he happens to be 
a criminal, his illicit activities will be ignored, if not accepted. 
In short, the "general cultural conditions [ ... I (of) the whole 
social system", Signorelli has argued, "constitute the premise 
for the blossoming of a delinquent culture, in our case, the 
Camorra's subculture" (1988: 143). 
4.4. Politics 
With regard to the political system, one is able to 
emphasise a number of specific conditions and mechanisms 
which may have also favoured the development of the 
Camorra. In 1945, as a result of the Second World War 
settlement, the Cold War created two ideological blocks in 
Europe with Italy caught in the middle, in a strategically 
vulnerable position which was then reproduced at the level of 
national politics and civil society, in the form of "a bipolar, 
ideologically charged state-system" (Therbom, 1996: 29). Thus, 
the country came to symbolise the world-wide division: the 
cleavage between the USA and the USSR was translated into 
the DC (Christian Democrat Party)- PCI (Communist Party) 
cleavage. 
At the national level, the alliances were clear: from 1948, 
the DC was strongly supported and financed by the USA and 
helped by the Vatican, especially at election times (when 
priests would tell their congregation how to vote), while the PCI 
was supported and financed by the USSR. The PCI and neo- 
Fascists (MSI), being considered anti-system (ie. anti- 
democratic) parties, were excluded from government. There 
was no alternation in power, the democratic process was 
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blocked and the governments led by the DC were more 
interested in preventing others from gaining power than 
promoting effective programmes of action especially against 
organised crime. Judge Falcone has argued: 
Since the Uberation, a single party, the Christian 
Democrats, has monopolised power, above all in Sicily, 
occasionally flanked by its allies. In the fight against the 
Mafia, the opposition has not always shown itself to be, 
an ally as it has had a tendency to confuse its political 
battle against the Christian Democrats with the legal 
battle against Cosa Nostra: 'We will not be able to do 
anything against the Mafia while this government and 
these men remain in power'. 
So there was paralysis on all fronts. The politicians, 
aware of the many problems and difficulties posed by a 
frontal attack on the Mafia, and in any case without any 
guarantee of immediate success, understood that in the 
short term they had everything to lose and little to gain 
by committing themselves to an all-out battle. Instead 
they faced this unprecedented crime problem with the 
same old feeble remedies, without a well thought-out 
plan which would have involved the full State apparatus 
in an unremitting and long-term commitment, and without 
the support of the people (1993: 140-1). 
In response to Mussolini's authoritarian regime, the new Italian 
Constitution of 1948 had chosen to avoid the concentration of 
power in the hands of a powerful leader by adopting a classic 
parliamentary systern. 4 Moreover, the electoral system 
adopted was the proportional representation [PR] list system. 5 
This system was initially chosen for its democratic 
representativity and flexibility and to give greater weight to 
organised opinion at the expense of individual personality. But 
the adoption of a preference vote within this list PR system 
had the opposite effect of allowing a political elite to use it 
4A bicameral system, a Head of State, elected by both Chambers every 7 
years, and a Prime Minister, as head of Government, who had to have the 
confidence of both Chambers too. 
5 The country was divided into large constituencies and each voter had 
two votes: one for the party and the other for candidates (preference vote), 
of which up to 4 could be indicated. 
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increasingly to develop its own private interests at the 
expense' of collective programmes. This produced great 
governmental instabilityG with many governments falling due to 
internal disagreements, but reforming with the same parties 
and new protagonists soon after. 
In Naples, this system could only thrive given the existing 
opaternalistic' system of patronage and clientelistic relations 
which had survived from the Bourbon period (Allum, 1973a7). It 
had developed some positive aspects, providing security and 
protection for the client and recognition and legitimacy for the 
patron, but also given rise to widespread political corruption 
(Allum and Allum, 1996; Ginsborg, 1990). Graziano emphasised 
the negative effects of clientelism on the political process at 
large: "even when it generates support, patronage does so in 
such a way as to weaken political legitimacy. The reason is that 
clientelistic consensus and political legitimacy imply two 
mutually exclusive sets of solidarities, instrumental and highly 
particularistic in the case of clientelism, normative and 
collective in the case of institutionalised authority" (1978: 1). 
It must be remembered that in Naples strong 
personalities, reminiscent of the father-king figure, have always 
been popular (Naples voted in favour of the Monarchy in 1946 
and idolised the Monarchist Mayor and millionaire shiP-owner 
Achille Lauro in the 19500) and 'personalised' forms of 
6 Between 1948 and 93, Italy had more than 50 governments. 
7 Chentelism has been defined as a "private, informal and unwritten 
relationship between two people" (Flynn, 1984: 135), a patron and a client, 
"who exchange goods, services or favours to the advantage of the patron 
who is, more often than the client, free to withdraw his/her favours and 
services" (Ibia). This system prospered in Southern Italy but also in 18th 
century England and 19th century France Many commentators have 
stressed the influence of living conditions in Naples. Until the beginning of 
the 20th century, contrary to other capitals, Naples did not have distinct 
popular and residential districts. All the social classes lived together 
sharing in a strong communal spirit and culture: the poor lived in the basg 
on the ground floor of the residences, while the rich occupied the piani 
nobiI4 upstairs. 
8As today with the former Communist Mayor, Antonio Bassolino. 
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behaviour remain widespread in Neapolitan political life 
because of the clientelistic system. 
It is easy to see that a PR-list system with preference 
votes would appeal to the Neapolitan political class and be 
accepted in general. By the 1950s, the party vote had stabilised 
between the main parties and thus Neapolitan politicians 
concentrated on cultivating, in full legality, networks of friends 
and clients, with promise of jobs and protection in return for 
votes (Piselli, 1995) in order to get their preference votes out 
at election times. 
The question is, however, whether this system gave 
specific opportunities to the Camorra. It is sufficient, at this 
stage, to stress the importance of clientelism in the Neapolitan 
political system, to note that it played a significant role in law- 
abiding citizens' lives, let alone in less scrupulous ones, until 
the early 1990s when there was a general change in the national 
political climate (thanks to the TangentopolP, 13ribesville' or 
'Kick-back city 'crisis) and to highlight the fact that the post- 
war transformation of the Camorra took place in a political 
system dominated by clientelism, with a PR-Iist system which 
permitted, if not encouraged, individual patronage and 
corruption. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have sought to draw out the main 
characteristics of post-war Campania, in other words, we have 
examined its geography, social-economic situation and political 
life in order to understand the general context of the Camorra. 
This chapter has been a necessary step in our study as it has 
9 The Mani pulite ('Clean hands) program of investigation of political 
corruption in Milan spread to the whole of Italy when judges took upon 
themselves to eradicate bad practices and corruption from all areas of 
public life. One of most famous trials was the Enimont trial. 
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allowed us to describe the general and chaotic background 
within which the Camorra has developed. Now, we turn to our 
first area of interest, possible motives for becoming a 
camorrista in the 1950s and 1980s. 
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Cha]2ter Five 
The Agent's Motivation 
Io sono uno che non ha mai avuto la possibilitLi di scegliere" 
Antonio Spavone (Faenza, 13-G-97). 
"Ptincipalmente, quando io sono stato definquente, e non mi 
ritengo tale nato, per6 ci sono diventato'ý 
Pasquale Galasso (S7a: 133). 
5.1 Introduction 
In an important study on I'Educazione Maflosa ffraining 
to become a Mafioso') Casarubea and Blandano (1991) attempt 
to distinguish the different moments of commitment, in 
particular, of criminal commitment. First, the 'conversion 
phase' is "[ ... the] moment in which a free choice is asserted, 
that is to say, when the individual measures and decides the 
validity of his actions in terms of convenience and risk [ ... I" 
(1991: 104). Next comes the 'affiliation phase', "[ ... ]the process 
through which the subject converts his decision into a new 
form of behaviour" (ibid). The scope of the next two chapters 
is to try and document these moments of conversion and 
affiliation for those who join the Camorra. Through this, we 
might better understand the psychological and sociological 
reasons for becoming a camorrista. 
Elucidating the possible motivations for joining any 
association, organisation or group raises many difficulties (see 
Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Dunleavy, 1991) to the extent that 
some political sociologists have resorted to the blanket 
expression of "the mysteries of commitment". These problems 
are exacerbated when studying a criminal subsystem like the 
Camorra which is, as a rule, enveloped in secrecy in Neapolitan 
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society. Motivations vary greatly, following each individual's 
perceptions of the association, its role and main aims. For 
example, people may join a political party for ideological 
reasons (to fight for their political beliefs), for reasons of 
self-interest (to improve their economic well-being or social 
life) or for altruistic reasons (to improve other people's lives). 
So why does an individual join the Camorra? To what 
extent do his/her culture, education, environment, reference 
groups influence his/her choices? And which values, verbalised 
in his/her discursive consciousness, explain such choices?. 
These questions raise a number of important analytical issues: 
firstly, we are clearly moving away from political science stricto 
sensu and into the territory of criminology, sociology and 
psychology. This unfamiliar territory for the political scientist 
requires great clarity and care in the use of terms, concepts 
and assumptions. The rewards lie in a more subtle view of an 
organisation which tends to be seen as a mass of people. 
Secondly, in dealing with two historical periods, the aim is to 
discover whether time has had any influence on agents' 
motivations. 
Methodologically, there is a disparity of available primary 
sources. For the 1950s, we have a relatively small number of 
case-studies to review (about 10) based on judicial documents 
(interrogations, trial transcripts, and sentenze) and interviews, 
whereas for the 1980s, we have a larger number of well- 
documented case-studies (about 301) reconstructed mainly 
from trial transcripts, official confessions and in-depth 
interviews of former criminals (pentiti) which make the agent's 
discursive consciousness more accessible and easier to 
analyse. 
1 See Appendix TWo. 
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S. 1.1 Review of the Uterature 
Sociologists and criminologists, as already noted, have 
long been interested in deviant behaviour and what motivates 
it. Merton, Sutherland and Bell, among others, have proposed 
different interpretations of deviant behaviour in America in the 
1950s. Merton (1968), for example, adopted a functionalist 
approach; for him, deviant behaviour in America in the 1900s 
was the result of pressures that the social structure bought to 
bear on individuals. It glorified values such as 'money' and 
'success' which meant that individuals were tempted to take 
up crime in order to attain these values, as they were seen to 
be worth fighting for. Sutherland (1972), on the other hand, 
stressed the importance of the environment as the learning 
centre for criminal techniques, whereas Bell (1967) suggested 
that crime was a system of opportunities offering social 
mobility to the poor and immigrants who became the clients of 
racketeers and political machines. 
Some of these approaches have been incorporated into 
studies of the Mafia and the Camorra. However, they do not 
look at the agents' reasons for joining because of the secrecy, 
intrigue and violence which surround these organisations and 
the consequent difficulty of access to the necessary 
information. Therefore, they focus on the conditions the 
postulants have to fulfil, the rituals that they have to follow in 
order to become a maflosolcamorrista and the nature of this 
form of membership rather than trying to understand the 
unique attraction that these institutions hold for individuals or 
the factors that may influence them into joining. 
For example, Falcone describes in detail the rules and 
rituals that future 'men of honour' have to obey such as "not 
to desire the woman of another man of honour, not to profit 
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from prostitution, not to kill other men of honour, except in 
cases of absolute necessity, not to talk to the police, not to 
seek conflict with other men of honour [ ... 1" (1993: 86) and 
states that "not everyone can join Cosa Nostra" (ibid. 88). Some 
very precise qualities are needed, in particular courage, 
capacity to commit violence and having relatives who are 
already members of Cosa nostra. These qualities crystallise 
criminal values and produce "a culture of belonging" (ibid. 65) 
Which give marlosi a clear sense of identity. Normally, potential 
members have to prove these qualities before joining fully, 
they have to show that they are "men of stomach" (men who 
can resist police questioning [lanni and Ianni, 1972: 381) and are 
ready to use violence. 
Hess (1973) also highlights the qualities needed to have 
a career in the Mafia: to be able to use violence and build 
authority upon it; to be able to clash with the state's judicial 
system and be acquitted; to be acknowledged by other niaflosi 
and lastly, to have all the qualities ascribed by the social 
environment (to be the protector, mediator and law giver). in 
short, the mafloso's prestige is based, according to Hess, on 
three factors: "his own actions, the attribution to him of 
further qualities [ ... I and the authority and respect enjoyed by 
the mafioso type and now transferred to the individual" 
(1973: 53). 
Siebert also addresses the question of membership in 
explaining how the Mafia is entirely a "man-made society", and 
how women perceive the institution and live with it. She 
analyses membership in terms of an almost religious, quasi- 
mystical form of male bonding, and not in terms of motivation 
as she believes that "material factors, such as income and 
status, are not enough to justify the extraordinary fascination 
which the Mafia obviously exerts over young and not so young 
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men who are prepared to do anything to join this exclusive 
organisation. [ ... ] You don't choose to join the Honoured 
society, you have to go about being chosen Membership of 
the Mafia is something absolute. The bond is severed only with 
death, and after the initiation oath both the private and public 
live of the mafioso is within the compass of the organisation. It 
is well and truly a pact with the devil (1996: 14-18). 
Studies devoted to the Camorra have been slightly more 
specific on this topic. They stress the social and economic 
conditions of Campania which may explain the motivations for 
individuals to join, and also the fact that, as Violante pointed 
out, there seems to be "no particular selection criteria before 
an individual can join a Camorra group" (1994: 5 9-60). 
Sales (1988) for example focuses on two important 
social problems which he believes were exploited by the 
Camorra and the NCO in particular, to expand its membership: 
1) youth delinquency; and 2) bad urban planning and housing. 
He argues that these social problems had been identified by 
the NCO as producing a mass of young unemployed with no 
concrete future. Therefore, the NCO presented itself as the 
only viable alternative "for a lot of Ahese young people, the 
Camorra has almost become an ideological belief, an 
opportunity of becoming rich fast which is otherwise 
impossible, at times a simple chance of a job and success for 
an enormous mass of young people of the large and small 
towns of Campania" (1988: 155). Concentrating on these 
problems might indeed help to explain some of the 
motivations for joining the Camorra. 
Arlacchi (1983) notes two important statistics for 
Campania: the young age of people murdered and/or -involved 
in Camorra-type crimes; and their geographical origins (poor 
areas, run-down suburbs and isolated hinterland towns). He 
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believes that this explains the presence of two types of 
criminals in Naples: on the one hand, the traditional organised 
crime 'families' and, on the other, 'clans' (bande) of young 
gangsters which he compares to those of the South Bronx. A 
typical young gangster 
comes from a rural immigrant or sub-proletarian family. 
His family of origin is characterised by a high level of 
instability or disorganisation. He has not frequented 
school often and has had some experience in under-age 
work as helper in tourism, as a shop worker or as a 
mechanic. He started very early to get into small local 
delinquent crime: stealing from shops and cars[ ... I Therefore, he has been educated in the street, by the 
gang, by the district, by the bar, by the external world of 
family relations. An important role in their criminal 
socialisation has been played by his contact with 
reforming institutions and then youth prison 
(1983: 158-9). 
According to Arlacchi, these two groups of criminals come 
into close contact and the youngsters can easily become 
attracted to the sophisticated Camorra: "we are in the 
presence of a first generation of professional delinquents who 
have recently left adolescence and have become adults, who 
find themselves surrounded directly or indirectly by the elite of 
Camorra leaders who are older and better organised" 
(ibid. 158). This type of analysis gives us some idea as to why 
young people, as a social category, may want to join an 
institution like the Camorra. But in general it does not give any 
insight into the possible motives of an individual for joining the 
Mafia or Camorra. On the other hand, our interaction model, 
which deals with agent motivation, can help us gauge more 
precisely some of the motives and combination of motives 
that moved individual agents to join the Camorra in the 1950s 
and in the 1980s. 
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5.2. The Agent's Criminal Values in the 1950s and the 1980s 
As outlined in part one, Giddens's theory presents three 
distinct but interconnected psychological levels for analysing 
the agent's motivation: unconscious, discursive and practical 
consciousness. It is clear that 'unconscious motives' are 
impossible to know but the material available allows one to 
outline elements of practical and discursive consciousness 
which should be helpful in analysing the agent's motivation. At 
times, they are finely interconnected and difficult to distinguish 
but the fact that the material is predominantly oral makes it 
easier to draw out the signific 
, 
ant elements of the agent's 
discursive consciousness. On the other hand, the more 
spontaneous forms of behaviour which emerge from the 
agent's practical consciousness are fewer and less clear-cut. 
The agent's discursive and practical consciousness 
('internal structure') obviously reflect the dominant criminal 
values of the time. In fact, in the 1950s, the agent's discursive 
consciousness reflects isolated criminal values; what we can 
call an emerging 'Camorra ethos', in the sense that it is not yet 
a coherent accepted group of values (see Figure 5.1) whereas 
in the 1980s, it reflects the much more precise and solid 
'subculture' (Arnold, 1970) and'ideology'2 (Siebert, 1996) of an 
organised criminal sub-system within the dominant culture (see 
Figure 5.2). The core fundamental criminal values of both these 
periods were: honour, family and friendship. 
5.2.1 Core Values: Honour. Family and Friendship 
The Camorra's 'criminal mentality' reflects the social 
values of civil society; it manipulates and interprets them on a 
2 It is interesting to note that Falcone argues you do not necessarily need 
to be a member of the Mafia to have a 'Mafia mentality' (1993: 67). 
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criminal mode. One of the values dominant both in civil and 
criminal society in Southern Europe throughout the two periods 
was that of honour. This notion can be defined as a form of 
respect and esteem shown to others which can be tarnished 
by one's own acts or others' behaviour. Honour is a traditional 
cultural value which has persisted compared to Northern 
Europe. Indeed, honour has formed part of everyday life in 
Naples for centuries; it has regulated all social interactions, 
especially since the legal system and the police force were 
unreliable, slow and inefficient and did not provide a prompt 
and fair restoration of one's reputation when needed. 
Siebert explained in more precise terms the role of 
honour in civil society generally: 
the concept of honour, as John Davis has clearly 
argued, designates a system of stratification, marking 
off dominant positions and subordinate positions. It 
presents itself as an absolute system, so that 'each 
competitor occupies a unique position in the hierarchy. 
One of the weapons in such discrimination is the 
distinction between honour-virtue and honour-status. 
The weapon is used by rivals'. The terrain on which 
rivalries are played out is a man's good name, or 
reputation [ ... ]. The outcome of these rivalries assails the 
man in his entire being, that is to say his honour 
(1996: 36). 
In the immediate post-war period in the South of Italy, honour 
was an important social value for all law-abiding citizens, but 
especially for the poor, as Brandon-Albini made clear "the poor 
have neither knowledge, money nor freedom. They have only 
their 'honour'" (1963: 41). Indeed, when people did not respect 
the code of honour, they could be marginalised and rejected 
by the whole community for not defending their honour and 
self-respect. Lewis recalled that when visiting Poggioreale, 
Naples prison, in 1944, he met some prisoners: "[ ... I they were 
ergastolani - lifers, and [ ... I having completed their 
first year in 
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solitary confinement, they were being taken to the island of 
Procida to complete their sentences I ... I" they explained to him 
that "I did it for honour'. The others agreed, they'd killed for 
the same reason. Would you do it againT I asked them. 'In the 
same circumstances, we'd have to. It stands to reason" 
(1978: 89). 
The code of honour was therefore a form of social 
control which persisted until the 1980s and determined how 
different relationships should be lived in civil society. It has 
clearly overflowed into the criminal sphere: the Bella Societil 
Rirormata (see Appendix One) as well as Cosa Nostra, 
incorporated it into their rules of conduct to be respected by 
all. An emerging guappo would be judged by how well he 
defended his honour and that of his family; if he failed he have 
would no future in crime. 
Defending one's honour and that of one's family can 
thus be a powerful motive for becoming a guappo or a 
camorrista as illustrated by the case of Antonio Spavone3 who, 
after his older brother, Carmine -a young emerging guappo - 
was murdered in 194S, sought revenge on his killer, Giovanni 
Mormone. This act of revenge was to determine his future: not 
only did it send him to prison but it also made him prestigious 
and popular among the criminal community (jouakim, 1979: 41), 
clearly setting him on the road to becoming an important 
guappo. 
The agent does not necessarily see revenge per seas the 
key motivating factor for his involvement in the Camorra but 
prefers to rationalise his action in terms of defending his 
honour. Vito Faenza recalled an interview he had with Spavone 
in 1979 when this was stressed: 
I wrote an article which ended with the question: "but who 
really is Spavone?. In court, he called me over and said 
3 See his life story in Chapter SeverL 
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"'Dottor Faenza, you wrote the best article ever because 
you ended by asking "who really is Antonio Spavone? 'ý 
Will you have coffee with meZ" So, I went and had coffee 
with him; he explained to me what a camorrista is, what 
responsibility is. He had been forced to make a choice, he 
had had to kill according to the code or honour which 
stated that you have to kill your brother's murderers and 
so he had inherited his brother's position and nickname, 
'O'Malommo'. He added "I am a person who has never 
really had the chance to choose'ý4 
This example clearly illustrates the central importance of the 
code of honour in the agent's discursive consciousness, 
although revenge appears to be his practical consciousness. It 
is one case, among many, which highlights the significance of 
respecting honour as part of the criminal code of conduct. 
In the 1980s, defending one's honour and that of one's 
family was still a strong social value; it was a specific rule 
which protected the private sphere, particularly the all- 
important sphere of the family, in a way law-enforcing 
institutions did not and could not do. Despite the 
industrialisation of Naples, this social value still plays a 
fundamental role in civil society and continues also to be 
respected by criminal organisations. Internalised by both the 
NCO and NF families as part of their ethos, honour remained a 
significant part of the criminal code of conduct. The new 
leaders controlled the behaviour of their members by 
expecting them implicitly to respect this social rule: if they 
wanted to be respected within the clan, members niust defend 
their honour and that of their family when it was violated, with 
at times murderous consequences. 
In a slightly different context, we can see this concept of 
honour clearly expressed by Gerardo Intagliatore who, when 
deciding to turn state witness, was told by his disapproving 
4 Interview with Vito Faenza in Naples on 13 June, 1997. Italics are used to 
indicate original oral material. 
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mothers: "think or us: ir you are a man make a decision, kill 
yourselr right away, do not make us all surfer [ .. ] From now on, 
it is up to you, you chose this lire, either you carry on as before 
or you rind a solution by killing yourself" (CD'Al8c: 12-13). 
Therefore, though it seemed to contradict his decision to 
collaborate with the authorities, he attempted suicide, 
explaining his gesture in terms of 'saving' the family's honour: 
"Ir I had killed myselr, I would have resolved my family's 
problem, a question or honour, 6 because my family still would 
have had a member who had collaborated, but who also had 
had the courage to kill himself; therefore I would have saved 
my mother, my brothers and all my ramiV (ibid: 18). 
Honour can therefore still be seen playing a fundamental 
role in controlling and conditioning people's behaviour - either 
at an individual, a collective or a family level. But can it still be 
presented as a motivating factor as was the case in the 
1950s? From our case-studies, the agent's discursive 
consciousness of the 1980s does not explain honour as a 
motive for joining the Camorra. Indeed, the discursive 
consciousness of agents in the 1980s appears to be shifting 
away from the code of honour towards that of fear, vendetta 
and profitable deals when their practical consciousness could 
still be explained in terms of the traditional code of honour. It 
would seem that the notion of honour is still important to 
modern camorristi in terms of a criminal value to respect (in 
particular, they use it to defend their families and clan 
members, or as in the Siani case, defend their criminal 
5 His wife, Monica, also had the same reaction although she later backed 
his decision to collaborate with the authorities. Another example can be 
seen when a state witness recounts the episode of the wife of his boss 
who became a state witness: "the fact that the wife of the boss of Acerra 
went to the Police and collaborated with the judges was a scandal, it was an 
insult to the rules of honour of the clan 'Isee CD'Al9). 
6 My emphasis. 
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reputation7), but it is no longer a motive for joining the 
Camorra as it was in the 1950s, other values predominate. 
It is interesting to note here that the notion of honour is 
closely associated with that of the importance of family and 
friendship. The Italian family has long played a significant role 
in civil society (see Brancaccio, 1987): it was the family's 
honour which had always been defended whatever the cost 
and by whomever, be they young delinquents or aristocrats. In 
a Catholic country like Italy, the biological family was of 
paramount importance not only in the private sphere where it 
operated as the emotional and socioeconomic centre for its 
members, but also in the public sphere where it acted as a 
clear reference point for all activities. During the whole of the 
post-war period, t he extended family networks, parentela, 
formed the backbone of civil society creating in turn networks 
of patronage and clientelism (raccomandazione) which 
regulated social activities. This family as a value was naturally 
appropriated by organised crime groups for both its emotional 
and functional value. It is this criminal value of the family which 
interests us here, rather than its role as a social institution. 
In the 1950s, for the Camorra, the family existed as a 
normal civil society institution and we find the murder of a 
relative as a strong motive8 for saving one's honour and thus 
becoming involved in the Camorra, whereas in the 1980s, the 
7 This is the case of the murder of a young reporter, Siani, from the daily 
Neapolitan paper, 11 Mattino, who had insinuated that the Nuvoletta clan 
had denounced one of their allies, Valentino Gionta, to the police. This 
was considered by both clans and their Sicilian Godfathers to be an insult 
and to have offended their honour: "Angelo JNuvolettal and the others 
insisted on the fact that this reporter had to die because "he was making 
us look like traitors" [ ... 1. Donnarumma [a camorrista-mafloso from the Gionta clan] was asked by them to go and speak to Gionta's brother-in- 
law to tell him that he had to die for what he had written. I ... II went to Valentino and said: "Listen, Valentino, here Angelo, Maurizio and Lorenzo 
have had orders from the Uncle [Toto Riinal in Sicily saying that he [Sianil 
must die" (CWA14). 
8 In the case of Spavone, it is his brother's death which motivates his 
involvement in the Camorra and in the case of Pupetta Maresca (see 
Chapter Seven), it is her husband's. 
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family has grown considerably in importance as an 
organisational value9. 
Raffaele Cutolo's Nuova Camorra Organizzata [NCO] 
was never called 'a family', as later clans were, but the 
concept of the family was of paramount importance. It was the 
rallying symbol of the organisation as a home which Cutolo 
used to recruit around him a mass of "poor lost souls" 
(Marrazzo, 1984: 48) to create one large extended family gro , Up: 
"they were boys without ideals, without identities, without 
objectives, to whom Raffaele Cutolo gave the possibility to 
feel part of a concrete, working and winning structure" (ibid. 65). 
In his organisation, there was a place for everyone: "from the 
road-thief to the drug- pusher, from the extortionist to the 
money recycler, from the drug -dealer to the businessman, 
from the scam organiser to the burglar" (Sales, 1988: 154). And 
Cutolo portrayed himself as their 'father figure': "he was a 
father to them, they regarded him like a God, they wanted to 
be like him (Ibid. 158); his home, Ottaviano Castle, was their 
home, 7a casa madre di Ottaviano'(Marino, 1986: 642). Following 
the tradition of the old Camorra, Cutolo looked after his 'sons' 
by setting up a system of social assistance for members and 
their families especially when they were in prison, distributing 
money and legal advice when necessary. Although Cutolo did 
have close relatives working with him1O, his organisation was 
not based on blood ties and marriage but on criminal 
solidarity. 
Following the rules of the old Camorra and also the 
strong symbolic image of the 'family' in the Catholic religion, 
Cutolo required all new members to be christened into the 
9 Gribaudi believes that the family of businessmen (famiglia di 
commercianti) has some aspects in common with the camorra family 
model (famiglia camorrista) (1993: 33). 
10 His sister, Rosetta and brother Pasquale as well as his son Robert took 
part in NCO activities. See her life story in Chapter Eight. 
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organisation (as in the Sicilian Mafia) and to be personally 
linked to a 'godparent'. This forced individuals to make 
personal commitments to each other and create loyal 
alliances. NCO members called each other "Cumpil, 
Cumpari&'11, godfather and companion, within the broad 
ideological vision of Cutolo's project. 
Although this organisation appealed to new members, it 
was very difficult for it to have a monopoly over the territory 
as it did not have deep blood ties and roots in the 
community; rather, loyal gangs spread out across the territory, 
and could change allegiances and join other families. For 
example, Nicola and Giovanni Nuzzo from Acerra as well 
Carmine di Girolanco and Giuseppe Cacciapuoti from the 
Casertano transferred from the NCO to the NF once the NCO 
started to decline (SO12). Many criminals did so in order to 
survive. 
As its name itself suggests la Nuova Famigha [NF] gave 
even more importance to the value of the family. The various 
clans were actual blood families (the Nuvoletta family, the 
Gionta family, the Zaza family, the D'Alessandro fan-dly, the 
Alfieri family, the Galasso family, the Mallardo family, the 
Bardellino family, the Schiavone family, the Graziano family, the 
Moccia family and so on). Directly influenced by the Sicilian 
model, the NF Families remedied the weaknesses of the 
previous model in the 1980s. For the Sicilian Mafia, as Siebert 
explains: "applauded as a valueU and rigidly defended on the 
basis of formal and functional criteria, the family takes on a 
dual aspect: it is on the one hand a pivotal means of 
11 Tarrow explains "Family-linked roles of a secondary nature play an 
important role in the South. The compare system is similar to the 
compadrazo of rural Spain, but far less important. The godfather in 
southern Italy is usually a friend of the parent who does not have business 
ties with the family. He is a protector and confidant to the godchild. but his 
role may extend eventual economic or political patronage" (19G7: G8). 
12 My emphasis. 
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exercising territorial sovereignty, on the other an 
organisational model for criminal activities. This second 
aspect, moreover, promotes the reproduction of an ideology 
which matches up criminal organisation with family, conferring 
on the former a halo of protectiveness and benevolence that 
is altogether familial" (1996: 28). 
For the NF clans, the family, both nuclear and extended, 
was a safe, closed, totally dependable unit of protectiveness 
and benevolence which was propelled into important strategic 
activities and business decisions. The biological relationships 
of family ties were transformed into alliances and working 
relationships with set functional ends, in order to maximise 
profit. In the Nuvoletta family, for example, the core 
organisational structure was essentially based on blood ties 
be they wives, sisters, brothers, daughters, sons, brothers-in- 
law or sisters-in law. 13 Both its criminal and non-criminal 
activities were managed by family members. The same is true 
for the Fabbrocino family "the brothers, brothers-in-laws and 
children of the arrested boss all contributed to the family 
business: Adele, the eldest child, married an important linen 
exporter; Giovanni, the youngest son, in turn, manages a few 
'confectionery' factories. Other relatives of the arrested are 
owners of important butchers [ ... 1. All these activities, 
according to the investigators, are a fragile cover used to hide 
the real business of the family: drugs, extortion and 
subcontracts" (Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno of 4 September, 
1997: 2-3). 
Marriage was a key way of making Camorra alliances and 
avoiding rivalry and conflicts: Gabriele Donnarumma's two 
sisters, Gemma and Francesca, married Valentino Gionta and 
Ciro Paduano respectively; Francesco Mallardo of the Mallardo 
13 See the family structure of the Nuvoletta clan, Picture 3 in Chapter 
Eight. 
82 
clan married one of three sisters, the others being married to 
the boss of San Carlo all' Arena, Eduardo Contini, '0 Romano, 
and to another important camor7ista, Patrizio Bosti (La 
Repubblica of 2 March, 199611). Marianna Giuliano and Michele 
Mazzarella, 14 children of two important Camorra families were 
married in 1996, uniting "two Camorra families who [had] been 
at war intermittently for over a decade" (Longrigg, 1997: 55). 
These intermarriages created ever expanding loyal 
networks and had the added advantage of providing a self- 
contained recruitment policy. Mothers, sisters and wives, who 
were otherwise important reference points in terms of 
emotional energy in the family, had by the 1980s also become 
front men and nominal business partners in Camorra 
companies covering the men's illegal dealings and money- 
laundering schemes. This shows us how close personal 
relationships can be exploited within the framework of the 
clan. It was often the case that while the boss was in prison 
the women outside continued to run the organisation and 
business as an extension of the family. This was typical of the 
Moccia (see Longrigg, 199715) and Nuvoletta clans where the 
14 The daughter of Luigi Guiliano and grand d, aughter of Pio Vittorio 
Guiliano (see Chapter Seven) from Forcella who married in the 1996 the son 
of Ciro Mazzarella from the Pallonetto, cousin of Michele Zaza and member 
of Cosa Nostra. See Sergio De Gregorio (1981) for an explanation of both 
clans, their origins, history and activities. 
15 We can see how involved Anna Mazza 'the black widow of the Camorra', 
mother of the Moccia brothers, was with her sons' criminal activities and 
legal battles: not only is she believed to be the leader of the clan which 
was heavily involved in drug dealing (see Quaderni 1, Osservatorio Sulla 
Camorra, 1989: 114) but she attended all her sons' trials and wrote letters 
to the President of the Republic, to the Minister for justice and the local 
priests to explain her sons' criminal situation and attack pentiti close to 
the clan (see La Repubblicik Naples pages of 14 of July 199G). 
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mother, sistersIG and daughters17 kept the clan together when 
their sons, brothers and fathers were in prison. The same case 
was made on behalf of the wife of Valentino Gionta, boss of 
Torre Annunziata, Gemma Donnarumma, who was charged with 
Mafia association because, while her husband was in prison, 
she replaced him as leader in the clan's activities (see S01 5). 
The NF clans combined the Sicilian model, with its strict 
hierarchical structure and pater ramilias, with the horizontal 
generational model which organised around brothers, sisters 
and their respective spouses guaranteeing territorial 
sovereignty, expansion and loyalty. Around the family itself 
gravitated numerous friends of the same generation, bonded 
together by a feeling of criminal solidarity (Gribaudi, 1993). 
They were the more vulnerable circles in case of danger as 
Matteo Graziano's case illustrates: it was in his interest to turn 
state witness, pentito, because he felt at risk. The leaders of 
the clan faced with his denunciation were threatening to 
"eliminate some of the members who were "not part of the most 
intimate circle, " (Prl4: 2) that is, those who were not part of the 
blood family. Thus, the 'generational family' was constituted by 
a blend of blood ties and criminal solidarity, with the former at 
the core of the organisation while the latter was at the margin. 
Carmine Alfieri's criminal organisation was not based on 
the Sicilian family model but it appears to have been a dynamic 
model of the 'generational family', what can be described as a 
'Confederation model'. judge Troncone explained this dual 
16 For example, the sister of two important members of the Nuvoletta clan 
(Francesco and Mattia Simeoli) Iolanda Simeoli, was arrested for keeping 
guns and explosive material in her flat in 1995. We could suggest that she 
was looking after them for her brothers (La Repubblicik Naples pages of 29 
November 1993: 5). 
17 Tatiana Imparato, daughter of Mario Imparato, boss of CasteRammare di 
Stabia, friend and then rival of Michele D'Alessandro killed in a police shot 
out on the 15th of March 1993, is also believed to "have looked after the 
clan's business activities" (La Repubblica, Naples pages of 17 April 
1993: V]I). 
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level Confederation model: "on the one hand, we can note the 
existence of a small, compact and intimate group working in 
close contact and under the constant direction of Carmine 
Alfieri and on the other, other groups which have developed 
through the years, working in the orbit of Alfieri but with a 
certain degree of independence and of territorial control" 
(S7: 102). Indeed, Alfieri himself argues that his clan was formed 
and based on the close friendship which he developed with 
fellow criminals as they defended themselves against Raffaele 
Cutolo: "our group was based on friendship" (S7d: 10)). 
In conclusion, we can say that one of the major 
developments in the Camorra's ethos in the post-war period 
was the way in which the family had evolved: in the 1950s, the 
concept of criminal family did not exist, guappi were loners or 
gangs of casual criminals, but in the 1980s, the emotional value 
of the family was extended into a strategic and functional one, 
creating the criminal family: family relationships were now 
exploited not only to provide protection for members on the 
run but also to make money and to recycle illegal earnings. A 
good example of this is Domenico Galasso (1962 - ), cousin 
of Pasquale Galasso, who was marginal to the criminal family 
until Pasquale "called me to one side and said: 'the time has 
come for you to make yourself useful and help us'" 
(CD'Al7r: 23). 
Some people became camorristi and seriously involved 
in illegal activities out of friendship. Friendship is an important 
socio-cultural value in Italy (as elsewhere) especially among 
urban men. This was true and has remained true throughout 
the period under consideration, in particular, of young 
Neapolitan men who live in the quartieri, or in the suburbs 
among their numerous brothers or peers, socialising in the 
streets 0 vicoli) and in the case of the upper classes, in very 
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closed circles of family homes, sharing common activities and 
opinions, united by ritual habits. This evokes "the Street 
Corner Society" of W. Foote Whyte (1981). The same applies to 
older men creating therefore a type of society where strong 
friendship and loyalties are a necessary part of everyday life. 
In the 1950s, these values were not particularly apparent 
among the guappL One knows of a few cases of friendship 
among them, such as Alfredo Maisto and Vittorio Nappi, but 
fierce rivalries were more common than close friendshipS. 18 
What was in civil society solid, loyal and reciprocal male 
bonding was by the 1970s taken over by the Camorra and 
transformed into precarious friendships which often turned 
out to be superficial and dangerous relationships based on 
devious manipulation. 
However, it would be a serious misrepresentation to 
argue that there were no sincere feelings of friendships or 
comradeship among camorristL For Alfieri explained that "we 
became friends because of the common problems we faced" 
(S7d: 10), especially among men who had been close childhood 
friends or cell companions. Indeed, many camorristi have 
explained their initial Camorra contact and activities through 
friends. Thus friendship can act as a motivating factor. 
Antonio Tarallo 19 of the Limelli family clan clearly explains his 
affiliation in these terms: "it was for emotive reasons, not 
economic. I was very close to people who were involved with this 
family. I became involved because of the friendship that I shared 
with these people'ý20 This was also true of Domenico Cuomo 
(1962 - ), Pasquale Loreto (1961 - ), Costantino Laiola (1960- 
), Gennaro Brasiello (1959 - ), Alfonso Annunziata (1956 - 
and Antonio Gaglione. 
18 Pasqualone 'e Nola was the known rival of both Alfredo Maisto (see 
CD'A2) and Antonio Esposito (who ordered his murder). 
19 See his life story in Chapter Eight. 
20 interview on 10 July, 1998, Procura di NapoI4 Naples. 
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The sense of fraternity, however, could easily dissolve 
during fights for the leadership and control of the clan or when 
it was a question of sharing the spoils or of murder strategies, 
as was the case of Gionta and Gallo2l in 1988 who split over 
strategies and the allocation of money (CUA14: 106) or 
D'Alessandro and Imparato who split in 1990 over territory and 
strategies. Even Alfieri, who preached the notion and virtues of 
friendship, eliminated three of his close lieutenants, Malventi, 
Ruoco and Sarmino, who had become too independent and 
thus, threatening. 
In the Camorra families of the 1980s, friendship and 
trust were very precarious values as the widow of Raffaele 
Nuzzo (the boss of Acerra and brother of Nicola Nuzzo) 
Alessandra Mainetti, explained: "they pretended to be friends 
when all they wanted to do was to kill each other" (CYA17g). In 
the 1950s, there was no such value among gangsters; in the 
1980s, it was more an apparent value than a true, solid one, 
masking double dealing and conniving. 
Friendship also forms part of practical consciousness. 
For example, Salvatore Rosa (1945 -), a shopkeeper, did not 
acknowledge his involvement in the Camorra out of friendship, 
although it is quite obvious that it was through friends that he 
became involved. He explained his initial contact with a 
notorious camor? lsta, Fiore D'Avino, thus: "it took place by 
chance, one day in a bar, in Somma Vesuviana, the Alaid Bar, I 
was with a certain Agostino Fiore, an acquaintance of mine, 
having a coffee; at that moment, Fiore DAvino who had a shop 
above the bar entered. We said "hello" and DAvino complained 
that he had had problems with the police of Pomigliano DArco. 
[ .. I If I am not mistaken it was in early 1991. Agostino Fiore said 
!I This happened when a close friend of the boss Valentino Gionta (who 
was in prison), Gallo, started to take care of all the illegal activities and 
felt insulted enough to set up his own independent group when the boss 
from prison requested to see proof of the money the clan was making 
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that he knew the policemen in question and that he could 
intervene [JSubsequently, Agostino Fiore called me to meet 
these policemen and help him to resolve these problems" 
(CYAM: 1-2). From then on, Rosa's shop became the meeting 
place for Fiore D'Avino, the camorrista, and corrupt policemen. 
In this case, the agent's consciousness does not articulate the 
main motivation for joining but his practical consciousness 
clearly indicates the role of friends and friends' acquaintances 
in his initial involvement. 
The same happened in the case of Mario Pepe. 22 Asked 
how and when he became involved in the Alfieri clan, he 
answered: "I met Alfieri through Sale and Citarella" (S7e: 3). It 
was Antonio Sale, a chartered surveyor with Camorra 
connections, who introduced him as 'a trustworthy' person to 
Alfieri "because he needed a bit of company and moral support" 
(ibid. 7) after a particularly gruelling crime, la strage di Torre 
Annunziata. 
Or again Federico Giovanni (1946 -) who met Pasquale 
Forino, a camorrista, by pure chance, became his friend and 
chauffeur. When Pasquale Forino became involved with the 
drugs baron Umberto Ammaturo, so did Federico Giovanni: "it 
was Pasquale Forino who introduced me to Ammaturo" 
(CD'Al9c). Here, the agent's practical and discursive 
consciousness almost coincide and indicate clearly that 
friendship played a determining role in the agent's involvement 
in the Camorra. 
Less spontaneous, and distinctly more manipulative, 
uses of friendship, bordering on a form of blackmail, appear in 
many camorristi's explanations: "I was a prisoner in Avellino 
prison. In that period, during an animated discussion, I smacked 
Giacomo CavalcantL At the time, I was forced to associate myself 
with Ciro Mariano because 
22 See his life story in Chapter Eight. 
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he took my side during the 
argument. [ .. I Giacomo Cavalcanti was a boss or the zone or 
Fuorigrotta, I did not know this. During the argument, I round 
myseIr isolated because I took orders from no one. Ciro Mariano, 
therefore, took my defence and I, to show him my friendship 
and my gratitude, became his faithful follower" (CD'Al 5a). 
This is how Umberto Bernasconi, a small time delinquent, 
recounted his entering the Mariano clan of the Spanish 
Quarters (Quartier! Spagnoli). Here the notion of friendship is 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, it is the result of a 
personal debt of gratitude and therefore an obligation made 
up of both loyalty and fear. On the other, the camorrista boss 
used and manipulated this 'new' friendship as a way of bringing 
the agent into his organisation making him "one or his men" 
(ibito while he was in prison and then later, using him as a 
killer. 23 Bernasconi added: "I did everything Ciro Mariano 
ordered me to do" (ibid). Pasquale Frajase, another killer of the 
Mariano clan, was also recruited through criminal friendship 
but he does not articulate it in this way (CWA1504). Therefore, 
the agent's discursive consciousness clearly articulates a 
feeling of friendship which was real in human terms, but which 
in Camorra terms was manipulated, making him subordinate 
and subject to the camor? Ista. This analysis of motives owes a 
great deal to the availability of first hand documents which 
have given a voice (discursive consciousness) to agents whose 
actions had up until then been assessed on their criminal 
behaviour (practical consciousness). 
23 Another example of this manipulation of the value of friendship Is 
described by the drug baron, Umberto Ammaturo, when he explains the 
recruitment of one of his right hand men, Pasquale Forino. He recounts: 
"When I was arrested in 1987,1 was taken to Avellino prison. There, there was 
Pasquale Forino sentenced on an extortion charge. I like this person, serious, 
thoughtful and mature, I proposed to him to Join. He, after a few months, was 
released, I put him in touch with my gang outside prison, Marotta Alberto, 
Pire114 etc and he became involved [ .. 
I" (CD'Al 9b). 
24 He only describes how he was recruited without clearly stating that it 
was through 'friendship: "I was the friend of Raffaele lacovelli. in 
MarchlApril 1987,1acovelli introduced me to Nicola Liguori [. J" (CD'A15c). 
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5.2.2 Vendetta. Violence andOmertA 
Among the important reasons given by criminals for 
engaging in criminal action -a recurring theme of the agent's 
discursive consciousness and clearly of his practical 
consciousness and closely bound up with the notions of 
honour, family and friendship - was the notion of vendetta. 
Anger at having been insulted, clearing one's own name, 
avenging one's or one's family's honour, are all common 
reasons for revenge. These values are respected and applied 
in the 1980s with the same means as in the 1950s: vendetta, 
violence and omertil. 
In southern Mediterranean countries, vendetta was and 
has remained a strongly respected value, especially to defend 
family and friendship. As part of folk culture, vendetta is "a 
cultural response, set up in defence and against the threat of 
being killed, containing the risk of loss of presence, just as the 
avoidance of the right/duty of vendetta contains the risk of 
the loss of social presence" (Lombardi Sartriani and Meligrana 
in Siebert, 1996: 38). It is clear that this archaic form of 
behaviour survived the establishment of other forms of 
authority in areas where these forms of law and order were 
weak and inefficient. In a system where the state agencies, for 
example the police and judicial system, were failing to perform 
their duties within the community, private vendettas continued 
to be a desirable form of revenge2S. As part of a retaliation 
procesS2G vendetta was closely associated with violence as it 
was its most common means of action. In practical terms, as a 
violent act of revenge, it has remained a persistent social 
25 It could be suggested that the lack of efficient legal solutions helped 
vendetta persist. For example, Carlo Gaetano Orlando maintains that the 
late introduction of a divorce law meant that for a long time, men were 
sent to prison after committing a crime which this law could have avoided 
(1989). 
26 The mourning period of the first act of violence lasts as long as the 
vendetta is not accomplished. 
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value within civil society during the whole of the post-war 
period from the 1950s to the 1980s and was easily adopted 
by all forms of organised crime. The act and value of vendetta 
became an important part of the Camorra ethos in some 
cases to put a wrong right, in others not to lose reSpeCt27. 
In the 1950s, vendettas were a central part of the 
guappo's code of conduct: taking revenge or retaliating was 
not only necessary to repair one's honour but also was a way 
of exerting a form of social control and of power in the 
community which in turn enhanced the guappo's social 
standing. In many cases, vendetta explained the motive of a 
crime but also the agent's involvement in regular camorra 
activities. For instance, in 19S5 Assunta Maresca killed the 
instigator of her husband's murder "right from the beginning, 
it was clear that he had been killed as an act of vendetta on the 
part of Maresca Assunta" (CD'A6: 11). During the trial, she 
explained that "she had to take revenge for her husband's 
murder, she had had no alternative" (Longrigg, 1997: 4; La 
Stampa of S April 195928). She was sentenced to fourteen years 
imprisonment which proved the beginning of her subsequent 
Camorra career. Therefore, in this case the discursive 
consciousness pinpoints vendetta as the motive for Pupetta's 
involvement with these criminal activities29. 
In the 1980s, similar examples can be found. The major 
clan leaders Carmine Alfieri3O and his elder brother Salvatore 
appear to have become involved in criminal or Camorra 
27 See Appendix Five. 
28 Pupetta Maresca during the whole trial presented herself as a victim 
who had no alternative (La Stampa, 5-4-59). The vendetta was her only 
solution and the police proved very unhelpful. 
29 We could also suggest that her practical consciousness in the form of 
the influence of her family as an institution had an impact on her 
behaviour. One could argue that if her husband had not been murdered, she 
would not have got so fully involved in these activities, and eventually met 
Umberto Ammaturo, a young drug baron when she came out of prison in 
the judge's office 
30 See his life story in Chapter Eight. 
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activities because of their need to fulfil vendettas. Salvatore 
avenged his father's killers (who had not been punished by the 
normal legal procedures) at the age of 17 in 1956. He was sent 
to prison and this fuelled the Alfieri family's "negative 
reputation" in the community and underworld. Carmine Alfieri 
explained that his full involvement in Camorra activities dates 
back to the day when he had eliminated his brother's murders: 
"Alfonso Catapano was murdered, after, having been 
interrogated I think. I think that it was actually me, Carmine 
Alfieri who killed him, with my own hands because I had to 
avenge Salvatore's death personally. This was the point of the 
vendetta" (P10: 46: 46). In the words of one of his accomplices: 
"in a symbolical gesture, he took off the black tie which he had 
worn in mourning for his brother, showing that he had 
avenged him and thus acquired real power in the criminal 
underworld" (P10: 127). Although other motives played a part in 
Alfieri's motivation vendetta was probably in his discursive 
consciousness the determining one. 
The same value of vendetta is linked to Angelo Moccia's, 
'Enzo', and his brothers' criminal development. Their father, 
Gennaro Moccia, was the local boss, "il super boss di Afragola " 
(Il Mattino of 1 June 1976) in the 1960-70s but when he was 
murdered in 1976 by his rivals, his sons sought vendetta and 
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sought to eliminate the culprits, 31 this turned into a full blown 
territorial Camorra war. Angelo Moccia explains "I live in this 
environment because I need to protect my family and I needed 
to vindicate the death or my rather" (CD'Al7s: 42). The same 
pattern applies to the Mallardo brothers when their father was 
murdered in 1967. These values form part of the discursive 
and practical consciousness. 
There are also numerous examples of people becoming 
involved in criminal activities as a result of a more 
complicated form of vendetta, 'una vendetta transversale', 
'collateral-indirect vendetta'. During the first Camorra war when 
an escalation of violent killings took place, many people were 
caught in this spiral, having to avenge the death of a relative 
who happened to be a camorrista. Automatically, they then 
enjoyed the protection of the clan to which the camorrista 
belonged. On a large scale, this not only created a network of 
obligations and protection but also brought in individuals who 
had no previous Camorra affiliation as can be seen in the case 
of Domenico Esposito. 
31 Claire Longrigg recalls the famous episode: 
"Anna Mazza's husband Gennaro Moccia was an old style camorrista, boss 
of Afragola, a small town in the Naples hinterland. I ... 
IA bitter territorial 
feud with a rival clan came to a crisis when, on 31 May, 1976, Moccia was 
shot in the face and died at the wheel of his car. The family was 
decapitated and the remaining members had to fight or run. They decided 
to fight. 
Their first target was Moccia's number one rival, Antonio Giugliano, who 
was charged with his murder, and then, to the family's disgust, acquitted. 
A few days later after the verdict, on 29 May, 1978, Giugliano was walking 
down the old Naples courthouse in discussion with his lawyer. People 
were pouring down the staircases and crisscrossing the cobbled internal 
courtyard-, defendants chained together were taking halting steps towards 
the cells. A young lad ran through the crowd, a pistol in each hand. and 
shot Giughano several times. Carabineri brought the boy down with a shot 
in the side. He was Antonio Moccia, aged 13. Ile was dragged off and 
interrogated, but he was too young, by a matter of weeks to be 
prosecuted. and they had to let him go. They next day they arrested the 
mother. 
[ 
... 
I Interrogated by the police, she denied instructing the boy to avenge the 
father, but showed no remorse for what her son had done. As prosecutors 
later pointed out, the boy was merely 'avenged the murder of his father in 
the onýy way acceptable to, and recognised by, his culture" (1997: 17). 
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Domenico EspoSito32 argues that it was the murder of 
his father by camorristi killers on 30th August 1982 which 
"changed his life" (A). His father had aided and abetted an 
important NCO boss, Nicola Nuzzo of Acerra. Esposito 
avenged his father and became an associate of Nicola Nuzzo. 
In his interview, there was direct discursive evidence that 
vendetta was Esposito's motive for becoming a camorrista. 
Naturally, vendetta commonly involves the use of 
violence. Violence or the threat of violence was a major 
resource both in civil society and within the Camorra. Normally, 
in Western societies, violence is controlled and monopolised 
by the state through laws, the police and the military and used 
to maintain law and order among citizens. In Naples, after 
fascism and the war, as the State failed to a large extent to 
reestablish its authority in the city and in the region, the guappi 
and camorristi moved in and took on this role. As such they 
used violence if, and when, necessary. Their activities in the 
community were wide-ranging: bullying shopkeepers to give 
food to a family in need, avenging personal insults and settling 
disputes. This, in turn, created and reinforced their reputation 
as powerful and prestigious individuals: "Pascalone is a man 
who decides what is right, even his guapperie are used for 
positive ends, like the time when he intervened to resolve a 
conflict, to defend seduced girls. Who would refuse to be a 
groom when Pascalone offered to be the best man? " (De Jaco, 
1959 quoted in De Jaco, 1982). Traditionally, the old guappi 
used violence in a very public way. Galdo defines this as 
"'open, fearless crime' - ie, the classical punishment by the 
boss of the traitor, guilty of an insult (un sgarro), in a public 
piazza with even some people witnessing his powerful deed" 
(Galdo, 1981: 207). 
But, the presence of the American allies and easier 
32 See his life story in Chapter Eight. 
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access to guns, increased the use of 'Americanised violence', 
that is to say, gratuitous acts of violence in hidden alleyways. 
Sales (1988) believes that the 'Maresca murder' in 1955 was the 
last public murder d I'andenne, of controlled and meaningful 
violence, whereas from the 1960s onwards violence was used d 
1'amiricaine, violence for violence sake on the part of men who 
acquired a violent reputation without the good intentions of 
the traditional guappL The violent natures of criminals like 
Francesco Fabbrocino (1930-198233) and Antonio Orlando 
(1924 -) may explain why they became easily involved in illegal 
and violent activities. 
During his stay in the slums of Naples in the 1970s, 
Belmonte noted that this raw resource of violence was a 
common commodity in civil society: "violence was endemic to 
all the lives which touched mine" (1979: 18). Moreover, he 
observed the effect of violence on those around them: "the 
volatility and brute force of Lorenzo's action repelled me, as 
did the admiration which the other men subsequently 
bestowed upon him (ibid'17-8). Violence, therefore, was a 
means of gaining a reputation in non-criminal or criminal 
spheres. This frequent use of violence increased during the 
1980s both in civil society and the Camorra. 
During the 1980s, the use of violence by Camorra gangs 
was very Americanised in nature: widespread massacres in 
quiet areas for the smallest of conflicts or insults, threats and 
intimidation; and murders to resolve power struggles with 
increasingly sophisticated weapons: bombs and foreign gunS. 34 
The widespread use of violence by Camorra groups meant 
that they were constantly on the lookout for young violent 
33 He was murdered by the NCO but his younger brother Mario Fabbrocino 
would become an important NF Camorrista in the 1980-90s. lie was finally 
arrested in 1997 in South America. Francesco Fabbrocino in the 1930s was 
a fearless individual who intimidated individuals (see CD'A3). 
34 For example, the murder of Ciro Nuvoletta. in Marano in 1983 and La 
Strage di Torre Annunziata in 1984. 
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small-time delinquents, for "people who were capable, who had 
the guts to kill" (CD'Al9b: 77). Thus, as a motive, violence was 
an outlet for aggressive individuals and exerted a great deal of 
attraction for ambitious young delinquents who wanted to 
make a career in the Camorra, gaining a reputation and 
becoming powerful: "[with violence you can] become 
somebody": [ ... I And most importantly, [Cutolo] gave them the 
conviction that with violence you were not alienated, but you 
were somebody3s, you were not a reject, but a camorrista and 
received dignity and prestige from this title" (Sales, 1988: 155). 
A violent nature can, therefore, be a motive for 
membership, when young men got involved in the Camorra 
because they had violent tendencies and could kill easily. The 
Camorra was an outlet for violence, the NCO and the NF alike; 
it structured these young people's lives, giving them a future 
which they otherwise would not have. This can be seen in the 
case of the Mercurio brothers, two violent streetwise brothers 
who were used as killers by bosses such as Umberto 
Ammaturo and Carmine Alfieri. There are many examples of 
extremely violent young men who were used by Camorra 
leaders to carrying out their violence. Most of them could not 
verbalise this in their discursive consciousness but some have 
done so like Umberto Ammaturo (see CYA19a +b). 
It is clear that the general rules of conduct which appear 
in the practical and discursive consciousness are as in the 
case of values closely linked to those of civil society as a 
whole. This is particularly the case for the law of silence, 
omertii, which has prevailed in Southern Italy all through the 
period under consideration among ordinary law-abiding 
citizens and criminals alike. In general, historians explain the 
origin of omertii in Southern Italy in terms of foreign 
occupation. Confronted by foreign rulers (such as the 
35 My emphasis. 
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Spaniards or the Austrians) considered as the enemy by the 
local population, silence was used as an invisible weapon, as a 
clear marker of the 'them against us' mentality, thus producing 
a collective feeling of solidarity. against the outsiders. Sterling 
sums up the historical development of omertil in Sicily but it 
also applies to Naples and Campania: "silence is a race 
memory in Sicily. Two thousand years of foreign occupation 
and despotic rule have taught the five million inhabitants of 
this Mediterranean island to keep their mouths shut. The state 
is the enemy, whether in the guise of the Norman conquerors 
or Bourbon kings or Modern Italy They have a word for this 
code of conduct: omerti), to be a man. Hardly a soul in Sicily 
would inform on the Mafia up to the 1980s. Fear held people 
back - stark terror often - but so did pride and fierce ethnic 
loyalty [ ... ] By and large, however, the ancient Sicilian code of 
oniertil held a whole populace in bond. secret by nature, the 
Mafia was doubly secret as a result of this great popular wall 
of silence around it (1990: 45-6). 
This code of conduct pervaded in the whole of society: 
on the one hand, criminal groups (Cosa Nostra and the 
Neapolitan guappi) used it as an internal code imposing silence 
on its members and on the other, oniertil, was respected by 
people who belong to civil society (civil omertti) "promote[ing] 
obedience to marzoso dictates and sometimes, also 
motivate[ing] opposition to the workings of the State (Siebert, 
1996: 139). To use the words of Judge Perrella "culprits and 
victims follow the most rigorous rules of omertil" (CD'A2: 298- 
99). It provokes thus both in civil and criminal society loyalty 
and fear, or as Lewis calls it, "the conspirational silence of the 
South" (Lewis, 1978: 72) which protects the illegal activities of 
the Cosa Nostra in Sicily and of the guappi of Naples and 
guarantees their survival. This can be seen for example when 
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Pasquale Simonetti, 'Pascalone e'Nola', an important guappo, 
was murdered in broad day light in Piazza Mercato, the busy 
market place of Naples in July 1955: "when the police arrived in 
Corso Novara after a few minutes, they looked at the traces of 
blood, they started to interrogate those 'who had not seen 
anything'3G" (De Jaco, 1959 quoted in De Jaco, 1982). Guarino 
noted that the classic mental and psychological state of 
Southern omertil thus continued to persist (1955); the 
endurance of this value means that important criminal acts 
have never been explained and that guappi were able 
sometimes to commit serious illegal acts in full impunity. As 
was the case for Alfredo Maisto. 
Thus, this general lawof silence helps create favourable 
conditions of implicit social control and undiscussed alliances. 
In some cases, this has encouraged people to become 
accomplices by being silent and not denouncing visible criminal 
activities. Moreover, while other forms of omertil have 
declined, this form of omertil has persisted through out the 
post-war period and was as strong in the 1950s as in the 
1980s. 
Omertil is a rule which was still very powerful among 
camorristi in the 1980s. In fact, it was still present in two 
forms: internal and external omertil. The internal onzertti 
present in the 1980s was still as consistent as that in the 
19SOs, if not more so, in the sense that both the NCO and NF 
clans adopted it as a clear and imperative code of conduct to 
be respected. As Ryan explains: "[the] code of silence, [is] a 
protective mechanism used to discipline and control the 
members of the Mafia [the Camorral. By threatening death for 
violation of the code, the Mafias [the Camorral are able to 
maintain loyalty and avoid prosecution" (1995: 276). In the case 
36 This makes us think of the classic scenario of Sclascia's Giomo della 
Civetta (1986). 
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of the NCO, it reincarnated the rules of the Societa Onorata (for 
example, "the glorification of omertX is used to start the 
initiation oath: "Omertil bella come Winsegnasti [ .. J" (beautiful 
omertil, you who taught me) and in the case of the NF families, 
they also used omertil following Cosa Nostra's rule of silence 
(silence and secrecy about organisation) were sacred rules of 
Cosa Nostra37). In both cases, those who spoke too much were 
silenced usually with murder as was the case with NCO 
member Antonio CUOM038 and Eduardo De Ronza39 of the 
Gionta Clan. 
In the mid-1980s, the predominance of this internal 
omertil started to fade, as some criminals started to talk, 
becoming pentit4 and distancing themselves from their criminal 
past). This phenomenon of pentitismo initially hit the NCO worst 
of all Uacquemet, 1996) as the organisation was not based on 
blood ties and because it suffered defeat at the hands of the 
new rising Camorra, the NF clans However, by the 1990s, the 
leaders and members of important NF clans also started to 
talk after being arrested, in return for protection and a new 
life. 
37 The three mafia-Camorra pentiti which I interviewed stressed how 
important this value of omerta was, especially not speaking of the 
organisation to others. See also the film, 11 Sasso in Bocca, (dir : Giuseppe 
Ferrara, 1970) which deals with the theme of omend in Sicily and how Cosa 
Nostra uses it as a social rule to impose itself on criminal and civil 
society. 
38 He was murdered in Naples Prison because Cutolo believed that he had 
talked to the police to give away his cover. His murder is vividly recounted 
in the book 11 Camorrista by Giuseppe Marrazzo in 1983 (Pironti: Napoli) 
and the film which was based on it, II Camorrista (director: Giuseppe 
Tornatore, 1986, Mondatori Video). Antonio Cuomo was murdered in 
prison by fellow camor? Ista, Pasquale Barra and his wife was also 
murdered, leaving their child an orphan. Cutolo dedicated a poem to the 
child to explain why they had been murdered because Antonio Cuomo had 
broken the law of violence (see Cutolo's book and newspaper articles). 
See his life story in chapter seven (page 140). 
39 The same thing happened to him as to Cuomo, he was perceived as a 
liability because he talked. De Ronza, a member of the Gionta clan, was 
murdered by his own clan and friends because it was believed that he was 
getting too friendly with the local carabinter! and give them some of the 
clans' secrets. 
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So, even the family with its strong blood ties was 
succumbing to the state's fight against crime and the control 
system of omertti was breaking down. However, even when 
camorristi talked and revealed important secrets, omertil still 
ruled partially as the pentiti did not go into great depths about 
their family or friend's crime or when, as in the Cirillo affair, 40 
there was a lot who gave conflictirig information, which made it 
impossible to know whether the truth had been told. 
As already pointed out, the Camorra still imposed 
external civil omertii, that which exists when the population 
sees and hears things but does no speak or help the police 
find the culprits. Pasquale Galasso was amazed: "to think that 
we acted openly in the presence of many people and nobody 
ever talked to the police" (Pr7: 21-2-92: 1 1). Alfieri maintained that 
this form of omertii protected him: "my protection was 
provided, above, all by the people of the region" (S7b: 63). One 
can see this omertii present and alive during Camorra trials in 
Naples when victims and witnesses stated that they knew and 
had seen nothing, contradicting at times statements they had 
made earlier to the police. Contrary to internal omertil, thus 
external civil ornertil has persisted through out the post-war 
period and is more alive than ever. With this form of external 
ornertil, of passive collective behaviour to what is happening 
around, one could also explain how some people got caught 
up in Camorra projects without necessarily intending to. . 
5.2.3 Monev. Social Prestfize and Power 
Vendetta and omertil are two fundamental social values 
which are imposed through the use of violence in order to 
dominate the territory. By the 1980s, violence was no longer 
the only me ns of imposing Camorra domination, even if it 
40 See Appendix Eight. 
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remained the most effective one. Two of the objectives of the 
Camorra on a large scale was to enforce its domination and 
defend its criminal ethos; as Galasso said "I understood 
perfectly how the aim of our clan was money and power, aims 
which would be achieved in any way possible, even the reckless 
and most inhuman" (Pr7: 4/97). 
By the 1980s, the majority of the Camorra gangs had 
made their fortune through extortion4l or smuggling and 
drugs42 and were now dealing with huge sums of money 
completely unknown to the earlier guappi. This money gave 
them an enormous amount of freedom and choice. With such 
money and violence at their disposal, the Camorra made 
inroads into centres of political power very easily to defend 
their values and more particularly the schemes they were 
interested in. They could bribe and threaten politicians to 
secure the decisions they wanted. For example, money enabled 
the NF clans in the n-iid-1980s to undertake a quantum leap in 
terms of business and contracts: they could start to set up 
legal businesses to recycle illegal money and corrupt 
politicians to secure important public contracts in the post- 
earthquake economy. This money made them extremely 
powerful. 
The huge sums of money, available both the NCO and 
the NF became a strong incentive for young delinquents. Such 
was the case of Luciano Aviello: "my cousin was a member of 
the Mariano Clan. 43 [ ... II was born and grew up in the Spanish 
Quarters and was straight away judged as an intelligent child. 
My cousin, whom I spent time with, said so. I was fascinated by 
his ways, the easy money which he had in his pocket, by the 
things he could buy: women, television, fun. I have always 
41 As was the case with the NCO. 
42 As was the case with the NF families whose main activity in the 1960s 
was smuggling and helping the Sicilians. 
43 Clan in the old centre of Naples (see Appendix Six). 
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wanted to dress properly. I think that it is better to dress in a 
certain way and this was appreciated by the group" (Di Fiore, 
1993: 247). This fascination for money can be pinpointed as the 
motive which led him to become increasingly involved in 
Camorra activities. 
The NCO also used money to attract young delinquents 
by setting itself out as a social alternative to the state. It 
employed a massive number of unemployed youngsters for 
illegal activities. 44 Like a State agency, the NCO set up a social 
assistance system whereby its members were financially 
secure and had lawyers to defend them as well as guaranteeing 
their families welfare if they were in prison. The NF families 
also set up a salary system making sure that all members were 
looked after. 
Money, fast cars, good suits, women and a sense of 
security can therefore be seen as a motive for becoming a 
camorrista in the 1980s. Such was the case of Carmine 
Schiavone43: his discursive consciousness shows that it was 
money which intrigued him and attracted him to organised 
crime, to the NF clans. The same can be said of Luciano 
Fiorillo, the son of a respected Neapolitan family, who was 
attracted to the camorra for its easy money: "Fiorillo asked to 
become a drug courier to pay his debts or make investments" 
(CUA19: 61). Money is an important motivating factor although 
rarely emphasised as such. It is more the social prestige of 
belonging to such an organisation which is clear in the agent's 
discursive consciousness. The mafioso Francesco Marino 
Mannoia told the magistrate Roberto Scarpinato: "a lot of 
people think you join Cosa Nostra for the money .... You know 
44 For example, members were paid easy money to carry out murders or 
smuggle cigarettes: Cataldo, member of Gionta clan, at the beginning of 
his career In the 1980s was paid 2 milioni a month for his work for the clan 
(D). 
45 See his life story in Chapter Eight 
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why I became a man of honour? Because before in Palermo I 
was Mr Nobody. Afterward, wherever I went people bowed their 
heads. No money could have got me that (in Robb, 1996: 263), 
Moreover, as Siebert points out: "when all is said and done, 
beyond the craving for wealth which is undoubtedly an 
important motive in criminal activities, the Mafia's paramount 
aim is power46 (1996: 61). The same can be said of the Camorra. 
? ower' for an organised crime group means 'territorial 
sovereigntyl: total control over the area, over the lives of the 
people, of the social and political activities, over everything: 
"[ ... I in its abrogation of absolute power to itself, the power 
over life and death (ibid. 62). 
The Camorra's strategic agenda might not be so 
obviously focused on power as that of Cosa nostra, but it does 
in its own way also seek to be all-powerful and dominant by 
controlling its territory, the money-making activities and the 
political decisions as Pasquale Galasso noted "I then 
understood how the objectives of this organisation were money17 
and power, objectives to be attained, however possible, even in 
the most savage and inhumane ways" (Pr7: 17-3-93: 4). What is 
interesting to note is that this notion of power attracts 
individuals to join and become involved in organised crime 
groups; as Siebert stresses: "yet, I am convinced that close 
involvement and active participation in the mafta organisation 
demands that the individual concerned cultivate a 
psychological predisposition for violence, power and unnatural 
death" (1996: 67). Some individuals may be fascinated by this 
notion of power and becoming powerful: being the leader of a 
group of delinquents who make a lot of money fast and 
control politicians and businessmen; thus, have a form of 
psychological predisposition, an inclination towards wanting to 
46 My emphasis. 
47 Indeed, Galasso did very well for himself. See Appendix Tbree. 
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dominate. This may explain why some people, especially those 
who became important leaders, got involved. Ammaturo 
highlights this aspect of showing off and in a sense, wanting 
the power that comes with being the centre of attention: 
"unfortunately, pathologically, we are exhibitionists, real 
exhibitionists, you do not undertake a crime if you do not want 
people to talk about it, I feel you lose something otherwise" (SM). 
It may also explain the attraction for weak individuals who are 
drawn to a clan because this gives them the possibility of 
becoming somebody, of becoming important and gaining 
social recognition. 
This value rarely formed part of the discursive 
consciousness, more that of the practical consciousness. It 
had become predominant by the 1980s. It can explain the 
behaviour of criminals like Alfredo Maisto and Raffaele Cutolo, 
both power hungry criminals. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Having outlined the discursive and practical 
consciousness of the agent in both periods, we can conclude 
that while in the 1930s motives were substantially based on a 
notion of criminality for survival; in the 1980s, motives were 
still rational but in a more sophisticated way. Now, motives 
were more focused on organisation and on using all possible 
values (the family, violence, friendship, omertil, vendetta and 
power), weapons and means for ends which were conducive to 
the money-making schemes of the business Camorra. 
Our evidence also illustrates that there were basic 
criminal values and motives for joining based around the 
traditional code of conduct: defending one's honour, respect 
for all, prestige, survival, personal vendetta and power. But, by 
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the 1980s, many of these basic values had been manipulated, 
transformed and based around a business: respect for power 
and money, strategic use of friends and family, greed. Now, we 
look at the influence of the macro- enviromnent. 
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Chalmer Six 
The Weight of the Macro-Environment 
"Mafiosi non si nasce, st diventa" 
Casarrubea and Blandano (199 1: 3 1). 
"Tranne pochi casi patologici Nomo non nasce col desiderio di fare del male. 
Ma se ý costretto a farlo lo fa E un suo diritto sacrosanto di sopravtvenzcL" 
Torre (1993: W. 
"It follows that the gangster is a product of his surroundings in the same 
way in which the good citizen is a product of his enviroranent" 
Landesco (1968: 123). 
6.1 Introduction 
So far, the major factors that are part of the agent's discursive 
and practical consciousness on the theme of becoming a member of 
the Camorra have been explained. Now, we examine different 
structural components of the macro-environment and how they have 
constrained agent's choices by looking at precise case-studies. This 
will help to illustrate the influence of the different components of 
macro-environment on the agent's motives for joining the Camorra. 
6.2 The Context in the 19SOs and 1980s 
The socioeconomic situation in which Neapolitans have made 
their life choices have been desperate throughout the post-war 
period. Naples and the Campania region suffered greatly during and 
after the war, in particular, from Allied carpet bombing, German 
sabotage in September in 1943 and military occupation in 1943-6. 
Norman Lewis recalls the city in 1943: "the city of Naples smells of 
charred wood, with ruins everywhere, sometimes completely blocking 
the streets, bomb craters and abandoned trams. [ ... 
] To complete the 
Allies' work of destruction, German demolition squads have gone 
IOG 
round blowing up anything of value to the city that still worked 
(1978: 26). 
Maurizio Valenzi's first impressions were similar: "the thing which 
really upset me was my encounter with Naples. Until then, the image I 
had was rather conventional, a picture post-card image, folk-picture 
in the worst sense of the word. Certainly, it was not easy to get on, 
in the midst of the war ruins - there was not one building, not one 
home which was spared by the bombs and added to this dire 
starvation and abject poverty" (1978, quoted in De Jaco, 1982: 200). A 
young Monarchist historian, Degli Espinosa, added: "all public services, 
commerce and honourable occupations had broken down and the 
population which had previously lived in an orderly manner was now 
transformed into a mass of people determined to survive at all cost 
(1946, quoted in De Jaco, 1982: 202). These, and other testimonies, 
confirm the disastrous effects of the war on Naples. 1 Consequently, 
the population resorted to all types of activity, legal or illegal in order 
to subsist. Black market and smuggling became "a 'regular job' for 
hundreds of Neapolitan families" (Coletti, 1995: 115). The culture of 
illegality which is so often associated with Neapolitan life flourished: 
"the storm of the war and of the post-war period caused the 
extension of illegal markets giving renewed vigour to violent crooks 
and to their role as mediators above and against the law (Scarpino, 
1993: 54). These illegal activities were so essential to everyday survival 
that they were tolerated by the public authorities; any repression 
would have caused a mass revolt. Thus, delinquent individuals and 
groups were able to organise seriously and take over these illegal 
markets (Guarino, 19 5 5,196 1). 
It has been suggested that this situation was facilitated by two 
further factors: first, the black market and smuggling were facilitated 
by the fact that many young American soldiers were of sons of 
Neapolitan immigrants and therefore sympathetic to the local 
population; in addition, some important American Mafia bosses (Vito 
1 There are also the notorious descriptions of Malaparte in his novels Kaputt(1944) 
and La Pelle (1949). There is also Paolo Di Marco's book Polvere di Pisellt La 14ta 
Quotidiana a Napoli durante I'Occupazione Alleata (1943-44), 1996, Napoli, 11guori. 
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Genovese and Lucky Luciano), after having been recruited by the US 
Army to help in the liberation of Sicily (see Campbell, 1977) and 
expelled from the USA as 'undesirable', settled in Naples to serve a 
punitive sentence. It has been argued that their presence in Naples 
encouraged local criminality (Sales, 1988). 
In any event, it is crucial to understand the nature of local politics 
in the 1950s. It showed a tolerance of illegal practices especially 
towards the black market and petty crime. The Monarchist Mayor 
Lauro considered the Camorra not as a problem but rather as a folk- 
characteristic of Neapolitan life: "the Camorra had aspects of 
generosity and chivalry" (D'Avino2, D'Ascoli, 1974: 117). It intensified 
clientelistic and corrupt practices particularly in the profitable building 
speculation schemes (Galasso, 1978: 251). The illegal sphere inserted 
itself into the legal one. 
Thus, Naples in the 1950s was a turbuleftt place where the slow 
and chaotic reconstruction of economic activities and of normal living 
conditions allowed the culture of illegality and criminality to thrive with 
the complicity of the public authorities. This culture of illegality may 
explain why many young men started smuggling in the 1950s in order 
to survive and make money. This then developed into a full time and 
lucrative activity. 
In the 1980s, the circumstances remained as desperate if not 
worse than in the 1950s, especially for the poorer classes. Robb's 
description on his arrival Naples in 1978 is vividly accurate: 
Naples in 1978 was, after nearly three millennia, showing her 
age. The unutterable scenic beauty of the bay and the city 
hardly bore a closer look. A lot of it was a filthy, polluted 
slum standing on the foulest sea in Christendom. Twelve rats 
for every human, someone had calculated. its schools, 
libraries, hospitals, universities, museums, prisons must have 
been worst in Europe. Visits to a bank, a post office, the town 
hall were hallucinatory experiences. The res publica, taken to 
include health, education, transport, politics, communications, 
entertainment, sport, personal safety, was a lost cause. By 
the usual measures of social wellbeing Naples was a disaster 
area. Five years earlier there had been an outbreak 
2 One of his supporters, the journalist Alberto Consiglio wrote a book, La Camorra 
(1959, Milano: Cino del Duca) in this vein. 
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of cholera. The incidence of hepatitis was the second highest 
in the world, as I found when I became infected myself. A 
wave of infant deaths panicked poorer districts for much of 
my first year. There was a lot of talk about a mystery illness 
but there was nothing mysterious about the squalor that bred 
infection. The third world begins in Naples, people used to 
say, and a lot of statistics were third world (1996: 156-7). 
Besides a small well-to-do-class with large apartments in Posillipo, a 
summer house in Capri or Ischia and an expensive life style, there is a 
mass of unemployed (about 25% in Naples), often illiterate, living in 
bad overcrowded conditions in the bass4 hardly making ends meet, 
engaging in casual labour, moon lighting, lavoro nero) and, whenever 
necessary, in illegal activities in order to survive. These were the "two 
cities" (due ciffil) or "two societies" described by Domenico Rea 
(1955): "two populations who live in the same districts, the same 
streets, the same buildings but have two different languages, two 
different visions of life, of work, of society, of customs, of morality 
which are totally distinct (Nobile, 2-1998: 263). 
Belmonte, in his description of the Neapolitan sub-proletariat 
stressed the precariousness of life and the lack of opportunities for 
young people that prevailed even in the 1980s: 
in an economic sense, they live at the edge of the world. Their 
social behaviour reflects the precariousness of their position. 
They call and cling to one another to keep from falling off, 
but just as often they push and trample one another down in 
their frenzy to survive. Poverty and scarcity bear down hard 
and provide the keynote for the pace and activity of their 
lives. [ ... I Politically, they are just cynical. Long familiar with the 
parasitism and corruption of established bureaucratic power, 
they are hesitant to align themselves with the revolutionary 
programs and rising fortunes of other powerful classes, 
whether liberal bourgeois or proletarian. They remain 
attached to the personalistic hierarchies of traditional 
authority. [ ... I In a cultural sense, they are at once excluded 
and highly selective. By preference, they speak and pass on to 
their children their own language and are content to learn 
some fragmentary standard Italian in a few years at primary 
3 Echoing Vincenzo Cuoco's famous explanation for the failure of the 1799 
revolution, "the patriots' views were not those of the people, they had different 
ideas" (quoted in Allum, 1973a: 50). 
109 
school. They preserve a catholic ritual facade but prefer their 
many Madonna-goddesses to Christ and maintain an active 
belief in myriad local house-spirits, reminiscent of a pre- 
Christian epoch. They take from the media only that which is 
relevant to their lives. But the mass entertainment of 
escapism, in music, television and film appeals to them as to 
all oppressed peoples as a coca to numb the hunger pangs 
of the mind (1979: 140-41). 
We must also remember that to make things worse, an earthquake hit 
Campania in 1980. This is the context which constrained the choices 
of many individuals such as Gerardo Intagliatore4 and Piero Pugliese of 
whom we have the confessions. 
In the case of Gerardo Intagliatore, this environment seems to 
have been a major influence on his 'life-choices' like the gangster in 
Landesco's study on organised crime in Chicago: "the gangster has 
lived his life in a region of law breaking, of graft, and of "fixing" 
(1968: 223). He was "a natural product of his environment" (ibid). Born 
in Torre Annunziata in 1963, he never went to school and therefore 
remained illiterate: I worked with my rather-in-law, I was a crartsman - 
bulletproof doors, aluminium windows, [. J brick laying, any type of 
work [ .. JI was a loner and tried my luck at stealing. [... ] Some Camorra 
members noticed me"(CUA18c: 7). As a young man with no education 
in a society where crime was a major occupation and the Camorra. one 
of the major employers, his involvement was normal. The Contact with 
the local Camorra boss opened new possibilities: "they gave me 
300.000 lire in 1983,1 was with Di Ronza, I was Di Ronza's or Gionta 
Ernesto's bodyguard. Then, little by little, from what was a cigarette 
ring, we got into murders, other things, hold ups because we had to 
organise when they had to kill, we had to steal a motorbike or a car, 
whatever they asked me to do I did. Then, little by little, we entered the 
big time taking orders directly from Gionta Valentino and becoming 
more or less part of the Gionta clan" (ibid. 2 1). 
Piero Pugliese (1954 -) is another clear example of the weight Of 
the environment on the agent's choices and behaviour. His discursive 
4 See his life story in Chapter Eight. 
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consciousness spells out the influence of the context in his joining the 
Camorra; he maintains that for a long time he was friendly with 'these 
people': "I think I can say that, for my misfortune, although I must 
admit that I really wanted to do it, that already in 1978-79-80,1 was 
close to people like Ciruzzi '0 Compagno, Paolo Di Lauro at 
Secondigliano. I lived in Casavatore so I knew the Lorusso of 
Secondigliano but not that well, only acquaintances" (CUA17b: 3). What 
he called in his confessions his "evil occupation, his activity as a 
camorrista" (CD'A17b: 1), he directly attributes to his social 
environment. Martusciello Ciro (1969 - ), an illegal mechanic from 
Secondigliano, also became involved in local Camorra activities 
because he lived in the close vicinity of these criminals: "I knew 
Araniello Vincenzo because his brotherlived next door to me"(S11a). He 
started frequenting the clan and would keep drugs for them. This was 
the beginning of a small time criminal career. Salvatore Migliorinos 
went even further when he said "I wish I had been born elsewhere" (B). 
He believes that it was his environment, his gang of friends and the 
lack of competent structures such as school which influenced his life 
choices and his criminal career. 
From these case-studies, we perceive the influence of the social 
context on the discursive consciousness of the agent. This reinforces 
the American criminological literature which considers the 
environment, the collective, as a fundamental influence (see Landesco, 
1968; Merton, 1968). The pressure of circumstance in the 1980s was 
greater than in the 1950s as mass unemployment and bad living 
conditions had worsened. 
6.3 The Institutions in the 1950s and 1980s 
Another facet of the external structure to be studied in this are the 
institutions which existed in the different systems; the primary 
referents of this institutional framework within which the guappi and 
the Camorra operated were (a) the family in the private sphere in the 
See his life story in Chapter Eight. 
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social system and (b) the state authorities in the public sphere in the 
political system. In the 1980s, however, the Camorra acquired such 
extensive power and influence over Neapolitan society that one can 
define it as a new 'institution' emanating from the social system. It 
was an institution in the sense that it had set rules and regulations 
which all members respected even if there existed no written formal 
rules. However, it was a 'cyclical' institution because it could appear 
as easily as it could disappear and its non-linear history has proved 
this. 
6.3.1 The Family in the 1950s and 1980s 
In the previous the role of the family as a criminal value was 
shown to be crucial in the formation of the Camorra's modern 
organisational structure. The family can also be looked at as an 
institution which, with its position at the centre of the private sphere, 
provided social practices such as reproduction, kinship, protection 
towards their women folk and economic strategies. It is the 
importance of this institution in determining the choices of would-be 
criminals which needs to be assessed here as for example in the case 
of Vincenzo 0' Franfellicaro6 who followed in his father and 
grandfather's criminal footsteps (De Majo, 1998). 
In Southern Italy, the family, with its strong blood ties, was a 
highly respected institution. Banfield (1958) has stressed that it was 
the key institution in civil society preventing the formation of other 
civil associations; especially as, in the post-war period, the Roman 
Catholic church and the DC united to reinforce its role (Goddard, 
1996). Individuals looked to the family as the only solid and secure 
reference point for affective, social and economic support. Belmonte 
explained: 
In the economic sense, the family is for sharing and pooling 
and distributing. The family is an organisational innovation to 
facilitate feeding and by the (implicit) directives of the incest 
For his life story see Chapter Sevem 
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taboo to insure the species a steady supply of genetically 
vigorous and politically useful mates. But the family is more 
than a set of arrangements for food sharing and alliance 
formation, more than a corporation for the husbandry of 
reproductive potentials. The family is the crucible of every 
human identity. like each person, every family has a 
distinctive quality. Each family imposes its own collective 
being upon the isolate being of each of its members 
(1979: 59). 
With the development of consumerism throughout the 1980s and 
worsening economic conditions the economic role of the family was 
reinforced: "in the South, families still face difficult objective 
circumstances and the relatively larger family units could reflect the 
persistence of strategies aimed at maximising the work and income of 
as many family members as possible. Furthermore, given the hostile 
social environment of Southern cities, the family could be seen as a 
refuge from the outside world [ ... I" (Ginsborg in Goddard, 1996: 164). 
Therefore it produced a strong collective identity and sense of 
belonging. It also produced a sense of protectiveness not only within 
the traditional relationship of the mother towards her children but 
also of the men towards their women folk. Carmine Alfieri spoke in 
very affectionate terms of his mother "a mother is unique and 
irreplaceable and when you lose your mother, you lose the only person 
who really cares about you! " (S7b: 121); and Salvatore Migliorino 
insisted that "you do anything for your loved ones" (B). As the family 
was the dominant social unit in civil society, it monopolised, 
determined and exerted control over the behaviour of its members. 
As a result, the opinions of the family were very important: the 
behaviour of sisters and daughters was closely scrutinised and 
judged according to the social codes which were acceptable to the 
family. It was thus a tight affective network where the exchange of 
feelings and opinions mattered and influenced individual behaviour. 
This kind of close-knit family may explain why some individuals 
became involved in the Camorra: the fact that some agents were born 
into a Camorra. family may have led them to be influenced by a close 
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relative, a father or brother and to follow in their criminal footsteps. 
Pasquale Galasso explained his potential role in influencing his 
children's future within his family when he told judges what they said 
to him: "Father, the Carabinieri are your enemies, they should be killed" 
(CAP1.2: 36). "I was becoming even for my children a role model and a 
hero because of my clashes with the police" (Pr7: 6-25). It may explain 
Domenico Rosa CUt010'S7 involvement in the NCO. As the eldest sister 
of Raffaele Cutolo, who bought him up because their mother was too 
old, it is clear that it was under his influence and out of affection for 
him that she engaged in Camorra activities. Similarly, we may explain 
the involvement of Martino Galasso, Pasquale Galasso's younger 
brother, in the clan: "In a certain way, I was always very close to my 
brother Pasquale after 198Z after the murder of our brother Nino" 
(CD'Al7q: G) 
The family has had this strong influence on many children and 
nephews of criminals as seems to have been the case for the pentiti 
Alfonso Ferrara Rosanova jr (1960 - ), son of Alfonso Rosanova and 
the D'Avino brothers. Ferrara Rosanova junior in no way accepted that 
his father was a criminal and does not consider himself one at all 
(CD'Al7x+y). Yet all. the evidence suggests that his father was an 
important boss and that he and his brothers, were members of the 
family clan. Fiore D'Avino does not explain the role of his father 
whereas his younger brother, Luigi, (1956 -) does: "I remember that 
from my early childhood, my father had had some difficulties with the 
law and had met Salvatore Alfieri, Carmine Alfieri, Raffaele Cutolo and 
I have always lived in this social criminal context from an early age" 
(CD'Al7t: 6-7). Whereas in the case of Stefano Reccia (1958 -) it was 
his uncle, Mario Iovine, the boss of Aversa, who influenced: "the 
influence which his uncle has had on him, has conditioned in a decisive 
way, his criminal behaviour" (SO 12: 513) 
Hence, on the one hand the Neapolitan family can be described as 
the nurturing ground for the young it can also be seen as the force 
which drives young men out into the world in order to seek out other 
See her life story in Chapter Eight. 
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young men (their peer group) to counterbalance the influence of the 
family. The family was in fact dominated by women, mainly mothers: 
"as housekeepers and carers of the children, it is on them that all the 
responsibilities of the family rests. This is why in the South, poor 
women, as soon as they marry, become very powerful; men (husbands, 
sons, grandsons) fear and respect them" (Brandon-Albini, 1963: 38). 
The importance of mothers in the Neapolitan family, despite 
stereotypes which may suggest otherwise (Gribaudi, 1996: 89), has 
been analysed accurately by Anne ParsonS. 8 She came to the 
conclusion that in the sub proletariat, 9 because men (husband and/or 
father) could not rely on economic security and on the prestige of a 
regular job, due to long periods of unemployment, power devolved to 
the mother (wife and/or mother). So having lost authority over their 
family, in particular in relation to their sons, husbands became 
dissatisfied and sought extramarital affairs, leaving the private sphere 
completely to the authority of the mother/wife. 
She discovered that this family structure caused important 
psychological personality problems for young Male sons. Whereas 
daughters developed close and intimate relationships with their 
mothers from whom they learnt how to be good wives, cooks, 
cleaners and mothers, enjoying the protection of their brothers and 
father, the young males felt gradually marginalised. Their private world 
was dominated by women and mother figures; in the absence of a 
strong father figure, they had to find a vehicle and form of expression 
for their masculine identity elsewhere, outside the family. According to 
Parsons the "social mechanism" which responded to these problems 
8 Parsons developed this analysis to try and understand the structure of and "I ... I the social dynamics of the Neapolitan family among the proletariat and sub- 
proletariat" (1969: 70). In a multiple-disciplinary, cross-cultural approach combining 
anthropology, psychology and sociology she carried out a projectile test (TAT), in 
which subjects were asked to relate stories about a series of interpersonal scenes 
in order to obtain "[ ... I an idea of the meaning that the concept of family had for the informants" (1969: 71). These tests revealed firstly, the importance of mothers in the 
Neapolitan familyand secondly, the difficulties of young males within the family, 
both phenomena having strong social implications. 
9 The matrilinear tendency seems more pro-dominant in the sub-proletariat where 
men were unemployed for long periods of time whereas in families where the father 
had a secure occupational status he retained his paternal authority. This was the 
case in most middle-class families (Parsons, 1969: 93). 
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and where their masculine identity was learnt and expressed, was the 
"male gang", which was part of the public sphere. The gang, she 
believed, was "a social compensating device in that it accentuate[d] 
masculinity for the boy, often by defining it as participation in group- 
encouraged delinquency or otherwise physically aggressive action" 
(ibid. 94). Thus, it was in their peer group, on the street-corner, that 
they received their street 'cred' education with its macho values, its 
use of violence and its emphasis on power and personal prestige. 
In the 1950s, she argued that young men found their masculine 
identity and awareness in a kind of loosely organised network of 
masculine friendships (1969) whereas when the "Camorra" was fully 
established as was the case in the 1980s, it was the ideal "self- 
reinforcing masculine society" which incarnated their needs. The well 
organised criminal groups of the 1980s offered a better 'family' than 
previously, reminiscent for them of their biological one, yet on an 
exclusively male basis, exalting exclusively masculine values. This may 
explain to some extent the Camorra involvement of Antonio Tarallo, 10 
a member of the Limelli clan, although he verbalises it differently (see 
Chapter Five). He was a single child with an absent father. Although he 
went to an American religious school in Portici which tried to give him 
some solid values, his absent father would appear to have had an 
impact on his unconscious decisions. His environment attracted him 
away from his family. We have a different example which shows that 
the lack of solid family can also push agents towards criminality: this 
is the case of Umberto Ammaturo, whose mother died when he was 
seven and left his father to look after seven small children. Ammaturo 
was a bright child who learnt crime on the streets (CD'Al9a+b). 
In conclusion, our analysis shows that the family as a institution 
influenced, or to use Alfieri's own discursive expression 
"contaminated", the agent and led him/her to become involved in 
illegal activities. 
lu See his life story in Chapter Eight. 
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6.3.2 The State Authorities in the 19SOs and 1980s 
The lack of state identification in Naples, and consequently the 
lack of a civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), pushes individuals 
from the public sphere to the private sphere where they organise 
around the family unit. This lack of a 'state' presence is a historical 
condition which has developed over the centuries and in the post-war 
period has been as significant as ever due to the inefficiency of public 
administration, politicians and the legal system: la Caniorra avance h) 
ofj I'Etat recule - in other words, the Camorra takes over the space left 
vacant by the state. 
Factors such as underdeveloped public infrastructures, 
personalisation of power and clientelistic practices in all walks of life 
have alienated individuals from public life and undermined a clear 
sense of belonging: "It is the institutions that still dictate the sense of 
community, the values, the models of behaviour of civil society, but 
the 'pervasive state' has produced a very low sense of the state" 
(Sales, 1985: 19). 
It translates itself into indifference towards the state authorities, 
its rules and regulations. This may not be a direct motive for 
becoming a camorrista but it can reinforce decisions. Migliorino 
speaks vividly of the lack of state and how he did not care for the law 
(B). Moreover, even if criminals were sent to prison, often they would 
not fully serve their sentences because the effective implementation 
of sentences is weak in the Italian legal system. 
6.3.3 The Camorra as an institutionallsed sub-svstern in the 1980s 
In the 1950s, the word "Camorra" was used when referring to the 
criminal activities of individual guappt, probably for historical reasons; 
the Camorra was evoked but it was not the secret society of late 19th 
century, since the individual guappi were not organised among 
themselves and did not form a structured organisation. The name was 
therefore used only as a synonym for local criminality (la nialavitti 
locale). By the mid 1960s, the term "Camorra" was used to describe 
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organised smuggling gangs with a leader and clear rules of conduct. 
But by the 1980s, an important transformation seems to have 
occurred: the social-criminal practices which the Camorra undertook 
had acquired such systematic proportions and pervasive influence 
that it would be legitimate to say that they had become 
'institutionalised' as organised crime. Arlacchi makes a similar case 
concerning the transformation of the Sicilian Mafia when he says that 
the personal code of honour "[ ... I transformed into power 
acknowledged as legitimate" could be considered as institutionalised 
(1983: 21). In fact, the Camorra had reached this stage of development 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s by establishing formal rules and 
defined positions, with set recruitment policies, clear rules of conduct 
and forms of business which had implications on agents' choices. It 
was able to recruit and socialise its members into a strong 
organisation, shape their incentives and sanction their behaviour with 
authority, as systems do according to Easton's paradigm (1965 and 
1990). 
Thus, the Camorra became a well-established institution within 
the social system by feeding off the incompetence of state 
authorities: as such it has been seen by a number of investigating 
magistrates (Giovanni Falcone, GianCarlo Caselli, Paolo Mancuso and 
Armando D'Altiero) as constituting a real Counter-State in the sense 
of being an alternative centre of authority. Indeed, we would argue 
that the Camorra needs the state authorities in order to thrive, as a 
state within a state. In other words, the Camorra needs the state to 
exist and expand. It is the state's shadow and literally sucks blood 
from it. But without the state as a base, the Camorra cannot exist. In 
this way, it presents itself as an alternative to the state within the 
state structure: a state within a state. 
The empirical data highlights the various facets of the Camorra 
as an institution. First and foremost, there is the matter of 
recruitment and socialisation into the organisation. One of the main 
recruitment centres for the Camorra was, as it had been a century 
earlier, prison (Di Fiore, 1993: 158): Poggioreale, Avellino, Secondigliano, 
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Santa Maria Capua Vetere. A lot of well-known gangsters spent many 
years in prison acquiring a prestigious reputation both inside and 
outside. They shared cells and exchanged experiences, becoming 
friends. The NCO was in fact formed in prison (Marino, 1986) and its 
membership was recruited predominantly there. This was the case of 
Cutolo and the businessmen Alfonso Rosanova and Corrado 
Iacolare, 11 both of whom he met in prison. lacolare claims that he 
wanted to "live on the edge". Asked about his role within the NCO, 
lacolare's discursive consciousness pinpoints prison as the place 
where they met: "we spent a couple or days together at Poggioreale 
and the relationship had ended there"(Prl: 4-6). 
Other examples of the importance of prison come from the NF 
clans. Giovanni Labonia was a young delinquent who in 1989, after a 
history of robberies, murders and youth detention centres, was 
already an experienced small-time criminal living off his criminal 
activities. He joined the Camorra, after having shared his cell with a 
camorrista, Giuseppe Castaldi: "I met him at Cavinola prison, we 
shared the same prison-cell, It was August 1989. [ .. ]I met him in prison, 
we became good friends and a close friendship developed between us. 
We talked about a lot or things and he told me that he was a member or 
the Mariano clan. I told him my stories, he asked me if I would like to 
join the clan L-1 He promised me that if everything went OK as he 
hoped it would -I would be a member or the organisation on my release 
(Cd'Al5b). Giovanni Ferriero (1958 -) was also recruited while in Santa 
Maria Capua Vetere prison in 1983 by the boss, Sandokan. He became 
his driver and bodyguard, earning 2 milion lire a month (SO12: 413). 
Thus, prison brought together unattached delinquents and highly 
organised Camorra bosses who took advantage of the situation. 
Sometimes gentle methods were used. For example, Giuseppe 
Palillo, who was sent to the same prison as Cutolo, (Ascoli Piceno) on a 
murder charge, was singled out by Cutolo as a potential and useful 
member. The investigating judge recalled Cutolo's recruitment of 
Palillo as typical: "once again, [ .. ], Cutolo used a winning 
formula. 
For his We story see Chapter Sevem 
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Favouritism towards a new prisoner (as was already seen with Medda 
and Pesce Vito) encouraged, or even imposed membership" (S4: 65-6). 
This was also true of Antonio CUOM012 and Michele Guardato. 
Recruitment was particularly intense during the first Camorra war 
(1977-82) when prison blocks were organised according to Camorra 
affiliation (NCO versus NF) in a similar way to the notorious T Blocks' 
in Northern Ireland which were organised according to terrorist-group 
affiliation. Michele Guardato has explained how, when he entered 
Poggioreale, he was assigned to the pro-Cutolo block because he was 
born in the same town as Cutolo, Ottaviano: "in the time necessary for 
the director of the pilson block to take down my information, I was 
affiliated to the association without understanding why"(Ietter 2.1). 
The other recruitment method used by the NCO both inside and 
outside prison was much more brutal and in some cases counter- 
productive: they intimidated small time criminals to join the 
organisation. Threats, bombs and general violence were used. 13 These 
techniques were so alienating that for example, Filippo Savino, 
Pasquale Galasso and Carmine Alfieri were deterred from joining the 
NCO in favour of rival clans which provided protection. This was also 
the case for Andrea delli Paoli 14 as he explained: In late 1980,1981,1 
was invited by Simone Luigi, member or Pasquale Scottis group, who 
wanted me to join his group. I refused and after a while I fell Into an 
ambush organised by NCO. Arter a while, I met Gaglione15, who told me 
what had happened and he explained to me that it was Esposito Aniello, 
called "Zambeletta, a member or Pasquale Scotti's group operating in 
Caviano who had done it" (CD'Al7f. 52). After this he decided to join a 
rival clan, the Magulio-Moccia clan, which provided him with protection. 
Salvatore Mele, a small-time criminal from S. Antimo, was murdered 
12 For his life story see Chapter Seven. 
13 Businessmen were also threatened and in order to protect themselves joined a 
Camorra clan. One example of this is Vincenzo Casillo, he was a businessman who 
was the victim of extortion and in order to protect himself, he sought the help of 
Cutolo. This was the beginning of their criminal friendship (see CD'A17). Another 
example is that the Engineer Sale who joined the Alfieri confederation as protective 
measure as he was being threatened and extorted by the NCO (see S7c. 57). 
14 See his life story in Chapter Seven. 
15 Known to him as a simple thief. 
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because he had refused to join the Camorra clan of his ex-cell mate, 
Pasquale Puca: "he had been explicitly threatened on that occasion by 
Puca [Camorra boss close to Bardellino but ex-NCO] who had said to 
him: 'if you do not work with me and you are not my friend I must thus 
consider you my enemy and I can also kill you ... ]Jwhereas] Mele had 
refused the offer of working with them stating ... ] that he wanted the 
quiet life and wanted to be the friend of everyone" (CUAI. 1: 2-29). 
As the NF clan was a different type of institution, being 
decentralised and family-based, the recruitment process was less 
formalised. Families and close networks of friends were the backbone 
of the organisation and only informal initiation rituals were required to 
confirm membership. The Neapolitan NF families which were affiliated 
to the Sicilian Mafia operated the sophisticated Sicilian initiation ritual 
(Migliorino, B; Tarallo, C). But the process of socialisation was similar, 
in so far as all members of all families had to respect the unwritten 
rules. 16 The Alfieri Confederation adopted a more flexible model 
whereby authority and decisions still stemmed from the boss, 
Carmine Alfieri, but the individual gangs retained a certain amount of 
autonomy. In some cases, Alfieri also adopted the NCO's threatening 
strategy of bullying criminals into joining his organisation. There are 
many examples of this but the case of Pietro Pianese illustrates 
particularly well. He was a shady character who was approached by a 
certain Antonioa Masseria who said to him, "Pierino, Don Carmine 
wants to meet and talk to you". I know how these criminals think and 
said: If I don't go to Don Carmine, I must leave hereL I knew that I 
needed to go and speak with him"(CUA17w. 56). In this way, he became 
involved in Alfieri's Confederation. 
As well as recruiting individuals, the Camorra as a social 
institution influences agents and shapes choices as it provides jobs, 
money, protection and a sense of belonging. In many cases, it 
provided jobs: GabrieleDonnarumma(1956- )explains 'work' as the 
motive for becoming involved: "Question: do you remember whether 
16 Pasquale Galasso describes how the Sicilian families rejected a young criminal, 
Fiore D'Avino, because his father had abandoned his mother. This behaviour was 
considered socially unacceptable. 
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there was a presentation or a precise moment when you entered the 
organisation? Answer. No. Question: What does that mean? Answer., 
Gionta already worked in smuggled cigarettes and I started to work- 
with him smuggling cigarettes" P7: 31-4). Oreste Lettieri (1952 - too 
was given a job "At the end or 1979-80, when I was unemployed .. ]I 
met Nicola Nuzzo, alias Carusiello, arter a while Ijoined the NCO and 
met Enzo, Casillo. In March 1980, he asked Nuzzo whether I could work 
ror him as his driver and bodyguard"(Prl3c: l). 
The Camorra also provided money to those who had economic 
problems: "This is why I got involved. That is to say, I got sucked into 
criminal activities because I had difficulties, my 'rriends' from 
Castellammare di Stabia [the D'Alessandro clan] offered to resolve my 
economic problem [-. 1 They lent me money and I took advantage of this 
for a rew years"explains Mario Fenga (195117 -) (Prlb: 14). 
The case of Aniello Prudente (1956 -) is also representative of 
the Camorra acting as an illegal bank in exchange for commitment to 
the clan. His father who was a gambler had got involved with the 
Camorra and accumulated debts which he could only pay in kind 
(hiding a car full of guns in his garage for example). The family 
company went bankrupt and Prudente had to borrow money from the 
D'Alessandro clan from Castellammare di Stabia: "I was buying cocaine 
from a cocaine addict and gave it to De Rosa who himself was an 
addict. This was a way to pay back the money that I owed him and also 
hid his addiction from the clan bosses who, if they had known of this, 
would not have trusted him with the role of money lendee (Pr12c: S). 
Thus, his involvement with the drug activities of the clan started from 
this repayment of debts. The institution also provided an important 
sense of belonging which bought all members together but which few 
17 Mario Fenga born in 19S 1 in Meta served as an officer in the Italian merchant navy 
looking after the engines from 1977 to 1980. After which, he decided to start up a 
spare parts and car accessories business in Piano di Sorrento. His business was 
not very successful and led him into serious financial. As a consequence, he turned 
to the Camorra for help. At the beginning, it would seem that his concrete 
relationship with the Camorra started purely for financial reasons. After this initial 
contact, he became fascinated by some of the leaders, especially Renato Raffone 
and Michele D'Alessandro, whom he started to frequent. This allowed him to 
attempt a political career and organise the import of cocaine from South America 
with some other international drug pushers. 
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verbalised. 
6.4 Interaction between the Aaent and Macro-Envirorument in the 
1950s and 1980s 
Before examining the interaction between agent and structure in 
the 1950s and 1980s, let us stress once again the importance of the 
macro- environment and the institutional framework in the life choices 
of the would-be camorHstL The macro-environment and institutions 
placed limits and constraints on the agents; they determined a 
number of possibilities within which the agent acted. The family in 
particular proposed models and institutionalised forms of behaviour 
which effectively limited his/her freedom of choice. In the same way, 
the Camorra having reached a new level of organisation and 
sophistication in the 1980s placed additional constraints, either by 
enticing or by threatening the agent to join the clan. Thus, the macro- 
environment forced the agent in a certain direction, providing him/her 
with a limited range of action-alternatives. The macro-environment is 
thus broadly part of the 'reason' why people joined the Camorra, 
though it does not account for individual 'motivations'. Of course, it 
is impossible to provide a general explanations which adequately 
account for every individual's decision, but the evidence of trial data 
and interview material points to the conclusion reached here. 
We have chosen two case-studies to illustrate schematically what 
we mean by the interaction between the agent and the macro- 
environment: one from the 1950s (Carlo Gaetano Orlando18) and one 
from the 1980s (Pasquale Galasso19). These cases have been chosen 
because the data and material available allowed us to identify more 
clearly than in most other cases the specific areas of the macro- 
environment and agents's motivation and to evaluate their relative 
weight in determining behaviour. However, we believe that these cases 
18 See life story in Chapter Seven and Picture 5 in Chapter Eight. 
19 See life story in Chapter Eight. 
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are representative enough2O to draw some general conclusions from 
them. 
In the case of Orlando, the structure appears to be that of a well- 
respected local Marano family whose father, Angelo Orlando, was a 
prosperous fruit and vegetable wholesaler who had been elected 
mayor of Marano on the communist list in 1952. He encouraged his 
children to become hard-working and successful citizens. Other 
sources, however, indicate the presence of less scrupulous relatives 
in his family, in particular his father's brother and sister, Antonio and 
Maria Orlando. 21 But, in his autobiography, La Veritil di Gaetano 
Orlando sull'Omicidio di Pascalone `e Nola (1989) (which represents his 
discursive consciousness), Carlo Gaetano Orlando stresses the sense 
of honour within his close family. He went to school and started to 
work for his father in the family business. Therefore, there is nothing 
in his family background which might explain his future criminal 
activity, except that he argues a personal trauma was significant: he 
was born out of wedlock and only went to live with his parents at the 
age of three when they got married (1989: 39-40) 
Orlando was then influenced by business friends, people he met 
in Naples fruit market, such as Antonio Esposito (Tonnonno 'e 
Pomigliand) and his associates, as well as his cousin Gaetano 
Nuvoletta. He was impressed by their money and life style and decided 
to become a killer on behalf of Antonio Esposito. Orlando's 
association with crime stems more from his personal values than the 
direct influence of the macro- environment. This confirms my 
hypothesis that in the 1950s motives could be relatively autonomous 
of structural constrains. 
Indeed, the case of Pasquale Galasso demonstrates, in a rather 
20 For the 1950s, the case-studies of Antonio Esposito and Pasquale Simonetti can 
also be analysed as interaction between the agent and the macro-environment 
where the agent's motives are dominant. 
For the 1980s: Rosario Giugliano, Raffacle Palmieri (19GS) and Pasquale Frajase can 
also be analysed as interaction between the agent and the macro-environment 
where the macro-environment is dominant. 
21 Maria Orlando married Giovanni Nuvoletta and was the mother of the emerging 
clan leaders from Marano: Lorenzo, Ciro, Angelo and Gaetano Nuvoletta (see 
Chapter Eight and Picture 5). 
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complex way the influence of the macro-environment over the agents' 
motivations. From all accounts, his father, Sabato Galasso, despite 
his FIAT business, was involved in illegal activities in his early days: 
Sabato was not satisfied with sweating in the fields. The war 
had taught him a lot. It had made him understand that in 
order to survive properly, you had to be cunning: he started 
with a bit of smuggling. In those days, it was not easy to find 
raw material. As with grain, for example: Sabatino bought it 
and would resell it at a profit. Then, big profits came. To 
increase this capital, he discovered how to do business. To 
sell at staggering prices goods which were then impossible to 
find became a profitable (business) transaction. On the other 
hand, the war had recently ended, the state and its laws still 
needed to be redefined. This was exactly the confusion that 
was necessary: very soon this flow of money became 
consistent. 
Sabato was still not satisfied with all this. He discovered that 
buying some old tractors, trucks unused by the Americans or 
abandoned jeeps, he could make money. As scrap you could 
buy it for nothing then you could rebuild it as if new, and you 
resold it at an enormous profit. A simple discovery. [ ... I In the space of a few years, [ ... ] Sabato Galasso, the simple 
man from a peasant family educated in the fields of 
Poggiomarino, became a 'Don. He was the real notable of the 
area, a point of reference for those who needed money. You 
needed money to buy a tractor? And who better placed than 
Don Sabato? Interest rates were exorbitant. Some called it 
loan-sharking but for Sabato Galasso that activity was "doing 
good for the poor". Who cared if in selling a car by 
instalments, his interest reached 20% 1 ... I With money came also prestige. The Camorra imposing itself? 
Don Sabato only considered himself a wealthy notable of the 
town, who became rich out of nothing, without having studied. 
From nothing, more or less. For the rest, his mind had 
remained that of plain old peasant" (Di Fiore, 1994: 12-3). 
But he had ambitions for his sons to do well. He sent Pasquale to 
university to read medicine. Pasquale Galassso emphasises: "I was not 
bom a delinquent like Cutolo"(Pr7: 11-13-93: 55). "My father wanted me 
to have a university degree" (CPA1.1). He therefore adopts his father's 
view of him and of himself, repeating more than once that he was 
from a good family: "my father[ .. j initially was a cereal merchant in the 
years which immediately preceded the war. Then, through his own 
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hard work and speculation, with building investments he created a 
fortune which enabled us to live comrortably" (CPA1.1). He also argued 
that his father was a hard-working businessman caring for his family 
who was unfortunately threatened and racketeered by the local 
Camorra gangs. The agent's motive was to defend his father and 
revenge his honour. This value, vendetta, would be apparent again 
when the NCO killed his disabled brother, Nino (Pr7: 17-3-93: 16-20). He 
was forced to act against his inclinations: "I became a delinquent 
despite my education and personality" (Pr7: 11-3-93: 5 5) and again, when 
he states: "I do not believe I was born a delinquent but I became one" 
(S7a: 133). So one can say that despite a good start in life, he was 
eventually influenced by the macro- environment of illegality which 
surrounded him and became a cold, calculating and fearsome killer 
(S7e22), interested in power and money. 
6.5 Conclusion 
From our general discussion of motives for Camorra membership 
in the 1950s and 1980s, we can come to several conclusions about the 
differences and similarities which exist. First of all, we can note that 
the predominant values which form the agent's discursive and 
practical consciousness in the 1950s, and which we have pinpointed 
as explaining the motives for becoming a guappo, were still present in 
the 1980s, but have been interpreted and developed in different ways. 
The main values which explain the agent's motives and which are 
manifest in the 1950s show that the guappo was a lonely and isolated 
individual who became a criminal because of his honour, reputation, 
personal ambition, survival, vendetta, or violence whereas the values 
and motives manifested in the 1980s show individuals joining the 
Camorra for the same reasons but also because it was now part of a 
business, a collective organisation which not only influenced individual 
behaviour but looked after its members. This can be seen both in the 
ZZ Although, the newspapers and books about him present him as an intelligent and 
well-mannered gentleman. 
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case of Giuseppe Palillo who was clearly looking for a group to identify 
with and which cared for him and Luciano Aviello who was attracted 
by the money the clan gave its members. In the 1950s, it was thus the 
individual level (internal structure) which influenced agent motives 
whereas in the 1980s, it was the collective level in the macro- 
environment (external structure). 
Secondly, the way in which the macro-environment (external 
structure) influenced the agent's behaviour has also changed. In the 
1950s, both the context and the institutions were in a state of 
disarray: this meant that adventurous, ambitious and opportunist 
agents could set up illegal scams in order to survive and become 
heavily involved in criminal activities. In the 1980s, the macro- 
environment was still in a state of turmoil, but the Camorra has 
become an institutionalised social subsystem, which conditions many 
agents' daily lives as well as politics and business. The family 
continues to act as an institution which has an impact on agent's 
motives and behaviour. Lastly, we can say that the interaction between 
the agent and the external structure still had a'determining role in 
influencing agent motives and behaviour. So, there are less changes in 
the case of the discursive consciousness of caniorristi than in the 
macro-environment. 
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PART TTIREE: THE TRANSFORMATTON OF THE CAMORRA 
IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
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Chavter 
- 
Seven 
The Camorras in the 19SOs, 
"Mio nonno ci parla pure della miseria nera dei tempi suo4 delle scarpe che 
non teneva, delle mani pieni di call4 del fuculare, sei centesiml e della guerra 
Lui mi fa penna quanto ci racconta questa vita sua! " 
in D'Orta (1990: 37). 
7.1 Introduction 
During the post-war period, the Camorra succeeded in taking a 
'great leap forward' (Allum. and Allum, 1996: 236). It is important to 
understand how and why, "even though it has disappeared for long 
periods since its first appearance at the beginning of the last century, 
it is perhaps the only criminal organisation based on unemployed or 
underemployed workers that has managed to become part of the 
local political elite" (Behan, 1996: 7). This major qualitative 
transformation (salto di qualiti! ) took place in a relatively short time. 
Sales points out that "those who study mafia-type criminality are 
struck by the quick transformation of the Camorra, a form of 
criminality which had been given up for dead, having disappeared at 
the end of the 1960s, and which managed instead, in the space of only 
two decades, to 'Mafiarise' itself and to assume a primary role in the 
sphere of major criminal activity at national and international levels" 
(1988: 3). This part of the thesis will attempt to answer these 
questions. 
However, constructing a satisfactory explanation is not an easy 
task as this study has to take into account a number of interrelating 
variablesl which not only obscure the description but also complicate 
the analysis. So, this chapter examines the existing literature on the 
topic and explains the use of Giddens's structuration theory (see 
Chapter Two) before applying it to the evidence of the 1950s. In 
Chapter Eight the analysis shifts to the modem Carnorra of the 1980s. 
I Social changes in civil society, international economic crises and local internal 
Camorra wars, for example. 
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By examining the life stories of a number of caniorristi in two 
precise historical periods, we will seek to understand whether the 
'structuration' of the Camorra's social criminal practice (in particular 
its rules and resources) has changed. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on a comparison of the nature and of the extent of change in 
terms of membership, activities and relations with the political and 
economic systems. 
For the 19SOs, we consider fourteen case-studies, five of urban 
camor-risti and nine of rural camorristi prominent in the 1950s. This 
then serves as a basis for comparison with the 20 cases selected 
from the 1980-90s. From this, it is hoped to infer conclusions that will 
enable us to understand the Camorra's post-war transformation 
better. 
7.2 Review of the literature 
Whereas there is an extensive literature on the Sicilian Mafia and 
its development in the post-war period (Pantalcone, 1966; Hess, 1973; 
Arlacchi, 1986; Catanzaro, 1989; Gambetta, 1993 and Lupo, 1993a, etc), 
there are fewer in-depth studies of the Camorra's post-war 
transformation. This may be due to the fact that until the 1990S, 2 
there was a lack of material. However, two specialists (Sales and 
Arlacchi) have endeavoured to pinpoint the factors which could 
explain this rapid evolution during which, as Galdo points out, 
"everything has changed: the type of activities, the code of conduct, 
the organisation, the methods. Even the age of the delinquents" 
(1981: 205). 
Sales is interested in answering the question: "what 
circumstances, factors and situations have permitted the successful 
modernisation of the Camorra to take place? " (1993c: 3). He highlights 
2 The 1990s mark the beginning of a new phase of the state's fight against the 
Camorra: as a direct consequence of a change in the law (law 81/91) in 1991, some 
criminals decided to turn 'state-witness, become a pentito, receiving important 
compensation for their collaboration. They revealed important details about the 
different Camorras' structures, activities, murders, organisation, membership and 
contacts with politicians for example. 
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various factors which he believes can help explain this process. 
Firstly, the involvement of the Camorra in smuggling and, more 
importantly, in the expanding international drug trade in the 19GOs and 
1970s he believes to be a central reason, though not the only one. 
Secondly, there is the presence of important Sicilian Mafia bosses in 
Campania who, due to the legal form of punishment known as 
'imposed residence' (soggiorno obbligato), served their sentences in 
the region. This had the effect of assisting the development of 
business relationships between the poorly organised smuggling gangs 
of Campania and the highly efficient and resourceful Sicilian Mafia. See 
for example, the relationships between the Neapolitan Alfredo Maisto 
and the Sicilian Stefano Bontate or the Neapolitan Nuvoletta gang and 
the Sicilian Corleone 'family' (Buscetta, 23-7-84: 2 1). Thirdly, the political 
and cultural processes of modernisation in Southern Italy enabled the 
Camorra to infiltrate every section of civil society. 
Politically, the South functioned on the basis of massive state aid 
controlled by a political elite which promoted the notion of 'power', 
'patronage' and 'clientelism; so the Camorra, by using corruption, had 
easy access to the political system and to the state institutions. In 
addition the securing of important national posts by the Neapolitan 
political elite in the 1980s meant that the Camorra had an even easier 
access to the highest levels of government for the distribution of 
important public contracts. For example, Antonio Gava as interior 
minister in 1989 and Paolo Cirino Pomicino as budget minister in the 
early 1990s. 
Culturally, the fact that Neapolitan society accepted values such 
as patronage, clientelism and violence meant that the Camorra 
expanded without much public outrage. Sales talks of 'the tolerance of 
illegality' (1988: 22) and believes that it is an important explanatory 
factor. The 1980 earthquake gave the Camorra the opportunity to 
hijack billions of lire which were supposed to assist the 
reconstruction. Moreover, indeed, he believes thatY "without the 
3 Faenza (1997) disagrees with this explanation: he argues that the Camorra's 
transformation would have probably taken more time, but it would still have 
developed into this omnipresent organisation in time. 
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economy of the earthquake (and without the drugs trade) the Camorra 
would not be what it is today in Naples and Campania. The 
contemporary explosion of the Camorra coincided with the 
assumption of national responsibilities (in the governing parties and 
government) by the highest echelons of the Neapolitan and Campania 
political class" (1993c: 8). 
Arlacchi (1983), a Mafia specialist, applied his understanding of 
the development of the Mafia to that of the Camorra; for him, the 
transformation of the Camorra (from the traditional Camorra to the 
Mafia-type Camorra) is closely connected with the transformation of 
Italian and especially Southern society, in particular the 'cultural 
revolution' which took place in the 1960s. He argues that these social, 
political and economic changes had repercussions for the Camorra 
and allowed it to assume its new role in the post-war period. For 
example, the state's declining monopoly over 'public order' in the 
1950s and 1960s meant that the Camorra (and also terrorists) found 
space in new areas and roles in the new markets and businesses, 
while maintaining the old clientelistic practices which were by then well 
established at the local level. In addition, he emphasises how profit 
accumulated in the 1970s and 1980s was invested in traditional 
activities but also in new legal and semi-legal activities, especially after 
the 1980 earthquake. 
Others, like the former judge and MP Imposimato (1993), the 
sociologist Lamberti (1987), and journalist Faenza (1993a) have 
pointed to the important role played by prisons as providing a 
meeting point for criminals, both a graduate school of crime and an 
employment centre. We refer extensively to these studies in this part, 
but by further utilising new material, it is hoped to be able to provide 
a more complete understanding not only in terms of changing 
Camorra activities but also of structures. 
7.3 Theoretical Reminder 
To evaluate the Camorra's transformation between the 1950s and 
1980s, the two historical periods are studied separately. This allows 
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us to look at the structuration in each period and at the conditions 
governing the structures, in particular at the rules and resources. It 
might be helpful here to recall Giddens's structuration theory (1984). 
The aspect of Giddens's theory which deals with the notion of 
overall social change is his precise notion of structuration. By 
structuration, he means the "conditions governing the continuity or 
transformation of structures, and therefore, the reproduction of 
systems" (1993: 118). Thus, in this analysis, it will be necessary to 
"analyse the structuration of social systems" in each of the historical 
periods which "means studying the modes in which such systems 
grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw 
upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts are 
produced and reproduced in interaction" (1984: 25). Doing this should 
allow us to determine whether the "conditions governing the 
structures" of the social criminal systems have changed: specifically, 
this entails investigation of how the nature of rules and resources 
changed. Hopefully, by establishing the nature of change in this way, 
we will be able to understand the reasons for change. 
7.4 Five Representatives of the Urban Camorras 
In the Eighteenth Century, the Camorra was mainly an urban 
phenomenon (see Monnier, 1994 and Marmo, 1990) and in the 1950s, 
there were still some old traditional quartiere guappi (district 
bandits/gangsters): Giuseppe Navara, alias 'il Re di Poggioreale' (the 
king of Poggioreale), Francesco Iasevoli alias 'Ciccio I'acquaiolo'(Ciccio, 
the water carrier) or our first case-studies, 'Vincenzo IArnericano4 
and Vincenzo Esposito who all replaced the lack of state authority in 
the local community. But, at the same time, a more modern form of 
urban criminal was developing who dealt in more profitable activities - 
selling petrol on the black market, smuggling tobacco, dealing in light 
and hard drugs - while still respecting values of the past (family, 
4 This is our first case-study for the period mainly because of the availability of 
first hand information found in Gribaudi (1999). 
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honour and duty - right and wrong). Such were Francesco Fucci alias 
Wano 'e pece'(Slippery Fingers), 7uzu di Santa Lucia' (Zuzu of Santa 
Lucia), Francesco Rossi alias '0 riglio 'e donna Giulia, (the son of 
Dame Giulia), the well-known Antonio Spavone, one of his prot6g6s 
Pio Vittorio Giuliano and the famous Italo-American gangster 
Salvatore Lucania, alias 'Lucky Luciano", who are the other three 
case-studies chosen to illustrate the urban Camorra of the 1950s. 
Vincenzo IAmericano, (1910 - ?) (Vincent the American) is a 
representative of the old traditional urban Camorra of the beginning 
of the century, who played an important social and political role in the 
quartiere, reminiscent of the members of La Bella Societil Reronnata. 
Gribaudi (1999) recounts his life-story: born in the Porto district of 
Naples to a father who was a part-time docker, he, together with his 
brothers, undertook precarious and illegal activities around the 
harbour surviving on their wits. From their basso, With his wife Fortuna, 
the daughter of illegal street-vendors, they would sell, among other 
things, coffee, sugar, liquor and contraband cigarettes, as well as 
practising different forms of loan-sharking. In their district, they not 
only controlled the various illegal activities (which his sons also 
undertook5) but also ran the various feast-days as 'niasti di resta' 
(masters of ceremonies), organising activities and stalls as well as 
selling the required goods (food, fireworks, etc). From this we can see 
that Vincenzo IAmericano performed unsophisticated social and 
criminal practices in the local community but within a very limited 
economic scope. Moreover, these practices and activities were always 
performed with the aim of gaining legitimacy and respect from the 
community; this he would truly gain as a vote-collector for the 
Monarchist ship owner Achille Lauro in the local elections in 1956 (see 
chapter nine). 
Another example of a traditional city guappo is Vincenzo 
Esposito, (1908-? ) Vincenzo 'o Franrellicaro (son of Franrellicaro). Both 
his grandfather and father were guappi who controlled the Quartieri 
Spagnoli district (Monteoliveto, towards Piazza Cavour). At the age of 
5 One son, Generoso, was a 'gigolo', another, Salvatore, was a criminal and is 
believed to be have been a member of the NCO (Gribaudi, 1999: 68). 
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14, he already showed his potential when his father was arrested for 
setting up a factory for making counterfeit money. Vincenzo was 
intensively interrogated by the. police who believed that he knew much 
about his father's activities, but he refused to talk. This showed his 
use of omertil to protect his father. He had many encounters with the 
police as he was violent and a good knife fighter. In 1943, he became 
president of the carters as he had a cart and shop (Ricci, 1989). He 
was president but also benefactor and protector of the Neapolitan 
carters. But in 1944, at a mature age, he fought another famous 
guappo on several occasions until he finally marked his rival's face 
with his knife (de Majo, 1998: 104-5). This episode illustrates his violent 
nature, but how he also exemplified values such as respect, honour, 
generosity, kindness to the poor. He represents the old guappo who 
lived in semi-legal world looking after the local community and 
adhering to traditional values. 
Antonio Spavone (1926- 198? ), alias '0 Maloinnio' ('Strong Man'), 
on the other hand is emblematic of the more modern urban guappo of 
the 1950s. Thinking and acting in the old Camorra manner, following 
basic traditional rules and resources - honour, respect, duty, 
generosity, omertti, intimidation, physical force used with style and 
gentlemanly charisma -he embarked on more challenging and 
economically profitable activities. It was the beginning of a new era 
when individual gangsters sought to become competent criminals and 
to make money rather than merely survive on a day-to-day basis. 
Spavone was born into a well-established fisherman's family, based 
in the Santa Lucia district of Naples; his grandfather CiroG was not a 
guappo but a highly respected local figure to whom the community 
turned for advice (jouakim, 1979: 23-4). Antonio, like many others, was 
an ordinary street-urchin (scugnizzo) who grew up during the Fascist 
period at a time when poverty and hunger were widespread in Naples. 
He became a strong, energetic and tough boy, street-wise and already 
cruel with sparks of generosity, who was fascinated by older boys. At 
G He was the captain of his fishing-boat and it was he who originally had the 
nickname of "0 Malommo'which came from his long and bloody struggles with the 
tuna fish in the bay of Naples. 
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the age of 15, he already had his own street-gang. But, as his older 
brother, Carmine, (also alias O'Malonimo) was making a name for 
himself as a tough young guappo, Antonio joined his gang. 
In 1945, after his brother's murder, he inherited Carmine's role 
and nickname, O'Malommo, restored the family's honour, following the 
dictates of Camorra tradition, by murdering Giovanni Mormone, his 
brother's murderer. He was sent to prison for 12 yearS7 at the age of 
21 in 1947 where he became a powerful, prestigious and generous 
criminal setting up a prisoners' self-help system (finding lawyers, 
providing financial support, etc) in the same vein as the traditional 
18th century Camorra, thus deserving the label of "the last real 
guappd'(E. Perez, 19968). 
He remained faithful to his nickname and was sentenced to a 
further 9 years after a violent brawl among inmates in Procida prison. 
But he also acted heroically during a thunderstorm in Florence gaol in 
1966, saving the life of the prison director's daughter and prisoners 
for which he was released early. He returned to Naples in 1970 and 
'officially' worked in a jewellery shop. This was the period of the 
Sicilian - Marseillais smuggling war; Antonio had close contacts with 
the Sicilians. It has been been suggested that he was heavily involved 
in smuggling tobacco and drugs since on the 5 March 1971 he was 
involved in the murder of his friend Gennaro Ferrigno, an Italo-Peruvian 
drug dealer. 
Having fled to America in April 1976 to avoid prosecution, he was 
asked to return in 1977-8 and again in 1981 by the NF bosses who 
thought that his prestige and methods would be useful in peace 
negotiations with the NCO. But Spavone's methods, inspired by the 
traditional guappo's values, were unsuccessful as the young warring 
factions resorted to more and more violence. This was the end of the 
7 For his first murder, 9 for his second (in Procida prison), and 11 for his third. a 
total of 32 years. 
8 Interview with Il Mattino reporter, Enzo Perez -6 September, 1996, Naples. 
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Spavone era. 9 
The impact of a traditional street education in reproducing the 
old system of rules and resources and the urban ethos was still 
visible in the case of Pio Vittorio GiulianolO (1928/9 - ). Yet, the new 
demands of the economic system forced him to adopt new rules and 
resources in particular to begin organising an urban criminal structure: 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he became the boss (capo clan) of 
an important Camorra 'family', which controlled the districts of 
Forcella, San Lorenzo and Vicaria in Naples. He was one of the first 
criminals to lay the foundations of a strong city clan which his sons 
reinforced. The clan's structures and activities were fully organised by 
the second generation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as was the 
case for many other families (for example, the Mallardo and the Gionta 
clans). 
Pio Vittorio Giuliano, alias Don Vittorio or 0' padrino (the 
godfather), was born in the heart of Naples. He was the oldest of 15 
children, left school at 11 and like Spavone joined the boisterous 
gangs of 'scugnizzi' in the streets of Forcella, learning the skills of 
survival in a deprived environment together with an attitude of 
defiance towards the police. 
All through the 1950s, his criminal activities ranged from 
'ordinary' crimes (receiving illegal goods, robbery, forging false 
papers) to more Camorra-like activities. In the expanding area of 
smuggling foreign cigarettes and selling petrol on the black market, he 
became a protigg of Spavone. In the 1960s, he was promoted to a 
'managerial' position1l overseeing the work of the smugglers' blue 
motorboats in the Bay of Naples. This was the stepping stone he 
needed to expand his clan, his activities (drugs and kickbacks) and his 
9 In 1978, he was condemned to 28 years for the murder of Ferrigno. On appeal in 
1979, he was cleared of this murder and declared not guilty of involvement in the 
disappearance of Pupetta Maresca's son Pasqualino Simonetti. Ile settled in South 
America in the 1980s. No Spavone clan exists in Naples today. 
10 His father, Luigi was a carter and petty criminal in the district of Forcella, but not 
a guappo (U Mattino, July 1998). 
11 Described by a local newspaper as: "the administrator of cigarette smuggling in 
the old city centre of the town "(17 Mattino, of 27 February, 198 2, in Rassegna Stampa 
Sulla Camorra). 
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role as a boss. He enrolled his 5 sons (Luigi, Gugliemo, Salvatore, 
Carmine and Nunzio12) in the family business and used the Forcella 
district as a pool of employment in the illegal economy, thereby 
intertwining his clan into the social fabric of the quartiere, constructing 
a network of solidarity, reciprocity, protection and also of control and 
power over a set urban zone. 13 
The new rules and the expansion of the smuggling of foreign 
cigarettes and drugs, both key factors in the development of the 
Camorra during the 1970s, began to appear in the 1950s when 
contacts between Neapolitan criminals and the Sicilian and American 
Mafia were made. One gangster who it is said played an important part 
in the modernisation of the Neapolitan Camorra is Salvatore 
Lucania14 (1897-1962) alias Lucky Luciano or Charley Lucky. His case- 
study is less directly linked to Naples but nevertheless important. 15 
Instead of settling down in Sicily when he was expelled from the United 
States and Cuba, he chose Naples and lived there from 1948 to his 
death in 1962. 
During this period of great confusion in Naples with the simple 
black market and basic smuggling trade, he managed to set up an 
intricate international drugs ring which included North Italian 
12 See Picture 4 for family tree in Chapter Eight. 
13 The same happened for example in the Spanish Quarter, In the Sanitd district of 
Naples and in the Dei Carcerati district of Torre Annunziata. 
14 As he has become a myth and film legend (see Francesco Rosi's 'Lucky Luciano, 
1973 and the American film 'The Mobster) many apocryphal stories have circulated 
about Luciano but his role in helping to modernise Neapolitan criminals must not be 
underestimated. 
15 Although Lucky Luciano, as a native of Sicily, had been used by the American 
Allies during the Liberation of Sicily in 1943 for his contacts and knowledge; he was 
nonetheless expelled from the USA and Cuba because he was an important 'boss', il 
capo dei capi (the leader of all leaders), the head of the Genovese family and the 
criminal brain behind the American Mafia's modernisation process. Ile not only kept 
the traditional values of self-assistance, introduced the rationalisation of the family 
system with a board of directors, the Cupola, which he would explain to the 
Sicilians (Buscetta in Arlacchi, 1996) but he also developed the drugs trade ("I ... I the Narcotics Bureau thinks that a world-wide dope ring allegedly run by Luciano is part 
of the Mafia" (Bell, 1967: 139) and all the illegal deals that accompanied it (arms, 
money) but had also developed a relationship with the politicians in New York. 
Daniel Bell points out: "The criminal world of the 1940s, its tone set by the captains 
of the gambling industry, is in startling contrast to the state of affairs in the decade 
before. If a Kefauver Report had been written thm "names" would have been Lepke 
and Gurrah, Dutch Schultz, Jack "Legs" Diamond, Lucky Luciano, and reaching back 
a little further, Arnold Rothstein, the czar of the underworld" (1967: 130-13 1). 
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industrialists, thus leading the American detective Charles Siragusa to 
define him as "the king of the drug dealers and at least a member of 
its Royal familyIG" (in doc XXIII, 2: 343). In 1954, he was banned from 
visiting the races because he was considered 'socially dangerous' 
together with 11 other criminals, such as Catello di Somma and 
Salvatore Zaza (II Mattino p. 19 and Il Roma of 20 November, 1954). 
However, Naples proved ideal for him and its tolerance of illegality 
must explain why he lived in full immunity, was never officially charged 
or put under surveillance and was even issued a passport (much to 
the Americans' disgust), despite the fact that it was clear that 
business trips and visitors were all connected to the international 
drugs trade (doc XXIII, 2: 343). To the Neapolitan smuggling groups, he 
provided a model of efficient worldwide organisation which was to 
inspire them (doc 1032: 1694). He died in 1962 and his body was 
shipped back to the USA, but there is no doubt that he left his mark 
on the Camorra's development. 
7.5 Nine Representatives of the Rural Camorras 
Contrary to the Mafia which was essentially based in the latifondi 
of rural Sicily, the Camorra originated in the city (Marmo, 1990) and 
expanded slowly into the rural zones of Campania at the beginning of 
the century. In the immediate post-war period, this primitive type of 
organisation consisting of gangs roaming the countryside and 
committing petty crimes was already present and had probably 
matured during the fascist period (Sales, 1988). Now, they racketeered 
in milk, meat, fish and agricultural markets, for example, poisoning 
food and burning crops to extort money from farmers. They also 
stole and sold stolen goods and they were also involved in all kinds of 
illegal deals (Guarino, 1961) However, they were never organised on a 
larger scale and never attempted economic expansion. Contrary to 
the Mafia, this criminal activity was not based on the great rural 
16 Buscetta recalled how in 1957, Lucky Luciano went to Palermo's Albergo dei 
Palm4 and explained to Cosa Nostra the efficient American organisation with a 
board of directors (a Commission or Cupola). Cosa Nostra soon adopted this model. 
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estates but on the economic activities which took place in the small 
hinterland communes (Sales, 1988). 
This primitive form of criminality was organised but only in very 
basic terms, methods and objectives. It was a simple form of 
association, not definable as 'Carnorra' since the crimes were almost 
spontaneous and the main aim was mere survival through the use of 
intimidation and violence. The gangs were armed but only as an 
intimidating device. They had leaders, for example, Antonio Aprovitola, 
alias '0 bosso di Marano' ('the boss of Marano') (1907 -t? ), who 
terrorised the local population with his impulsive and threatening 
behaviour. The gang also started to act as a collectivity: the members 
slept in the same house before their operations, discussed their 
projects, shared out their loot and even, when necessary, expelled 
accomplices (CD'A4). 
Besides these gangs, there was some strong individuals who 
made a business of imposing themselves for profit by whatever 
means necessary - threats, intimidation, arson, etc - as 'mediators' 
between suppliers and sellers of farm produce. As a result, they soon 
established a monopoly over the territory, terrorising farmers and 
controlling prices and were able to move from the rural zones where 
this took place into the urban network of the market place. There, not 
only did they control prices and supplies but they made large profits, 
expanding and diversifying their activities in the urban areas. Contrary 
to their city counterparts, Sales (1988) argues, their activities were 
more 'legal' and respectable. 
The life stories of the nine rural caniorristi selected for the 1950s 
illustrate the various phases of the emerging rural Camorra. They were 
similar and different at the same time. While they differed in their 
approaches and methods, some being more prepared to cheat, to use 
fear, violence and ruthlessness for the achievement of their projects 
of making money at all costs, they shared the old traditional criminal 
rules and resources: the code of honour, respect, family, survival, help 
of others, cunning, violence only for set means and all belonged to the 
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same agricultural background. Luigi MallardoW, (1924 - ?) alias '0 
figlio 'a nera' or '0 figho d'a nera' Cthe son of the dark woman), an 
illiterate agricultural worker, was part of the Aprovitola band who ran 
wild in the Giugliano area. According to his police file (CD'A4: 61/57), 
his career began in 1948 when he was condemned to 1 year and 4 
months and fined 8.000 lire for aggravated burglary. By 1953, he was 
part of a 'gang' who specialised in stealing cattle and chickens but 
also shoes, fabric and clothes. On one occasion, they stole a cow and 
murdered the farmer (II Mattino of 12 April 1953). The presiding 
magistrate noted that, "apart from their criminal activities, they have 
created above all an atmosphere of terror in the zone in which they 
operate and therefore represent a serious danger to the public" 
(CD'A4: 29). He served six years and was released in 1962. 
Giuseppe Pedana18, (1918 - 1979) alias 'Peppe 'e braciola' ('Joe Big 
arms'), was a similar type of criminal but on a larger and more 
sophisticated scale. Although he reminds us of a traditional 18th 
century style guappo by being the law-giver of the community and 
protector of the poor, by his death in the late 1970s, he was an 
established racketeer, extortioner (for example in 1979 he threatened 
to burn down a factory if the owner did not pay up ten thousand 
pounds) and killer (in 1947 he shot his rival Paolo Di Bello, in the early 
1960s his brother and finally a carabiniere, Raffaele Fede, in 1963). His 
methods made him the fearsome super-boss of the Casertano (Villa 
Literno, San Cipriano d'Aversa and Casal di Principe), much respected 
by the modern younger bosses of the late 1970s; Cutolo, the NCO 
boss, is reported to have attended his funeral (Perez in IlMattino of 
16 September 1992). 
The next case-studies illustrate a much more organised stage of 
development of the rural Camorra, still clinging to values of the past 
but also clearly heralding the future. The life-stories of Antonio 
Esposito, Pasquale Simonetti and Alfredo Luigi Maisto as well as those 
of Raffaele Baiano, alias Tapele 'e paci-paci', 'Raphael, son of Fatty' or 
17 This case-study is based on trial material, police reports and newspaper articles 
18 This case-study is based on newspaper articles and interviews. 
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Tapele 'e Marano' 'Raphael of Marano' and Gennaro Boccia alias '0 
bello a vera' 'the handsome real son', are closely interlinked as they 
were business partners and rivals. They were all born and brought up 
in the rural hinterland of Naples in the prewar years and are 
emblematic of a new type of criminal, the emerging rural businessman- 
guappo. 
Antonio Esposito, (1917-1955) alias 'Totonno 'e Pundgliano' 
(Tony of Pomigliano) and Pasquale Simonetti (1924-1955) alias 
'Pascalone 'e Nola' , Big Pascal of Nola) or 'Pasqualone 0 guappo, Big 
Pascal, the gangster (CD'A2: 298) were born in the hinterland east of 
Naples at the foot of Vesuvius, in Pomigliano d'Arco and Palma 
Campania respectively while Alfredo Maisto came from a small town 
north of Naples, Giugliano di Campania. 
Esposito's and Maisto's families were linked to agricultural 
activities: Esposito's well-to-do father dealt in agricultural products 
and owned several businesses, in particular a factory which employed 
50 people, while Maisto inherited with three of his brothers a mill and 
some land (Il Roina of 26 June 1976). Both had prosperous lawful 
businesses at the beginning of their careers, whereas Simonetti had 
nothing (his mother was a housewife and his father was a carter). 
By the 1950s, all three were heavily involved not only in 
agricultural racket - as 'mediators' - but also in illegal deals. They had 
an entourage of lieutenants' and their own chauffeurs. 19 They were 
well-connected, having started alliances with other guappi and, more 
importantly, with politicians who protected them. As an observer said: 
"There was already sonie kind of organisation but only of sinall groups 
headed by inen who knew how to behave in business and were willing to 
use violence; violence as an instrunient to achieve their own objectives 
but never violence to kill" (P, 14-1-9820). 
As far as can be ascertained, Esposito was already involved in 
serious criminal activities during the 1940s (murder, robbery, GBH, 
extortion), but by the 1950s, he had taken over his father's business 
19 Pasquale Simonetti had many drivers (among which Alfonso Jervolino) to drive 
him from Palma Campana in the hinterland to Naples. 
20 Interview on 14 January, 1998, Naples. 
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and was trading in agricultural products, mainly dried fruits. His older 
brother, Francesco was blind and his younger brother, Giovanni, 
expected to become an accountant, so he was in charge of the fan-dly 
business, Fratelli aposito and was very successful: "with a sharp 
business sense and an 'unorthodox' approach, he managed to 
increase his father's wealth. As his views were that it was not always 
possible to keep one's hands clean when one wanted to make serious 
money, [ ... I it is clear that his approach included a certain amount of 
'guapperia' which he wanted to keep to himself (II Mattino of 5 
October 1955). This 'guapperia' consisted of the introduction of a new 
dimension to the respectable trade of buying and selling agricultural 
products: resorting to illegal activities and violent means in order to 
make money and gain power: "Antonio kept to his ideals as ever and 
went on dealing in onions, in tobacco but also in other drugs [ ... I" (La 
Stampa of 5 April 1959). It has been suggested Obid) that he used his 
legal business to recycle goods and money, a primitive form of 
organised crime in which a legal business hides illegal deals. He was 
criminally intelligent and understood how the different legal and illegal 
systems worked but perhaps he also had the right friends (see 
Enzensberger, 1998: 117). 
Simonetti's criminal career2l began in a very small way in the 
1940s when he falsified ration books to obtain food which he sold on 
the black market at a profit (P, 199822). He then went on to deal in 
agricultural products where he was often referred to as the 'President 
of prices' because of his bargaining skills. What made him an imposing 
criminal was his great charisma and physique. 23 Everybody commented 
on his size: "Pascalone was tall and strong. In the criminal world of la 
21 Francesco Rosi's film "La Sfida" (1959), is said to be based on Pasquale 
Simonetti's dramatic and eventful life. It shows in clear terms how one could 
succeed in the developing Neapolitan criminal world in the 1930s. 
22 Interview on 14 January, 1998, Naples. 
23 "He had the physique, 'le physique de 1emploi, first of all, he was big, tall and 
strong. [ .. I therefore, he could impress in that kind of environment, that of the 
underworld because he was a dealer in agricultural products and was born in Palma 
Campania into a modest family, I .. 
j it was his physique that helped him to be admired in 
the local underworld. But, to tell you the truth, he also had great charisma. Ile was 
generous, he offered his services to all his friends, to all his countrymen/neighbours to 
help them in any way he could. He frequently invited lots of people to lunch with him 
(Interview on 14 January, 1998, Naples). 
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malaidta he had a prestigious position which kept improving every 
time he became involved in some criminal activity" (Paese Sera of G/7 
October 1955). He used this to his advantage and soon became a law- 
giver in his zones as the old traditional urban guappi had done. In this 
way, he became the reference point in the community to whom all 
turned when they encountered problems; he was, to a certain extent, 
an alternative to the State authorities24 which seemed to be absent. 
This is one of the reasons why he was considered a traditional 
criminal who lived according to the code of honour, almost of a 
bygone era. But what was more important, and the great innovation for 
a guappo at that time, was that he began to get involved in the 
distribution of smuggled cigarettes. By 1955, he was a well-established 
'businessman'. 
In contrast to the 'guappo gangster, as Sales called Simonetti, 
Esposito had developed more into a 'inafloso gangster' (1988: 124) 
more unscrupulous, and more prepared to cheat and betray his own 
friends to further his business aims. In the early 1950s, he had become 
one of Simonetti's business partners. When in 1953 Simonetti was 
imprisoned for 8 years and 3 monthS25 for the attempted murder and 
a shoot-out over territorial supremacy against a band of criminals led 
by Alfredo Maisto, Esposito "immediately took over control of all the 
illicit dealings which took place under the cover of trading (11 Segreto 
del Sangue, Paese Sera, of 6/7 October, 19 5 5)" and betrayed his friend: 
"he promised Simonetti's allies that he would keep a percentage of the 
profit for Pasquale Simonetti, but he did not keep his promise (De 
jaco, 1955 in De Jaco, 1982. ). When at Christmas 1954, Simonetti came 
out of prison, after serving two years of his sentence, he sought to 
regain his lost prestige and activities. Although his criminal activities 
slowed down under the influence of his new young wife26, Assunta 
4*1 See Appendix Five for stories about him. 
25 He and his friends were also accused of starting a prison riot by setting 
mattresses alight while in the prison of Poggiorealc in 1933, but this was never 
proved (11 Mattino of 7 April, 19 54). 
2G His wedding was a big affair: there were a lot of guests, a lot of food and even 
his rivals: "The Maisto, the Nappo, the Orlando, the Esposito [ ... I the homage of 
nearly all the general staff, the general staff of crime to the supreme leader and his 
happiness" ('11 Segreto del Sangue di Corso Novara, Oct 1935). 
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Maresca, he still helped his friends organise a fierce war against 
Esposito: "there was bad blood between them" (Paese Sera of 6/7 
October, 1955) as jealousy and fierce competition grew with "both 
believing that they ruled over the market district of Il Vasto" (ILUattino 
of 5 of October, 19SS). 
This rivalry climaxed on 16 July 1955 when Simonetti was 
murdered by Carlo Gaetano Orlando and Gaetano Nuvoletta27 
(Guarino, 1955: 85): "In any case, it is certain that it was Antonio 
Esposito who wanted Pascalone murdered, and the Police could not 
but be aware of this (Paese Sera of 5/6 October, 1955). However, 
Esposito was never arrested as the instigator of the murder but 
Orlando, the killer, was. Simonetti's pregnant widow, Assunta Maresca, 
took justice into her own handS28 and murdered Antonio Esposito in 
October 195S in broad daylight in Corso Novara: "she had to vindicate 
her husband's murder" (Scarpino, 1995: 64). This was a classic Camorra 
murder, visible and public, one of the last of its kind (Guarino, 1961; 
Sales, 1988). 
Our fifth case-study of the rural Camorra in the 1950s is Alfredo 
Maisto, (1918-1976) Don Alfredo, the target of Simonetti's bullet in 
May 1952 (CD'A2). His life story represents a combination of both 
Esposito's and Simonetti's, that of a guappo inafloso mixing traditional 
values and activities with more 'modern' ones (violence, utilitarian 
ends, calculated risks). From the age of 19, he was involved in crime 
from petty theft to serious gun fighting and was "believed to be one 
of the most "feared" bosses of the underworld which operated in and 
round Naples during the 1950s (IlMattino of 26 June, 1976: 6). By then, 
Don Alfredo, a thirty year old criminal, was typical of many of the 
emerging caniorristi of the time, he sought power not only in his semi- 
legal business activities (mediating in agricultural products, running a 
garage and smuggling cigarettes and petrol) but also in imposing his 
own will on the territory of the Giuglianese and in Naples by using fear 
and intimidation (see CD'A2: 297-8). And if this did not work, he would 
27 See Nuvoletta clan in Chapter Eight. 
28 She was convinced that the police were not interested in arresting those truly 
responsible and thus felt she had to take things into her own hands. 
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not hesitate to resort to violence. He used guns as threatening 
devices, for instance shooting in the air and at times remained very 
old-fashioned in his choice of weapons (clothes hangers, hat pins or a 
mere slap! 29). 
He soon established a flourishing business and forged for himself 
an important reputation3O which gave him power and status in the 
community-31 "but, Don Alfredo remains in the memory of the 
inhabitants of the zone, the real guappo, the man who repaired the 
insults to a girl by organising the wedding and if the young man could 
not afford it, he would provided the money for the ceremony" (II 
Maffino of 8 February, 1992). Thus, the "uncontested patriarch of the 
Giuglianese Camorra until 1976" (11 Mattino, ibký became " 'a real boss' 
who had obtained respect by his actions" (Faenza, 1993: 15-6) and his 
contacts with the DC party. He had many friends (Vittorio Nappi alias 
"'0 studente" was "his friend, adviser and a dangerous delinquent" 
(CD'A2: 288) and enemies (Simonetti and Baian032). 
29 Once in 1952, he intervened in a sale between an acquaintance and two 
businessmen friends of Simonetti, the Troncone brothers from Fuorigrottx 
"Maisto, had off his own initiative, decided to threaten these businessmen" 
(CYA2: 3). 
30 Indeed, the story goes that Don Alfredo had enough power and prestige to save 
someone's life: in the late 1940s or early 1930s an ambitious guappo had slapped 
Lucky Luciano in public at the races in Agnano, by this act seeking to become 
someone important. Lucky Luciano, reacted by pulling out from his jacket a white 
handkerchief with an L on it, while his bodyguards pulled out guns. Although this 
episode is attributed to both Pasquale Simonetti and Alfredo Maisto, it was in actual 
fact one of don Alfredo's followers, Francesco Pirozzi known as Ciccillo 'o francese 
(for the way, he pronounced his soft rs like the French) and it is said that Don 
Alfredo saved by intervening in the incident. This is now a famous episode which 
is often recounted. 
31 Raffaele Cutolo recalls that as a young boy, he went with his father to see Don 
Alfredo to ask him for help: they wanted him to intervene on their behalf because 
there was an aggressive person who was bothering and harassing them. They did 
not go to the police but to Don Alfredo who acted as a law giver and made sure that 
this person left them alone, he used his own famous reputation and imposed his 
private retribution to do so (Marrazzo, 1983: 24-23). 
32 They, together, undertook aggressive and intimidating acts, forms of extortion, 
against people and businessmen who did not keep their word. In this way, they 
invented for themselves the roles of law givers and law imposers. Ile also had arch 
rivals like Pasquale Simonetti who sought to undermine Maisto's dominance in the 
Giuglianese: 
"[ ... ]a rivalry between Maisto and Simonetti 
for the dominance of the agricultural 
products" (CDA2) existed. 
And Raffaele Balano: "Maisto, indeed, had become the fierce enemy of Baiano 
because he had been slapped by him in his garage in Piazza Vittoria, a significant 
act in the criminal underworld and which needed to be vindicated in order to regain 
the lost honour with a blood act" (CDA2: 293). 
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During the late 1950s and early 1960s, his criminal career took a 
completely different orientation. He met a mafioso sent to Campania 
for a "soggiorno obbligato' ('internal banishment'), Francesco Paolo 
Bontade (Nord e Sud, 1982). They first became friends, and then 
business partners, an important step forward for Don Alfredo and his 
clan who thereby established solid Mafia connections at a time when 
the Mafia was expanding (see Arlacchi, 1984 and Falcone, 1993). 
Don Alfredo was no longer a traditional guappo. First, he had a 
well structured clan around him composed of his three sons Luigi, 
Antonio and Enrico) and ambitious cousins lacolare" and the Sciorio 
brothers (Il Mattino of 21 August 1967) as well as the Nuvoletta 
brothers, Lorenzo and Ciro, and some Sicilians based in Naples. His 
clan was further strengthened by criminal intermarriages. 34 Secondly, 
his frequent contacts with the Sicilian Mafia had taught hirn'the Mafia 
method' which he famously applied in 1966 during the first so-called 
'American-style crime' (Il Mattino of 19 August 1967), Domenico 
Mallardo's murder in Giugliano which recalled "the worst forms of 
American gangsterism of the 1930" (IlMattino of 4 August 1967). Until 
his death33 in 1976, his clan controlled and monopolised all illegal 
activities in Giugliano, despite numerous trials which limited his own 
direct participation. 
Don AIrredo Maisto's life shows the capacity of the criminal agent 
to take up the right opportunities and adapt to changing times: in the 
1950s he was an ambitious criminal who respected traditional rules 
and codes (rules of diplomacy, punishment, obedience, law of the 
strongest, setting the agenda). By the 1970s, he was at the head of 
one of the most powerful clans in the hinterland of Naples, controlling 
a vast territory and handling large sums of money: the statesman of 
criminality in the shape of the Napoletano who had adapted to the 
33 See life story in Chapter Eight. 
34 One of his sons Enrico married Rosa Orlando (related to the Nuvoletta clan) and 
one of his nephews also married an Orlando. See picture 3 in Chapter Eight. 
35 He differed from Esposito and Simonetti as he was "I ... I one of the few men of 
the criminal underworld who died in his own bed" (11 Mattino of 9 February 1992; 
Faenza, 1993)! 
147 
modern Sicilian timeS. 36 
A similar transformation can be seen in the life story of Assunta 
Maresca (1935- ) alias Pupetta (dolly), who from her vendetta murder in 
1955 and the title of 'Vedova di Camorra"(Camorra widow) (Beneduce 
in Faenza, 1993a) graduated to the illustrious 'Madanie Cainorra' in 
the 1980s (Faenza37), leading accomplice of a drugs baron, Umberto 
Ammaturo, who represented a new form of Camorra. In some 
aspects, her life can be considered emblematic of the post-war 
transformation. 
She came from no ordinary family; the Marescas from 
Castellammare di Stabia (known as the 'Lampetielli), had a long 
tradition of petty crime, mainly threatening behaviour, verbal abuse 
and receiving stolen goods. She followed the path of many Southern 
women by leaving school at 11 and learning the skills of an 
accomplished housewife, una donna di casa, una fenitnina donore (De 
Gregorio, 1983: 35) in the expectation of a husband. She was a very 
attractive woman when at the age of 19, she married the important 
guappo Pascalone 'e Nola (Pasquale Simonetti) in April 1955; it was like 
a fairy tale38: "the wedding in 1955 was a grand affair with 500 guests 
and the whole town turned out to wish them well. Most people gave 
them the traditional envelopes stuffed with money, others brought 
jewels for the princess" (Longrigg, 1997: 2). 
Their house in Palma Campania was the centre of the community 
for those who needed help and she excelled in her role as the wife of 
a powerful guappo. We know what happened to Pascalone and the 
action she took to revenge his death. During her trial in 1959, she 
36 The Maisto clan had disappeared by 1992 at the end of a bloody feud with the 
new rising Mallardo clan: Luigi Maisto was murdered in 1979, Antonio in 1987 and 
Enrico in 1992. 
37 Interview of 13 June 1997, Naples. 
38 "[_. ] He came out of prison on the eve of Christmas in 1954 1 .. JAnd his mother had recently passed away and therefore, we wanted to accompany him home to Palma 
Campania I .. ] but instead, he wanted to go to Castellammare. And this was a surprise for us because we did not know [ .. ] So, we went to Castellammare; in Castellammare, he told us the road to take and where to stop and then asked us to inform Mr Alberto 
Maresca I .. ] that there was Pasquale who had come out of prison and who wanted to say hello to him. I .. I we were very well received and at a certain point, while we were talking, Pupetta appeared, thus we understood, there was a beautiful young woman" 
(P, interview of 14 January, 1998, Naples). 
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pleaded self-defence but was sentenced for 14 years where her son, 
Pascalino was born (see Longrigg, 1997) to be separated from her 
three years later. She came out of prison in 1963-4. 
The latter part of her life exemplifies a development in Camorra 
activities. She became the companion and associate of the emerging 
drugs baron Umberto Ammaturo39 who with the rise of the NCO in the 
late 1980s, joined la Nuova Famiglia together with her younger 
brother Ciro, to protect their criminal activities. After Ciro survived an 
ambush from the NCO, she called a press conference to warn Cutolo 
off her family, thus allowing Ciro to get away (see De Gregorio, 1983). 
Another episode indicates her involvement in the murder of a 
Roman criminologist, Aldo Semerari. Ammaturo escaped to Africa and 
then to South America (with a new girl friend) while she remained in 
Italy to face the charges and served four years for this crime between 
1982-86. She was acquitted on appeal in 1989 for lack of evidence - 
although Ammaturo as a pentito has now confessed to this crime. She 
had a number of shops in Naples and in Castellammare and now 
seems to be leading a regular life, although she still has sympathies 
with the Camorra. 40 
So far, we have dealt with major figures of the rural Camorra who 
had caught the media's attention. It is usually more difficult to find 
information on secondary figures but in the case of Carlo Gaetano 
Orlando who has written his autobiography and has an important 
criminal record, we get an insight into a "loyal and caring devotee" (II 
Roma of 31 March, 195941), an active though minor member, often 
39 Assunta Maresca came out of prison in 1964,1965, immediately we met (at) the 
Judge of Surveillance's office in Naples'tribunal and started having a relationship 
(Ammaturo, CD'Al9d: 69-70). 
40 For example, in 1998 she was called to testify against her brother Ciro but found 
all sorts of excuses not to do so. The police had to bring her to the court room by 
force. 
41 "Tanino 'e bastimento has an important penal record, but this is not enough to 
make him an illustrious camorrista. I ... 
I Gaetano Orlando was seeking his 
revaluation, staying in the shadow of Totonno 'e Pomigliano of which (as one of 
Esposito's brothers made clear in a letter) he was not a 'compariello' in the strict 
sense, because he had not been baptised by him, but he was a loyal and caring 
devotee [ 
... 
I next to Totonno 'e Pomigliano he undertook all the jobs, even the most 
modest and he was without money" (Francesco Canessa in Il Roma of 31 March 
1959). 
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considered an 'insignificant person' (II Roma, ibid) of Antonio 
Esposito's entourage, one of his hired hands. 
In his youth, Carlo Gaetano Orlando (1930-1998), alias 'Tanino 'e 
bastimento'(Tony, son of strong arms) used violence as a resource to 
resolve his problems (defend his father and protect himself) and thus 
became a violent small time criminal. By the early 1950s, he was 
involved with Antonio Esposito and carried out the execution of 
Pasquale Sirnonetti (see above). This was his moment of glory not only 
as a criminal, being the person who "murdered Pascalone 'e Nola", but 
also as a soldier demonstrating his loyalty, devotion, and gratitude to 
his boss. 
As a result, he spent the next 17 years in prison (1959-1971). 
When he came out, as his patron Esposito had been shot in 1955 by 
Pupetta Maresca, he, together with his son, seem to have become 
involved with his cousins, the Nuvoletta clan"' in the same capacity as 
before (kidnapping people and hiding illegal weapons). Although he has 
always denied being a member of the Camorra, he has clearly been 
associated with Camorra bosses and until his death in 1998 he 
enjoyed a kind of respect in the community normally showed to 
camorristL This case-study gives some insight into the role of many 
petty criminals who gained social prestige by being associated with 
emerging guappi to whom they gave loyalty and service. 
An example of a true guappo who never really sought or managed 
to modernise is that of Catello di Somma, alias Don Rodrigo (1906- 
1984), from Castellammare di Stabia. He was a traditional postwar 
hinterland guappo who organised the racket of fruit and vegetables, 
milk and meat. He also dealt in smuggled cigarettes and was once 
caught with 5000 cigarettes (See 118). His main characteristic was his 
free use of violence and his attitude of self-righteousness: he 
imposed his will on others and if they did not accept he intimidated, 
threatened or even kidnapped them. In the early 19SOs, he, together 
with other emerging criminals, was considered "socially dangerous" 
and banned from the race course. In 1955, he was sent al conflno, to 
See Lorenzo Nuvoletta in Chapter Eight. 
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the frontier, for bad behaviour. He had threatened among others the 
local politician and his family, Silvio Gava whom he appeared to be on 
friendly terms with. 
He did not remain long in Ustica, at the frontier, and was soon 
back on the mainland, where he stayed two and a half years before 
returning to Naples. He made a considerable amount of money from 
his different activities which he invested in a luxurious hotel in 
Castellammare. Moreover, it is interesting to note that although he 
clearly violated the law with his criminal activities, he was twice found 
guilty but never sent to prison. 
His political contacts are typical of post war guappt it would 
appear that, although he lacked respect for Silvio Gava at times, he 
was a gran elettore for Silvio Gava (see Chapter Eleven). His popularity 
and respect in the local community can be seen by the number of 
people (more than 5,000) who came to the funeral of his nephew in 
1975. The case-study of Di Somma shows the violent nature of guappi 
who took the law into their own hands and acted as the state. 
Domenico Mallardo, (1918-1967) Don Mimi aka Mimi 'e 
Carlantonio (Mimi, son of Charles-Athony) from Giugliano is the ninth 
representative of the rural Camorra. He was a small time criminal in his 
youth (intimidating behaviour, carrying illegal weapons, robbery, 
violence and illegal brewing of alcohol) as well as a deserter in 1941. In 
the 1940s and 1950s, his activities were varied but, contrary to 
Esposito, Simonetti and Maisto, he was never an agricultural mediator- 
racketeer. 
Although he was often seen as a threat by other older guappi, he 
was still steeped in traditional ways. By 1938, like many of his city 
counterparts she was fully involved in the smuggling and distribution 
of cigarettes and petrol in the Giugliano area for which he was 
arrested and tried in 1958 and 1960. When he was released after a 
short prison sentence he "enjoyed an important reputation" (IlMattino 
of 21 August 1967) although he was not a leading smuggler. The police 
placed him under special surveillance in 1965-66 and when he was shot 
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dead in August 1967 by the Maisto clan43, he was again under 
investigation. His 'American style' murder was unexpected and 
shocking since it indicated that normal illegal business activities could 
now be part of a more violent sphere of criminality. 
Domenico Mallardo's life incorporates the old traditional values 
of respect, honour, trust and faith with the new illegal post-war 
business activities and opportunities which were expanding in 
Campania at the time. But it demonstrates also that the Camorra 
based in the rural hinterland was modernising and competing with the 
urban Camorra in terms of activities and violence. 
7.6 Conclusion 
Within the theoretical framework, these case-studies indicate that 
the rules (code of honour, respect, loyalty) and resources (surviving, 
cunning, ruthlessness, violence) present in the 1950s were still to a 
great extent those of the past. The simple social-criminal practice 
which was establishing itself still had the socially useful aspect of 
replacing the state authorities where they failed the community; and 
the actors to a large extent were charismatic, old fashioned 
gangsters. Their practices were more often than not spontaneous and 
undertaken within the general framework of survival. Nevertheless, 
within the context of continuity there are signs of modernisation, of 
the adaptation of criminals to new market-forces and opportunities. 
This is evident in the case of Pio Vittorio Giugliano and Alfredo Maisto. 
43 This murder marked the beginning of a 25 year bloody feud between the Maisto 
and Mallardo clans. 
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Chapter Eikht 
The Camorras in the 1980s 
'Apart from Michele Zaza' 
8.1 Introduction 
During the early 1980s, among the many clans, families and gangs, 
two prevailed in their visibility and violence, so different as to be able 
to talk of 'two Camorras': "[ ... ] the Nuova Famiglia [NF] and the Nuova 
Catnorra Organizzata [NCO], structurally different - as well as 
hostile" (Tranfaglia, 1992: 306). 
By 1983, the NCO and its leader, Raffacle Cutolo, had been 
defeated by the Sicilian influenced NF clans-during 'the First Camorra 
War' (1978-83). The winning alliance, whose unifying aim had been to 
eliminate the NCO, duly disbanded and its two leaders, Nuvoletta and 
Bardellino, formed rival factions which fought 'the Second Camorra 
War' (1984-86) (Feo, 1989: 30-1). Nuvoletta was beaten and Bardellino 
murdered, but his young ally Alfieri formed a post-NF Camorra, the 
'Third Camorra', 'a New Campanian Mafia' (1983-931). These three 
Camorras had their own specific history, leaders, ideology, members, 
structures, activities and political-business relationships. 
Material hag become available through the revelations of pentiti 
which document the lives of important caniorristi, their different 
alliances and the role of subordinate affidiati, in various zones of the 
Campania region. The case-studies which follow refer back to the 
previous chapter and also bring out the transformation in rules and 
I These dates show the period of existence of these alliances. It does not mean 
that they disappeared afterwards just that they are no longer controlling and 
dominating the region as was the case with the NF alliance - each clan went their 
own way and are still dominant in their own territory. 
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resources which took place through the 1980s. 
8.2 Ta Nuova Camorra Oraanizzata': The Mass Camorra 
The NCO was a rigorously hierarchical and strictly local Camorra 
which flourished in the Campania region between 1977-83 (see Map 7). 
It modelled itself on the Bella Sociefti Refonnata for rules and 
regulations; at the height of its power in 1981, it was estimated that it 
provided "a living for at least 200,000 people in the Neapolitan area 
alone" (Jacquemet, 1996: 1); had an important membership; 2 and 
controlled a vast territory with Ottaviano as its headquarters. Raffaele 
Cutolo, who founded it in 1970, played a key role in the development 
and orientation of the Neapolitan Camorra3: a first step towards 
modernisation. 
8.2.1 The Leader 
Raffaele CUtOJ04 (1941 - ), alias Vprufessore'(the professor), '0 
Saggio' (the wise one), '0 Principe' (the prince), '0 Sommo' (the 
supremo), '0 Zio'(uncle) (see S15), was born in Ottaviano, the youngest 
of three, to a peasant family. After a happy childhood, he lost his 
father prematurely in 1953; as Michele Rosa, an old man from his town, 
explained "[ ... I this turned his world up side-down and then 
he killed 
2 See Picture I for structure of association and relationship of the different case- 
studies chosen. 
3 He argues that he has never been condemned of 'Camorra Association - law 416 bis and therefore strictly speaking he cannot be considered 'a camorristd (Letter 5). 
4 His life story has been recounted in a book, R CamorrisU4 vita segreta di Don 
Raffaele Cutolo, by Giuseppe Marrazzo, (Napoli: Economica Pironti, 1985,2nd 
edition) which was then transformed into a film with the same title directed by 
Giuseppe Tornatore (Italia, produzione Tilanus, 1986) 
5 Other names used to refer to Raffaele Cutolo include: Compare, Padrino, Vangelo 
(Marino, 1986: 637). Also 'Gesus, 'San Francesco' (Di Pietro, interview of 5 August 
1999). 
154 
IS-57 
P-i j 
som- . 
tis+; P" 
Second- in rommaW Ayslmk 
Advim 
ScjarriW - 
Z-nt ltacl6s 
C.. 
chIi1on-tM - 
s0t 
Picc, H, -- 
4rik irxm 
rp, I ON 
GLJolo, Le4dtr aoid fowxdtr, 
; QD ROM CUýWO 
3Ak I&M 
; A(LikU CMAO 
OUTSOE 
t 5(0 
that boy" (Rossi, 1983: 206) 
This murder led to his incarceration in Naples prison, Poggioreale, 
in 1963. There, he realised7 the potential that lay in such an 
environment: by helping young prisoners and their families with 
protection, money, legal aid and social assistance, he could create a 
pool of grateful and loyal followersý inside or outside prison 
(Marrazzo, 1984). On the surface, this project had the old-fashioned 
appeal of the 19th century Bella Societti Reformata: to fight social 
injustice, "a revolution against injustice" (letter, 6: 3). Cutolo wanted to 
be the Neapolitan "Robin Hood" (Marrazzo, 1981 in Rassegna Stampa 
sulla Camorra, vol 1). But in reality, he was to set up a criminal 
organisation based on mass recruitment which broke new ground by 
reducing "[ ... I the traditional gap between common delinquency and 
organised crime" (Sales, 1988: 154). 
He was released in 1970 and had contacts with smuggling 
Calabrian 'Ndrangheta gangs. This inspired him as they named him 
`caposocieni' for Campania, head of the Neapolitan Camorra. After 
being rearrested in 1971, he began to implement his criminal project: 
he recruited and trained young delinquents who, once released, served 
the organisation. They had to abide by strict affiliation rituals and 
rules9 in a rigid hierarchical structure while maintaining oniertel: Cutolo 
remained the leader, even while in prison, 10 and had capi zone (zone 
6 He did well at primary school and was a altar boy. His father died when he was 
still only twelve; this event may explain his future troubled and criminal life as his 
elder sister, Rosa, became responsible for him and his education: 
"Rosetta bought Raffaele up as her own child, she made a man of him" say those 
who lived in Ottaviano. When their father, Giuseppe, died many years ago, the future "Godfather of the Camorra" was no more than a boy and Rosa, the of first 
three I ... I felt she had to act as "father" for Raffacle who was the youngest. After all, Carolina, their mother was already too old to look after the family. Her strong 
and decisive personality was to emerge over the years" (Marco Pellegrini, 11 Mattino 
of 12 Sept 1981). 
7 He recalls how "my only 'tutor' Umastro) was don Vittorio Nappi from Scafati of 
the old Camorra" (Letter, 5: 1). 
8 Some people tell the story that while in prison at this time: he studied Antonio 
Spavone also in prison at the time, with all his benefits and one day even slapped 
him publicly in order to gain respect from inmates and create his criminal reputation 
(see Marrazzo, 1983, chapter 4). 
9 One of these rules was also the setting up of a tribunal which would judge 
members' behaviour (see Gay, 1998128). 
10 He maintains that once he was in prison, it was not he who commanded the 
organisation but rather people on the outside like Enzo Casillo (letter, 1: 2). 
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leaders), in each town across the territory to represent him. This gave 
members a great sense of collectivity, loyalty and commitment. 
The NCO's economic activities were robberies and extortion of 
businesses which were coordinated from Cutolo's home in Ottaviano 
and centralised for efficiency's sake: a percentage of the criminal 
profit for Cutolo and a monthly tax (500.000 lire) was collected from 
each zone to feed a solidarity fund for members and buy necessary 
items. In February 1978, he escaped from Aversa prison-hospital and 
challenged rival smuggling clans by demanding a levy on their 
activities1l. This provoked the First Camorra War. He was rearrested 
in 1979 and the NCO was heavily defeated in 198312 after great 
violence (between 1977 to 1983,1,500 people were murdered see 
Appendix Six) because its enemies had assistance from the Sicilian 
Mafia. 13 At the height of his 'career' in 1981, he played a major role in 
the Cirillo Affair14 as he had political contacts. Between 1982 to 1988, 
he was put into solitary confinement in Asinara island-prison and since 
1988, he has been in Belluno prison where he is serving seven life 
11 Rosanova junior has suggested that the real reason was that Cutolo did not want 
the Sicilians taking over in the region (CD'Al7x+y). 
12 The NCO's defeat was due to a combination of police investigations (the first 
maxi trials with a maxi blitz. This was the Tortora trial when many NCO camorristi 
including a famous TV presenter were arrested and accused of Mafia association 
and drug dealing, for more information about this trial, see Jacquement, 1996, who 
refers extensively to it) and the violence of the NF family clans. There had been an 
attempt at a compromise in 1979: the NF families would control Naples city and 
Cutolo the province, but Cutolo soon violated this pact as he wanted full control 
and domination of the region. Cutolo was placed in isolation for six years from 
1982 to 1988 to break down the channels of communication with his members and 
weaken his leadership. it is interesting to note that he did try and establish 
contacts with other international criminal organisations but failed to develop them. 
In 1978, while on the run, he met some bosses of the American Mafia who refused 
serious contacts with him because 'business is business' and the Sicilian Mafia and 
its allied in Campania were better organised, on a more international scale (De 
Gregorio, 1983). 
13 The Sicilian Mafia adopted a double tactic towards Cutolo: Buscetta recalls how 
in the 1960s, the Sicilians had tried to recruit Cutolo without success. In the 1980s, 
they then sought to eliminate him by ordering a killing squad yet again without 
success (see S010). 
14 See Appendix Eight. 
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sentences and refuses to become a pentito. ls 
His social-criminal practice marks a new departure in the history 
of the Camorra: "Cutolo's Camorra beyond, the superficial similarities 
of affiliation and initiation rituals, has little to do with the old Camorra. 
It is somewhat more complex a centralised organisation, using urban 
gangsters and violent young delinquents, exploiting their social 
aspirations, a crime-show with political links (Tranfaglia, 1992: 3 09). Yet, 
it failed, to go beyond the old Camorra's simple social activities and 
racketeering. As a leader, Cutolo tried to modernise the Camorra. He 
had the foresight to understand the need for political and business 
complicity in order to 'launder 'illegal money in the legal economy 
through public contracts: "he was very attentive to the influx of public 
funds and created his companies primarily to recycle illegal profits. He 
obtained public contracts and bribes on them" (Gay, 1998: 128). But his 
project remained too local and too centralised to compete with other 
criminal groups when he started to seek total dominance. 
8.2.2 The AccompUce 
In the shadow of the NCO boss, there was a woman, his elder 
sister: Domenico Rosa Cutolo, aka Rosetta, (1937 -) who acted as 
deputy leader and alter ego while Cutolo was in prison. Her case-study 
is interesting in two respects: as a woman and as an accomplice. 
The interpretations of her as a woman- accomplice show a degree 
of ambiguity. Cutolo himself said "Rosetta has never been a 
camorrista [ ... J she only listened to me and sent a few suitcases [of 
money] to prisoners as I instructed her to do (Il Mattino of 4 
November 1992). So did Pasquale Barra, his right hand man "what has 
Cutolo Rosa got to do with it, what have women got to do with the 
Camorra? " (S1: 384). Or the Neapolitan writer Raimondino "the women 
15 It is said that he is much respected in the prison community for not having 
become a pentito. He is very sceptical about pentiti considering them liars: "Believe 
me, they tell the truth i have nothing against these pentiti"(Letter 4). Indeed, If he was 
to talk, he would reveal a lot of intricate secrets especially about the Cirillo Affair. 
The NCO has disappeared but its members are still prosecuted. In December 1990, 
his son was murdered and his wife's family have been murdered. 
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of the Camorra are no longer colourful. things as Pupetta Maresca was 
at the time of her trial, but grey and sad women like [ .... I the sister of 
Cutolo" (1991: 23). On the other hand, judges have demonstrated that 
she played a much more important role in the organisation "the 
situation of La Cutolo has undoubtedly been influenced by her 
brother's way of life [ ... ] which by no means excludes the 
determination and excellent skills which she deployed in the 
realisation of the NCO's projects" (S1: 394). 
Not only was she a model of loyalty but, also a highly skilful, 
efficient and cunning accomplice. Apart from the routine activities of 
coordinating the organisation, collecting and distributing the solidarity 
fund and dealing with lawyers, she helped in Cutolo's escape from 
Aversa hospital prison in 1978 and avoided arrest during a maxi blitz 
on her home in 1981. She was on the run from 1981 to 19931G and was 
one of the key negotiators during the Cirillo Affair. It is clear that she 
was very active on behalf of her brother but that she never tried to 
usurp his power, remaining a devoted accomplice. 
8.2.3 Prison Lieutenants 
One of the NCO's differences from the guappi of old was its 
sense of solidarity, organisation, and also its systematic recourse to 
violence and therefore, to many killers. Many of the high ranking NCO 
camorristi, at the santista rank (second-in command17), undertook this 
role. A well-documented case is that of Pasquale Barra (194 5-), alias 
"0 nimale'(the animal), 'Alias', 7occhio di ghiaccio'(eyes of ice) from 
Ottaviano, one of the first members of the NCO. 
Barra was a violent young man who joined Cutolo in prison where 
their friendship and criminal project flourished. He helped Cutolo set 
up the NCO and was "from the very beginning a faithful follower" but 
preferred to take a secondary role, "reinforcing all intimidation, 
16 it has been suggested that she enjoyed solid political and criminal protection 
during this time even once the NCO was defeated. She gave herself up in 1993 on 
the request of her brother and was released at the beginning of 1999 after having 
served her time. 
17 See picture 1. 
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extortion, and racketeering activities within their territory" (jacquemet, 
1996: 67-8). During the first Camorra War, he specialised vicious killing 
inside and outside prison, where he commi , 
tted many murders, even of 
friends. His titre de gloire as a 'man of honour' was that he never killed 
anybody in the back, but it is said that he ate the heart of one of his 
victims! Eventually, fearing for his life and afraid that Cutolo no longer 
needed him, he became a pentito in 1982. 
In his evidence, he stressed the vulnerability of criminal friendship 
and his position as there was no shortage of killers in the NCO. There 
had been an escalation of violence as a means of becoming 
indispensable, but there was the underlying fragility of a highly 
centralised organisation based on 'contracts' between unrelated 
criminals. 
Pasquale D'Amico, aka O'Cartone (The Cardboard) (19?? - ?) 
was another high ranking camorrista who was recruited in prison in 
1976. As Cutolo's cell-mate, he became his PR man distributing orders 
to the organisation. A strong friendship developed between them, 
which may explain why D'Amico was allowed autonomy to recruit new 
members, order murders and expand economic activities (Jacquemet, 
1996). He escaped in 1981 but was soon re-arrested. The information 
found on him confirmed the organisation's existence and structure. It 
was his disillusionment with the organisation's easy use of violence 
which led him to become a pentito in 1983. 
8.2.4 Second-in Command in Civil Society 
With its boss continuously in prison from 1967 onwards the NCO 
needed strong and committed lieutenants outside prison to take 
command. They had to be loyal to the boss as well as capable 
organisers. Such were Corrado lacolare (1941- ) and Vincenzo 
CasUlo (???? - 1983). 
Corrado Iacolare, originally a car dealer, met Cutolo in prison18. 
He joined the NCO in 1978 (S1) and, once released became capo zona 
18 Ile was'involved in the Mallardo murder in 1967 (see Chapter Seven). 
IGI 
in the Giulianese. His intelligence and skills promoted him to the rank 
of second in command outside prison, a position which he shared 
with Vincenzo Casillo. As such he played a pivotal role in the activities 
and conflicts of the organisation. Responsible for economic activities, 
extortions in particular, he also had good diplomatic skills: he acted 
as mediator between Casillo and the boss Nuzzo during a racket 
dispute, took part in peace negotiations during the first Camorra War 
and also accompanied and advised Rosetta Cutolo during the Cirillo 
Affair. He clearly established himself as a man of ideas and business. 
However, he could also use violence when necessary: he was 
involved in the murders of the lawyer Cappuccio, Antonio Mottola, and 
Vincenzo Casillo's partner, Giovanna Matarazzo. To avoid death and 
prosecution after the NCO's elimination19, he fled to the USA, 
Argentina and settled in Uruguay in 1987. He was arrested in 1991 but 
escaped in 1992 returning to Uruguay. In 1998, he was arrested and 
deported to Italy. 
Vincenzo Casillo2O, aka Lorenzo, Enzo '0 Nirone (the black one) 
was a small businessman2l who sought protection from Cutolo and 
became his second in command, organising and developing the 
organisation's activities; extortions in particular, the profit from which 
was invested in other illegal and legal activities. He was a shrewd 
criminal who not only kept the organisation going, but also 
participated in peace talks with the NF in 1981-2 and was involved in 
the Cirillo Affair. it is said that he developed contacts with other 
criminal groups and the Secret Services and even murdered the 
banker Roberto Calvi in London for the Sicilian Mafia. He was 
murdered by Pasquale Galasso in Rome in 1983 using a car bomb, 
although Cutolo let it be known that it was he who was punishing his 
Man. 
19 He testified against Antonio Gava in the Maglio trial in 1994 from Uruguay and in 
July 1998, was arrested and extradited by the Italian authorities as one of the last 
free Cutoliani (La RepubblicA Naples pages of July 1998). 
20 From the important business family, the Ca-sillos, his uncle, Gennaro Casillo had 
an important grain merchant based in Foggia. Gennaro (now dead) and his son, 
Pasquale, are implicated in the Maglio trial and have other trials pending for 
Camorra involvement. 
21 He had a jeans factory in his home town, San Giuseppe a Vesuviana. 
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8.2.5 The Soldiers 
Among the army of anonymous soldiers recruited in prison by 
Cutolo some names have emerged; in particular Antonio Cuomo 
(19S1-1980), aka "OMarangeiello' (little angle) who was to be Cutolo's 
chosen heir and whom he had trained him in prison. However, because 
of his premature death, he retains the image of the faithful and 
energetic soldier who believed in the NCO's cause. Many pentili have 
talked about him, especially after he had been liquidated by his own 
boss for betrayal. They all praised his loyalty and commitment to 
Cutolo: "Cutolo educated him [ .. I he gave him a few million lire and 
exploited the boy's courage and charisma"(CPA1.1: 49). 
He became capo zona of Castellammare di Stabia and sought to 
organise extortions there. He helped in Cutolo's escape from Aversa 
hospital but, it seems as if he 'gave' up his boss on the run, in order 
to save him from being murdered by rival gangs. For this, Cutolo 
ordered his murder. He is representative of the mass of young, 
uneducated, small-time criminals who joined the Camorra as a job and 
were given a sense of identity. His criminal path and promotion to 
capo zona shows the NCO as a big family business giving 
opportunities to unemployed young men. He was murdered by Barra 
on Cutolo's orders in Poggioreale prison in 1980. 
8.2.6 The "Businessman' 
One of the less developed aspects of the NCO, compared to 
the later Camorras, was its relationships with the business and 
political worlds. However, certain contacts did emerge under Cutolo, 
for instance with businessmen such as Alfonso Rosanova (1924- 
1982). 
Don Alfonso was a shady character from Sant'Antonio Abate, 
involved in a wide range of activities: smuggling and the black market 
in the 1940s, subcontracting pinball and slot machines with Lucky 
Luciano in the 1950s (Caputo, 1998: 9), construction companies and the 
food process industry (tinned tomatoes and meat) during the 1950s- 
1G3 
1980S. 22 His reputation and fortune made him a respected local 
figure23 well-connected among businessmen and highly placed DC 
politicians (Francesco Patriarca and Antonio Gava24 used him as capo 
elettore for Sant'Antonio Abate, see chapter eleven). But, his activities 
were all on the margins of legality. He had many friends among 
camorristi (for example, Ciro Maresca, the Nuvolettas and Salvatore 
Zaza) and above all while in prison for suspected arson in 1969, he 
became the friend, and then mentor of Cutolo as well as his financial 
adviser on investing NCO money. As his son explains: "tit the 
beginning, my rather had a soft spot [for Cutolo] and introduced him 
to businessmen, industrialists, and various people from the 
Castellammare di Stabia area" (CD'Al7x: 6-12). All this made him 
invaluable to Cutolo. He was murdered in his hospital bed by the 
Alfieri gang in 1982. 
Alfonso Rosanova represented a new class of businessmen who 
appeared in the 1960s ready to dirty their hands and deal with the 
Camorra (businessmen camorristi25). 
8.2.7 NCO Conclusion 
These case-studies suggest that, contrary to previous gangs, the 
NCO was a specific criminal organisation with a large membership and 
a rigid structure. Its rules on the whole retained many characteristics 
of the earlier social-criminal practice (especially racketeering) but its 
new resources (easy access to violence and money) clearly showed 
the beginning of a rapid modernisation process. 
ZZ In 1982, he had legal construction business which employed 350 employees. 
23 Thanks to his reputation he could help Pasquale Galasso when he went to prison 
in 1975. He asked his friends and Cutolo to leave him alone; thus Galasso came 
under his protection. 
24 His son, Rosanova Ferrara junior, has recalled many meetings between the two 
men especially in Rome. Gava would allow Don Alfonso, who was on the run at the 
time, to use his office (telephone, fax, etc) in piazza Nazionale. This shows the 
initimate relationship they had; he had also such an intimate relationship with 
Senator Franceso Patriarca. 
23 As opposed to the camorristi businessmen which appeared in the 1980s who were 
camorristi who went into business (both legal and illegal). 
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8.3La Nuoya Famiglierthe Business CamOTra 
The NF alliance (1978-83) which won the first Camorra War against 
Cutolo was composed of different families and clans (see Map 5 for 
the NF's control of the region). Some were under the influence of the 
Sicilian Mafia (the Giulianos from Forcella, the Vollaros from Portici, 
the Zazas from Santa Lucia, Antonio Bardellino from the Casertano, 
the Nuvolettas from Marano) and formed what can be called the 
'Mafiarised Camorra' or 'Sicilian Camorra. Others remained 
autonomous and have been referred to as 'the New Campanian Mafia' 
(the Alfieri, the Galasso, the Moccia). Tensions between groups led to 
the Second Camorra war (1983-88) and the victory of the 'New 
Campanian Mafia' led by Antonio Bardellino and Carmine Alfieri. 
8.3.1 The Sicilian-influenced Families: the Drug-Experts 
The 'Mafiarised' Camorra26 was a hybrid organisation with both 
Camorra traditions and Sicilian organisation and methods. Its most 
influential members were affiliated to the Mafia. The head of the 
Neapolitan 'family' Lorenzo Nuvoletta was closely associated to the 
Corleonese family headed by Toto Riina and his leader Luciano Liggio, 
Michele Zaza was associated to Tommaso Spardaro and Antonio 
Bardellino to the Bontade, Baldamenti and Buscetta clans. These three 
Neapolitans were all regional representatives of the Mafia and were all 
represented by Michele Greco on the Mafia's central Commission, La 
cupola. Below them were local representatives, capo decina (for 
example, the Gionta, Gallo and Limelli families from Torre Annunziata 
and the D'Alessandros from Castellammare) who were leaders of their 
own zone, with their own lieutenants and advisers (Salvatore 
Migliorino, Antonio Tarallo) but who were subordinate to the heads 
of the family in Naples. At the lower level, were local men, foot- 
soldiers, who were not affiliated to the Mafia (for instance, Gerardo 
Intagliatore). 
26 See Picture 2, for structure of organisation and relationship between different 
case-studies used. 
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Picture 2: The Nuvoletta clan's structure and our case studies 
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Judge Falcone (see PrIS and Pr16). 
It is clear that Nuvoletta by the early 1970s, had established 
strong business relations and friendships of his own with the Mafia. 
These ties were reinforced during the Franco-Sicilian War of 1971-74 
and it was at this time that he was co-opted to Cosa Nostra by the 
Corleonesi as a regional representative. This gave him a great deal of 
power and prestige; he was in fact accused of mafia-type criminal 
association (associazione per delinquere di stamPo marioso) by the 
Palermo judges in 1974. On the demise of the Maisto-Sciorio clan in 
the early 1970s, he became a boss in his own right. He controlled an 
important territory "Marano, Calvizzano, Qualiano, Giugliano in 
Campania, S. Antimo, Mugnano di Napoli and various centres in the 
Caserta region" (see Map 6). 
When the Sicilians developed the cocaine and heroin trade at this 
time, they used the same route as for the cigarettes and the same 
collaborators: important mafia bosses such as Rosario Riccobono 
and Toto Riina stayed in Nuvoletta's house both for business and 
pleasure (CD'A14: 18) and received telephone calls from another 
important mafioso Luciano Leggio. 30 The Nuvoletta clan was by then 
fully involved in the distribution and financing of drugs in Campania. 
They made huge profits which allowed the clan to expand, diversify 
and invest: "On the criminal market, [the Nuvoletta clan] occupies a 
central role in the control of the drugs trade for heroin and cocaine. 
[ ... I For this clan, the drugs trade is only a way of making money and a 
lot of it, as only a small quota needs to be reinvested to sustain 
criminal activities" (Larnberti, 1992: 116-7) 
This is the crucial moment in the history of the Camorra when a 
criminal organisation specialising in racketeering and smuggling 
becomes a 'capitalist enterprise' (McIntosh, 1973). In our model, this is 
the moment of transformation from a social-criminal practice as 
undertaken by the NCO to an economic-criminal practice as 
30 I-herarchy of the Sicilian Mafia in the 1970s: Michele Greco the leader, then the 
Corleonese family headed by Luciano Leggio with Salvatore Riina as his right-hand 
man. 
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undertaken by the 'Sicflian' NF. 
According to McIntosh, a racket develops into a 'capitalist 
enterprise' when a criminal group (the NF Nuvoletta clan in this case) 
has established a monopoly position. in the illegal market by 
neutralising victims and subverting state authorities. From activities 
such as extortion or the provision of illegal services and products (in 
this case drugs) the organisation moves into the legitimate economy 
because of its accumulation of capital and starts controlling this new 
market. 
This financial accumulation is recycled, 'laundered', into a variety 
of legal sectors, while the illegal activities took care of themselves by 
self- financing. The spreading of illegal capital into civil society is a 
complex phenomenon during which it becomes difficult to distinguish 
between what is legal and what is illegal: "the Mafia's infiltration into 
the legal market, accompanied by a reduction in criminal actions, at 
least of the most violent kind in spite of the obvious benefits, 
represents, I repeat, a highly disturbing phenomenon. [ ... ]the mafloso 
who has grown rich on illegal earnings and has entered the legitimate 
business world [ ... I is a sign of the absorption and dissolution of the 
Mafia into honest society" (Falcone, 1993: 121). Once started, the 
mechanism snow-balls. As Judge Mancuso points out "the 
entrepreneurial sector has been used not only with the aim of 
recycling illegal money ('money laundering') but also in order to identify 
productive investment sectors from which more profits can be made" 
(S03: 29). 
This is exactly what the Nuvoletta clan did. His chosen area for 
recycling money, like many other clans, was the construction industry. 
This included supplies (cement companies) and machinery, all 
supposedly owned by 'clean' front men (prestanonn) who could deal 
with banks and escape police attention. By infiltrating the market 
place, he distorted and controlled it either through bribes, blackmail 
or intin-fidation: "with his own construction companies he takes part in 
the competitive tendering procedure, always introducing a mechanism 
of distortion; moreover with his own building supply companies he 
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imposes on other companies his own contractors, forcing them the 
recruitment of his own workers and the purchase of old stock at 
prohibitive prices" (Lamberti, 1992: 118). 
By the mid-1980s, he had an important business empire. From 
1980, he was on the run but remained in control of it: this was the 
golden age for the Camorra as the 1980 earthquake struck Campania 
giving rise to a massive reconstruction programme during which 
Nuvoletta strengthened and developed as a 'mafioso businessman, 
using more and more shady business to help in the hijacking of state 
funds and in the management of legal companies. 
Indeed, we may note two things about this 'Mafia method'. The 
first point to make is that organised criminals come to dominate and 
infiltrate the Political world (local and national), public administration, 
banks, (credit institutions), legitimate companies and trade unions 
because of two important resources which they possess. Firstly, they 
have large sums of money available allowing them to take over 
companies, corrupt officials and gain credit from banks. Secondly, 
they have freely available the resource of violence. Thus, they can 
resolve their problems through the use of violence (Mancuso, S03: 
chapter 1). This was particularly helpful in enabling them to infiltrate 
the massive post-earthquake reconstruction programme. 
The second point to make is that this 'mafia method' takes hold 
because trade unions are weak and businessmen are either passive or 
co-opted into corrupt Camorra deals because of the lack of business 
ethics that eýdsts in Campania. In this way, Nuvoletta (like Alfieri and 
Galasso later) was a 'mafioso businessman' (mafioso imprenditore): "he 
converts himself, acquiring the necessary economic means, to a 
business activity in which he can invest his illegal profits made from 
crimes" (S03: 23) which was different from a 'businessman marloso' 
(L'imprenditore mafioso) who was already an established businessman 
and became part of the Camorra in order to help to 'launder' the 
organisation's illegal profits in the legal economy (S03). 
As far as internal politics were concerned, Nuvoletta had also 
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adopted a Mafia approach: he was always very ambiguous, 31 in his 
alliances, often acting with duplicity to preserve his own interests. He 
was "an ally of Raffaele Cutolo" (Mancuso, S03: 20) and at the same 
time a leading member of the anti-Cutolo camp, NF, always trying to 
maintain a neutral position: "the role of the Nuvolettas was all the 
stronger because they sought to be the 'mediators' in the conflicts 
between the different Camorra families" (CUA17: 16) thus, never taking 
a clear position in the First Camorra war. 
In the ruthless pursuit of economic domination, he declared war 
in 1983 on Bardellin032 and Alfieri with his ally Gionta: "they did not 
wait long to gang up against each other in order to split the different 
spheres of influence and all the deals, first of which was the drugs 
trade (CUA14: 16). The Second Camorra war was fierce with 
massacres at the Nuvoletta house in Marano and in Torre Annunziata. 
Alfieri and his clan won33. 
When he died in prison, in 1994, although it is believed that his 
younger brother Angelo34 had already long taken over the clan, he was 
still a 'super boss', 'a charismatic leader', 'the boss of two Mafias', 
'the real leader. He had managed "to unite the old to the new: the 
agricultural products to building developments" (La Repubblica of 8 
April 1991). He adapted Neapolitan organised crime to the Sicilian 
method, with its emphasis on rational, functional strategies. He was 
31 Indeed, many pentiti have pointed out that they saw Rosetta visited the 
Nuvolettas and that they help hide her while she was on the run in the 1980s. It has 
even been suggested by some that during the first Camorra war the Nuvolettas 
never killed directly any of the NCO members. 
32 Nuvoletta moved to remove his ally Bardellino so that he would be the dominant 
force and sole Mafia representative in Campania; thus Bardellino's closest ally and 
fellow maftoso, Raffaele Ferrara was murdered on 10 of December 1983. This was a 
clear aggressive move against Bardellino and it is said that he was already 
considered dead by Riina. Bardellino together with Alfieri went on the attack 
against Nuvoletta and his allies: in June 1984, Ciro Nuvoletta was murdered during 
an attack on the family home where Lorenzo was the target and in August 1984, 
there was a massacre against the Gionta clan (Strage di TorTe Annunziata), close 
allies of Nuvoletta who were also involved in their deals and murders. 
33 It is argued that Antonio Bardellino was killed by his own men in South America 
in 1988. 
34 It is interesting to note the intermarriages that have taken place within this clan. 
For example, one of Lorenzo's daughter, Rosa married the son of another local 
boss, Raffaele Lubrano; his uncle Armando Orlando's daughter married an important 
Sicilian-Camorra boss: Luigi Scorio; his oncle Antonio Orlando's daughter Rosa 
married Enrico Maisto, the son of Don Alfredo Maisto (see Picture 3). 
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thoroughly dedicated to the Mafia as the pentito Migliorino recalls 
"Lorenzo Nuvoletta was a very charismatic man [ .. 1, a person of few 
words, of very few words, but he had a way with words when he talked 
about Cosa Nostra which. was very persuasive, he talked about his youth, 
about his ideas, about Cosa Nostra and its ideals which were 
rundamental to him [ .. j (B: 65). 
8.3.3 TheCapq decing 
To help the Mafia tighten its control over the territory, the 
Nuvolettas recruited many of their more reliable allies: "in Torre 
Annunziata from the early 1980s, there was one single clan, with 
Gionta Valentino as its leader, which incorporated the Gallo group and 
the Limellli clan; the Nuvoletta family, represented by Angelo and 
Lorenzo Nuvoletta exerted complete hegemony over this clan" 
(CYA14: 15). 
Valentino Gionta (1953 gave continuing proof of his 
unconditional loyalty to the Nuvolettas. At the time of the smuggling 
boom, he made a lot of money not only out of cigarettes but also out 
of drugs, following in the footsteps of one his uncles, Pasquale 
Marano, '0' Nonno' (the grandfather). And like many other small 
bosses of the time, he moved into more secure sectors, by investing 
his illegal profits into legal activities: the fish and flower markets of 
Torre Annunziata: "the control of the markets, especially the fish 
market but also shops, was achieved through a more subtle system 
compared to the classical violent extortions, through that form of 
tacit intimidation which was possible because Gionta was well-known 
by then and feared for his powerful organisation. Therefore he was 
able to achieve his aims without explicit threats or coercion" 
(CUA14: 14). The Gionta clan was extremely violent. On one occasion, 
for instance, they raped a woman whom they believed was about to 
talk (see S10). Moreover, they violated all rules of the Camorra as well 
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as of the Mafia. 3s But what is most striking was its extreme loyalty to 
the Nuvolettas. 
One of the prime examples of this attachment is provided by the 
Siani murder in 1985. In an article, Giancarlo Siani, a young reporter of 
the Neapolitan daily Il Mattino, had suggested that Gionta's arrest in 
Marano, on safe Nuvoletta territory, implied that the Nuvolettas had 
abandoned him and helped the police because they wanted to break 
up their alliance. The Sicilians and the Nuvolettas felt insulted and 
ordered Siani's murder; at first Gionta refused because of the bad 
publicity it would bring to his territory but in the end he agreed as long 
as it was carried out outside his zone. The clan and the Nuvolettas 
were finally condemned in 1997, after more than ten years 
investigation by judge D'Alterio. 
While this example illustrates the great loyalty which existed 
between allied clans, it also shows the complex nature of the different 
rules regulating this hybrid organisation. It is further interesting to 
note that the Gionta clan has the classic criminal family structure with 
the main family and extended members involved in Camorra activities: 
the children, the wife, even Gionta's father, Aldo, were arrested in 
1997. 
8.3.4 *Ibe Heutenant 
Besides the boss, there were many advisers: referring back to him 
for major decisions, they had a powerful position and important 
responsibilities. Salvatore Migliorino was one of them (1956 - ). He 
was recruited into the Mafia which gave him added strength and 
prestige in the clan. He is now a pentito and has given full details not 
only about his own life and the activities of the Gionta clan, but also 
: 33 In particular, allowing Di Ronza, a key member of the group to become a mafioso 
even if his father was traffic warden, a representative of the State. This is forbidden 
by Mafia rules (see Falcone, 1993: 88). 
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about the activities of Cosa Nostra in Campania during the 1980S36. 
He is representative of the many young delinquents who grew up 
in the streets of Torre Annunziata, in families who were "on the 
margin or the legal and illegal worlds" (B: 1), with no formal education, 
totally dependent on their peer group, gangs of young men living in 
and off the streets, in a culture of illegality where Camorra and Mafia 
values were dominant and human life of little value. He himself has 
stressed the level of deprivation of his environment and the lack of 
parental support. 
Through his life story, we can follow the development of the 
Gionta clan and the expansion of its activities. In 1975, when he went 
to prison for murder for the first time, he was already involved in 
smuggling, but he said: "let's say that in Torre Annunziata there did not 
exist a complete organisation, there were only isolated people but 
nothing concrete" (CPA2: 1). When he came out in 1984, the clan was a 
fully-fledged organisation, able to give him f 5,000 while in prison and 
f 2,000 on release. He was immediately recruited into the clan and also 
the NF, and soon after into the Sicilian Mafia (April 1984). 
By late 1984, the clan became a branch of the Sicilian Mafia (with 
Toto Riina from the Corleonesi and Marano Agate from Mazano del 
Vallo as its reference points), subordinate to the Nuvolettas who had 
affiliated them: "From that moment on, we always considered ourselves 
as mariosi [ .. II believed myselr to be, like the others, "one and the same 
thing" with the Nuvolettas from Marano and also "one and the same 
thing" with the other rHends or the Gionta clan. [ .. ] We formed a group 
with precise rules, a common kitty and an equal share-out or all our 
prorits and with Valentino Gionta as our leader (B: 8). 
36 Salvatore Migliorino is today a "I ... I state-turned-witness, 
[who] is absolutely and 
intrinsically believable, seeing that he offered his collaboration, admitting to have 
committed (in the first person) very serious crimes, even murders, when he had 
served nearly all his sentence for these crimes. The important role he had in the 
Gionta clan is highlighted by his sentences, in the marriage certificate of the 
daughter of Valentino Gionta at which he was a witness; by his own admission and 
external confirmations the role of mediator with local politicians; participating in 
extortions and taking part in important criminal acts for the clan which show him 
determining strategic choices" (SO10: 6). Salvatore Migliorino is an interesting 
character for he is one of the first mallosi from the Gionta clan to have collaborated 
with judges and explained some of the criminal mysteries that occurred in 
Campania in 1980s. 
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He 'fought' in the Second Camorra war against Bardellino and 
Alfieri37 and went to prison for one of these murders in 1984. When he 
was released in 1986, he became the leader of the clan in Torre 
Annunziata because the majority of its leaders were in prison. He was 
arrested in 1992 and became an important pentito as his declarations 
led to the solving and trial of the Siani murder in 1996-7. 
In Migliorino's evidence, we may note the attempt of the clan to 
'clean itself into the legal economy' by undertaking legal activities but 
also traditional features: self help, close brotherhood, all living in one 
building Palazzo Fienga38- and not extortion of the locals. Members of 
the clan have argued that to avoid social unrest the clan did not 
racket local businesses, only 'foreign' ones. 
Migliorino's roles are described in other legal documents and 
testimonies (see S10) progressing from smuggler to inafloso, from 
extortionist and killer to political and business mediator for the 
negotiation of subcontracts with important local politicians (il capo 
clan del settore appalto as Judge D'Altiero has called him). It is in this 
last role that he made his reputation as he obtained important 
contracts (for instance, building a School) and made considerable 
profits for the family. 
8.3.5 The Political Mediator 
One of the important characteristics of the 1980s Camorra 
(Mafiarised or not) was its relationship with the local and national 
political elite (see chapter eleven). Antonio Tarallo, was one of the 
political mediators of the Limelli family. 39 
37 Migliorino in June 1984 as part of the second Camorra war murdered two allies 
of Bardellino: Mario and Antonio Verde. He was arrested and released in 1986. 
38 judge Annunziata describes the headquarters of the Gionta clan: 
"as the residence of many of the accused I ... 
I as the Quartier Giniral of the clan 
containing doors and hideouts where arms and protector jackets are kept. In 
addition, a television security system was discovered to control outside activities 
for defensive reasons and, as will be seen for offensive reasons" (S10: 7). 
Expressions used by inhabitants to describe the defensive roccaforte that is 
Palazzo Fienga: "they were all closed in" "I told them if they believe they can, 
they must come and shoot me in my quarter" (S10). 
39 The limelli clan in the 1980s orbited both in the Nuvoletta-Sicilian faction and 
also the Alfieri confederation. Here, we are considering it part of the latter faction. 
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Born in Torre Annunziata in 1955 in an unstable family situation, 
he was sent away to the American Evangelical college in Portici until 
the age of 12. He went back to his home-town and started to keep 
bad company. He was arrested in 1982 for possessing fire arms. On 
his release in 1984, he joined the Limelli clan which was already 
affiliated to Cosa Nostra through the Nuvoletta clan. He became a 
member of Cosa Nostra in 1986; this was, he said, "an important 
moment because not all members of the clan became members of Cosa 
Nostra" (Pr6: 27/2). Retrospectively, this affiliation can be seen as a 
classic calculative manoeuvre on the part of the Mafia to prevent the 
Limelli clan from striking up an alliance with the Alfieri confederation, 
the Nuvolettas' rivals in the second Camorra war, as the alliance was 
never really activated. 
Between 1987 and 1992, Tarallo progressed and, like Mighorino, 
looked after the clan's local contacts with the political and business 
worlds4O. Although, he had less political clout than the rival Gionta 
clan, he still managed to win someý important public contracts for the 
Limelli clan. In 1992, Luigi Limelli distanced himself from Tarallo who 
quickly understood that he (and Migliorino) were the price for peace 
between the two clans. This led him to become a pentito. Contrary to 
Mighorino, he only looked after the political and business contacts 
and never actually murdered anyone. He used his criminal brain and 
was a thinking man rather than a man of action. 
8.3.6 The Bodvggard 
One of the intriguing characteristics of the hybrid Mafiarised 
Camorra was that its foot-soldiers were not affiliated to the Sicilian 
Mafia, a clear indication that the lower ranks of the clan were 
considered as mere mechanics. not that committed to the 'cause' 
(there are exceptions such as that of Fernando Cataldo, who was a 
ruthless killer but also became a niafloso). They were often in the front 
40 He earnt 150 milion a year. He received 4,6 milion a month until December 1992 
as a contribution from the gang. 
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line, not only in terms of physical executions but also as bodyguards 
and skilled hands. 
Gerardo Intagliatore (1963 -) was recruited from micro- 
delinquency for his skills and courage. He is emblematic of the many 
petty criminals who were recruited into organised, structured Camorra 
groupS41. They were often illiterate young men who took up small time 
crime to survive and were recruited for their skills, courage and 
criminal appetite but also for their discretion and respect of the 
hierarchy. In the case of Intagliatore, apart from his criminal skills 
(spotted by a camorrista for his expertise in burglaries), he was a 
good bricklayer and carpenter (fixing doors and making hideouts, all 
of which were strategically helpful and put to good use by the Gionta 
clan). 
As the group developed, so did his responsibilities. He 'was 
promoted' to armed bodyguard and driver of important members 
(Eduardo Di Ronza or Ernesto Gionta) as well as procuring the right 
equipment (guns, getaway cars, motorbikes), getting rid of 
incriminating evidence and distributing wages to other members. But 
he always remained a humble foot-soldier: he insisted that "when 
Donnarumma [a camorrista-mafloso from Gionta clanIspoke with 
Angelo Nuvoletta, I would move away not to overhear what they said" 
(CD'Al8c: 53). He was never recruited as a mafloso. He became a 
pentito in 1995 because he wanted to change his life and the future of 
his children. 
8.3.7 The Cltv Allies 
One of the key elements of the Nuvoletta clan's strength - as was 
true of Alfieri's as well - was its ability to forge alliances. It had solid 
alliances with some groups and pacts of nonaggression with others. 
As the clan was based in Marano, with its territory spreading north 
41 Another example is Pasquale Di Napoli from Torre Armunziata who after being a 
car thief and a smuggler of cigarettes became a drug dealer for a clan. These are 
often the first to be killed in conflicts. Di Napoli was murdered in 1997 (La 
Repubbfici4 15-4-97). 
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west of Naples, it was important for them to have strong links with 
the more urban clans of the centre of Naples. For example, at the time 
of the expansion of the smuggling trade in the 1960s, it was useful to 
have an alliance with another mafiorised clan, the Zaza family of Santa 
Lucia and, at the time of the first Camorra war, they had an agreement 
with the Giuliano family, from Forcella, which produced peaceful 
cohabitation afterwards. These two families had similar origins and 
were both based in the city, but played different social roles and had 
different economic activities. 
Michele Zaza (1945-95), aka 0 Pazzo(the Madman), head of the 
Zaza-Mazzarella family42 was, like Lorenzo Nuvoletta, an important 
inafloso and a regional representatiVe. 43 He is an interesting case- 
study for he demonstrates how important the illegal economy is to 
fuel the legal economy, and how important it is for a criminal 
organisation to develop and expand. 
He was born to a fishing family in Procida, the second of three 
brothers, and had, like many of his peers, a troubled adolescence 
(involved in burglaries, fighting, and even attempted murder). It was in 
his early twenties that he distinguished himself as an emerging 
smuggler, "un contrabbandiere". he had had the foresight to use all the 
opportunities available (Greek contacts with a base in Corfu, 
motorboats and a healthy market) to set up an extensive smuggling 
ring. During the 1960s, besides the Maistp clan, he was the leader of 
the other predominant44 smuggling group in Campania. 
He was so successful that he was recruited by the Sicilian Mafia in 
the mid- 1970s. Once again the Mafia's econon-dc logic was correct: it 
was to its economic and territorial advantage to co-opt Zaza into its 
organisation. The relationship also had benefits for him: in exchange 
for his allegiance and loyalty, it would protect him, in exchange for a 
cut of his profits, he would have access to more markets, and thus 
ultimately to the legal economy. He recycled his profits from his drug- 
42 See Appendix Six. 
43 There were only three criminal with such an important role: Lorenzo Nuvoletta, 
Michele Zaza and Antonio Bardellino. 
44 He controlled the zones from San Giovanni a Teduccio to Santa Lucia (Perez, 11 
Mattino of 20 June 1982 in Rassegna Stampa sulla Camorra vol 1). 
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trade into his brother's construction business ('Lloyd centuratd) (De 
Gregorio, 1983). 
The Sicilian Mafia thus enabled Zaza to transform himself into a 
big businessman, strong enough to act independently of the Mafia. In 
fact, he left Naples and moved to the South of France until he was 
arrested in 1994. Financial success through the drugs trade in the 
1970s therefore allowed him to move beyond the traditional 
boundaries of the quartiere (both for territory and inain doeuvre - 
although he still controlled it from afar) and to "modernise" his rules 
and resources: more money in particular. His successor at the head of 
the clan, his nephew, Ciro Mazzarella, reinstated traditional urban 
methods and remained in Naples to control the territory in line with 
most unmafiarised families (Giuliano, Contini, Liccardi). Zaza died of 
heart disease in prison in France in 1995.45 
The Giuliano family was also a important member of the NF 
alliance against Cutolo although it never joined the Sicilian Mafia. Don 
Vittorio Giuliano's elder son46, Luigi Giuliano (1949 - ), aka OLione 
(the lion), in the 1980-90s represented in Forcella the typical Camorra 
city boss sharing the territory of Naples with the Mariano of the 
Spanish Quarters, the Contini and the Liccardi of Secondigliano, the 
Alfano of the Vomero, etc, controlling drugs, cigarettes, arms, 
together with clandestine lottery, prostitution, extortion and 
burglaries. Although the clan47 was violent towards its enemies, it was 
very present in the quartiere and played an important role in the lives 
of its citizens, both as work provider and protector, two activities 
which the State authorities should supply. In exchange for these 
services, citizens strictly followed the rules of omerO as well as 
protecting criminals on the run and obstructing the police from 
arresting them as was the case in 1998. Luigi Giuliano and his 
45 The clan has survived under the leadership of Ciro Mazzarella although in the late 
1990s it is locked in a camorra war with the powerful Secondigliano Alliance 
(Contini-Liccardi clans). Ciro Mazzarella was arrested in Nice in July 1999, very ill, 
awaiting an operation. 
4G See Picture 4 for Family Tree. 
47 See Appendix Six for details about the clan. 
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Picture 4: The family t ee of the Giuliano clan 
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brothers followed in their father's footsteps but adapted to modern 
times while keeping a strong foothold in civil society. By respecting 
traditional methods, this clan in comparison with the more dynamic 
clans, made less money. 
8.3.8 NF Conclusion 
These case-studies of 'Mafiarised Camorristf show that they are 
different from the Camorra of the 1950s and to some extent from the 
NCO. Based on the Sicilian Mafia model, this Camorra was rigidly 
organised, seriously motivated by profit, with good local, national and 
international members and loyal and well-placed political friends. The 
economic activities (clans based in the hinterland) were sophisticated: 
from the smuggling of cigarettes to the international drugs trade, to 
the infiltration of the legal economy to recycle its 'dirty' money, 
through the use of its legal and respectable companies (in 
construction companies, cleaning companies and agricultural 
businesses). 
While, the city-based families, involved in the local social fabric, 
were less economically advanced than the hinterland families and they 
still invested in the illegal economy, the traditional Sicilian Mafia's 
values and codes of behaviour were respected and followed (and in 
this sense it was more traditional than the NCO). It had important 
political contacts which protected it to a large extent. 
The rules and resources were a mixture of both Neapolitan and 
Sicilian values, methods, attitudes and techniques. The rules were 
formal rules of behaviour for the group and individual: the strict code 
of honour which needed to be formally respected. The resources were 
derived from those commodities illegally traded in the region 
(smuggled cigarettes and drugs) but were greatly enhanced by 
investment in legitimate businesses. The 'Mafiarised' Camorra was a 
well organised criminal organisation which no longer undertook purely 
a social-criminal practice but which developed and progressed into a 
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more complex criminal-economic practice. 48 This practice involved 
both criminal acts but also more intricate economic activities and 
transactions. It had political contacts but these were still casual and 
spontaneous. 
8.4. The Alfieri Confederation 
The outcome of the second Camorra war in the mid 1980s was 
the victory of the Bardellino-Alfieri alliance. After Bardellino's 
supposed murder in 1988, Carmine Alfieri became the all-powerful 
leader of the dominant Camorra (see Map 7). 
From 1984 to 1992, his confederation infiltrated all strata of civil 
society and the state apparatus and became the dominant force in 
the vast area of the Napoletano and Salernitano. This was the period 
when the Camorra worked extensively at the level of subcontracts 
and built a solid relationship with businessmen and politicians 
becoming a criminal organisation involved in political-criminal practice. 
The main bosseS49, Carmine Alfieri and Pasquale Galasso, some 
independent ones (Mario Pepe) and others from the lower ranks 
(Domenico Esposito and Andrea delli Paoli) have since all become 
pentiti. Therefore, the case-studies are not only based on secondary 
sources (police, judiciary and the CPA reports) but also on their 
detailed confessions. 
8.4.1 The Leader 
Carmine Alfieri, (1943- ) aka '0' ntufato' (the fat man) or 
'Cann in uccio' (little Carmine) was born in Saviano, east of Naples, and 
was undoubtedly the architect and uncontested leader of the Camorra 
and criminal-political-business collusion which imposed itself in 
Campania between 1984-92. Although unique many of his life 
48 We may note that by qualifying it as a criminal organisation which undertakes a 
criminal-economic practice, this does not mean that it does not do other things but 
that this is its main activity. 
49 See Picture 5 for the structure of the organisation and the relationship between 
the different case studies. 
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experiences reflect more generally the mentality of the emerging 
caniorristL 
like many, Carmine Alfieri grew up in an environment which valued 
violence, revenge, respect and honour; his "faniily had old Caniorra 
traditions", said Galasso (16-3-93: 3) thus, when his older brother, 
Salvatore, murdered his father's murderersO, they gained respect, 
admiration and a positive reputation within the local community. He 
felt powerful and 'special'. 
In the 1970s, he had a furniture and meat business, he sold land 
and reinvested the profits in various businesses as well as lending 
money at interest rates varying from 15%, (less than a bank) to 50% 
(Pr8: 18-2-94: 2). He used his intelligence, business logic and shrewdness 
to become an established semi-legal businessman, with important 
profits and social recognition. 
In 1976, he murdered a smuggling-businessman rival, Glorioso and 
was sent to Poggioreale prison. Prison played its usual role on this 
twenty-five year old shady character. It provided him with the 
opportunity of making solid friendships within the criminal community 
between 1976 and 1978: he met and socialised with his future advisers 
and partners in crime (Pasquale Galasso, Angelo Moccia, Marzio Sepe, 
etc). Prison friendships would be one of the keys to his unique 
organisational structure as these loyal friends from so many areas, 
would form the reliable and loyal 'direttivo' (board of Directors) of the 
confederation, able thus to control a vast territory, criminally, 
economically and politically. 
It also provided the opportunity to study at close quarters the 
organisation of the e)dsting Camorra groups: Cutolo on the one hand 
and Nuvoletta on the other; both of whom sought his allegiance. 
Rejecting Cutolo's advances, he put himself under the protection of 
the Nuvolettas, who seemed the more rational preference because of 
ýu According to him, the cause was a "stupid argument" (lite banale, Pr8: 22.04.94) 
for the culprit was never arrested. Thus, his older brother, Salvatore a teenager of 
17, six years after his father's murder revenged his father's death and killed Notaro. 
As a result, he went to prison for ten years coming out in 196S. 
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their Sicilian alliance; 51 as he explains "practically, we were convinced 
that by putting ourselves under the umbrella of protection or the 
Nuvoletta, Cutolo would leave us alone"(Pr8: 22.04.94: 22). 
When Alfieri's gang triumphed in 1984 - after the two Camorra 
wars and the defeat of the NCO and Nuvoletta clan - its organisational 
structure did not appear to follow the rigid, Sicilian hierarchical model. 
Rather, "Carmine Alfieri and I [Galasso] never became members of the 
mafia. This choice was determined by a series of practical 
considerations, it did not suit us for a number of reasons" (S7d: 3). 
Indeed, his organisation had more a confederational structure, less 
rigid than the Sicilian Mafia with different bosses controlling their 
zones autonomously with their set interests, projects and 
relationships, though ultimately being subordinate to Alfieri and his 
close advisors; this organisational model was based on reciprocal 
friendship without any specific ritual, where everyone controlled their 
own zone52" (Pr8: 18-2-94: 3). Alfieri and his advisors, ("il gruppo 
direttivo"53), all had their own zones and as prestigious bosses 
protected their smaller allies. This is a modern criminal model, 
comparable to the Sicilian mafla but more flexible, where 'the directing 
group' behaved like the board of directors of a legal company; the 
different local leaders controlled their territory (politically, socially, 
criminally and economically) but referred back to Alfieri, the managing 
director, for advice and help more out of respect than out of 
51 "In 1981, there were many meetings in Marano, in the house of Nuvoletta; who had 
behind them the weight and strong support of Liggio, Mine; Bagarella and the whole of 
the Sicilian Mafia" (Galasso in P3.1). 
32 He controlled all the Nolano region with the help of Peppe Ruocco, Geppino 
Autorino, Marzio Sepe and also the Russo brother (Pasquale and Salvatore). And his 
men were Pasquale Galasso in Poggiomarino and surrounding areas through, Enzo 
Moccia in Afragola and surrounding areas, Ferdinando Cesarano in Pompeii and 
Ponte Persica, Angelo Vicciano, Luigi De Martino in the area of Boscoreale, Giovanni 
Pecoraro in Battipaglia, Giovanni Maiale in Eboli, Mario Pepe in Nocera, Pepe Olivieri 
in Pagani, Pasquale Loreto in Scafati, the Fiore brother and Luigi DAvino in Somma 
Vesuviana and Pasquale Galasso's cousin Domenico Galasso and Gennaro 
Brasiello, Catello Di Riso and others in SantAntonio Abate (see Map 7). Ile also had 
Antonio Malventi in Naples inFuorigrotta before his murder. 
33 This is the term used to describe the most important members of the extended 
Alfieri confederation, its board of directors. For this reason this organisation could 
be compared to a business but we will that it is much more than that. One of its 
main aims was to make money but it also was fully involved in civil society and the 
state. 
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necessity. In 1988, Alfieri's own loyal family was composed of 21 
members in 1988 with an average age of 42. No women were part of 
the family (see 112). 
Alliances beyond the confederation were another key factor in 
Alfieri's logic of expansion and survival. Through different alliances he 
controlled an important territory, the whole of the Napoletano and 
Salernitano (see Map 7). Some rival bosses were not so keen on this 
logic and rejected it as was the case in 1989 when the fierce Naples 
city clans (Licciardi-Contini-Mallardo as well as Bardellino's heirs, the 
Iovine, Schiavone, Bignotti and Verde clans from Casal di Principe) 
refused to join. Indeed, these different clans would prove to be the 
next Camorra generation, of leading more violent camorristi and 
cunning than Alfieri, but not as politically astute. 
Personally, Alfieri seemed to value friendship: he admired and 
revered the Neapolitan mafioso Antonio Bardellino but in the criminal 
world, it is a precarious value ("business is business") and he ordered 
the murders of many of his close friends and allies when they 
endangered his organisation. Survival was the key. 
The use of violence was still a crucial ingredient and used 
excessively especially during the Second Camorra war. The attacks on 
the Nuvoletta house in Marano and on the fish market in Torre 
Annunziata in 1984 are both examples of military and terroristic 
violence used to eliminate rivals. Alfieri explains that, "killing our rivals 
was a necessity dictated predominantly by the need to survive and also 
of maintaining control of the territory to avoid being eliminated by 
other organisations" (Pr8: 18-2- 94: 2). But killing was also used to avenge 
as previously and to warn off rivals: in particular, Alfieri needed to 
eliminate all those he suspected of his brother's murder, and 
therefore murdered Vincenzo Casillo, second in command of Cutolo, 
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with a car bomb in 1983. This was an explicit warning to both CutoloS4 
and the ruling political elite that he was now the dominant criminal 
force in Campania. 
Alfieri was on the run between 1982 and 1992. like many other 
caniorristi, he managed to hide locally and thanks to well-placed spies 
among the Police, he was fairly safe and protected. He became the top 
boss of the Camorra during this period, controlling magistrates and 
the political-bu sines s elite, not only because he was intelligent, 
understanding how the different relationships should work5s but also 
because he had a vast criminal network across the territory5r) with 
well-placed accomplices, and because local and national politicians 
needed his help to drum up electorate support which he provided in 
the communes of Saviano, S. Giuseppe, Nola, Boscoreale, Somma 
Vesuviana, Ottaviano, Trecase, Pompeii and others (Pr7: 17-03-93). 
In terms of economic activities, the Alfieri confederation's illegal 
activities included clandestine lotto, drugs and arms traffic but were 
mainly focused on extortion. Alfieri also adopted the much developed 
$capitalist enterprise model' but contrary to the Nuvoletta clan, his 
confederation had many more legal companies and political scouts to 
help achieve access to state funds. 
Indeed, Alfieri's Camorra, like that-of the Nuvolettas, had set up 
with the local and political elite an illegal system which was mutually 
beneficial and difficult to discover due to the Camorra's presence as 
legal companies: for example with the complicity of businessman 
Matteo Sorrentino, they won in 1984-5 a subcontract for Acquae 
Piovane worth 200 milion lire, in 1987-89 the building of a 100 flats for 
54 As Galasso explaifis: "[AIfleHj had decided to use a bomb, explosives to give Cutolo 
in the name of and for the institutions who were connected to him, a last message. "you 
are nobody, you are finisheg it is better for you to shut up about the Cirillo Affair"[ .. I The idea of using a bomb was thus that of convincing Cutolo to remain silent forever 
and never pull out the documents, this is what he seems to have decided At the same 
time, with this explosive criminal act, Carmine Alfieri would also show everyone that he 
was Gava and all his other political allies'new contact" (Pr8: 12-3-93: 13). 
Thus, this action had a clear symbolic criminal and political meaning, Alfieri was 
now the dominant leader in the region, the clear reference point for all. 
5S For example, in 1981. he refused to take part in the Cirillo Affair because he felt 
that politicians would take advantage of him. 
SG He controlled a much more vast territory than the Nuvolettas. The Schiavone 
gang also controlled an important territory. See Maps 6 and 7. 
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which they received a further 150 milion lire. This full symbiosis 
between the Camorra and politics meant that it was no longer merely 
a economic-criminal practice but ap olitical- criminal practice 
undertaken by an association, a business group. 
In 1992, his reign came to an end when he was arrested on the 
information provided by his faithful follower Pasquale Galasso who 
had become one of the first pentitL Some months later, Alfieri also 
became a pentitOS7 after ten years of dominance of the criminal 
underworld. 
8.4.2 The Charismatic lieutenant. Capqzona and Banker 
If Alfieri's confederation lasted for such a long time, it is because 
he had loyal, competent and efficient advisers who made up the 
general 'managing group' and who ruled in their different zones. One 
such capo zona, but also one of Alfieri's right hand men, was Pasquale 
GalasSO58 ('Pasquale was like a son to me'Pr7: 04-05-94v). The case- 
study of Galasso will help to explain the role of advisor and his 
different roles which ranged from killer to businessman and from 
extortionist to 'political agent' and election decider. 
Pasquale Galasso (1955- ) was born in Poggiomarino into an 
'apparently' well-off family, as he explains "in immediate post-war 
period, my rather59 [ .. 
] initially was a grain merchant. Then, with his 
own work, speculative deals, with property investments, he made a 
fortune which permitted us to live comrortably'(CPA1.1: 14). His father 
made his fortune from marginal and illegal activities and there is no 
doubt that this influenced his five sons. But, he wanted them to better 
51 It is suggested that he knows a lot more than he is prepared to reveal , in particular, that he did personally meet Antonio Gava and others to decide how to 
&cut up the cake' but he has never really gone into this. 
58 Although many in this confederation followed Galasso and Alfieri, there were 
still important members of this 'managing' level who rejected their decisions, men 
like Marzio Sepe, Ferdinando Ceserando, Angelo, alias Enzo Moccia. 
59 "GALASSO Sabato, founder of the family, appears to be the most important 
adviser to his sons, united with and with the help of other members of the clan, 
using their reputation as violent and domineering people, creating panic and fear in 
the population with threats and reprisals, has managed in a short period of time to 
create an important economic empire" (U). 
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themselves and to have a solid formal education "unfortunately, I 
have to say, I only realised today, that my rather wanted me to have a 
degree. Unfortunately, I became a criminal" (CPA1.1) Pasquale did not 
complete his medical studies as he became involved in violent 
Camorra conflicts to protect his father. 
Prison yet again played its usual role. Instead of reforming 
Galasso, Poggioreale goal, provided a course in crime during which he 
felt he changed and was influenced by "the criminal gotha or 
Campania or that period, from Mr Cutolo to the major mariosi 
references in Campania at that time who managed all the illegal deals or 
the maflosL These people were: Michele Zaza, his brother Salvatore, the 
Nuvolettas, the Sciorios, the Maistos" (CPA1.1: 9). When he came out, he 
not only became involved with the Alfieris to protect himself and his 
father's FIAT showroom, but also in the first Camorra war against 
Cutolo. He carried out 10 aggressive murders and personal vendettas 
(in retaliation for the murder of his brother, Nino on 21 January 1982 
and Salvatore Alfieri in 1981) in the early 1980s. 
After Cutolo's defeat, Galasso became a charismatic, well 
dressed, handsome, aggressive and violent criminal who demanded 
and commanded respect in his zones (Poggiomarino, San Valentino, 
Sarno, San Marzano, Scalfato, Boscoreale). Mario Pepe, a member of 
Alfieri's clan, noted his free use of violence: a person "was murdered 
because he'd had an argument with Galasso [ .. I this person did not 
respect Galasso, it was a question orprestige" (S7e: 28). In the mid 1980s, 
these criminals became so powerful and feared that they could 
basically do what they liked. On may occasions they freely distributed 
sanctions to resolve problems which citizens asked of them and took 
the law into their own hands. This happened because people felt they 
related more to the local camorrista than the state authorities which 
remained ineffectual and*remote. 
What is interesting in the case of Galasso is his multifaceted 
nature: a ruthless killer but also a legal and efficient businessman and 
a refined political mediator. As a zone leader and businessman, he 
was also the local political organiser, which made him an important 
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reference point in the community with solid contacts. In 1984, he 
distanced himself from the criminal organisation and concentrated his 
efforts on his legal and semi-legal business empire. In 1987, Alfieri 
asked Galasso to be his banker which Galasso accepted as he saw 
this as a guarantee of survival and a way of expanding his legal 
activities. Galasso's business empire was acquired illegally through 
mafia techniques: either corruption of politicians and businessmen (he 
acted as a bank and protector for businessmen in return for 
involvement in the company and money) or through violence (he would 
take over companies which interested him by using force, threats or 
extortion). 
A clear example of Galasso's business dealings can be seen in his 
setting up of the cement consortium PRO. CAL in 1988. The 
consortium, of which he was a director was organised with the help of 
politicians and businessmen to offset the fall in business. The 
Camorra and politicians provided social, legal and political protection 
to the businessmen as well as furnishing materials in exchange for a 
percentage of the profits (for example, 2.000 lire per cubic metre of 
cement). They were inspired by the Casalesi clan (see page195-6) in 
the developing of this model but it was so successful that it became 
a model for other city Camorra groups (such as the Licciardi, Mallardo 
and Contini clans) which were even more greedy and wanted a higher 
percentage. Subcontracts were so abundant in the post-earthquake 
decade that the organisation could survive purely on this activity 
alone without needing to take part in other illegal activities such as 
drug-trafficking. Here we see the transformation of the Camorra from 
an e conomic- criminal practice to a political- criminal practice. 
The case-study of Galasso is particularly interesting for it 
illustrates the different and dangerous qualities that a boss must 
combine to make huge sums of money, to become a vital part of the 
economy and civil society and to become a fundamental ally for 
politicians who needed social consensus in the region. 
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8.4.4 The Drug Dealer 
Once the NCO was defeated, many of its allies went over to the 
new dominant clans of the NF, 60 as was the case, for example, of 
Nicola Nuzzo, '0 Carusiello'from Acerra who joined the Alfieri clan, or 
of Carlo Biino, Carmine Costagliola and Salvatore Di Massa who joined 
the Giuliano Clan (see CD'A9). These moves were clearly undertaken 
for strategic reasons, involving survival as well as economic 
calculations. During this exodus, the Alfieri confederation provided a 
natural home; it was better than that of the Nuvoletta clan, because it 
was much more flexible, tolerant and economically successful. 
Domenico Esposito, (1959-) alias "Mimi '0 Blindato' (Domenico, 
the armoured one), shows this logic at work for he, like many others 
who were not in a rigid organisation, sought to join the emerging 
Camorra groups. He was born in San Felice a Cancello in a modest 
agricultural family and became a sales representative for the company 
"FratelliSalviato" in Caserta. His was not a Camorra family but he 
became involved when he avenged his father's murder. 
In 1984, he joined the Nuzzo clan (an ex-NCO clan from Acerra 
which sought NF alliances) and its leader Nicola Nuzzo helped him to 
organise his own group of 20-25 men. His activities were extortions 
and the racketeering (of agricultural products; mainly potatoes). As 
Nuzzo was still considered an NCO representative, Esposito 
understood that his alliance with Nuzzo was dangerous so he 
distanced himself and sought to ally himself with Alfieri. 
His case-study also illustrates the violation of rules that occurs at 
the lower levels of the organisations. Not being able to get into 
contact with the top man Alfieri, he became involved with one of his 
advisers, a dangerous and ambitious carnorTista called Pasquale 
Russo, who was in Esposito 's words "an arm of the [Alfieri] clan" and 
this made Esposito "an arm of the arin of the [Alfieri] clan" (A: 29). 
Russo set him up in the drugs business, evýn if it was officially 
forbidden by Alfieri who saw drugs as a potentially serious social 
problem for the local community, the Camorra's natural ally. 
CIO There is the odd example of camorristi also moving in the other direction as was 
the case for Armandio del Giudice who moved from Alfieri's clan to the NCO. 
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Esposito was able to buy cocaine from Naples and then sell and 
distribute it freely from his 'internal banishment' location al conflno, 
Cattolica near Rimini as there was no clear police control of his 
activities. This episode highlights yet again the police's inefficiency in 
fighting such a phenomenon. We must stress the ambiguous role that 
drug- trafficking plays for Camorra groups. Whereas Nuvoletta and 
Bardellino clearly made money from drugs, Cutolo and Alfieri had a 
moral dilemma about drugs. Even, if they officially forbade them, it is 
clear that many of their most intimate associates were important 
drug-traffickers (in Alfieri's case, the Moccia clan). 
Having made a lot of money from extortions and drug-trafficking, 
when Esposito returned to Campania he tried to take the next step 
and move into the legal economy through subcontracting. But, he 
never really succeeded due to his lack of connections and of 
organisation. In 1992, he was arrested for extortion and became a 
pentito. 
8.4.5 The Toval' Criminal 
Mario Pepe provides a further interesting case-study because he 
illustrates not only sincere loyalty in a cruel and violent world but also 
the different variety of people involved in the Camorra. Its members 
are not only violent criminals and petty thieves, but also so-called 
'legal' businessmen. 
Mario Pepe (1949 -) was born in Pagam in a poorish family and 
became a cabinet maker, then had a car showroom while also 
becoming involved in petty crime such as smuggling and carrying guns 
which he defines as non-Camorra activities. Galasso contradicts this, 
however, "All the old Cutoliani Camorra groups (the Maidle from Eboli, 
the Forte from Baronissi, Salvatore di Maio from Nocera Inferiore, Pepe 
Mario rrom Salerno, the Marinelli brothers from Avellino, the Graziano 
from Quindici, the Maisto from Giugliano and others) tightened their 
relationship with our organisation" (Pr8: 12-3-93: 1). His life story shows 
the progression from petty criminal to bodyguard- soldier, and 
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eventually he sought independence in his zone of Nocera Inferiore in 
the early 1990s. It was through his friendship with Antonio SaleG1, alias 
Tingegniere' (the engineer because of his profession as a land- 
surveyor) and Gennaro Citarella, a builder and cement seller, that he 
met Carmine Alfieri. At first, he accompanied and became the 
bodyguard of the main bosses (Galasso, Cesarano, Moccia, Russo 
etc) but because the organisation was flexible, he and his two 
businessmen friends soon found the space and territory for their own 
activities which meant that they could become more autonomous. 
This also indicates the extent of their self-confidence and their wish 
to act on their own. 
This group was dynamic and successful as Sale and Citarella had 
good business and political contacts and thus could make some 
profitable deals (in particular, on the Nocera-Caserta railway in the late 
1980s). Alfieri used Sale and Citarella while they were useful to him and 
his organisation, but once they started to gain too much 
independence in the Nocera Inferiore region, they were eliminated 
(Antonio Sale in September 1990 and Gennaro Citarella in December 
1990). 
This episode illustrates the precarious and fickle nature of 
'friendship' in the Camorra and also the leader's need for power and 
control at all cost. Nevertheless, Pepe defied this and became an 
autonomous boss in Nocera Inferiore in 1990, dealing in both legal and 
illegal activities. He became a pentito in 1991 after he felt that he was 
in personal danger. The remaining bosses, in particular, the Moccia 
brothers, sought to punish him as a pentito and murdered his brother 
in 1993.62 
Mario Pepe's case-study demonstrates the ruthlessness of the 
Camorra world, and the difficulty of managing relationships within it. 
61 Sale treated Alfieri as a brother and was the only one who was apparently allow 
to shout at him (see S7e). 
G2 There has been a military attack by different Camorra clans against pentiti and 
their families: Mario Pepe lost his brother, Antonio, in 1993 and Umberto Ammaturo 
also lost his brother, Antonio, in 1993 (CPAIA). Carmine Alfieri's son was 
kidnapped and some of his relatives have been murdered. 
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8.4.6 The Killer 
The whole confederation was extremely flexible and allowed its 
members to act independently: local clans recruited young members 
who were free to go. Andrea delli Paoli (1958 -) is an example of 
such a delinquent who made his way up the criminal ladder becoming 
more and more independent. 
He was born in Caviano in the expanding suburbs of Naples, 
where there was high unemployment and crime-rate. His childhood was 
difficult; he spent a long time in borstal in Naples (il Filangieri) and 
became involved in small-time crime, micro-delinquency before being 
recruited into the Moccia clan as a protective measure (the NCO had 
tried to murder him). Once a member of the Moccia clan, his main role 
was as a soldier, bodyguard and NCO killer in the Afragola, Caviano, 
Casoria, Arzano and Frattagmagiore zones carrying out extortion and 
murders. He distanced himself from the clan when they did not want 
to cooperate in a murder. He became a pentito in 1992. 
8.4.7 The Important AlRes 
Finally, if Alfieri was able to become the dominant force in 
Campania in the 1980s and winner of the Second Camorra war, it was 
thanks to his alliance with the Neapolitan mafioso Antonio Bardellino 
who was extremely cunning and had great criminal vision; he was 
perhaps a criminal genius. 63 Bardellino was an important criminal 
during the 1970-80s not only because he was a representative of the 
Sicilian Mafia but also because he was particularly admired and 
respected by his peers among whom were Umberto Ammaturo and 
Carmine Alfieri. These two groups (the clan from the Casertano and 
that of the international drugs baron) were thus indirectly Alfieri's 
allies, although with the disappearance of Bardellino in 1988, they soon 
distanced themselves from the Alfieri clan. We believe it is important 
to look at these two criminal groups because they are yet again 
63 A lot of political scams were put into place by him and It would appear that he 
started this form of political-criminal practice. 
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different forms of Camorra with clear rules and resources. 
The Casalesi, the Schiavone clan, from Casal di Principe provide a 
good example of internal fighting and violence. It illustrates clearly the 
violent dialectic which ruled these organisations whereby friends and 
brothers killed each other for money and power. Francesco Schiavone, 
alias Sandokan, started out as driver and bodyguard of Umberto 
Ammaturo, then as the old bosses (Bardellino and lovine) and 
potential younger leaders (the Bidognetti, the De Falco, and the Verde) 
disappeared in the space of seven years, it was his turn to become 
the boss of the clan in the 1990s as he was the strongest and most 
cunning of this new generation. This clan was the descendent of 
Bardellino's which may explain why it was one of the most modern 
clans in Campania whose business and political activities were in the 
vanguard and copied by many, the Alfieri confederation in particular. 
This clan dealt in traditional extortion of agricultural businesses 
in its rural territory, but also in much more up-to-date profitable 
activities such as drug-trafficking, EC frauds, public subcontracts and 
recycling nuclear waste. EC frauds, which were also carried out by the 
Nuvoletta clan in the 1970s, consisted of setting up scams with legal 
businesses receiving EC money for declaring overproduction of 
agricultural products which did not exist. It was in the extortion of 
agricultural cooperatives, dealing in drugs and the winning public 
subcontracts that it set the trend. It also started recycling nuclear 
waste. 
This clan carried out many extortions, but soon moved into more 
profitable activities in 1980 like drugs dealing where there was a high 
return on investment as they usually monopolised the market. Public 
contracts were won through collusion with politicians and their legal 
companies. Recycling nuclear waste consisted of importing nuclear 
waste from Eastern Europe and recycling it in the region and then in 
other regions. These activities were in stark contrast to the urban 
clans, like the Giuliano or the Mariano of Naples city which were very 
present in the community. This is illustrated by the clan's town of 
Casal di Principe which is not a small intimate town but one full of 
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bunker houses with high security systems to protect the different 
members. 
The configuration of the Sandokan clan in the 1990s shows its 
tight-knit family structure. It was dominated by the Schiavone family, 
both in its criminal branch (camorristi) and its in socially respectable 
branch (doctors and businessmen). For example, Carmine Schiavone 
(1940 - ), the cousin of the leader, was a violent young man (carrying 
fire arms, selling illegal goods, robbery, frequenting clandestine 
casinos where he met Bardellino) who joined the organisation with 
many of his cousins. By 1989, when Francesco Schiavone became 
boss, he nominated his close relatives to key posts, including Carmine 
Schiavone, as political adviser (he was already financial adviser) and 
members of the legal branch to the municipal council (see chapter 
eleven). 
Although, this clan had been affiliated to the Sicilian mafla in 1981, 
it soon sought independence of all its affiliations and its alliances 
(including that with Alfieri). This gave it major flexibility and control 
over its activities. This policy enabled it to be at the forefront of the 
development of the Camorra in the early 1990s. A fundamental aspect 
of the Camorra's development in the post war period was its 
involvement in the international drugs trade in the 1970s. This major 
resource was a vital ingredient in the Camorra's transformation. 
Indeed, there is no doubt that its involvement in the drugs trade 
permitted its dramatic transformation: using the money made from its 
extortion activities it invested this capital (about 50%) into the drugs 
trade. Drugs allowed it to accumulate vast capital which it then could 
recycle into the legal economy, in building companies or the tourist 
business, for example. The greater the finance available to the 
Camorra the more organisation was required. When the Camorra 
became involved in international drugs trafficking, it had to organise 
and organise it did with international banks and scientists to set up 
refineries and locally distributors. 
Umberto Ammaturo (1941 was an ally of Bardellino and 
brother-in-law of Antonio Malvento adviser of Alfieri. He is an 
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interesting character who began his criminal career in 1955-6 as a 
petty criminal, then a cigarette smuggler in the 1960s; in the 1970s he 
became a drugs baron; in the 1980s, he escaped to South America to 
set up some businesses; and in the 1990s, he ended up as a pentito. 
His activities covered the whole period we are studying and show 
clearly the development of rules and resources between the 1950s 
and 1980s. Moreover, since he became a pentito his statements, 
despite some reticence, provide useful information and insight into 
the transformation of the Camorra. 
Umberto Ammaturo, alias "0 pazzo(the mad oneG4) was born in 
a large Neapolitan family which was economically and emotionally 
precarious: his father's wine business suffered from economic 
difficulties while he lost his mother at the age of seven. So, like many 
of his generation, he became a street urchin, 'guaglione'of the street" 
(Perez, 199663) where his criminal career began. 
In the 1960s, he became involved in smuggling and was sent to 
prison in the early 1970s where he met the light-footed and modern 
Sicilians Gennaro Ferrigno and the Grieco brothers, who helped him 
become one of the most important drugs baron of his generation. 
Prison played a fundamental role in the development of Ammaturo's 
criminal career: in the mid-1970s, in Aversa goal he met the main local 
bosses Angelo, Ciro, Aniello and Antonio Nuvoletta as well as Raffaele 
Ferrara (a Neapolitan mafioso) when they were rising to power. In 1963, 
he became involved with Pupetta Maresca and in 1977, he was 
involved in a extensive cocaine deal with the Consul of Panama and 
Aniello Nuvoletta. He joined the NF alliance, when Cutolo started his 
offensive in 1981 and was heavily involved in the Camorra war 
together with Bardellino. Together, they murdered many NCO 
members. In 1987, he fled via Africa to South America to invest his 
money in the drugs traffic and hotels. 
Ammaturo remained a loner and was the exception which 
confirms the rule: he had no territory, no family and specialised 
W This nickname was adopted due to the fact that when he was In prison and faced 
trials he pleaded insanity, a well-known ploy used by criminals. 
6S Interviews of 6 September, 199G and 4 April 1997, Naples. 
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entirely in drug dealing. He had wealth and power and yet no social and 
even less political, control. He became a pentito in 1993 when he 
revealed important criminal secrets. 
8.4.8 Alfieri Conclusion 
The Alfieri confederation group Pan be seen as a clear evolution 
of both the NCO and the Sicilian-influenced Nuvoletta clan: its basic 
economic activities were the same as the NCO when it reached its 
maximum potential. But it was more Neapolitan and autonomous from 
the Mafia; it was less rigid and more informal than the NCO. It had no 
initiation rituals but was more specialised and more sophisticated; as 
will be seen, it had the opportunity to move into politics and took it. 
In theoretical terms, it started out as an organisation, business 
which had undertaken a social-criminal practice like the NCO and an 
economic-criminal practice like the NF but then evolved into a 
p olitical- criminal practice, in McIntosh's terms a 'political capitalist 
enterprise, ' making money with political help, a sophisticated business 
which is an accumulation of all the Camorras and practices which have 
come before. 
8.5 General Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have sought to illustrate the transformation of 
the Camorra in the 1980s using the life stories of prominent 
camorristL It is clear that between the 1970s and 1990s an 
extraordinary transformation took place: the characteristics of the 
different prominent Camorra gangs demonstrate this: from extortion 
(a social-criminal practice) to drug dealing (an economic-criminal 
practice) to public contracts (a political- criminal Practice). Our three 
different Camorras clearly show these three stages of development. 
Now, we turn our attention to understanding how this occurred. 
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Chanter Nine 
The Neapolitan Camorra's Post-War Transformation: 
Successful Modernisation 
"Modernisation is a revolutionary process. " 
S. P. Huntington (1998: G8) 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have established that a 
complex process modified the Camorras from being, in the 
1950s, loose alliances of criminal individuals who enacted a 
social-criminal practice; to in the mid-1970s, a more disciplined 
criminal organisation but still undertaking a social-criminal 
practice; to in the late 1970s and early 1980s, families 
influenced by the Mafia to undertake an economic-criminal 
practice; and finally, by the mid-1980s, a massive 
confederation, or cartel of criminal alliances involved in a 
political- criminal practice (the Alfieri confederation). In this 
chapter we endeavour to identify the reasons for such 
transformations. 
9.2 Modernisation. of Italy in the Post-War Period 
The rebuilding of Italy after the Second World War 
involved thirty years of economic growth ('1es trente glorieuses) 
and the passage from an industrialising to an industrial 
society. This boom involved technical progress, development 
of scientific knowledge and industrialisation. It had wide 
political, social and cultural repercussions such as 
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urbanisation, secularisation, demo cratis ation, education, 
consumerism and media participation. This multi-faceted 
transformation provoked in Italy, to use Martinelli's words, "a 
true social revolution" (1999: 4) "involving changes in all areas 
of human thought and activity" (Huntington, 1968: 32). 
From a modernist, 'progressivist' perspective, this 
development can be interpreted as a positive experience and 
as the motor of change in the rest of society, encouraging 
social, political and cultural developments leading towards 
universal well-being and happiness (see Pinto, 1981) "a sort of 
utopic evolutionism" (Lash and Wynne, in Beck 1992: 2). In a 
more skeptical 'regressive' perspective, the pharniakon of 
progress, as Agnes Heller (1999) pointed out, can be seen 
either as a medicine or as a poison: "a dark dimension" can be 
perceived to the process of modernisation, whereby "a set of 
risks and hazards, the likes of which we have never previously 
faced" (Lash and Wynne, ibid) appear. Already, in the nineteenth 
century, Marx and Durkheim had seen the dangers of so-called 
'progress'. 
Huntington (1968,1998) also developed this 'regressive' 
position pinpointing in particular how modernisation breeds 
violence and corruption. He defined 'modernisation', which in 
Western Europe began at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century but was significant and rapid in the post-war period, 
"as a product of the tremendous expansion of scientific and 
engineering knowledge [... ] that made it possible for humans to 
control and shape their environment in totally unprecedented 
ways" (ibid, 1998: 68) and looks at its different aspects and how 
it touches every part of "human thought and activity". 
"Modernisation'involves not just structural change" write Lash 
and Wynne, "but a changing relationship between social 
structures and social agents. When modernisation reaches a 
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certain level, agents tend to become more individualised, that 
is, decreasingly constrained by structures. In effect structural 
change forces social actors to become progressively more 
free from structure. And for modernisation successfully to 
advance, these agents must release themselves from 
structural constraint and actively shape the modernisation 
process" (in Beck, ibid). Huntington shows how it has an effect 
both on the agent at an individual level and on the collectivity 
at a mass level. At the psychological level, modernisation 
involves a change in values, attitudes and expectations: 
shifting from the micro (family, village-based framework) to the 
macro-level, of impersonal group ties, moving away from the 
individual to the universal. At the intellectual level, there are 
changes in knowledge, with an increase in literacy, mass 
communication and education. 
At the social level, clear changes in patterns of life 
appear: longer life expectancy, more employment, geographical 
mobility, a population exodus from the rural countryside to the 
urban cities. The family is no longer the centre of the 
individual's life, as more secondary associations start to have 
varying and specific functions. At the economic level, there is a 
diversification of activity, more complex occupations and 
skills, capital intensive rather than labour intensive production 
and a decline of agricultural activities as more commercial and 
industrial activities expand. Thus, with modernisation, there is 
an expansion of the geographical scope of economic 
activities, which move away from the local to the national and 
more centralised level, to the national market with national 
sources of capital and this was expected to introduce 
increased economic well-being and reduce economic 
inequalities. 
In Italy, this social change took the form of a drastic 
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transformation, as Martinelli highlighted, from a largely 
agricultural economy to a service-oriented economy with 
strong industrial foundations, from a self-reliant economy to a 
fast-growing, export-oriented economy, from an important 
demographic expansion to a zero population growth and a 
nuclear family base, from aI ab our- exporting country to a 
labour-importing country, from a largely peasant society to a 
mature, urban, informed society, from a simple social structure 
to a socially fragmented mass society, from a static social 
structure to a highly mobile population, from traditional 
consumer attitudes to individualistic, mass consumption 
patterns, from a fragmented society with different dialects to 
a unified society with one national language, from ethnically 
homogeneous regions to an ethnically heterogeneous national 
society, from family-based solidarity to a welfare system, from 
traditional power relations to organisational patterns, from 
subordinate home-caring women to liberated and autonomous 
working women, from a traditional, religious culture to a 
modern secular culture, from authoritarian regimes to 
representative democracy, from class antagonism to self 
employed versus employed workers and welfare versus private 
sector conflicts (1998: 4-3). This concept of 'modernisation' by 
Martinelli only helps up until a point. This thesis will show that 
it is misleading for the South. Indeed, in the South this social 
transformation was not so clear cut (Allum, 2000). Borelli (1972) 
has argued that modernisation in Naples was too rapid and 
thus, produced a 'hybrid' society which was not completely 
industrialised containing elements of a pre-industrial traditional 
society and a modern industrial society. 
Increased social mobilisation and economic 
development have an impact on politics and political 
institutions: rationalised authority and differentiated structures 
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with mass participation are the key characteristics of a 
modern polity. But Huntington argues that it is wrong to 
conclude that modernisation produces such characteristics; if 
anything "the gap between the two is often vast. Modernisation 
in practice always involves change in and usually the 
disintegration of a traditional political system, but it does not 
necessarily involve significant movement toward a modern 
political system" (1968: 35). Thus, social modernisation does 
not necessarily produce political modernisation. But even more 
interestingly, it is not a peaceful process but a rather chaotic 
one: there are general radical cultural, economic and political 
changes in a society which remains in turmoil. Some situations 
retain normality and others do not: "modernisation thus tends 
to produce alienation and anomie, normlessness generated by 
the conflict of old values and new. The new values undermine 
the old bases of association and of authority before new 
skills, motivation and resources can be brought into eýdstence 
to create new groupings" (ibid. 37). In such a precarious 
situation, violence, corruption and organised crime groups are 
allowed to develop, precisely because modernisation produces 
a change in the basic values of civil society. Old values and 
norms are replaced by new comprehensive, merit-based 
norms, new loyalties and identifications, new criteria and 
standards: "the conflict between modern and traditional norms 
opens opportunities for individuals to act in ways justified by 
neither" (ibid. 60). 
Moreover, with modernisation comes the need to 
distinguish between public welfare and private interest in all 
realms of the social sphere. A greater divide between the 
public and private sphere is introduced with individuals turning 
away from the public sphere with its civic duty to the private 
sphere dominated by the family. In this way, rapid 
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modernisation with its search for economic equality and 
achievement based standards "may stimulate greater family 
identification and more felt need to protect family interests 
against the threat posed by alien ways (ibid-. 60-61). 
Modernisation also produces new sources of wealth and 
power. Thus, new groups with access to new resources 
become important players in civil society and the political 
sphere. New wealth permits easy access to the centres of 
power for the first time, while the poor enfranchised classes 
can use their new voting power to gain jobs and favours. 
Lastly, modernisation, as rapid social and political change, has 
a direct impact on government output and "governmental 
authority" (ibid. 61): government produces more laws, 
regulations, and directives in order to keep up with the growing 
needs and demands of civil society. 
Following Huntington, I believe that Southern Italy 
adapted to post-war modernisation according to its historical 
codes, experiences and traditions. This produced conditions 
which were conducive to violence and corruption but also 
produced opportunities which encouraged the expansion of 
organised crime groups throughout civil society and the 
political institutions. The South's adaptability produced 
different 'political opportunity structures' (Kitschelt, 19861) 
which politicians and organised crime groups have exploited. 
I To understand and define 'political opportunity structures' we use both 
Kitschelt's definition: 
"Political opportunity structures are Comprised of specific 
configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and 
historical precedents [... ] for action" (1986: 58). 
and Meny and Rhodes' explanation of the usefulness of such a theory. 
" it can be of use in explaining variations in the intensity and 
methods I ... I by indicating the case or 
difficulty of access to and 
exploitation of procedures and institutions in a given political 
system" (1997: 100). 
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As Giddens explains "the development of modern social 
institutions and their worldwide spread have created vastly 
greater opportunities2 for human beings to enjoy a secure and 
rewarding existence than any type of pre-modern system. But 
modernity also has a sombre side, which has become very 
apparent in the present century" (1990: 7). Like Giddens, Beck 
saw these opportunities but defined them as risks and 
dangers: "in advanced modernity the social production of 
wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production 
of risks. [ ... ] Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing 
with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernisation itself Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are 
consequences which relate to the threatening force of 
modernisation and to its globalisation of doubt (1992: 20-2). 
My emphasis. 
9.2.1 AP-ricultural Rackets 
The post-war economic boom had an important impact 
on Western Europe. It proved to be the motor of overall social, 
cultural and political developments, the catalyst for change, 
evolution and progress. However, even if it may have appeared 
so on the surface, this change was not consistent everywhere. 
In Italy, in the North there was a strong productive and 
industrial base whereas in the South there was only a strong 
agricultural base with intermittent industrialisation. In the Italian 
case, Schneider and Schneider (1973) talked of "modernisation 
without development", a process of modernisation without 
solid investment in a productive and industrial infrastructure 
causing unemployment and crime. Martinelli talked of 
"unaccomplished modernisation or more bluntly, of failed 
modernisation" (1999: 16) which reminds us of Giddens's 
"discontinuities of modernity" (1990: 4). 
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After the upheaval of the war and the economic 
confusion that followed (the economic crisis and slow 
recovery), the open air Neapolitan street market, stretching 
from Corso Novara to Piazza Mercato, was one of the biggest 
Italian markets. It represented a gold mine with a turnover of 
28 miliardi of lire (over 10 million pounds in the 1990s [Sales, 
1988: 122]) and in 19S5, horticultural exports representing 30% 
of the Italian national market (Guarino 1985: 933). Business 
exchanges took place in the chaotic and thriving market place 
where there were no strict nor formal rules: it was like a jungle 
where "the law of the fittest" predominated. 4 It became the 
target of aggressive individuals, guappi, who imposed their will 
on farmers and on these weak market structures. Forceful and 
menacing individuals, like Antonio Esposito, Pasquale Simonetti 
and Alfredo Maisto became 'mediators' between farmers and 
the market place, imposing prices both on producers and 
buyers. By using force they established a monopoly situation 
of certain products such as tomatoes and potatoes and 
therefore they set whatever price they wanted. This is why they 
were called 'the Presidents of prices. 
It was relatively easy for them to establish an agricultural 
racket at the expense of the myriad of small peasant farmers 
from the hinterland who were too weak and disorganised to 
fight back. Small farmers were not well-equipped in front of a 
violent guappo who imposed his business conditions on the 
distributor and sale of the products at elevated prices in the 
city market while paying a miserly price to the former for them 
3 The Neapolitan street market was unique compared to many other 
regional markets which were seasonal, the Neapolitan market functioned 
on a permanent basis because Campanian agricultural productivity, thanks 
to the climate, ripen 0 the year round (Guarino, 1983: 93). 
4 Francesco Rosi's film La Sfida (1962 - which recounts the story of 
Pasquale Simonetti and Assunta Maresca in the 1950s) shows well this role 
of 'mediator, the rivalries between mediators and the weakness of the 
farmers confronted with these racketeers. 
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in the first place: for example, the guappo Pasquale Simonetti 
bought potatoes for 100 lire per kilo and sold them at market 
for 30-40.000 lire (Sales, 1988: 123). If the farmer did not accept 
these conditions, he would be threatened or see his farm go 
up in flames. They also dealt with bigger companies like Cirio, 
the most famous tinned tomatoes company in Campania, 
mediating between Cirio and the farmers, setting the prices of 
the deals. This type of mediating activity developed in the 
immediate post-war period because of the nature of the 
market and the lack of modern market- structures. Mediators 
regulated the market where there was active production but 
limited demand, profiting from weak market structures to 
impose their own business rules and make money. 
Although this act was a form of 'racket' as the 
agricultural mediator extorted from the farmer of his product 
and only gave him a small return, it was difficult to collect 
evidence to demonstrate its criminal aspect. It was for this 
reason that this activity was considered more legal than the 
activities undertaken in the city by their counterparts. 
The role of agricultural mediator had many positive 
knock-on effects: it gave prestige and respect in the 
community as well as a step up the criminal ladder, providing 
also a good business cover for more shady activities, as was 
the case of Antonio Esposito. 
It was a delicate situation for a guappo-canior7lsta, who 
had to use intimidation to control these economic 
activities. Many market traders were armed. They were 
violent. It was not a place for the faint-hearted and 
violence calls for violence. Those who did business in 
these areas knew that, in the absence of law, only the 
strongest and most courageous survive. The Esposito 
family, owners of 'Esposito Brothers Conipany, members 
of the traders' association knew this. The one who knew 
how to make himself respected the most was Antonio, 
known as 'Totonno 'e Pomighano. He was no angel. 
Already in 1930 he had been condemned for GBH (Di 
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Fiore, 1993: 143). 
A similar pattern applied to the more modem camorristi 
such as Lorenzo Nuvoletta who was "the heir of an agricultural 
family which was one of the first to start a fruit export- 
business" (IlMattino of 11 December 1990). The Bardellino- 
Schiavone clans and the Nuvoletta clan organised, for example, 
with the complicity and collusion of local Camorra- sponsored 
businessmen and regional officials a successful agricultural 
fraud involving the mismanagement of EC funds: in 1992, the 
police denounced them for the falsification of bills and the use 
of illegal certificates produced by regional officials which 
allowed Camorra-sponsored businessmen to receive EC money 
illegally (SO13: 257). 
Such activities in the market place provided 
opportunities to develop friendships and working relationships 
with the Sicilians. Arlacchi and Pizzorno explain "The first 
economic exchanges between Mafia and Camorra groups date 
back to the immediate post-war period and were based 
around the commerce of horticulture products. Some Mafia 
leaders started to act as suppliers for the agricultural market 
of Naples and its province, establishing relationships with 
Camorra businessmen which were reinforced in the 1960s " 
(1985: 27). This is confirmed by a Carabinieri's report on Mafia 
contacts in 1973 (see Doc 1029: 2). It is from this time that the 
Orlando family established strong business links with the town 
of Trapanis and that Pasquale Simonetti had a working 
associate called 'Fift, il siciliano' (see CD'A2). This may explain 
how eventually the Neapolitan 'fruit exporter' Lorenzo 
Nuvoletta managed businesses which had been created by the 
Sicilian Luciano Liggio (Feo, 1989) 
5 The case for the Orlando family business where Carlo Gaetano Orlando 
spent a few months in Trapani for his father's horticultural business. 
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9.2.2 The SmugO%g Trade 
Another economic decision which was to have an 
important long term impact on Italian organised crime groups 
was the reintroduction by the Italian government in the 
immediate post war period of a state monopoly in the tobacco 
industry to make money rather than levying direct taxes. The 
increasing demand for cigarettes in the immediate post-war 
period in Naples was such that state cigarettes could not 
satisfy it. 6 A black market developed around Amqrican and 
British troops who had vast supplies, especially of the popular 
American cigaretteS7, 'americane' or 'bionde'. But once the 
Allies had left in 1946 and closed their warehouses, the 
government was forced to ration cigarettes to a maximum of 
30 cigarettes and 6 cigars per person as it could not satisfy 
the general demand - either with Italian or foreign cigarettes. 
This measure, taken in 1946 and applied until 1948, sent 
the smuggling trade into crisis as there was tight control on 
activity by the local authorities. However, local guappi and 
bigger crime groups soon organised out of necessity. They 
used both the cheaper option of producing illegal cigarettes in 
local factories in Barra, San Giovanni a Teduccio and Gragnano 
from locally grown tobacco leaves, and also introduced new 
methods of smuggling cigarettes by sea from Marseille, 
Gibraltar, Nice and Tangiers (Figurato and Marolda, 1981). 
Importation of tobacco, American cigarettes due to the 
'acquired taste' (Pall Mall, Marlboro, Kent, Camel, Chesterfield, 
Morris) proved easier because the foreign criminal groups 
6 Arlaccbi and PIzzorno noted that between 1931 and 1970, national 
consumption of tobacco increased from a value of 306 to 1.081 billion 
(today - 1984) and in 1963's terms it went from 393 to 1.018 billion di lire 
value. Between 1930 and 1970, State monopoly's profit increased by 100% 
(1983: 12). 
7 At this time, one can read about many crimes involving American troops 
and cigarettes (see Sales, 1988: 119, for descriptions of clever crimes 
where Neapolitans managed to steal train loads of cigarettes). They either 
brought or stole cigarettes from the American troops or their warehouses. 
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were highly organised and structured this activity. 
The 1950s saw the smuggling of American cigarettes 
develop into a fine art: the main organisation was synchronised 
by foreign groups (the Marseillais, Corsicans, Sicilians) with 
radios based in the Vomero area: they coordinated the arrival 
of big ships and the pick-up by rapid blue motorboats in the 
Bay of Naples, while local guappi distributed the cigarettes 
used as hommes de main. Some of the more ambitious guappi 
took a pro-active role and became more involved: "on that 
occasion, it was established that many Neapolitans had 
invested considerable sums of money in the organisation. 
Always in 1955, following the requisition of the boat 
'S. S. Calogero' connections emerged between the famous 
Alfredo MAISTO from Giugliano (NA), SPADARO Giuseppe, 
ADELFIO Salvatore, and SPADARO Vincenzo, and other 
Sicilians" (doc 1032, n 2, vol 4: 1667). Others developed 
business contacts and solid friendships: "already in 19S8, there 
was evidence of operational contacts in the smuggling sector 
between Antonino Camporeale, Tommaso Buscetta, Filippo, 
Gioý Imperiale and [the Neapolitan] Felice Malvento"8 (Aa. w, 
Nord e Sud, 1982: 14). 
In Naples in the early 19GOs, these activities were 
controlled by the two major smuggling groups the Maisto- 
Sciorio and Zaza clans (ibid. 13) but many other groups, the 
Giuglianos, the Vollaros, the Nuvoletta-Orlandos and Antonio 
Bardellino, soon joined them. From the 1970s to the 1990s, 
smuggling American cigarettes was still an important econon-dc 
8 Felice Malvento was related to Umberto Ammaturo (see Chapter Eight for 
life story): his brother, Antonio Ammaturo had married Luisa Malvento. 
Therefore, these two criminal families were related. Moreover, another son 
of Felice Malvento, Antonio Malvento was a close associate of Carmine 
Alfieri. 
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activity for many groups. 9 This provided a living for many non- 
affiliated supporters which in turn produced a sense of loyalty 
as they felt grateful towards the Camorra groups who fed 
them. The social usefulness of this activity for the local 
community therefore makes the guappi's practice a social- 
criminal practice. 
An external political event precipitated the 
transformation of Neapolitan smuggling gangs from a social- 
criminal practice to an economic criminal practice: the closing 
of the free port of Tangiers in 1961. Until then, Tangiers with 
its status of 'free international city' requiring no visas or 
passports and very little bureaucracylO had been the natural 
choice by the main organised crime groups as the transit port 
for the illegal smuggling of goods in the Mediterranean. A 
Customs and Excise document pointed out that this changed 
the smuggling logistics in the Mediterranean: "after 1961, there 
was a profound evolution of the smuggling trade via the sea in 
the Mediterranean. As the Free Port of Tangiers, a smuggling 
restocking base, was closed, numerous warehouses were 
opened on the Yugoslavian and Albanian coasts" (doc 
1032: 1667). 
The closure of Tangiers meant that Naples, with its ideal 
strategic position in the Mediterranean, its easy access to the 
Yugoslavian and Albanian coastlines, and as we have seen, its 
lack of coherent organised criminal groups, took over in the 
1960s as the major transit centre for smuggled goods in the 
9A growing number of people were denounced for involvement in 
smuggling: 1832 in 1983,1393 in 1985,2838 in 1987,5656 in 1989,13271 in 
1991,13271 and 23374 in 1993 (Istat, 1994 - see Appendix Seven). This is 
based on the number of people denounced by the police and others. 
Obviously it is a vague indication of the numbers involved although one 
can assume based on these figures that there are several thousands that 
live off smuggling even in the 1980-90s 
10 Antonio Lovato in 1946 remarked about the Free port of Tangiers: 
"therefore everyone without distinction of race, profession, political ideas 
and religion, all can freely enter and leave to their hearts content without 
explaining to anyone" (Figurato and Marolda, 1981: 18). 
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Mediterranean: the mother ships carrying the illegal goods 
would hide just behind Capri, a perfect camouflage for these 
large foreign tankers, and then at night small blue motorboats 
(i blu motoscaffi came to off-load the goods, 11 avoiding the 
Customs' officers: "the favourable characteristics of the low 
Campanian coastline which goes from Mondragone to Torre 
Annunziata facilitated the operations of off-loading important 
amounts of smuggled cigarettes " (Doc 1029: 3). 
The good on-land transport networks, well-connected to 
the rest of the peninsula and other countries, did the rest. All 
through the 1960s and the early 1970s, there was a boom of 
smuggling activities and Naples harbour became the landmark 
for illegal activities in the Mediterranean. Whereas previously 
the off-loading of 500 boxes per operation had been 
considered good, now it was possible to off-load 35.000- 
40.000 boxes at a time (Grasso, 1998: 276). 
As the Parliamentary Antimafia Committee stated: "from 
1962-63, the role of Campania in the smuggling market became 
more and more central. The Neapolitan area, in particular, 
became "the clearing-house of nearly all the operations 
(relating to the Sicilian Mafia) linked to international traffics [ ... ] 
Contrary to what happened in Milan, in Genoa or in Rome, the 
need of alliances and links with local criminality was, more than 
natural, it was essential: the protection of the off-loading 
points in Naples, the common defence against the 'MarseilIais', 
were elements that sealed the convergence of interests and 
thus the alliance between Mafia and Camorra groups" 
(Arlacchi and Pizzorno, 1985: 28). The Sicilian Mafia and the 
'Marseillais' milieu fought a bloody war between 1971-74 for 
the control of this traffic (Figurato and Marolda 1981). The 
11 Michele Zaza was a skilled contrabbandiere and an exception in the 
independence he maintained over his activities (see life story in Chapter 
Eight). 
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Sicilians won12 because of their crude modern economic logic 
which has been confirmed in interviews by both pentiti 
Migliorino (1997) and Tarallo (1998). Migliorino explains "you 
must understand there is one thing Sicilians place before feelings 
and blood feuds. They place before everything else business; that 
is if someone can help them make money, they will make a 
friend of him, but if he is not useful, they will have nothing to do 
with him"(B: 23). 
So, many local criminals came into direct contact with 
the Sicilians who often needed their services and local know- 
how. In many ways, the Sicilians were the brains behind the 
operation and the Neapolitans furnished the arms. They 
introduced the Neapolitans to the economic thinking showing 
them how to access illegal markets and how to invest in 
different activities in the legal sector. At this basic stage, the 
Neapolitans invested their profits from extortion scams into 
the smuggling trade. 
To rationalise the smuggling trade, the Sicilians not only 
co-opted Neapolitans into becoming members of Cosa Nostra 
(the Nuvolettas, Antonio Bardellino, Michele Zaza, Mazzarella, 
etc) but also set up a smuggling deal (una societt! per il 
contrabbando) with them which lasted from 1974 to 1979 when 
a new and more profitable one came into operation. The deal 
consisted of a rota of off-loading turns: 4 teams of off-loading 
turns made up of both Neapolitans and Sicilians, helped each 
other smuggle, off-load and distribute the goods. This rota 
made the off-loading of smuggled cigarettes more efficient 
and coordinated but also helped seal some solid business 
relations and friendships. It is through this activity for 
12 The Marseille-Sicilian war which lasted from 1971-74 marked the end of 
the French Mafia, the Marseille Mafia's presence in Naples and war with the 
Sicilian Mafia over dominance in Naples. The French Mal-losi were murdered 
in Naples and thus it was decided to back off, retreat. This meant that the 
Sicilian Mafia had a monopoly of activities in Naples and could do business 
in Naples with Neapolitan help in peace. 
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example, that the Gionta clan came into contact with the 
Sicilians for the first time. Unlike the Nuvoletta and Bardellino, 
which started with horticultural rackets, the Gionta clan started 
directly as a business, undertaking an efficient economic- 
criminal practice. In some cases, the Sicilians helped the clan 
to expand, in others they helped smuggling start as a clan's 
initial practice. There is no doubt that these contacts had a 
vital impact on Neapolitans gangs, marking the beginning of an 
efficient and lucrative relationship. 
9.2.3 Hard Drup-s 
The Camorra's main expansion was linked to the 
increased demand for drugs during the 'crazy' 1960s when light 
and hard drugs came to play a more prominent role in citizens' 
lives as attitudes towards recreational drugs became more 
relaxed and tolerant: "the development of the international 
market of hard drugs is a recent phenomenon, linked to the 
increase in demand of heroin in the USA from the end of the 
Second World War to the 1960s and in Europe, in the Third 
World and the Socialist countries in the 1970s and 1980s next 
to the enlarging of the demand of cocaine by certain European 
and American middle-classes from the mid-1970s up until 
today" (Arlacchi and Pizzorno, 1985: 7). The main heroin route 
was from Asia (The Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent: 
Thailand, Burma, Laos, Vietnam and Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Mexico) to North America (Canada and the USA) via 
Europe (Naples, Sicily, Milan) while the main Cocaine route was 
from South America (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and the 
along the Southern coastline of Caribbean) (Abadinsky, 1990) 
to Mexico, the USA and Europe. 
Initially, the Sicilians adopted the same routes as the 
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66 natural evolution of the smuggling trade. They used the same 
structures, stockists and international contacts" (Grasso, 
1998: 283-4) but the nature of the trade required more 
organisation, money and personnel: if they traded directly, 
they needed new distributors and if they made their own 
substances (morphine based heroin necessitating special 
refineries) they needed more specialised scientists. As the 
narcotics travelled through many countries, they needed 
contact with international banks and intermediaries who acted 
as front men in their dealings with foreign banks. These new 
operations included Naples and the old Neapolitan smuggling 
gangs. Indeed, Naples was yet again an ideal centre for the 
Sicilians, strategically placed either between the producing 
countries of Asia and the Sicilian and Spanish morphine-based 
refineries and the North American and Western European 
markets. 
There had been an international drugs trade in the 1950s 
and 1960s but it had been undertaken in Europe essentially by 
individuals like Lucky Luciano rather than by the efficient 
organisations as of the 1970s. The Sicilians used their 
Neapolitan smuggling allies as manovalenza, as the workforce 
to distribute heroin, their main commodity, across Campania 
and Italy. The main smuggling families, Nuvoletta, Bardellino, 
Zaza became the drugs' families and monopolised the drugs 
trade in the region with smaller families (for example, the 
Cozzolino and the Mauro clans) organising the selling and 
distribution. In the mid-1970s, both the heroin and cocaine 
markets became one of the principal economic activities of 
the local families as Naples itself became an important market- 
place for drugs: the early 1980s saw the explosion of drug 
addiction in the region;, in 1984 32 drug addicts died of an 
overdose, that is 8.6% of the number of such deaths in the 
218 
whole of Italy (Sales, 1988: 136-7). 
In the late 1970s, the Sicilians decided to pursue 'a 
division of drugs' policy, 'a twin track heroin-cocaine' policy, 
(doppio binario eroina-cocaina), whereby "a rigorous logic 
behind the control of markets and a subtle strategic choice 
was made between the Sicilians and the Neapolitans" (Feo, 
1989b: 31): the Sicilians dealt solely in heroin providing it13 to 
the American Mafia for the North American market and fighting 
off rivals (the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Portoricans, etc). 
The Neapolitans were left to deal in and organise the cocaine 
traffic (although still distributing heroin locally). In this way, the 
Sicilian Mafia put in place a drugs traffic in which the 
Neapolitans played a crucial part: "the heroin arrived from 
Turkey or Lebanon, in exchange for cocaine, arms and God 
knows what else, before leaving for New York after making a 
stop in Milan and Naples, or it is produced in Palermo, Calabria 
or in the hinterland of Naples" (ibid. 32). 
The Neapolitans, even CUtolo, 14 divided up the South 
American cocaine market1s up to control its production and 
commercialisation: the Zaza-Mazzarella clan controlled 
Colombia, the Ammaturo and Bardellino clans, Peru, the NCO 
and the Bardellino clan, Bolivia and Venezuela (ibid. 56). They 
then bought it into Europe where it was sold at prohibitive 
prices: 6000 dollars on the South American market and 
250.000-300.00 dollars in Naples (ibid. 57) amounting for the 
Neapolitans to a business worth about 37 billion lire a month 
IJ The Sicilians not only brought heroin from Thailand (via sea or air) but 
also brought morphine (from Bulgaria, Turkey and Albania) to transform it 
in their refineries in Sicily. 
14 Drugs provided the Neapolitan Camorra gangs with an important ethical 
dilemma as whether or not to deal and its potential social impact on 
members. Both Cutolo and Alfieri have argued that they pursued a 'non- 
dealing policy'. However, this is very difficult to prove as leaders may give 
one set of instruction while soldiers do as they please and deal in their 
districts. 
15 By the mid-1980s, the control of the markets were less rigid with the 
Sicilians starting to deal in cocaine and the Neapolitans in heroin. 
219 
or 4000 billion lire a year this meant about 10.000-15.000 billion 
lire of money circulating (Sales, 1988: 139 ). Another example is 
provided by the Casalesi clan selling cocaine at five times the 
value it was bought at within 15 days: buying it 100 million lire 
and selling at 500 million lire after two weeks (SO12). This gave 
the Camorra, for the first time in its history, huge sums of 
money, much more than it had ever had through its rackets, 
extortion and smuggling activities or the clandestine lotto, 
robberies, etc: "this explains the revival, reorganisation and 
restructuring of [ ... I the Camorra in the last few years. [... ] It is 
drugs which have made organised crime groups become so 
economically powerful" (Feo, 1989b: 1 1). 
This new found wealth changed the Camorra's 
organisation, activities and relationships, into much more 
sophisticated international organised crime groups (G. 
Galasso16) equal to the Sicilian mafia in terms of power and 
wealth. It marked the transformation from a social-criminal 
practice to a econoniic-criniinal practice. These gangs were no 
longer an association but a business undertaking an economic- 
criminal practice. With these new sums of money, the Camorra 
clans adopted the Mafia method of investing and recycling 
their 'dirty' money in legal and illegal ventures becoming a 
camorra di impresa (a Camorra business): "as one can imagine 
it is these profits which have profoundly modified the 
Camorra, as they have modified the Mafia. But for the 
Camorra, the transformation was much more important and 
qualitative" (Sales, 1988: 139). 
In other words, the international drugs trade gave 
Camorra gangs not only the opportunity of setting up new legal 
com anies and in this way, infiltrating the legal economy but P 
also gave them power to become useful to politicians. This 
proved to be the case for clans such as the Nuvoletta, 
16 Interview of 18 September, 1996, Pozzuoli, Italy. 
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Bardellino-Schiavone, the Zaza-Mazzarella, and the Gionta 
clans which were very successful at it. Other clans (the 
Cozzolinos, the Mauros) in the late 1980s did not use the 
drugs trade for its transformative capacity but specialised in it 
to make money and distribute it to other clans. The culture of 
illegality and tolerance helped criminal gangs to do this as the 
local authorities and public opinion showed a certain 
indifference. 
The pentiti explained that many Camorra groups did not 
deal in drugs in their own zone to avoid creating a social 
problem and conflict with the local community but as Robb 
explains, "the old camorra [NF] was threatened by Cutolo at 
the very time it was tapping into huge new wealth derived from 
heroin. Cutolo had forbidden the New Camorra to traffic in 
heroin, having the intelligence to see it would most damage the 
very social stratum that had empowered him. Later, when 
Cutolo's NCO found itself overextended and in difficulty as a 
result of its rapid growth, he may have changed his mind" 
(1998: 203). Despite these moral reservations, heroin became a 
lucrative commodity and thus a serious social problem. in 
1984, there was an estimated 17.000 heroin addicts in the 
Campania region which represented 111 billion and 4 20 million 
lire of which 32 billion ended up in the hands of four and five 
clans (Arlacchi and Pizzorno, 1985). 
9.2.4 State Policies towards the South 
In 1950, in response to the South's wartime hardship and 
its underdeveloped rural economy and industries, a specific 
economic policy was decided by the central government in 
Rome. This special public intervention (Tintervento 
straordinario') was adopted with the aim of bridging the gap 
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between the industrial North and the so called 'rural' South17 
and of "giving a fatal blow to the structural causes of the 
South's backwardness" (Sales, 1993b: 44). 
A special fund was set up, La Cassa del Mezzogiomo, to 
fund various infrastructural and industrial projects in the 
South, hoping that this would lead to further regeneration and 
development. This programme was conceived in two phases: 
the first, from 1950 to 1957, concentrated on agriculture (land 
reform) and infrastructure (communications) while the second 
(71 secondo tempo) from 1958 to 1973 sought to help the 
process of industrialisation in the South through the use of 
state incentives. Public funds were heavily pumped into any 
company or public works which relocated and developed in the 
Mezzogiorno region (as was the case for the Alfa Sud car 
factory). 
In this way, it was hoped that a productive base would 
provide jobs and launch building programs. Although this 
policy had some short-term positive results, on the whole, its 
results were according to Trigilia (1995) "contradictory" had 
"severe limitations" (Ginsborg, 1990) while according to Sales 
they not only caused the Northern League phenomenon of the 
1980s in the North, but also created: "in the South a political 
and social block hostile to its productive and industrial 
growth" (1993b: 44). 
Trigilia attributes part of the failure to mistakes made in 
the investments: the Cassa encouraged investment in the giant 
projects (steel works, petrochemical and mechanical plants, 
electronics) with a large-scale investment of state capital for a 
low return in terms of employment and wealth. This had 
negative effects: it destabilised the already eNdsting productive 
17 With a population equal to 37% of the national population, the South 
contributed about 1S% of industrial income. In the mid-1930s, investment in 
industry in the South was equal to 10% of national investment (Trigilia, 
1993: 745).. 
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system (pushing up prices and the standard of living) but did 
not stimulate any new effective production. in fact, it did not 
achieve the stable productive base which the government had 
hoped for. 
Ginsborg points out other limitations: the first phase 
dedicated to agriculture and infrastructure was too short-term; 
the jobs that it produced were in many cases temporary. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, 12% of the Cassa del 
Mezzogiorno's budget was for industrial projects which also 
benefited Northern industries since they provided the raw 
materials. And more importantly for our study the fact that 
both the land reform and the Cassa produced new types of 
politicians: 'mediatori, middlemen (Gribaudi, 1980). This also 
coincided with the renewal of the DC's personnel that as we 
have already mentioned, brought in a new ambitious political 
elite holding government positions and distributing Public 
funds from the Cassa to their local constituencies, thus 
mediating between central government and the local 
community: "instead of installing an independent model of 
economic development, [it produced] a system of power" 
(Barbagallo and Bruno, 1997: 418) based on traditional 
clientelism. 
Although the reform was adopted with the intention of 
industrialising the South and therefore unifying Italy in 
economic terms, this never happened: the first oil crisis in 
1973-7 marked the end of 'les trente glorieiises' and the 
government's major economic initiatives towards the South. 
The government had to help the industrial North, to restructure 
to cope with the crisis, leaving the South to its traditional 
resources (small family businesses and public funds) and 
abandoning the industrialisation programme (factories closing 
down, Bagnoli deindustrialising, etc). 
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This change of policy took its toll on the South and had 
long term effects: it became entirely dependent on the state 
for funding and dependent on the North for consumer goods 
(Sales, 1993b). The Cassa became the only source of funding 
for the South's economy until 1992 and as, a consequence, 
those who managed it or had access to it became important 
politician: patrons distributing favours, from the Cassa to their 
local constituencies, to reinforce their local electoral networks. 
They wielded enormous power and money which they used to 
guarantee reelection as well as starting to deviate public funds 
to their friends' businesses and their own. 
The Southern policies of different DC governments have 
been described both by economists and political scientists, as 
examples of 'malgoverno, economic mismanagement which 
caused social and political stagnation while allowing the 
Southern political elite and Camorra to make money at the 
expense of the population. They gave the Camorra one of its 
most important opportunities, that of taking over an already 
well established clientelistic system. 
In this way, the traditional clientelistic system developed 
and adapted by 1950s politicians was transformed into a more 
sophisticated model: the terms of exchange were no longer 
jobs, pensions, favours for votes and support but 'social 
opportunities' in the business sector (ie planning, building and 
land speculation). Bogus planning projects, building 
programmes or land development for example were set up by 
politicians to obtain state funding which would then be 
diverted to 'friends' or 'clients' in the client-patronage 
relationship in exchange for votes and political support. This 
was a complex financial operation which involved a lot of 
proactive planning oil the part of the politicians and important 
sums of public money. Any excuse or justification was used to 
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deflect public money into private pockets. This is what Sales 
called the 'opportunity economy' (Teconoinia dell'occasionel 
which used any opportunity to apply this "modern form of 
clientelistic management of public money" (Barbagallo and 
Bruno, 1997: 418-9). Thus, the South experienced 'modernisation 
without development' (Schneider and Schneider, 1973) where 
modernisation gave the Camorra the possibility to infiltrate 
different sectors of society and politics. 
9.2. S Changes in Civfl Society 
During the postwar period, the gap between civil society 
and the state became wider. The State, with its government 
instability, bureaucratic inertia, lack of concrete help and 
traditional clientelism for many citizens, appeared all the more 
remote and distant. Local criminal gangs, on the other hand, 
with their new values appeared friendly and available to 
citizens and their problems. Indeed, more often than not, local 
criminals helped the local community by providing goods and 
services which the State did and could not. Thus, the new 
values of the local gangs were acceptable, complied with and 
even protected. 18 
Another important factor was the lack of modernisation 
of the Italian legal penal code which meant that in the post-war 
code, there were still remnants of the old fascist code in the 
form of 'internal banishment' (soggiorno obbligato). This was 
implemented and meant that many dangerous mal-losi were 
sent to Campania in the 1950s and 1970s. This helped19 the 
18 We have many examples of this for example, when the Police presented 
itself at the house of a camorrista to arrest him, the local community 
started a riot to allow the camorrista to escape. People in the street would 
throw dishes on the heads of policemen and even physically obstruct 
policemen from doing their job. 
19 Many of the important bosses of Cosa Nostra such as Stefano Bontade, 
Vincenzo Spadaro, Gaetano Riina and Salvatore Bargarella were 'banished' 
there (see also Lorenzo Nuvoletta in Chapter Eight). 
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Camorra to learn at close hand Mafia techniques and methods. 
9.2.6 Chanaes in Local Politics 
Another change which created long-term opportunities 
for the Camorra was the national reorganisation of the 
Christian Democrat party, initiated by the national General 
Secretary, Fanfani between 1954 and 1958. This had a greater 
impact on the local party in Naples than in the North (see 
Allum, 1997a) and would prove the move which allowed a 
certain type of politicians to appear and dominate the local 
party. 
In the 1940s, the DC recruited old Southern Notables who 
enjoyed local social prestige to attract votes for the party. 
However, in the rnid-195OS20, Fanfani's reform, as Tarrow notes, 
"undermined the old notables and replaced them by provincial 
political machines, controlled by a new leadership group of 
local and regional bosses, based on systematic clientele 
networks (1967: 312). In this way, the party renewed its local 
leaders with politicians who would. provide the basis of the 
new DC political machine. These were a new breed of politician 
who lacked social prestige of their predecessors and thus had 
to cultivate votes and create consensus in any possible way. 21 
Of course, the old patronage system still worked, distributing 
favours, privileges, jobs in exchange for votes; especially as 
some of these 'new' politicians were rapidly appointed to 
government office where they acquired considerable new 
powers and resources which at local level they used to create 
new extensive 'private clientelistic fiefdoms'. At the centre of 
this new fiefdom was a new form of patron, the DC boss, 
20 The calculation was that more candidates would be needed for the 1948 
general election, more candidates than had been necessary for the 1946 
Constitutional Assembly. 
21 Examples: Clemente, Servadio, De Feo, etc. 
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hungry for power; of which Silvio Gava was an early example 
(see Allum, 1973 and 1997a). There are other significant more 
recent examples, such as Paolo Ciro Pomicino and Alfredo 
Vito, both ambitious DC politicians who saw politics as a 
money-making business and not as representative democracy. 
These ambitious new DC bosses were more interested in 
creating consensus by distributing public resources, along 
local patronage networks than discussing ideology and 
policies. As the DC's hold on national government weakened in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, this new political elite needed 
to ensure access to powerful positions which managed 
important State resources, thus becoming intermediaries or 
'political middlemen' between central government and their 
local clientelist networks (Barbagallo and Bruno, 1997). 
Camorra bosses formed an important part of this local 
support system as casual electoral agents as was the case for 
Pasquale Galasso and Carmine Alfieri who supported 
Francesco Patriarca in 1972 before their sophisticated 
Camorra careers or that for Angelo Nuvoletta (brother of 
Lorenzo) who told Alfieri to vote for Gava in 1979 (M). 
However, in 1975, the situation became more pressing 
for the local DC political machine as it suffered a crisis when 
the PCI became the largest party in local elections in Naples 
and was well supported in the region. This signalled to the 
local party that it had to modify its social cons ensus-building 
machine in order to gain more local support. The convergence 
with the Camorra was thus inevitable as it had a large social 
base which would be useful to the local party. The DC's need 
for votes and support presented the Camorra with the ideal 
opportunity to become a vital and systematic part of its 
electoral-clientelistic network. 
What is important for us to note here is that the new 
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political elite present in the DC and PSI from the late 1950s and 
dominant by the early 1970s was prepared and willing to enter 
into any kind of alliance to ensure reelection, protection of 
their access to public funds and strengthen its clientelistic 
base. As far as it was concerned 'Politics was a business' and 
business deals could even be undertaken even with the enemy. 
This attitude meant that these politician had no scruples about 
dealing with the Camorra (see Aa. w, 1988) when necessary 
and make a profit from this relationship at the same time. 
Della Porta and Pizzorno have labelled these kind of politicians 
'businessmen politicians' (1996). Moreover, another example of 
the DC's close and unscrupulous relationship with the Camorra 
was the Cirillo Affair in 1981. After the kidnapping of DC 
regional councillor, Ciro Cirillo, by the Red Brigades, the local 
DC did not hesitate to contact the local Camorra for his 
release (Aa. w, 1988). This affair made politicians grateful to 
the Camorra and at the same time, widened the Camorra's 
future opportunities. 
Decentralisation was implemented in the early 1970s 
under the influence of left-wing parties who were proposing a 
more consensual and participatory model of local and regional 
government: fifteen ordinary regions were established in 1970. 
Regional government gained limited legislative powers 
(Art. 11722), new administrative responsibilities (areas of health 
and transport) and financial powers (law 281 of 1970; funds for 
special activities). Among the most important new powers of 
regional government was the possibility of deciding the 
agricultural and industrial policies and more interestingly 
22 The region may legislate on: municipal boundaries; urban and rural 
police forces; fairs and markets; public charities, health, and hospital 
assistance; vocational training and financial assistance to students; local 
museums and libraries; urban planning; tourism and the hotel industry; 
regional transport networks (excluding railways); regional roads, 
aqueducts, and other public works; lake navigation and ports; mineral and 
spa waters' extractive industries; hunting; inland fisheries; agriculture and 
forestry-, and artisanship (Hine, 1993: 26G). 
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handling more money from special funds. 
In a similar way, changes were introduced at the 
municipal level. The 1970s was a period when the Left, which 
was gaining electoral support, and the new social movements 
demanded increased local services (More specifically, in the 
public provision of services). As a result, all private bodies 
and companies involved in local services were "nationalised" 
or "municipalised" (eg. rubbish collection and garden services). 
This strongly politicised. local services and transferred 
managerial powers to elected officials and/or to a new class 
of political appointees. It was also proposed that public 
services should be free. As a consequence, the financial 
burden on local councils increased greatly which meant that, in 
turn, the national grant had to be increased (Dente, 1991: 111). 
Therefore, in the 1970s, local councillors became 
important players in the local economy as they started to 
manage important budgets and to make important decisions; 
therefore they became easy prey to manipulation and 
corruption. As far as we are concerned, municipalities became 
more important targets for the Camorra in its overall money- 
making strategy whereas in the 1950s, having had no such 
powers, they were less useful for the guapp! 
The government's decision to implement 
decentralisation was on the surface of it a political decision to 
introduce democracy at local level, allowing people to have 
more control over their own lives. Unfortunately, this reform 
coincided with the introduction of a new political elite, 
ambitious business-orientated politicians, who used clientelism 
extensively including their public roles and funds to guarantee 
its power base. By increasing the powers of local councillors 
and state agencies, these local political reforms gave this new 
political elite power to control the public authorities and 
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reinforce its support. It also made local political decisions - 
especially financial ones - more accessible to the Camorra, 
where it could, with its different resources (violence or money), 
infiltrate local administrations and gain direct access to the 
local decision making centres and more importantly, the 
financial deciders whereas previously it had only had access, 
on a casual basis (providing votes at times), to national MPs 
locally elected with no great hope of substantial return. 
9.3 Conclusion 
In the post-war period, the South adapted to 
modernisation in its own way and this produced opportunities 
for organised crime gangs to develop. For example, new values 
(such as greed, money, selfishnesg, individualism) replaced old 
traditional values in the South (community, family, spirit and 
solidarity) thus allowing more efficient clans to infiltrate 
politics and undertake a new p olitical- criminal practice. 
Our analysis has shown that modernisation produced 
clear opportunities structures for guappi who adapted to 
these new local, national and international environments. While 
retaining great flexibility and autonomy of action contrary to 
the centralised Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra clans took the 
opportunities offered to transform themselves from 
associations enacting a social-criminal practice to businesses 
enacting an economic-criminal practice. Ultimately, they 
cooperated to forge a cartel enacting ap olitical- criminal 
practice. 
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PART FOUR: THE CAMORRA'S RELA'nONSHEP 
WITH POIMCS 
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Chapter Ten 
Change in the Neapolitan Political Sub-system 
in the Post-war Period 
"Central to any understanding of [organisedl crime is the 
political set up of a city" 
Bell (1967: 193). 
10.1 Introduction 
In Part Three of this thesis, we alluded to the Camorra's 
relationship with politics. Indeed, the Camorra has long had contact 
with the political elite. In the past, as Roberti indicates, "it was 
tolerated and in some cases even 'used', as was the case in 1860, 
when the Prefect of Police, Liborio Romano, fearing public disorder 
during Garibaldi's arrival in Naples, had recruited caniorristi to 
guarantee public order and prevent crimes" (1995: 106). In Part Four, we 
will address my last research question: the nature of the relationship 
between the Camorra and politics during the 1950s and 1980s. What 
was its rationale, logic and type of exchange? Who controlled its 
dynamics and why? Or, to use the interaction model, how did the 
social, economic and political systems (and their agents) come 
together? What recurring practices did their interaction produce? And 
to what ends? 
Incorporating elements of a diachronic analysis should help to 
define the changing terms of 'the mutual solidarity pact' ('patto di 
mutua solidaritil') (RA: 24) established between the Camorra, politicians 
and businessmen (what we have called 'an exchange'), since the 1950s. 
In this chapter, we will look at the changing nature of the Neapolitan 
political system in the post-war period in order to be able to 
understand the different types of politicians who developed a 
relationship with the Camorra in our study. 
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10.1.2 Review of the Uterature 
Prior to the 1980s, the American literature is replete with studies 
which analyse the relationship between gangsters and political 
machines in urban centres during the early decades of the century. 
These studies (Merton, 1968, Gosnell, 1968, Whyte, 1981, etc) 
concentrate on the organisation and the collection of votes by 
precinct captains and ward leaders. They examine the role of precinct 
captains and ward leaders, who acted as mediators between 
politicians and civil society, and gangsters, who sought favours in 
return for their votes. All these studies look at Italian and Irish 
inspired political machines and show the type of exchange which was 
created between the candidate and his constituency (and gangsters in 
particular). They show the simple exchange of votes for protection 
and impunity which operated. In Gosnell, the intricacies of the 
organisation of the political machine (1968) are examined whereas W. F 
Whyte (1981) describes the different techniques used on election day 
to cheat the system. Many of these studies adopt a functionalist 
approach and show how the political machine integrated the local 
community into the political process. 
Italian literature on this topic flourished after the first wave of 
pentitismo in the mid-1980s when it became possible to understand 
the dynamics behind the Mafia's relationship with the political elite. 
The Parliamentary Antimafia Committee produced reports in the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s (see CPAQ; those of the 1990s described the 
intricate relations and exchanges which took place between DC 
politicians and the Mafia; this relationship resembled the one 
described in the American literature in terms of the type and nature of 
the exchange. The 1993 Antimafia Report is devoted specifically to 
the Camorra (CPA1). Based largely on Sales's important book, La 
Camorra, Le Camorre (1988) and the pentito, Pasquale Galasso's 
testimonies (CPA1.1 and CPA1.2) to the Committee in 1993, 'it gives an 
accurate picture of the state of the Camorra in the 1980s and 1990s 
and some indications of its relationship with the political elite. In 
particular, it concentrates on the Camorra's relationship and 
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exchanges with the political elite in the Commune of Sant'Antonio 
Abate. It shows how politicians were not passive partners but fully 
and consciously involved in these corrupt exchanges, especially when 
it was a question of the distribution of the earthquake reconstruction 
funds. 
Pizzorno and Della Porta (1996a, 1996b) and Della Porta and 
Vannucci (1999) analysed these exchanges theoretically showing the 
importance of the -type of politician involved: a new type of politician 
appeared in Italy in the 1970s, 'a businessman politician', ambitious 
and money-orientated, "with little sense of civic morality" (Della Porta, 
1996a: 353) and no scruples in engaging in corrupt activities, either in 
the North, with extensive corrupt business exchanges, or in the South, 
with organised crime gangs. 
Another interesting approach was adopted by Piselli (1995) and 
others who used the concept of social networks to explain these 
exchanges and political relationships. They adopted a 'social network' 
analysis inspired by the Manchester School led by J. C Mitchell (1969). 
Brancaccio (1996) used this approach to study local politics in Bagnoli 
between 1980 and 1992 and showed that important social networks 
could explain the way different political parties gained and used 
support: the DC was flexible and manipulated the different networks 
whereas the PSI was more rigid and could not use the networks so 
successfully. Zaccaria (1997) also used this approach. Both these 
studies show the flexibility of this approach and how it incorporates 
many different aspects of social (personal views, family relations, 
opportunities and subjective capacities), economic and political life 
which are usually considered contrasting. These are stimulating 
approaches which are incorporated in our own systems analysis: new 
'businessmen politicians' are in the political sub-system of the 1980s 
and 'social networks' are resources which have been present in the 
internal structure from the 1950s to 1980s. Thus, we have sought to 
use the latest and most challenging concepts in this field. 
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10.1.3 Theoretical Reminder 
In this part of the thesis, the Camorra is examined as a sub- 
system which interacts with other sub-systems. This serves to show 
the development of a clear and functional exchange of resources, 
commodities, services and favours between camorristi and politicians. 
In particular, we draw out the differences between the interaction and 
exchanges of the 1950s and 1980s. The aim is to understand the 
dynamics of such relationships and who don-dnates them. 
To do this, it is necessary to start by examining the 
representatives from the political sub-system and in particular, the 
political parties and their changing nature in the post-war period which 
led to the establishment of links and pacts with Camorra groups. 
10.2 Changing Nature of Political Parties in Naples in the Post-War 
Period 
In Chapter Four, we noted that the political system instituted in 
the 1940s was a republican multi-party parliamentary system which 
resembled the French Fourth Republic, with a Figurehead president, 
weak and Prime Minister-led unstable governments and a weak 
parliament with strong parties. The governments were considered 
'weak' because they gave too much power to political parties and 
allowed personalities to dominate. This can be explained by both the 
Cold War dynamics and the electoral system (the list-PR system with a 
preference-vote) which was adopted. In Naples, this electoral system 
played a funýamental role in permitting widespread patronage, 
clientelism and personality politics to be revived. 
Mass organised parties with a national identity and agenda on 
the Duverger model (1951) took a long time to establish themselves in 
Naples; politics was "characterised [ ... 
I by the formation of various 
blocks and organisations of power" (Allum in Galasso, 1978: 243) as 
was already the case in the pre-fascist years: "the old pre-fascist 
notables, often placed in positions of responsibilities by the Allies, 
were busy reestablishing their old arrangement - electoral links with 
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old friends and 'clients' - in the hope of replacing the fascists who had 
monopolised local power for twenty years. They did not organise 
parties because parties were alien to their mentality; they reorganised 
their old electoral machines under the generic names of 'movement' or 
'alliance'" (Allum, 1973a: 277-8). 
Whereas in North and Central Italy in the early post-war period, 
pro-constitutional parties, LArco Costituzionale, set the political 
agenda and constructed democratic political institutions, in Naples, 
politics was controlled by old notables "of varied formations 
belonging to the political universe of the Right" (Minolfi, 1993: 5). Their 
presence reintroduced in the political arena their traditional methods 
and techniques of securing support through the use of clientelism. 1 
The practice of clientelism or 'ideology' as Signorelli (1983) 
defines it, is a traditional form of social and political relationships 
which has developed and existed in very different kinds of political 
systems across the centuries: from the late feudal and early liberal 
systems (e. g England in the mid-eighteenth century [Scott, 1972: 32]) to 
Twentieth Century Mediterranean, African and Asian countries 
including democratic systems (Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine, 
1989). The eidstence of this practice tells us much about the nature of 
the relationship between citizens and the decision-making centre. in 
our case, clientelism was rife: this reflected, in part, the fact that Italy 
was unified late (in 1861) and that the political system and its leaders 
had to combine both local and national demands. 
In its early form in traditional and economically diversified 
countries, for example in eighteenth century England, it was called 
'patronage' and represented a simple exchange where landlords in 
their local communities became the patrons of their tenants farmers 
(providing help, favours or food) in return for loyalty and legitimacy. 
This exchange modernised as society industrialised and universal 
suffrage was introduced, developing into 'clientelism': "a personalised, 
affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of 
actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually 
I See the polemic between Guido Dorso and Silvio Gava in 1945 (details in Allum, 
1978: 24-5). 
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beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the 
immediate sphere of dyadic relationships" (Lemarchand and Legg, 
1972: 151-2). 
'Clientelism', based on the same premise as 'patronage', was a 
'lopsided' exchange of different resources between social actors in a 
modern state. Notables were replaced by the modern day politician 
who was in a position of power and had special access to resources 
to which citizens aspired. The politician, thus, became the 'middlemen' 
(Gribaudi, 1980) between the state's resources and the citizen. He 
would use his power of distribution to become a patron, because he 
had access to specific resources (jobs, favours, money), which were 
useful to citizens who thus became his clients. As a result an exchange 
or transaction took place: the patron provided recommendations, 
jobs, favours and money in exchange for votes and electoral support 
from citizens, his clients. In this way, the politician built up a clientele, a 
loyal and faithful following, which reinforced his electoral base while he 
looked after them. These relations were called 'patron-client' ties (see 
Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). 
Clientelism in the last century was perceived as a negative and 
detrimental form of political arrangement since "it is an obstacle to 
the legitimation of institutions because they make loyalty depend only 
on the pragmatic satisfaction of material interests. It impedes the 
establishment of political identities based on the promotion of 
collective interests or group solidarity" (Briquet, 1998: 16). In some 
cases, it also blocked the establishment of representative democracy 
and developed into a corrupt and "ubiquitous system of payoffs and 
favours, back- scratching, stealing, campaign contribution and personal 
aggrandisement (Chambliss, 1978: x). Such was the case in post-war 
Italy, which has led some to speak of a 'clientelistic state' (Briquet, 
1998: 32), completely foreign to the modern representative democratic 
model. 
However, it is important to note that functionalists (Merton, 1968; 
Bailey, 1969) haveemphasised the positive aspects of clientelism in so 
far as they highlighted the fact that political machines in American 
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cities in the 1920s and 1950s, -with their clientelistic and corrupt 
practices, tended to fulfil important functions which other official 
structures neglected (Ben-Dor, 1974): "in our prevailing impersonal 
society, the machine, through its local agents, fulfils the important 
social function of humanising and personalising all manner of 
assistance to those in need" (Merton, 1968: 128). In this way, it is argued 
that American political machines integrated local communities into the 
wider national political community in a way that no other system was 
able to do, thus linking the representative of the machine to local 
voters and transforming politics into a personal matter about 
relations and ties (Merton, 1968). 
In the post-war period, we have identified three different forms 
of clientelism which evolved with the development of political parties. 
In the 1950s, the state and political parties established a political 
system based on patron-client ties which has been described by 
Graziano (1978: 2). This system was then transformed into a system in 
which 'party-directed patronage' prevailed (Weingrod, 1968: 385), 
especially, the DC's political machine of the 1960s and 1970s. By the 
1980s, this DC system had metamorphosed itself into a "politico- 
criminal machine" (Allum, 1997: 41). With this transformation of power 
relations came new politicians. In the 1950s, rich 'notables', in the 
1960-70s, traditional middlemen (mediaton) between state and civil 
society (Gribaudi, 1980) and in the 1980s 'businessmen politicians' 
(Della Porta, 1996a; Della Porta and Pizzorno, 1996b): "'young Turks', 
'on the make', 'not overtly scrupulous', 'out for 'personal gain' or 
'power for its own sake', 'ambitious professionals'" (Della Porta, 
1996a: 353) were attracted by power where they could "line their 
pockets through bribery and the exploitation of their political power in 
other activities, particularly where the power gave them an edge over 
competitors" (Della Porta, ibid). 
This periodisation does not include the years 1975-83 when the 
Italian Communist party controlled Naples city council on the basis of 
the national 'historical compromise' (1973) as it would appear that the 
Camorra did not seek direct contact with the PCI at that time. During 
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this period, the PCI tried to establish a different pattern of power, the 
"power of participation" (Allurn in Galasso, 1978: 243), which 
retrospectively had an inverse effect in so far as this defeat forced 
the Neapolitan DC to reorganise as a modern and efficient political 
machine. We do not deal with this period nor with the Camorra's 
relationship with the PCI, as it would appear that the Camorra 
concentrated on building relationships only with parties involved in 
national government. The PCI, for the most part, could not prove 
useful in this way especially as many of its militants and activists 
energetically campaigned against the Camorra. 
The post-war period in Campania witnessed the transformation 
of clientelism from a simple political strategy to a set of methods 
used by corrupt politicians, administrators and businessmen, where 
"everything goes" (Bell, 1967: 128) and then to a fully fledged illegal and 
criminal exchange where "organised crime and organised political 
corruption have formed a partnership to exploit for profit the 
enormous revenues to be derived from lawbreaking" (Landesco, 
1968: 189). The three different phases of clientelistic transformation 
are now examined as the premise of a more detailed analysis of the 
Camorra's exchange in Chapters Eleven and Twelve. 
10.2.1 Achille Lauro. 'the City Boss' (1952-1962) 
The first phase, the early 1950s, was dominated by Neapolitan 
notables, both at local and national level, of whom Achille Lauro, the 
city boss, became the main representative at the head of the Partito 
Nazionale Monarchico (PNM) and then, his own party il Partito 
Monarchico Popolare (PMP). The "Lauro phenomenon" (Zullino, 1976: 49) 
or Laurism is important because it illustrates well the social, economic 
and political conditions as well as the mood of the city in the 1950s 
and above all, the clientelist system characteristic of Neapolitan 
politics. 
Achille Lauro (1887-1982) was the fifth of six children of a small 
ship owner from Sorrento. He went to sea at an early age and, at 
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eighteen, on the death of his elder brothers and his father, took over 
the family business which he managed to rescue and expand. He thus 
became the head of one of the most important shipping lines in the 
world, La Flotta Lauro. This allowed him to diversify into other 
businesses, such as newspapers and football and to come to 
symbolise the 'self-made man' par excellence (see Allum, 1973a; Zullino 
1976). 
His business prosperity coincided with Mussolini's fascist regime 
and it has been suggested (Fasano in Allum, 1973a: 275) that his 
business benefited enormously from the regime. In fact, he joined the 
Fascist party in the 1930s and as Allum makes clear, "as a result of his 
party connections with the Ministers of Defence and Mercantile Marine 
and the party hierarchy, not only were his ships not requisitioned, but 
he was given transport monopolies and favours which enabled him to 
become one of the biggest Italian ship-owners by the end of the war. 
He was given further monopolies: the passenger line to Italian East 
Africa; advantageous contracts for cargoes to Northern Europe and 
the Far East" (1973a: 275-6). This relationship had important 
implications for Lauro in the immediate post war period as he was 
identified with the regime and a "fascist past" (Zullino, 1976: 50): not 
only was he sent to a concentration camp for twenty-two months by 
the Allies when they liberated Naples, but the DC repeatedly refused 
him membership in the 1940s and 1950S. 2 
As representative democracy was being established in Italy in the 
late 1940s, Lauro, the successful and charismatic businessman that he 
was, became interested in politics: he "immediately had the intuition 
that with the new regime, to get into serious money, you needed to be 
in politics, you had to find a political space and keep it" (Zullino, 
1976: 50). His decision, like Silvio Berlusconi's in the 1990s, was to 
Gava recounts: "in the 1930s, he [Laurol often told me that he would happily hav 
joined the DC but I advised against it because a democratic and popular party like 
the DC would not have fitted his authoritarian character and because allowing 
himself to be involved in the party would not have been convenient for someone 
like him who, as I explained to him, did not have a true vocation for it "(1999: 24G-7). 
Others have suggested that the reasons for the DC's refusal was fear of Lauro's 
economic power which meant that he would be independent and politically 
uncontrollable (see Allum, 1973a: 307-8). 
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'enter the field of politics'. He was 58. After the refusal of the DC and 
the disintegration of the Uomo QualunquO movement (Allum, 1973a; 
ZuIlino, 1976), in an act of typical pragmatic fleýdbflity, he chose to join 
the Monarchist party, il Partito Nazionale Monarchico. It "was the 
obvious choice for him in the circumstances: Naples had shown that it 
was the most monarchical big city in the 1946 referendum" (Allum, 
1973a: 282). Indeed, in the 1946 referendum4,76.5% of the electorate in 
Campania had voted in favour of the Monarchy. It was even more in 
the city of Naples with 79.9% compared to the national figure of 45.7% 
(Allum, 1978: 40). 
The PNM already e)dsted before Lauro joined in 1948 but it was a 
little-known party, despite a Monarchist as mayor of Naples. By joining 
it, Lauro gave it a new dynamic identity, well-needed funds and political 
representation in Parliament: in 1948 it won 13% of the vote in the 
Naples-Caserta Constituency which gave it 4 MPs; nationally it won 2.8% 
and 14 MPs. Lauro was elected mayor of Naples under this banner in 
1952. This did not last long as he spilt with the PNM secretary, Covelli, 
and established his own party, il Partito Monarchico Popolare in 1934 
(Galasso, 1955). 
His post-1948 allegiances to the monarchist's cause must be set 
against the background of a pragmatic political attitude, "pragmatic in 
the full meaning of the word" (D'Avino in D'Ascoli, 1974: 357), being 
rooted in his prewar business ventures. He perceived politics as a 
business and his use of politics was to advance his and other 
businessmen's interests; "it is clear that the basis of Laurism was 
immediate profit and booty from political activity" (Allum, 1973a: 309). 
3 The Uo mo Qualunque movement was a right-wing movement founded in 1945 by 
Giannini. It was an anti-Party movement. For more information see Allum (1973a) 
and Pasquino (1993). 
4 Institutional Referendum 2 June 1946: 
Italy Naples-Caserta 
Republic 12,717,923 54.3% 241,973 21.1% 
Monarchy 10,719,284 43.7% 903,631 78.9% 
(Allum, 1973a) 
5 He financed the Uomo Qualunque Movement in 1943; however, after a dispute 
with the leader of the movement, Giannini, about supporting De Gasperi's 
government in 1947, he withdrew his finance and it subsequently disintegrated (see 
Allum, 1973a: Chapter 9). 
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By the mid-1950s, Achille Lauro and the PMP were local and national 
actors who played their part in both political arenaS. G 
When Lauro became leader in 1954, the Monarchists in terms of 
political organisation were under-developed. It had no set ideology, no 
political programme and no permanent party secretariat or formal 
permanent structure. It was thus very easy for a charismatic 
personality like Lauro to construct around him 'a movement' which 
promoted the ideas and the projects of its leader and of his friends. 
Lauro was the organisation: a network of friends, of relatives, of 
followers, of associates, his clique who undertook the necessary 
tasks (Allum, 1973a). The movement did not need mass membership 
as it was directly funded by Lauro as were its electoral campaigns: 
"the electoral machine requires important sums of money and Lauro 
can claim, better than anyone else, that the money used is exclusively 
coming from his own shipping activities" (D'Avino in D'Ascoli, 
1974: 349). Consequently, the organisation remained almost exclusively 
Naples-based with some alliances and support in the wider region: "a 
typically southern-based protest phenomenon, feeding on anti-Rome 
feelings [... ] which degenerated into the super power of one single city 
boss (Roberto Gervaso in Il Mattino of 4 August 1998). One of the 
main official activities of Lauro as mayor was to promote and defend 
Naples and Neapolitan traditions taking the title of the 'Viceroy of the 
South' and fighting the monarchical cause with simple emphatic 
rhetoric (Allum, 1973a). In reality, as can be seen in the new districts of 
the Vomero, Fuorigrotta and Posillipo he embarked on a massive 
speculative building programme so accurately evoked by Francesco 
Rosi in his film, Mani sulla cittil (1963). 
Laurism was a system based on the extensive and almost 
exclusive use of one resource: clientelistic methods. Lauro was a rich 
patron who distributed favours and goods, to clients, who were 
obliged to return loyalty-, in particular at election time. This method of 
'doing politics' may have been at odds with the democratic project of 
post-war Italy, but in the South and, in particular, in Naples, this simple 
6 In the national arena, the Monarchist parliamentarians were an important factor in 
the centrist majorities in the decade from 1933 to 19G3. 
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form of 'patron-client ties' was very easy to operate as the tradition 
of the old influential 'notables' was still alive. Moreover, if we assume 
like Weingrod that it is the presence of 'gaps' in a political system 
which gave rise to a category of 'middlemen' or patrons, we may 
conclude that the Italian state at this stage was sufficiently 
underdeveloped in terms of representation as to allow a small number 
of people, local 'notables' or patrons, to bridge the gaps between local 
and national instances: "patron-client ties can be seen to arise within a 
state structure in which authority is dispersed and state activity 
limited in scope, and in which considerable separation eýdsts between 
the levels of village, city and state" (Weingrod, 1968: 381). It was these 
clientelistic methods which made Lauro the mayor into the "big city 
boss of Naples. " Not only was he personally wealthy, spending money 
to create his electoral base, but he received a lot of funds from 
central government (Naples's special law of 1 953) to reconstruct 
Naples which he could use for "the interests of a specific economic 
group, the building entrepreneurs" (Allum, 1973a: 399). 
It is interesting to compare the case of Lauro with the 1920s 
American city bosses. In a city like Chicago (Gosnell, 1968, Merton, 
1968), the political machine was made up of different precinct 
captains representing their districts and supporting the political boss. 
In Naples, it was the same. Lauro had in each quartiere, loyal 
supporters, in particular capi elettori, grandi eletton7 and even, as we 
shall see later, guappi who acted as 'precinct captains'. Brogan says 
that the main characteristic of these 'precinct captains' was that "he 
must get out the vote; [ ... ] He buys votes in many ways, but above all 
by services" (1957: 131-2). 
This applied to Lauro: he bought votes in all possible ways8 and 
provided services such as planning licences, jobs, houses, etc. But his 
I Allum defines grandi elettorl as "the more important local persons who were 
active in the DC [party] cause, who controlled local clientele networks: mayors and 
municipal councillors, communal party secretaries, but also members of the liberal 
professions (GPs, lawyers). " 'Capi elettoH' were "often difficult to distinguish from 
the grandi elettorL They were activists who were part of a social network, whether 
familial, territorial, professional or artisanal (buidling, petty commerce, etc. )" 
(1997: 33). 
8 See Chapter Fleven. 
243 
support was not organised in a systematic way compared to the 
cohesive American political machine. He played on populist themes, 
direct action and attracted a wide range of clients ranging from the 
subproletariat to important businessmen. His movement has been 
described by Zullino as "the party of those without a party" (partito dei 
senza partito-ý (1976: 57) because it was clear that in his network of 
clientelistic exchanges everybody was after their own self-interest. 
This business-like approach to politics explains why Lauro had no 
appeal among the aristocracy and the upper classes. 
Lauro's political movement was "of some consequence in Naples 
only so long as it controlled the municipality" (Allum, 1973a: 310). He 
had tried to gain bargaining power at national level with the DC but he 
lost power when the DC finally organised at local level, challenged his 
movement and forced him to withdraw from local politics by not 
standing in municipal elections in 1964.10 
10.2.2 The DC Political Machine (1962-73) 
The second phase which we have identified as the 1960s sees the 
development of a more sophisticated form of patronage in Naples, a 
party based political machine. In the early 1950s, the DC was not yet 
an organised mass party. In an attempt to compete with the cohesive 
PCI, Fanfani as General secretary of the party launched a reform of the 
party in 1954. This had significant consequences in the South and in 
Naples in particular: it undermined the old notables and replaced them 
by provincial political machines, controlled by a new leadership group 
of local and regional bosses, based on systematic clientele networks 
(Tarrow, 1967 in Allum, 1997a: 30). It developed the DC into what 
Pizzorno called "a syndicate of provincial political machines" (ibid-. 31). 
Moreover, one of the DC government's most important decisions 
in the 1950s for Neapolitan politics was to develop the state sector of 
9 Incidentally, this is also Giannini's definition of his Uomo Qualunque Movement in 
the 1940s. 
10 ffis power was weakened and he was marginalised but managed to get re-elected 
to Parliament in 19G8 as capo fista (number one) of the Monarchists (Allum, 
1973a: 289). On his relations with the DC, see also Gava (1999: 243-232). 
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the economy-, it gave the ruling DC party direct access to the country's 
economic development funds and therefore, greater power in civil 
society in so far as it controlled the distribution of resources. It is 
easy to see how the interpenetration of civil society and the state by 
the ruling DC had an enormous impact in Naples where the clientelistic 
system of Lauro could be hijacked by a more efficient and systematic 
party machine and developed into formidable "party-directed 
patronage" (Weingrod, 1968: 385). This was a new power system. 
The electoral efficiency of the DC party machine was probably 
due to its reliance on faction and faction leaders which made it a 
highly 'oligarchical' party. Dominant factions decided internal policies 
and appointments locally and nationally, and within government during 
the Christian Democrats rule between 1948-92. 
In order to become the leader of a national party faction, it was 
necessary to have a solid local base. Through clientelistic networks, 
ambitious politicians obtained support from local party sections 
which was vital for electoral purposes. This gave them the means to 
progress in the party hierarchy nationally. Once they had reached a 
position of power in Rome they could then use public resources (jobs, 
favours and money) to feed back into their local stronghold. This all- 
important role of the party and of the political machine at the centre 
of all social, political and economic activities in civil society became 
the main feature of Neapolitan politics during the second phase. 
Moreover, because of the emphasis on personalities in Naples, 
the place of the charismatic Lauro had to be taken over by other 
powerful personalities. It fell to an emerging DC boss based in 
Castellammare di Stabia, Silvio Gava (1901- 1999) and later to his son, 
Antonio (1930 - ), to lead Naples through these periods. While Lauro 
was dominating local politics, Silvio Gava became a national 
politician1l and a leader of the 'Doroteo' faction which took charge and 
controlled the party and the Italian State, for twenty to thirty years. 
Thus, control of the Toroteo' faction implied control not only over the 
11 A summary of Silvio Gava's political career: 1949-53: junior minister in De 
Gasperi's government; 1953-57: minister; 1960-69: Leader of DC senatorial group; 
1969-74: Minister; 1948-76: Senator. 
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party but also over the state apparatus which the party governed. 
Gavism was in many ways a continuation of Laurism but in a more 
successful form. Lauro and Silvio Gava were different in styles but 
very similar in substance: Gava was more interested in control than in 
votes but he used similar strategies and business connections to win 
the same electorate (Allum, 1973a). He managed to link national and 
local politics where Lauro had failed to do so because he had the 
political party machinery behind him as well as control over many 
social and economic activities in civil society. he placed his followers 
in important political and economic positions. By the 1960s, he 
controlled crucial positions both within the party and in the city. In this 
way, he was able to organise the defeat of Lauro in the 1964 municipal 
elections and marginalised him thereafter. 
Silvio Gava's political career spanned three decades from the 
1940s to the 1970s where he occupied a variety of ministerial 
positions from 1953 to 1974. At the height of his political career in the 
1960s, he became the 'boss' of the Neapolitan DC political machine 
who used his powerful national political position, in particular 
ministerial positions in successive governments, to reinforce his 
clientelistic local base. His son Antonio was able to use his national 
position to launch a political career of his own which led to his 
domination of Neapolitan politics in the third phase. 
During this phase, the old traditional ingredients of the 
personalised patron-client type of exchange developed into an 
sartisanal' political machine (Allum, 1997a), still based on highly 
personalised exchanges but already dealing in national currencies. 
Silvio Gava introduced a new power system based on control, 
indirectly of civil society, the economic system and the political 
system. 
10.2.3 The Neapolitan DC Political-Criminal Machine (1981-93) 
During the third phase of the analysis, 1980s to early 1990s, 
another transformation of the clientelistic system took place: from a 
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well oiled political machine, which the Neapolitan DC was under Silvio 
Gava, it became a very efficient and lucrative operation under Antonio 
Gava and his associates, Armando De Rosa, Francesco Patriarca, 
Vincenzo Meo, Raffaele Russo and Alfredo Vito. Having suffered an 
electoral defeat in 1975 with the relative successive of the PCI in the 
city elections, the Neapolitan DC reorganised its political machine with 
much more zest. 
Gava jr and the 'Doroteo' faction reinforced its control over its 
local clientelistic support system to guarantee reelection. To achieve 
this they had to control, first and foremost, the local party apparatus, 
both formal and informal structures: on the one hand, the local 
sections which managed local procedures and oversaw key local party 
nominations and on the other, the multifarious networks of informal 
party activities (associations, circles etc) which fed and strengthened 
the clientelistic support system. 
The main formal party structures which Gava jr controlled were 
the local party sections and their secretaries as they played a central 
role within the party: they controlled the recruitment of members 
locally and also had a significant input into all the local selection 
processes (such as choice of mayor and composition of the local 
party lists). It seems that Silvio Gava had already started this process 
but the testimony of Alfredo Vito (PrlO: 27-4-93) confirms and 
highlights very precisely the extent to which Antonio Gava 
consolidated and exploited the local sections in the hinterland during 
the 1980s. 
These local sections, especially in the smaller communes in the 
hinterland, were ideal targets for the systematic development of 
clientelistic electoral networks (Pr8: 27-4-93). Local sections were 
constituted by party card-carrying members (tesserati) and at the top, 
an elected executive committee (un direttivo sezionale) led by the 
secretary (segretario). The latter had a disproportionate amount of 
power in the smaller communes: "The party had structures across the 
territory., the main one was the section. Each or the major parties had 
sections in each or the communes or our country; in the larger 
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communes they had several. [ .. I Every year the section recruited party 
members [ .. ] Among whom were section representatives who were 
elected every two or three years [ ... I In the big towns these did not count 
much but in the smaller communes they counted a lot because it was at 
section level that political, local issues and the party's political projects ror 
that commune were discussed" (CD'Al7v). 
Each year the provincial Federation sent them a document (un 
tabulato) laying down the exact number of members required in each 
section (PrlO: 27-4-94: 3-4). Vito indicates that it was normally 50% of the 
local electorate. If there were not enough members, the secretary 
found ways of recruiting supporters: he recruited members who were 
sympathetic to his faction, blocking those who were not by closing the 
office or refusing to accept their application forms, giving more than 
one card to one person and also by inventing names or taking them 
from the telephone directory (CD'Al7v). 
This kind of manipulation became visible at election time when 
there was a discrepancy between the votes expressed (which 
corresponded to the actual number of members) and the official 
membership figures: a section secretary could be in an embarrassing 
position "because if he said that he had 200 paid-up members and the 
candidate they supported received only 100 votes, it is clear that this 
figure of 200 was" (ibid) manufactured. Vito justifies the corruption 
which took place in the DC at this level by saying that it was general 
practice in Italy: "In Italian political parties, controlling the recruitment 
process has always been a way to manage internal disagreements and to 
organise leading factions; it is an unofficial practice" (Vito, ibid). 
Another important form of control exerted by section secretaries 
was the drawing up of the party lists and consequently, the choice of 
mayor since the mayor was chosen by the elected councillors (PrlO: 27- 
4-94; see also Barbi, 1985). It was inevitably the faction to which the 
section secretary belonged which had control over these procedures 
and "once a certain faction had gained a mcUority in a local section, it 
was very difficult ror it to lose it and very easy for it to keep it" (PrlO: 27- 
4-94.4). During the 1980s, "in the majority of communes, the 
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compositions of the local lists was largely determined by the 'Doroteo' 
faction which then controlled access to local political life and to the city 
council" (ibid). Antonio Gava confirmed this by his very presence at the 
close of every election campaign in the communes of Sant' Antonio 
Abate, Castellammare and Gragnano: "as these communes constituted 
the hard core or his power system, [ .. I it was traditional for him to 
deliver the Friday night speech in one of these communesn(PrlO: 7-5-93). 
Another example of close control by national politicians of the 
territory was the placing of their allies in key local political positions. 
Carmine Alfieri recalls how Gava and his faction supported the 
nomination of Mario De Sena as mayor of Nola: 
Towards the end of the 1980s, there were the elections for 
the municipal council of Nola; I understood that Meo and 
Gava were manoeuvring so that the General Mario De Sena 
became mayor. They had not chosen De Sena by chance. 
Indeed, he was General Manager of the water company 
Condotte dAcqua, which was part of the IRI group. At that 
time in Nola, they were going to start important public works, 
for some billions of millions for the construction of Aeritalia 
and Iterport. Therefore, it was necessary that the ruture 
mayor of Nola, be at the same time a faithful follower of Gava 
and Meo [ .. ] and personally interested in these contracts. In fact it was the company Condotte d'acqua which won the 
contract from Aeritalia (Pr8: 2). 
Thus, as a boss of a political machine, it was fundamental for 
Gava jr to place his men in important decision making positions which 
gave him personal power and control over large sums of public funds, 
contracts and territory. Among these positions were the very lucrative 
posts of regional directors of public services. The most notorious 
example was that of the health service (USL) where the director of the 
USL was responsible for the national health service and therefore 
received a lot of funds to allocate in the region. In a large number of 
communes, the management committees of the USL, which were 
elected, were made up of Gava's friends (CD'Al7v: 7). People like Luigi 
Riccio, who was both mayor of S. Paolo Belsito and director of USL 34, 
as well as Raffaele Boccia and Pasquale Catapano. It appears that 
these people often misused their public position by distributing 
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favours and public funds to friends and relatives in this way 
guaranteeing their reelection and popularity. 
More specifically clientelistic was the establishment of informal 
associations, cooperative, at election time to reinforce the candidates 
electoral support. For example, the local DC in Naples set up the 
Metropolis Cooperative for young unemployqd Neapolitans. The real 
purpose of this association was to campaign for the DC candidate 
Alfredo Vito: if the young people voted 'correctly' they would get a job 
as parking attendant. We have a detailed description of this practice 
in a police report because it went wrong: Vito was elected with a very 
high preference vote which gave him the nickname Mister Cento-mila 
voti, but the 40 jobs promised were never delivered. Instead, the 
young people were solicited for a second campaign, the local 
elections a month later, as long as A and B were elected. "During one 
of the meetings of the Coop when half the members were present as well 
as the organisers, we were inrormed that there were only 10jobs and 
only if candidates A and B were elected. We refused to vote and 
campaign ror these candidates because they had not kept their original 
promises" (SM: 1-2). 
Another example of informal associations and clubs set up for 
propaganda purposes was a front organisation, 'Mezzogiorno 
nell'Europa', a so-called DC research centre, un Centro Studi Cattolici 
Democristiani, set up in Sant'Antonio Abate in 1986. The official aims 
of the organisation were to be "non-profit making, to roster civic 
awareness and democratic practices in the town, to promote social and 
educational activities, to encourage participation in community-projects 
and to further the exchanges of ideas, experiences and knowledge in 
order to improve working and living conditions across the territory" 
(P11: 126). But, in reality, as Vito recalls, it was "an anti-DAntuono 
space" (PrlO: 7-5-93) organised by Gava's secretary, Antonio D'Auria, on 
his behalf purely to campaign against D'Antuono, the mayor and rival 
DC, in the 1988 local elections. 
It is interesting to note, that as well as imposing clientelistic 
methods on civil society, the 'Doroteo' faction also imposed its will on 
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the economic community. For example, in 1974, the Italian government 
introduced a law on the public financing of parties (Melchionda, 1997). 
However, the 'Doroteo' faction to finance its electoral campaigns 
sought donations from citizens and powerful businessmen. Lauro had 
not required such sums as he had had his own personal fortune but 
the Gava clan did: "economic difficulties increased at election time 
(municipal, provincial elections), we were, thus, forced to ask for external 
contributions rrom friends and even DC businessmen, using them 
unequally and solely for electoral ends" (Meo, letter, PS + P5.1: 28-02- 
95: 3). Alfieri recalls how a businessman friend of his, Giuseppe 
Apreda, "had to give a donation of 300 milioni to Antonio Gava" 
(Pr8: 02-11-94: 2). This kind of donation was not merely a friendly 
contribution by businessmen as they started to expect some kind of 
positive return for their money in the form of public contracts. Thus, 
politicians and businessmen started to develop a very intimate 
relationship which would also be helpful for the Camorra's exchange. 
We can conclude that Antonio Gava and his 'Doroteo' faction's 
control of local party sections in the hinterland of Naples gave it 
significant power over the party apparatus at regional and national 
level. This was a clear and efficiently structured power system where 
local power reinforced the national leader. The latter's power system 
was based on the indirect control of social and political networks. 
This was now a modernised clientelistic system, or as Sales (1985) 
calls it 'distorted' clientelism, which was controlled by Antonio Gava 
and his network of front men. 
Moreover, in the mid-1980s, a new kind of politician more greedy 
and ambitious than Antonio Gava, appeared on the Neapolitan political 
scene. These were 'businessmen politicians' who used politics purely 
to make money. The two prime examples of these 'businessmen 
politicians' are Alfredo Vito of the 'Doroteo' faction and Paolo Ciro 
Pomincino of the Andreotti faction. Although they and their practice 
became prominent in our period, they did not manage to supersede 
completely the old traditional politicians, but learnt their trade and 
activities from these old masters, la vieille 6cole, and became more 
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ruthless and malicious in their ways. The main difference was that 
while Antonio Gava sought power to control the region, this new 
generation was interested in power solely to make money. For this 
reason, they were more dangerous. 
As Ginsborg (1990) and Allum (1997a) have pointed out, the Gava 
clan did not invent anything by installing this modern clientelistic 
system because all the elements of this clientelistic business 
exchange have always been present in southern Italian politics 
including corruption. But what the DC and the 'Doroteo' faction did 
"during its long years in power was to compound them while increasing 
its control over the state apparatus and the public sector of the 
economy" (Allum, 1997: 46). What also happened by the early 1990s was 
that the old personnel of the party with traces of the old traditional 
patronage system began to decline and a new generation of politicians 
came to the fore. They no longer spoke of values and ideology but 
engaged in lucrative money-making schemes where the profits were 
very substantial. It was not only the Toroteo' faction which developed 
these practices, other factions as well as the minor government 
parties (PSI, PLI, etc) also became involved (for example, 
Mastrantuono, a PSI deputy). 
10.2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have identified the three main phases of 
political power in Naples in the post-war period. We did this in order 
to understand the kind of politician which Camorra bosses would have 
to deal with but also the nature of the corrupt- clientelistic exchange 
which politicians had set up and dominated until the 1980s. We can 
now turn our attention to the type of exchange which existed between 
camorristi and politicians in the 1950s and 1980s and the kind of 
goods and services which they traded. 
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Chapter Eleven 
The Camorra's Exchange During the 19SOs and 1980s 
R- 11 mio cavallo e ..... Ti 
faccio vedere che 
il mio cavallo arriva prima del tuo t ... I D- Gava di chi era il cavallo ? 
R- Un po di tutti quanti.... 
R. PaInueri (CD'A17p: 70) 
11.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the Camorra's relationship with the political elite 
in the 1950s and 1980s is examined to see how its exchange has 
evolved and developed (see Figure It. 1). In particular, we want to 
study the different kinds of exchanges and the commodities, services 
and favours the Camorra provided in both periods. 
Fiaure 11.1: The Camorra's Exchange 
Politician 
camorrtra Businessman 
11.2 The Camorra's Exchange at Local Level in the 1950s 
In the immediate post-war years, the traditional clientelist system 
of Lauro used some of the important city guappi of the time for the 
social respect that they commanded in the community. The old 
traditional city guappi and the ambitious rural businessmen- guappi 
took on important roles at election time and became what Allurn has 
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described as capi elettor! (1973a, 1997). They became very active as 
political agents and efficient as vote collectors because of their social 
networks and prestige. Indeed, Ricci has argued that outside election 
times, the social role of the traditional city guappi was of relatively 
minor importance ('elementi trascurabili')(1989: 117). 
From our evidence, it is because of the social standing that they 
had within the local community that they were useful political 
instruments. As Landesco writes: "What needs to be appreciated is 
the element of genuine popularity [of the man] homegrown[ ... ], 
idealised in the morality of the neighbourhood" (1968: 169). The 
politicians played on that popularity, in the same way as they played 
on the respectability of doctors, lawyers and professors who 
campaigned on their behalf in their own professional circles. This was 
part of the traditional Neapolitan clientelistic framework but it was 
certainly the guappi who were the most successful political agents 
because in their circles of the urban sub-proletariat, it was easy to 
satisfy basic demands against the promise of a vote. 
From our theoretical point of view, the Camorra'sl relationship 
with politicians in the 1950s was a two-way functional, but casual 
exchange between two agents, the individual guappo and the politician, 
respectively from the social and political sub-systems. It consisted of 
a simple interaction between two agents who individually enacted their 
different recurring practices (the politician, a political practice and the 
guappo, a social-criminal practice) and who came together in a casual, 
unsystematic and informal way. Indeed, it was because of its 
ambiguous and informal nature that it was not an important and 
dominant characteristic of the guappo's practice; that is why the 
guappo's practice can only be defined as a 'social- criminal practice'. 
Thus, this political exchange was a relationship between individuals 
who worked out a functional exchange between themselves, 
exchanging basic commodities, services, reciprocities and obligations 
(see Figure 11.2). 
The examples are well known: Lauro's monarchist party 
distributed tokens for Easter cakes, dei buoni per la Colomba di 
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Pasqua (Macciocchi, 1969) as well as packets of pasta and odd shoes, 
one before and one after the election (Ricci, 1989: 114; Gava 1999: 249) 
and the DC distributed packets of spaghetti (see Figure 11.3). One 
could say with Macciocchi that it was not a question of explaining 
political manifestoes but merely of buying votes (1969: 114), but it 
would be a simplification as the myth of the Monarchy and the anti- 
Rome feelings were also part of the electoral mobilisation. 
In this respect, the role of the guappi must be divided into 
categories. Most of them carried out their electoral duties in good 
faith and campaigned as political agents for Lauro and the 
Monarchists out of political conviction. Their political involvement was 
sincere: they believed in Lauro's message, agreed with his political 
agenda for change and improvement for Naples and also with his 
position of protest against the existing regime. They, too, evoked the 
glorious past of the Monarchy. Some guappi even took their political 
conviction so seriously as to form political associations to support 
Monarchist politicians. This was the case, for instance of Paschialone 
who set up 'the Monarchical Alliance for the South', (Alleanza 
Monarchica del Sud) which supported Lauro in his campaigns in the 
early 1950s (Ricci, 1989: 115). 
One of the best known pro-monarchist guappi was Giuseppe 
Navara (Isabella, 1980: 210-11). He had made his fortune as a deep sea 
diver in Marseille during the 1920s and had gained social respectability 
and prestige not only by frequenting the American allies during the 
1940s12 but also by bringing back 'the Treasure of San Gennard (a 
holy treasure of gold) from Rome to Naples in 1947 (Marotta, 1995: 53). 
He was known as 'il Re di Poggioreale', 'the king of Poggioreale', 
because Giuseppe Buonocore, the Monarchist Mayor between 1946- 
1948 had appointed him 'Vice-Mayor' of his district. This nickname 
fitted him well: sitting on a throne, like a king, he ruled over the zone 
with style and held audiences at his home. People came to see him to 
ask for advice, help and assistance; in return he would distribute 
12 The American General at the time called him 'The king of Poggioreale'. He was the 
first person in Naples to be granted the right to carry arms legally in occupied 
Naples (see Isabella, 1980). 
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goods, food and recommendations. 
His regal behaviour reminds one of Lauro and his associates, 
combining "ideological mobilisation on the myth of the Monarchy, [ ... I 
with common forms of clientelism and paternalistic assistance" 
(Galasso, 1978: 245). The social prestige he had in the local community 
was transformed into political clout out of conviction and to increase 
his own social prestige. He was particularly active during the 
Neapolitan election campaigns in 1952 and 1956 as a political agent 
for the Monarchist party: he distributed electoral propaganda in the 
streets of Poggioreale and gave electoral speeches to the crowds 
from the balcony of his house (Gribaudi, 1998). 
Another example is that of Don Vincenzo '0 Franfelliccaro. He was 
a well-respected carter and shop-keeper who had a great reputation 
for courage and severity in the community. He campaigned for Lauro 
during the 1956 municipal election in the central districts of la Sanita, 
Vicaria and Borgo Loreto (Ricci, 1989: 114). 
In contrast, other guappi considered their political role merely as 
a job. They provided political influence within the clientelistic 
framework but expected something concrete in return for their 
services. The drawback was that sometimes politicians 
underestimated the work of their political agents. Ricci recalls the 
case of Zi Pitone and Giovanni '0 'Nafferrabile who had 'worked' 
together for a candidate, Cascinelli, and had promised him many 
votes. But the politician refused to pay them arguing that Zi Pitone had 
been ineffective in his district (1989: 115). In some extreme cases, the 
guappi resorted to kidnapping the reluctant politician to obtain 
satisfaction: Vincenzo IAmericano kidnapped MP and city councillor, 
Mario Ottieri for this reason (Ricci, 1989: 11S). In some cases, the men 
never reappeared. The famous disappearance of the mayor of 
Battipaglia, Lorenzo Rago, in 1952 or that of the vice-mayor of 
Sant'Antonio Abate, Andrea Galasso, in 1954 was rumoured to be due 
to guappi involvement (IlMattino of 11 April 1954 and Paese Sera, 11-12 
April 1954). 
Outside election time, political guappi were of course less visible 
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and therefore, their role is much more difficult to assess. However, 
some famous incidents allow us to conclude that some guappi 
remained useful to politicians by intimidating or threatening 
unsympathetic parties. In 1954, the notorious guappo, Ciccio 
I'Acquaiolo, attended a city council meeting to intimidate the 
opposition by shouting insults at them. The precise motives for his 
action can only be speculated about but it is known that Lauro himself 
had to intervene in person to restrain this energetic participant 
(Guarino, 1965: 89). 
While Lauro used guappi in Naples city, Silvio Gava was using the 
same techniques in the hinterland. Silvio Gava was a lawyer and used 
his profession as one way of making contacts and befriending 
powerful guappL As the journalist Ottone emphasised: "politicians 
should fight and destroy the Camorra. Instead, they defend it as 
lawyers. And then, people are convinced that they are defending them 
all the time, even as local concillors" (1965: 68SI3). This appears to be 
the case with Catello Di Somma, a guappo from Castellammare di 
Sabia, who despite being taken to court and sent on 'internal 
banishment to Ustica, supported Gava. Indeed, the psychology 
professor Giuseppe Lavitola, a friend of the Gavas, has recalled that 
"during the election campaign of 1958 (or maybe 1953), Silvio Gava [an 
established politician and and senior minister14 walked around 
Castellammare, arm in arm with the old camorrista Catello Di Somma" 
(PS: 29-11-93: 2). This apparently open parade of affection could only 
have one political aim: that of signalling to the local population whom 
Di Somma supported and how they should vote. 15 
13 Ottone also mentioned in his article that Gava's son Roberto "participated as a 
defence lawyer into the famous Maresca trial" (1965: 686); Silvio Gava in a letter (12 
October, 31 October 1964) replied that "his highlighting the really important news 
that my son Roberto was a defence lawyer in the Maresca trial raises the suspicion 
that I might have some link or contact direct or indirect with the Camorra". In his 
response Ottone wrote "it is not sufficient to fight the Camorra, as Senator Gava 
claims to have done. it is also necessary to demonstrate clearly to public opinion 
that one is fighting it" (1965: 728). 
14 Silvio Gava has published his memoirs in 1999, where he refutes his relationship 
with Catello di Somma explaining that he was the first Neapolitan politician to fight 
the Camorra. 
15 Silvio Gava wrote today "after that lie the Court Case] he continually offered me 
votes and services which I regularly refused I ... 1" (1999: 147). 2S9 
We have other evidence of Silvio Gava's close relationship with Di 
Somma and in particular of its clientelistic nature. Antonio Gava 
evokes an episode which shows how interlinked and unique their 
relationship was: during a trial Silvio Gava had dared taken one of Di 
Somma's family to court; Di Somma retaliated by slapping Gava's 
father-in-law in his absence. This slap was interpreted as a clear 
message provoked by "the betrayal of a non-written pact of reciprocal 
respect and solidarity, believing that the politician was in debt to him 
because of the electoral support he guaranteed him" (P5: scheda 26: 5/4). 
Silvio Gava according to Galasso (Pr7: 21/22-12-93v), appears to have 
entertained relations with many other prominent guappi of the 
different zones in the hinterland to strengthen his political power: 
from Catello Di Somma in the Stabiese and Vesuviana region to the 
Orlandos and then from the Nuvolettas in Marano to the Gaudinos in 
Poggiomarino. On the whole, the guappi's relationship with politicians 
at local level was casual, uncoordinated and entirely controlled by 
their patrons within their clientelistic framework, either patron-client or 
party-directed patronage. They were in a subordinate position and 
never had their own independent political agenda. 
As a national politician, Silvio Gava seems in the company of 
other DC politicians to have used the services of prestigious 
hinterland guappi (see Tarrow, 1967). Yet again, the social prestige of 
these guappi transformed into political support which was used by 
politicians as an electoral commodity to secure election. Antonio 
Gava, in a conversation with professor Lavitola, recalls how his father 
made use of these guappi. - "Peppino, you've been in politics and have 
used these people like me. I used them like my father did" (PS: 29-11- 
93: 2). 
By the 1960s, in comparison with Lauro and the PMP, the DC was 
an efficient political machine. and could provide some solid political 
favours and rewards (in other words, politicians had obligations) for 
the guappi, in the 'party-directed patronage' model (see Figure 11.4). 
Thus, during general election campaigns, guappi campaigned and 
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organised the vote for the party. It would appearIG that various DC 
politicians during the 1950s and 1960s also used guappi for their 
electoral campaigns as capielettoH. Catello di Somma, Alfredo Maisto 
and Antonio Esposito were used and manipulated for their social and 
criminal prestige in the local community. They supported and formed 
part of an exchange system which was fairly unsophisticated. 
However, the main difference between Lauro's exchange and the DC 
politicians' exchange is that the latter, once national political Figures, 
had access to public funds and thus, put into place a system of 
'party-directed patronage'. 17 
11.3. The Camorra's Local Exchange Duriniz the 1980s 
The changing fortunes of the local DC in 1975 forced a radical 
reorganisation of the party's electoral strategies. Antonio Gava, who 
succeeded his father as an important Neapolitan factional leader, and 
his men had to find an efficient way of winning support to replace the 
disappearing traditional electorate. So, within the traditional 
clientelistic framework, they turned to new sections of the local 
community, in particular to some of the people who counted, the 
young new gangsters. The latter themselves were obviously attracted 
by power-seeking politicians who could provide legal help and political 
protection. In fact, Alfieri and Galasso were already DC supporters in 
the 1972 general election (Pr8: 14-2-94) as were the Nuvolettas (Faenza, 
1990; PrUbid). Galasso recalls his father taking him to an election 
meeting already in 1973 where he met the local DC mayor, Francesco 
Liguori, as well as Antonio Gava and Francesco Patriarca (later MPs) 
(Pr7: 12-3-93). 
The DC's reorganisation at local level coincided with a period of 
turmoil for the Carnorra. - the first Camorra war broke out in 1977 with 
Cutolo seeking dominance (see Chapter Eight). There was a greater 
16 1 use the word 'appear' as the well informed sources I have spoken to would not 
confirm what they said but suggested that what these were very strong rumours. 
17 Interview with dott. De Mare, 1997, thanks to dott. B. Passaro of Piano di 
Sorrento see b. Passaro (1990). 
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need on both sides for support in their respective empire-building 
efforts. The two winning alliances, Gava on the one hand and Alfieri on 
the other, were thus on equal terms. 
The basic two-way exchange of the 1950s became a three-way 
exchange in the 1980s. The terms of the 1950s clientelistic exchange 
were now modified and 'modernised': firstly, patrons and clients were 
now equal partners; up to the mid 1970s the caniorristi had been 
subordinate political agents. Secondly, camorristi now had a more 
dynamic role as 'political sponsors' (see Figure 11.5 to understand 
how the Camorra controlled votes in the local community). 
Moreover, the clientelistic exchange was no longer an exclusive 
dyadic but a triadic relationship, with the introduction of big business 
as the third term of the equation, completing a triangular exchange 
between sub-systems18 (see Figure 11.6). The new agent was the 
'businessman' from the economic system; this presence added a new 
logic to the exchange as well'as new resources. It was the Camorra 
which brought in this new element during the 1970s through its need to 
'launder' money. Businessmen were thus co-opted by force, 
intimidation or agreement to become the 'respectable' face of legal 
Camorra activities. In this way, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as 
the Camorra's relationship with businessmen changed from casual 
acquaintance and small-scale corruption to a fully involved 
partnership 'laundering' illegal money, the businessmen were drawn 
into the Camorra's political relationship. Indeed, politicians also had 
close business links, which helped make the emerging three-way 
relationship a natural development. 
The new exchange was a triangular or tripartite agreement where 
18 A DIA report explained the functionality of this system: 
"- the corrupt institutional agent manages both the financing and distribution of the public 
contract, as a 'mediator' between the company, always seemingly a national company from 
the North and the Camorra. This type of mediation Is generally a bribe, a kickback, paid in 
advance, to him or other local politicians and the distribution of subcontracts to companies 
directly controlled by the Camorra. 
- in the case of the distribution of contracts to local companies, this would be managed 
directly by a business committee comprising politicians, businessmen and camorristi, all on an 
equal basis. 
- the company undertaking the work must pay another bribe, or kickback to the clan leader 
who controls the zone where the work is to take place" (RG: 19-20) and see RA. 
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each agent represented different systems, collectivities, organisations 
or institutions, and had different dynamics, aims, resources and 
agendas. Thus, it was effectively a three-way functional interaction but 
also a business exchange of commodities, services, goods, 
reciprocities and obligations between representatives of three 
different systems: the camorrista, a member of a criminal organisation 
(a sub-system of civil society) which has its own set of rules and 
resources and its own aims (to protect its members and make 
money), interacted both with politicians (agents in the political system 
whose objectives were vote-maximization and winning office) and 
businessmen (agents from the economic system whose goals were 
financial). The new exchange was thus, a functional and profitable 
partnership in which each actor was pro-active with a set political 
agenda and clear aims and objectives. 
In effect, these actors, representing their different systems and 
monopolising control, power and money between them, operated 'a 
cartel arrangement, the common goal of which was to divert public 
funds and make huge profits. In theoretical terms, this exchange can 
be analysed as a symbiosis between the three different sub-systems 
(see Figure 11.7). 
Questions of detail remain: what commodities were provided by 
the Camorra and what were the dynamics behind this modified 
exchange between camorristi, corrupt politicians and big business 
post-1983? "I must add that Cirillo and Cutolo were also on excellent 
terms with the Christian Democrat mayor of Ottaviano, Felice lervolino, 
who was elected with the votes and the support of the NCO, it is in fact 
obvious that ina town such as Ottaviano which is totally controlled by 
the NCO, you cannot be elected without the approval and support of this 
organisation" (Prl lb: 2-3). This remark by one of Cutolo's lieutenants 
establishes the correlation between the two partners of our traditional 
exchange. The zones controlled by the NCO clan, by the NF clans and 
later by the Alfieri Confederation, corresponded to the zones of 
influence of the DC and its allies, the PSI-PSDI. All the legal and police 
documentation has demonstrated that the Camorra controlled 
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electoral consensus by, firstly, organising the electoral campaign; and 
secondly, getting out the vote on polling day. This was a traditional 
commodity provided by the Camorra in the 1980s as it was by the 
guappi in the 1950s. But, the power of the organisations and the 
radical means used were of a totally different nature and reminiscent 
of the methods described by Gosnell in 1920s Chicago (1968) and 
Whyte in 1930s' Boston (1981): canvassing and fixing, distribution of 
favours and services; ballot-box stuffing; alteration of tally sheets and 
ballot erasures, display and threats of violence. In other words, the 
political role of the Camorra was now more blatantly coercive, 
intimidating and corrupt than hitherto. 
At this point it is helpful to discuss some specific 
"" 
well- 
documented examples of local election campaigns in which the 
Camorra clans demonstrated their capacity to influence and control 
electoral consensus; they include19: Torre Annunziata, Marano di 
Napoli, Poggiomarino, Casal di Principe and Sant'Antonio Abate in the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
Torre Annunziata is a former medium-sized industrial town in 
the Bay of Naples which, despite six years (1970-76) under a left wing 
administration (PCI-PSI-PSIUP) had a 65% unemployment-rate in 1981 and 
endemic social degradation. This run-down urban community with 
mass unemployment was, as judge D'Antonio wrote: "plagued by utter 
deprivation, ancient layers of criminal subculture and marginality [ ... I 
which reduced drastically the possibility of action by public agencies; 
the state was always felt to be weak and far away" (CUA14: 13). This 
socioeconomic situation was fertile ground for Camorra activities. 7he 
town's two dominant Camorra clans at that time were the Gionta and 
limelli-Vangone clans. Electoral campaigning was of vital importance 
to them: by p oviding votes to the local patrons, they were 
19 Between 1990 and 1993,32 councils were disbanded for Camorra infiltration in 
Campania. The whole list is: -in Naples' Province: Acerra, Casamarciano, 
Casandrino, Casola di Napoli, Ercolano, Marano di Napoli, Nola, Poggiomarino, 
Pomiogliano d'Arco, Quarto, San Giusepppe Vesuviano, Sant'Antimo, Sant'Antonio 
Abate, Torre Annunziata; Avellino Province: Pago del Vallo di Lauro, Quindici; - in 
Caserta's Province: Carinola, Casal di Principe, Casapesenna, Cesa, Frignano, 
Grazzanise, Lusciano, Mondragone, Recale, San Cipriano d'Aversa, Santa Maria La 
Fossa, villa di Briano; - in Salerno's Province: Nocera Inferiore, Pagani, Sarno, Scafati 
(CPA1: 160-1). 
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guaranteeing for their clan political protection, judicial immunity and 
profitable business deals. 
One of Valentino Gionta's right hand-men, Salvatore Migliorino 
emphasises that, "it was useless for an honest politician to organise an 
honest electoral campaign, promising things that he could not deliver as 
he was not really able to resolve the city problems" (11: 78). The clans, 
however, could provide short-term solutions: "we replaced the state: we 
promised work we distributed money, a family would come to us and 
say 'my son needs work. We would answer 'Go to that building site and 
tell them that we have sent you. [ .. ] With promises, with a couple of 
thousand lire, with smalljobs, with a bit of help to find accommodation. 
[ .. I We bought the votes of the population. [ .. I In the 1980s, 70% of the 
vote was ours" (ibid. 79-88). A population in need was more likely to 
vote for the clan's preferred candidate, in exchange for help and 
support. 
The Gionta clan in particular had enormous influence in Torre 
Annunziata. They usually did not intervene directly, but used "clean 
and respected people from outside the clan, friends, relatives and 
acquaintances who took the message to the people; it was enough for 
the people to know whom we wanted to be elected for them to vote 
the right way "(ibid). The smaller Limelli'clan, on the other hand, 
intervened more directly as Tarallo recalls: "for the 1985 provincial 
election, we were asked to procure votes for Bertone. [ .. ] We distributed 
propaganda, [, .. I put up electoral posters and indicated clearly to the 
people the number of the list and the PSI logo" (Pr6: 20-1-91: 13). We must 
remember that about 5% of the town's voters were still illiterate. like 
most Camorra clans, the Gionta and the limelli clans sponsored the 
politicians who would be most useful to them and their deals in the 
long term. They may have used money during their canvassing but they 
were never actually paid for their electoral support. 
During the 1980s, the politician who was the most useful was 
Domenico Bertone. He was the PSI candidate who represented the DC- 
PSI national governing alliance. An ex-trade unionist, he was mayor of 
Torre Annunziata between 1981 and 1985. He and his political friends 
269 
(about 25% of the councUlors2O) enjoyed the support of both clans. A 
police inquiry investigating the election results in 1981 and 1985 
pointed out the exact correlation between high preference votes for 
Bertone in the 1985 municipal and provincial elections and the 
geographical zone of influence of the Gionta clan (D'Alterio, 1996: 183- 
4). It is very difficult to assess the exact electoral weight that these 
clans represented, but looking at the number of preference votes for 
the candidates who have been named by judges in connection with the 
Camorra, one can surmise that the clans probably controlled between 
600-1000 votes in their geographical zones since even the candidates 
not elected but whom the Camorra supported received a relatively 
high number of preference VoteS. 21 
This example shows the political power which Camorra clans 
exercised over their territory, but we must bear in mind that the clans 
became involved to varying degrees in electoral campaigns according 
to their size and social influence in the local community. Incidentally, it 
20 In 1985 we identified 11 out of 40 councillors who were Involved in Camorra 
collusion. 
21 On the basis of legal documents we are assuming that these candidates had 
links with the Camorra: 
Non-elected Camorra sponsored candidates: local election 6 May1990 
Emidio De Pamphilis (PSI) 363 preference votes 
Salvatore Scarpa (DC) 529 preference votes 
Salvatore Capasso (DC) 906 preference votes 
Gennaro Orofino (PSO 920 preference votes 
Italo Gordano (PSI) SG8 preference votes 
Pasquale Visiello (PSI) 884 preference votes 
Nicola Carillo (PSI) 549 preference votes 
Giampiero Nitrato Izzo (PSI) 832 preference votes 
- The lowest number of preference votes for non-elected candidates being 209 and 
the highest being 980 for the DC list. For the PSi list, the lowest number of 
preference votes is 53 and the highest is 976 preference votes. 
Elected Camorra sponsored candidates: local election G Mayl990: 
Antonio Carotenuto (PSI) 1883 preference votes 
Sergio Gargiulo (DC) 1138 preference votes 
De Leo Carmine (PSI) 1953 preference votes 
Antonio Elveni (PSO 1130 preference votes 
Nfichele Savino (DQ 1364 preference votes 
Esposito Muchele (PSDI) 1493 preference votes 
Antonio Irlando (DQ* 1453 preference votes 
Umberto Caliendo (PSDO 124S preference votes 
Beniamino Verdezza (PSI) 111G preference votes 
Liberato Cafiero (PSI) 983 preference votes. 
(Source: Ministero dellInterno, Direzione Generale dell'Amministrazione Civile, 
Servizio Elettorale, Divisione Org anizzazione dellle Consultazioni Elettorale., Torre 
Annunziata, 6-5-90) 
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also highlights the total lack of local democracy in Campania during 
the 1980s. 
We find the same pattern in Marano di Napoli as in Torre 
Annunziata. Marano is a small town to the North East of Naples. Forty 
years ago it was a pleasant agricultural market town but with the 
intensive building speculation of the 1960s and 1970s, it became part 
of the outskirts of Naples with all its accompanying features and 
problems: u46.165 inhabitants, 5 primary schools, 3 junior schools, one 
secondary school, no hospital, one police station, 2 cinemas - closed 
five years ago. No real economic activity to speak of, as those who 
are employed work in Naples" (Martano, 1993: 58). As in Torre 
Annunziata, the general run-down nature of the zone made it an easy 
prey for the Camorra. The dominant local clan is the Orlando- 
Nuvoletta-Polverino family which already in the 1970s, according to 
Antonio Ammaturo22, head of the squadra mobile, "was able to 
mobilise thousands of votes for certain candidates" (Faenza, 
1990: 133). 
It was a DC politician, Raffaele Credentino, who became mayor 
with sponsorship of the clan in 1980-84, but what is of particular 
interest is the fact that in this case we can clearly quantify the weight 
of the preference vote and therefore of the clans's influence since 
two newcomers (Francesco Santoro and Raffacle Orlando) with no 
political past but Camorra support in the 1990 local elections, 
obtained a very large number of preference votes (respectively 1,768 
and 1,743), overtaking all the well- e stablishe d local candidates 
"especially in the polling stations of Via Merolla (polling stations 24 
and 25), Via Mallardo and Guglielmo Pepe (polling stations 30-40) and 
Poggio Vallesana where the influence of Nuvoletta's men was absolute" 
(IlMattino of 9 December 1989). The newcomers' presence on the DC 
list increased the DC's vote from 9,879 in 1985 to 15,971 in 1990 
(Ministero dellInterno, Servizio Elettorale, Commune di Marano di 
Napoli, Elezione del 6-05-1990). This example not only demonstrates 
22 Capo della Squadra mobile 197 -82. He was murdered by the NCO in 1982 as a favour to the Red Brigades. It is believed that he was getting very close to the truth 
about the criminal activities of many of the Camorra clans in Campania. 
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the Camorra clan's control of the electoral process but also indicates 
a new development: the placing of 'its' own men, usually family 
members, on the Town Council to guarantee the direct representation 
of its economic interests. 
Another well documented case is that of Pasquale Galasso's 
fiefdom, Poggiomarino. In his deposition to the Parliamentary 
Antimafia Commission (CPA1.1 and 1.2), Galasso explained in great 
detail the promises and exchanges of favours which took place during 
the election campaign as the clan sought votes: "Someone -who had 
problems with the VAT inspector, the Inland Revenue or the local 
authorities, who needed planning permission or a building licence came 
to us for help. Services rendered tied him to us and therefore to "our" 
candidate" (CPA1.2: 2749). If and where the support was not naturally 
forthcoming, camorristi canvassers did not hesitate to resort to 
violence, intin-ddatory action and even to murder. Evidence of this can 
be found in nearly all the communes in Campania: for example, Acerra, 
Torre del Greco, Pornigiliano d'Arco: burnt cars, gunshots, shops and 
offices set on fire, etc (Faenza, 1990) as well as three killings in a 
fortnight during the election campaign of April 1990 in Poggiomarino. 
In Casal di Principe, the Schiavone clan organised an 'efficient' 
electoral campaign: "members of the organisation went to every 
house: sometimes with threats, sometimes with compromises, they 
were able to produce good results" (SO12: 100). In this Commune, the 
electoral staff of one of the DC candidates was composed of his 
camorristi cousins, in particular, the violent clan boss, Sandokan: "they 
undertook door-to-door canvassing, asking for votes. For those who did 
not agree, threats were made against them, their properties and their 
businesses" (SO12: 102). With these violent tactics, the clan was able to 
increase the DC's vote from 30% to 50% in 1982. The examples of 
Poggiomarino and Casal di Principe highlight the pervasive and violent 
measures which Camorra clans were willing to resort to to impose 
their political will. It also illustrates the Camorra's fierce and 
totalitarian nature. 
in SantAntonio Abate, the stronghold of the 'Doroteo' faction 
272 
leader, Antonio Gava, electoral campaigns were always tense and 
often violent, and candidates could easily be beaten up in the main 
square (Mario Saverese in P1 1: 69). The day of reckoning was election 
day. Galasso recalls how in Poggiomarino the absolute loyalty of the 
clan was tested: "you could count on the 200 votes of your family" 
(CPA1.1: 2748) as well as the local community which can help explain 
how a candidate he supported obtained 1.055 preference votes out of 
1.406 total votes for the party list (Faenza, 1990: 132). But the Camorra 
also used every possible trick to make sure that it got the vote out. 
Votes which had not been won by persuasion were either seized by 
fraud or force. 
In December 1990, a judicial inquiry into the May 1990 local 
elections found voting irregularities in seven constituencies in 
Campania indicating clearly that ballot papers had been stuffed into 
the ballot box since there were more votes than the number of people 
on the electoral register (Behan, 1996). In Castel Volturno, a local bar 
was the residential address for more than a hundred electors 
(Faenza, 1990) and in Casal di Principe, a polling station was 
conveniently set up in the house of a local boss! 
Migliorino insists that his clan never used violence or intimidation 
during elections in Torre Annunziata. But, we have the evidence of 
Francesco Donadio, a PDS councillor (1985-90), who recalls an episode 
during the local elections of 6 May 1990 in Torre Annunziata: "the 
secretary of my party had to go to the Police Station to inform them of 
the presence of alarmingly violent men outside polling stations" (S03: 94). 
The use of camor7isti and their violence by politicians was not 
restricted to elections. There are many interesting examples where 
camorristi were called in by politicians to resolve their political 
$complications'. In this respect, politicians still saw themselves as 
patrons and camorristi as subordinates obeying- orders. This arrogant 
attitude, however, declined during the 1980s as canior7isti grew in 
importance. Antonio Gava, in particular, frequently used the Camorra 
in this way, much like his father is claimed to have done. Moreover like 
his father, Gava jr never sought direct contact with camorristi but 
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always did it indirectly through his lieutenants. 23 
Two clear examples show how he expected the Camorra to use 
violence to help him resolve his political conflicts, where ultimately the 
ends justified the means; in his case, power and domination of the 
Toroteo' faction. Both examples took place in Antonio Gava's political 
heartland and in Carmine Alfieri's centre of operations. After the 1985 
municipal elections in Poggiornarino, Gava contacted Pasquale 
Galasso, the local boss, through his political lieutenants and asked 
him to force a successful independent DC candidate into joining the 
Toroteo' faction so that it could become dominant on the Council. It 
is clear that by asking a camorrista to intervene, Gava was making use 
of the reputation of a violent and feared boss. Galasso at first 
refused, but his leader, Alfieri, intervened: "He asked the reasons for 
my refusal, he conrirmed that Gava was our friend and that I could not 
refuse this favour. I thus met with Sangiovanni [DC candidate] in my 
hide-out in Sarno and transmitted the request [ .. 1. It was impossible to 
distinguish between my criminal reputation and the influence which 
derived from me being on the run. Sangiovanni in this way was 
convinced and supported Gava"(Pr7: 19-03-1993). 
In the other case, camorristi were used once again to physically 
eliminate political rivals to reestablish the 'proper' DC Toroteo' 
dominance on the local Council. This took place in Sant'Antonio Abate 
in 1988 and has been well-documented (CPA1.1 and Behan, 1996). In 
this commune, the local DC had split because of different sponsors: 
the traditional DC list backed by Fantini and Andreotti was sponsored 
by the old NCO clans (Rosanova and Abagnale) and the new Civic list 
was backed by Gava and was sponsored by the Galasso-Loreto clans. 
When the traditional DC won the majority on the council: "it was clear 
that Gava was losing power in SantAntonio Abate whereas Fantini had 
constructed, with Giuseppe Abagnale, after the concession or the public 
water purifler, a very strong electoral base" (P1 1: 1 OG-7). The Galasso- 
Loreto clans took direct action to redraw the political balance in 
23 In this way, legally, Antonio Gava has been able to argue that he did not have 
anything to do with camorristi or the Camorra. Much of his defence is based on this 
attitude; for his father see Gava (1999). 
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favour of the 'Doroteo'faction: they killed their rival political sponsors 
(the Rosanova brothers) to make the message clear to the other DC 
politicians. Ferrara Rosanova recalls 
We [the Rosanova clan] had supported the DC list led by 
Giuseppe DAntuono and Giuseppe Abagnale, which had won 
this election with 15 councillors. The Civic list, led by Tonino 
D'Auria and supported by Pasquale Galasso and Pasquale 
Loreto, had in actual fact, lost the election, obtaining only 13 
councillors. The murder of my brothers provoked political 
turmoil and the seizing of power by the Galasso-Loreto clan. 
Indeed, while Geppino Abagnale left the political scene and hid 
out of fear of being killed, three elected DC councillors (Diodato 
D'Auria Ciro Mascolo, and Salvatore DAntuono) followed 
after a 
ýhile by Bozzatore, brother-in-law of Agostino Abagnale, 
all su pported the civic list and formed a mqjority allowing the 
constitution of a municipal junta (CD'Al7x). 
Gava jr, as a politician, indirectly played a part in this episode although 
he has argued that he was not directly involved and the different 
political dynamics had nothing to do with him (OM). 
Politicians who were discarded by one clan sought sponsorship 
from other clans. This was the case in Torre Annunziata, when a DC 
politician, Salvatore Capasso, who was not sponsored by the Gionta 
clan, turned to the Limelli clan. As Tarallo recalls: 
I met Capasso in 198Z He was still Mayor. [ .. ]I remember that 
a couple of months after this meeting, Carotenuto [the Gionta- 
sponsored politician] replaced Capasso as Mayor. The meeting 
was organised by Trotto who was filendly with Capasso. Trotto 
told Giovanni Annuziato that he had organised a meeting with 
Mayor Capasso who wanted to meet us. I made it clear that the 
meeting had not been called by us. At the house of Trotto's 
relative, Trotto Pasquale did the introductions. Capasso straight 
away started to flatter Limelli saying that, compared to the 
Gionta clan, he and his group were different, superior and he 
made himself available to us. Later on, taking into account the 
fact that within the space of a couple of months, Capasso was 
replaced by Carotenuto, sponsored by the Gionta clan, It 
thought that he [Capasso] had come to us because he was 
aware of his political decline and of the rise of Carotenuto, 
backed by the Gionta clan. During that first meeting, Capasso t 
talked to us about what he was going to do for the territory; he 
spoke as if he were at an electoral rally. It was clear that he was 
able to look after our interests I .. ]. Limelli replied that he trusted 
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him, that he was a serious and well balanced person [. j. He told 
him that on our side, there was all the good will in the world to 
support him. We did not talk about votes because there was 
another two years before the next election campaign 
(Pr6: 26-8-94: 25-6). 
Other politicians refused contact with many Camorra clans to protect 
their already established exclusive links. For example, Antonio 
Carotenuto, a Gionta sponsored PSI councillor, refused contact with 
the Limelli "not to betray the Gionta clan"(Pr6: 26-8-95: 1 1). 
It is clear from this evidence that the Camorra clans took part 
willingly and efficiently within the traditional clientelistic framework, at 
times using 'middlemen' to deal with politicians in the 1970s (Faenza, 
1996). But in the 1980s, they went beyond this to become pro-active in 
the exchange and started to infiltrate both political parties and, as a 
result, the local municipal councils to influence political and economic 
decisions directly. 
As already pointed out, two of the determining factors that 
precipitated this evolution were the 1980 earthquake and the huge 
amounts of money controlled by local councils and on the other, the 
Cirillo Affair (see Appendix Eight). In many Italian studies of the 
modern Camorra, one finds the expression "inquinamento 
camorristico", pollution by the Camorra. This, indeed, seems the best 0 
way to describe the phenomenon of Camorra infiltration, penetration 
and collusion by which a party machine, in particular the DC, was 
invaded and taken over by Camorra elements who connived to gain 
access to the decision-making centres. Then, they either intervened by 
proxy or personally entered the political arena; in the municipal 
Councils, for example, they fully participated in making decisions and 
laying their hands on reconstruction funds. 
In a way similar to the take-over of the party section by the 
Toroteo' faction, the criminal gangs engaged in taking over the local 
DC, PSI and PSDI party sections and administration. For example, in 
Poggiomarini), in the late 1970s, as Pasquale Galasso recalled, the 
NCO's Alfonso Rosanova, with the help of his front man, Avv. 
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Giuseppe Caso, "had succeeded in obtaining [ .. ] the control of the DC 
and therefore of the local administration" (P10: 77). The Camorra clans 
were taking power either by agreement with corrupt politicians or by 
being elected themselves. In this way, they were becoming a 
'legitimate' part of the political process. The main parties which were 
targeted by the Camorra and which responded, needing the resources 
that they could offer (violence, social networks and money), were the 
ruling majority parties, the DC ('Doroteo' faction in particular), the PSI 
and the PSDI. It was very easy for local gangsters and local politicians 
to establish contacts at this level as they had grown up together. Vito 
explains that: "in many cases, there were ramily links or rriendships 
between us so exercising influence was a very smooth process" 
(CD'Al7v: 60), or again, the mayor of Poggiomarino was the local 
doctor of the Camorra clans and therefore became imperceptibly 
involved with them. Friendship and social acquaintance gave both 
camorristi and politicians special access to each other and their 
resources "Alfferi's strategy was to have electoral control over the 
territory he controlled criminally. Having thousands of votes at his 
command, due to his control of the mayors or Saviano, S. Giuseppe, 
Nola, Boscoreale, Somma Vesuviana, Ottoviano, Trecase, Pompeii and 
other towns [ .. ], he determined the election of the politicians supported by 
him" (Pr7: 1). But there were exceptions such as the Communist 
businessman and town councillor sponsored by the Gionta clan in 
Torre Annunziata (Antonio Carpentieri [D'Alterio, 1996: 196]). 
Alternatively, a number of 'clean' members of the Camorra gangs 
(doctors, lawyers, teachers, etc) were encouraged to take up a career 
in politics by their Camorra cousins. In Aversa, Marano, Casal di 
Principe and Quindici among others, gangs actually placed their men 
on DC, PSI and PSDI lists and they became town councillors and 
mayors: the brother of the gangster Antonio Bardellino, Ernesto, 
became the Socialist mayor of San Cipriano d'Aversa in 1981-84; four 
close relatives of Lorenzo Nuvoletta were elected DC councillors in 
Marano in 1990; two cousins of the gangster Francesco Schiavone, 
became mayor and finance assessore in Casal di Principe in 1985. The 
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mayor of Quindici was the brother of the local boss. it is surely 
reasonable to suggest that they could only achieve this result by 
influencing, in some way, the local party section and secretaries. 
Thus, the collusion between local councillors and the Camorra 
was the result of different strategies, often difficult to document. But 
defining these strategies in terms of exchange is much easier: social 
networks and violence were the resources provided by the Camorra 
to local politicians and administrators which, within the framework of 
the traditional clientelistic framework, allowed camorristi to be more 
and more involved in the political process. Faenza highlights the 
following relationships during the late 1980s: Cardito: 6 PSDI 
candidates and one elected, sponsored by NCO-Moccia clan; 
Casandrino: 4 DC and 2 PSI candidates and all elected, sponsored by 
the Verde and Puca clans; Marano: 3 DC and 3 PSI candidates and all 
elected, sponsored by the Nuvoletta clan; Acerra: 5 DC, 1 PSI, 1 PSDI 
candidates and all elected, sponsored by the Nuzzo clan; Brusciano: I 
DC and 3 PSI candidates and all elected, sponsored by the Nuvoletta 
clan; Torre Annunziata: 1 DC sponsored candidate and elected by the 
Cavalleri clan (1991: 139-40). Between 1990 and 1993,32 local councils 
were officially disbanded because of Camorra infiltration and 
replaced by government representatives who sought to eliminate 
these corrupt relationships. 
The main reason why organised crime groups sought influence 
and control over politicians and their economic agenda was the 
access that these had to decision-making centres and to the 
distribution of public resources. In the 1950s, Lauro and his friends 
provided small favours; by the mid-1980s, the DC and PSI had control 
over the state apparatuses and resources, 24 and had direct access to 
public funds. The 1980 earthquake further increased the resources 
available as the state embarked on a massive 'reconstruction 
programme' in the region. 
24 There is an interesting discussion about this relationship in Katz and Mair who 
talk about the emergence of a 'cartel party' as"being characterised by the 
interpenetration of party and state" (1993: 17) and in Allum (1997a) in particular in 
relation to the DC. 
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These investments provided a powerful incentive 
* 
for the 
Camorra to step up their infiltration of local Councils and become 
major players in the local economy. Until the 1960s, emerging 
camorristi had used local businesses as a base for their rackets, 
intimidation and casual contacts with politicians. By the early 1980s, 
we can distinguish between two different strategies. On the one hand, 
the NCO's became involved in the businesses which it had once 
racketeered by buying them out and therefore gaining access to the 
legal market, while continuing their traditional rackets. These activities 
were concentrated in the construction industry. They had businessmen 
who helped them in their transformation especially where important 
public contracts were at stake. Such was the case of the 'legitimate' 
businessman, Matteo Sorrentino, 2S who acted as the middleman 
between the clan and large Northern building contractors working in 
the Campania region who had to pay bribes (3-5% on the work 
undertaken) in return for guaranteed good working- conditions and no 
trouble on the building site. He also imposed suppliers and 
subcontractors who were protected or owned by the NCO. This 
system was described by Carmine Alfieri as "the Cutolo model": 
Cutolo invested only in the companies which he had racketeered and 
in which he had accumulated capital. But he remained at the first stage 
of investment in the market2G (Sales, 1988: 201). 
On the other hand, there was the strategy of the NF clans. The 
smuggling clans of the NF, which became involved in the international 
drugs trade in the 1970s, needed to 'launder' their 'dirty' money 
through legal businesses and thus approached legitimate businessmen 
to become their front men in this operation. But, in many instances, 
using the names of their wives, mothers or daughters, they also 
23 Other businessmen who acted as mediators between the NCO and business 
were Luigi Romano, Gennaro Citarella, Alessandro Nocerino. In some cases, the 
common town and socialisation of camorristi and businessmen led to close 
friendships and functional relationships. This was particularly the case with 
Carmine Alfieri in the late 1980s. 
26 Sales suggests that the only NCO camorrista who invested his money in the 
legal market was Cutolo's right hand man, Vincenzo Casillo (see Chapter Eight), 
who expanded his activities to Rome and managed to control the Italian National 
Lottery, the Enalotto, across the whole of the country (1988: 201). 
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became legitimate businessmen with businesses in the legal economy 
(in vast areas from agricultural products to tourism and all forms of 
commerce - clothing, carpets, jewellery, etc) and thus, becoming 
"camorristi businessmen' (17mprenditore camorrista). In the post- 
earthquake economy, this was very useful because it allowed the NF 
clans to become fully involved in the distribution of public contracts; 
whereas Cutolo's NCO was ill prepared to meet the business 
challenge and had just started this three-way exchange when it 
succumbed to the combined action of the police and the NF clans in 
1983. 
Thus, when the earthquake occurred in November 1980, the 
different Camorra clans in their various legal guises were ready to 
compete for a place in the reconstruction programme. The kidnapping 
of the DC regional councillor Ciro Cirillo in April 1981 and the crucial 
role of Cutolo in his liberation (see Vasile, 1993) officialised and 
formalised the relationship between politicians, caniorristi and 
businessmen in a triadic exchange in which the Camorra became the 
controlling force setting the political and economic agendas. 
The first well-documented example of such control of the 
economic agenda in the post-earthquake era appears in a judgment of 
the Avellino tribunal in July 1984 (see S2) which condemned Stanislao 
Sibila, an NCO building contractor, for repeated extortion; this 
described in great detail the intricacies of the Camorra's power. In 
December 1981, Avellino City Council put out to tender a contract for 
the construction of 1,000 prefabricated houses for the homeless. in 
February 1981, nine national companies submitted tenders and two 
were finally retained for technical and budgetary reasons: Volan! Sud 
from Rome for 50% of the work and Feal Spa from Milan for the other 
half. However, in the following month, some irregularities in the legal 
position of the Volani Sud company were discovered and Feal Spa was 
offered the whole contract. From that moment onwards, the judicial 
documents become a Kafkaesque story of intrigue and kickbacks. At 
the centre of the story was Stanislao Sibila. First, the Milanese 
company, Feal Spa was forced to pay 3% of the whole contract in cash 
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under the table to Sibila and three local builders to guarantee good 
working conditions on the building sites. Not only were these local 
builders imposing their services on the Northern company but they 
were also racketeering it. 
Secondly, Stanislao Siblia together with his NCO associates, 
Roberto Cutolo and Vincenzo Casillo, managed to recover 40% of the 
total work for Volani Sud with the informal agreement (trattativa 
privata') of some local City councillors and Feal Spa. In return for this 
favour, Volani Sud had to pay 5% of the cost of the work undertaken 
(half a million pounds), give all subcontracts to Camorra sponsored 
companieS27 and use Camorra suppliers (in particular, a company 
called Beton). Volani Sud could only work under these conditions as 
the NCO specified "that there would be no problems of any kind" as 
long as they paid up. This shows us three aspects of the business 
Camorra: firstly, the extent to which the Camorra became involved 
with local businessmen, who acted as vital mediators in the exchange; 
secondly, the way the Camorra could violate legal procedures and 
establish illegal agreements as the norm; and thirdly, how the Camorra 
used the political sub-system (for example, corrupting local 
councillors) so linking the three sub-systems (political, economic and 
social) 
This basic type of exchange became a template for other 
emerging Camorra groups: the NF families and the Alfieri 
Confederation built upon and perfected the NCO model. The Camorra 
provided good working conditions, companies for the subcontracts 
and supplies for the work (cement, tools, diggers, bulldozers, etc) in 
return for 3-5% of the contract. Two types of companies took part in 
this exchange: the legal Camorra companies which won the contracts 
and sometimes never completed the work, and the Camorra- 
sponsored companies which received the contracts and accepted to 
work under the conditions imposed by the Camorra and politicians. 
This model was activated with relative ease during the 1980s at 
local level by the majority of Camorra clans. First, they applied it to 
27 Some of these companies were formed for the occasion like COMACOS which 
also had to pay 4% of the cost of the work which it undertook to the Camorra. 
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the earthquake reconstruction contracts (appaltieccellenti' or major 
construction projects in the hinterland) and then, the new clans (such 
as the Bardellino, Schiavone and Alfieri clans) adapted this model to 
all municipal contracts with the complicity of local politicians, 
administrators and businessmen. Thus, it became the norm. 
When the Camorra clans could not set the economic agenda, they 
became violent and started to eliminate reluctant politicians. 
Numerous cases of political murders have been well-documented for 
the period: Marcello Torre, DC mayor of Pagani in December 1980; 
Domenico Beneventano, PCI local councillor of Ottaviano in November 
1980 (CPA1: 20); Alfredo Mundo, ex-DC mayor of Marigliano in April 
1981; Eugenio Torrese, independent left-wing town councillor of Torre 
del Greco; Giugliano Pennacchio PSDI local councillor of Giugliano in 
July 1982; Giuseppe Caso, DC local councillor of Poggiomarino in 
August 1982; Francesco Giugliano, PSI mayor of San Gennaro 
Vesuviano in October 1982; Francesco Buzziti, local assessore of 
Lusciano in February 1983; Crecenzo Casillo, mayor of Casoria in 
December 1983 (Feo, 1989: 40-2) and the murder of 5 Cduncil 
Committee chairpersons. Similarly, there were many cases of 
intimidation: 17 bomb attacks between April 1982 and March 1983 
against local councillors (such as the one against the municipality of 
Parete in March 1982); 5 attacks against trade union offices, 16 
assaults on trade unionists and 14 attacks on local councillors (Behan, 
1996: 137). 
There were also cases of kidnapping such as that of De Lorenzo, 
public works assessore in Casandrino in January 1987, whose release 
was conditional on the resignation of the council: "the council resigned 
eight days later" (Martano, 1993: 47); or again, in Torre Annunziata, the 
direct action of the Gionta clan against the the DC mayor, Capasso to 
force him to stand down. As Tarallo explained: "Capasso stood down 
because he had been threatened by Pasquale Gallo [a member of 
the Gionta clan], who told him to resign, to let Carotenuto be elected in 
his place. He told me that 3 or 4 politicians from Torre Annunziata had 
also been contacted by Gallo Pasquale to have Carotenuto Antonio 
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appointed as mayor" (Pr6: 12-3). In Quarto, the Nuvoletta clan went as 
far as bombing the mayor's car and that of another senior council 
official in late 1982 when the Town Council was on the point of 
refusing the clan building contracts; the Council subsequently resigned 
and the new administration agreed to the building contracts (Behan, 
1996). It is clear that during this period of great Camorra expansion, 
the ends justified the means more than ever as the stakes were very 
high. 
In conclusion, the examples presented here illustrate the 
development of the Camorra's political exchange in three phases: (1) 
the traditional clientelistic exchange where the Camorra provides 
votes and campaign assistance; (2) the gradual infiltration of the party 
machine, placing its 'own' men in political positions; and (3) setting the 
political and economic agenda, thus, taking over the corrupt 
clientelistic exchange to produce a new modern exchange with new 
rules. 
11.3.1 The Camorra's Exchange at National Level in 1980s 
At national level, a similar pattern of functional exchange 
reproduced itself, as Pasquale Galasso has stated: "it is all too obvious 
that at election time, this privileged relationship between the political 
electoral network of a politician and the criminal organisation 
transformed itself into votes"(Pr7: 22-12-92). This is particularly clear in 
respect of the local DC leader, Antonio Gava and his men, although 
Gava jr has fiercely denied all the pentiti's allegations, accusations and 
evidence against him of Camorra involvement (OM). His lawyers have 
defended him using two important arguments: firstly, not one pentito 
can give clear evidence of having had direct contact and dealings with 
Antonio Gava. Therefore, his involvement is difficult to prove. 
However, it can be argued that this was typical of Gava's power 
system and way of 'doing politics; Antonio Gava remained in control 
of social and political networks. His lieutenants, such as Vincenzo 
Meo, Raffaele Russo, Alfredo Vito and Francesco Patriarca, had direct 
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dealings with camorrist4 but he managed to remain aloof and got his 
lieutenants to do the ground work. 28 Secondly, his lawyers argue that 
the pentiti made some serious mistakes about details such as election 
dates. It is clear that there are often mistakes of memory of this kind; 
even so, it would appear that both the versions of camor7lsti pentiti 
and the politician pentiti (especially Alfredo Vito) do largely correlate 
and confirm each other. Thus, we believe in general that the pentiti's 
stories do give us an overall picture of the modern clientelistic 
SySteM. 29 
Although, in the 1970s, there were some simple, casual and 
unsystematic relationships similar to those of the 1950s (see Figure 
11.8); in the 1970s, it was the combination of the DC's loss of local 
power in 1975, the 1980 earthquake and the Cirillo Affair in 1981 which 
forced a new dynamic relationship between politicians and the NCO 
and the other smuggling Camorra families at the national level. Indeed, 
the Cirillo Affair30 marked a turning point, as the NCO played a pivotal 
role in its denoue ment. Not only was it "the opportunity for Cutolo to 
consolidate the relationships that he already appeared to have had with 
DC politicians in the years 1977-8" (C. Alemi, 199631), but it also marked 
"a watershed" (Bassolino, 1993: IX) in the development of the 
Camorra's exchange with politicians. 
The evolution of the Camorra's relationship with politicians at 
national level, especially with Antonio Gava, are clearly seen through 
the three Camorra gangs: the NCO had a simple relationship; the NF- 
Nuvoletta had a more complex relationship; and the Alfieri 
confederation had an intricate and systematic relationship. 
The NCO was an electoral machine. Alfieri recalls how "a good 
number of Campania politicians, especially those that I have indicated as 
"Dorotei", protected CUTOLO because of the fact that he could exert 
28 The industrialists Bruno Brancaccio, closely linked to the 'Doreteo' faction, has 
stated that: "Gava, moreover, never acted personally in the collection of bribes 
(tangenti), in contrast to other political actors, entrusting this task to his 
lieutenants" (PrIG). 
29 For the problems posed by the pentiti's evidence and the judges's approach see 
Gribaudi and Musella (1997) and Chapter Three, section 3.3. 
30 See Appendix Seven. 
31 Interview of 10 September 1996, Caserta, Italy. 
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Figure 11.8: The NCO and the 1970s DC Political Machine, A classic clientelistic Exchange 
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military control over the territory and therefore, the strong electoral 
consensus which this produced" (Pr8: 18-2-94). Cutolo confirmed this 
when he emphasised that "my townsmen, friends of [DC politician] 
Scotti, told me that SCOTTI was the emerging DC personality and thus, 
could one day be useful. I remember that on that occasion, at election 
time, Scotti received 100.000 votes more than Gava, which I believe was 
due to my support" (Pr11: 4-6-87: 1-2). Cutolo's men became capable 
capielettori, electoral agents producing votes immediately (see Figure 
11.9), as Judge Alemi explains: "there appears to have been active 
campaigning by Cutolo to get these people elected [ .. ] so much so that in 
the moment in which Cutolo said in 1978. "we will no longer vote for Y 
but for X", X for the rirst time has more votes than Y who was number 1 
on the DC list. Thererore, this support was efficient and concrete"32 (10- 
9-96: 2). The NF-Nuvoletta gangs also campaigned and provided votes 
for Gava, as Alfieri recounts 
[.. jAntonio Malventi had told me that the Nuvolettas had 
organised a meeting with Antonio Gava, which according to 
Don Lorenzo, we should not miss ror all the world. It was due 
to be held on a Sunday about twenty days before the election. I 
could not attend because I had a cold and told Antonio 
Malventi to go as my representative. The next day, Malventi 
brought me the electoral propaganda that had been distHbuted 
duHng the meeting and told me how it had gone. [ .. ] There 
were about one hundred people there, for the most part 
representatives of the Neapolitan and Casertan underworldj.. 
Antonio Gava made a speech 
on the need to strengthen the DC, the type orspeech that 
politicians make. After his speech, according to Malvent4 Gava 
left the room with Don Lorenzo and Angelo Nuvoletta and 
others (Pr8: 14-2-94i: 2-3). 
At the same time, the Nuvoletta clan also gave political orders to their 
allies: Alfieri recalls how in the late 1970s, when his clan was under 
their protection, he was told how to vote in the 1979 general elections: 
"Sica [Salvatore Sica, DC politician close to Gaval was presented to me 
by the Nuvolettas [ .. ]. I remember that Angelo Nuvoletta together with 
32 A letter was found in 197G in Cutolo's sister's house on Parliamentary headed 
note paper which read: "sincerest thanks for your contribution to my re-election", 
signed Francesco Patriarca (documents attached to P10 on the subject of F. 
Patriarca: 4). 
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Figure 11.9: The NCO in the 1980s: An attempt at modemising the Classic Clientelistic Exchange 
Rwffi quak e 
Amd 
ýorotw 
Ga 
Faction 
The State ýand State fundmg 
Political System 
favours for ftumds 
tt exchange Ar votes 
mdrurm 
Comanies 
vAth DC 
NCO tmk S 
0 
citiz ens Economic System 
Key: 
LegaIhdp, political protection, 
tolerance, favcurs, pubhe contracts 
and jobs. 
-0-- 
Votes, -on y 
Protection. 
Money (airtgereetaibes) 
281 
three or four people from his clan accompanied the solicitor Sica to my 
house in Piazzolla di Nola and asked me to support him in the electoral 
campaign. Effectively, I campaigned for Sica" (Pr8: 15-2-94: 1). There 
exists other evidence of links between Gava and the Nuvolettas: not 
only was a letter found in Nuvoletta's house from the lawyer Palumbo 
asking them to support Antonio Gava, but also Domenico Di Maro, an 
important businessman close to the Nuvoletta clan, when stopped by 
the police had Antonio Gava's visiting card on him (Faenza, 1990: 133). 
This relationship was a traditional clientelistic exchange based around 
'vote exchange', votes for political protection and impunity (see Figure 
11.10). 
With the disappearance of the NCO and decline of the Nuvoletta 
clan in the mid-1980s, the Alfieri confederation took over the territory 
not only in terms of social, criminal and economic activities but also in 
its exclusive political relationship with the DC/PSI as Alfieri explains 
(see Figure 11.11): "'as we took over the territory, we also took over all 
the relationships with the political and business representatives who had 
had relations with Cutolo"(Pr8: 18-2-94). 
This meant that Alfieri became Antonio Gava and the local DC's 
main electoral agent, as a legal document stressed: "Carmine Alfieri, 
who had decapitated the NCO with the murders or Rosanova and 
Casilllo and, on the other hand, Antonio Gava, who had taken control of 
the Neapolitan DC and who had obtained a personal electoral success in 
the 1983 general election" (P5.1: scheda 60). The dominance and control 
of Gava and his 'Doroted faction in Campania corresponded to 
Carmine Alfieri's rise to Camorra dominance: "they were all 
simultaneously Gava and Carmine Alfieri's men"(Pr7: 12-03-93). 
The Alfieri confederation provided the DC with two types of 
commodity: votes and financial help in their electoral campaigns. In 
the 1987 general election Antonio Gava and his lieutenant Raffacle 
Russo received 1.600 preference votes in Poggiomarino, Pasquale 
Galasso's fiefdom. But, sometimes camorristi had to split their votes 
among different faction representatives which could also be 
problematic for them as Galasso explains: "he [Miranda -a Gava man] 
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Figure 11.10: The Nuvoletta clan. the Business Camorra and its links with Politics 
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Figure 11.11: The Alfieri Confederation. the Political Camorra in the 1980-90s 
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insisted instead that I guarantee him the entire 1500-2000 votes that 
Gava had always received in that Commune. Miranda insisted for a long 
time that I should have received Gava during a meeting at my home, 
but I refused to avoid a clear backing for one or the other[... ]. In that 
general election, I supported more Gava than Pomincino (he received a 
few hundred votes less than Gava), especially because I was attached to 
Sangiovanni, but I also helped Lettieri so that I did not lose my relations 
with Pomicino"(Pr7: 19-3-93). The dominant logic which prevailed in their 
political choices was not ideological but functional. Thus, when they 
targeted Alfredo Vito as a DC politician to sponsor, they did so 
because "'he would be a userul politician ror his political power as an 
exponent or the 'Doroteo'raction and was very close to Antonio Gava" 
(Pr7: 19-3-93: 5). So, the Alfieri confederation distributed its votes 
tactically: Galasso developed a relationship with Paolo Ciro Pomincino 
and Senator Bargi while Alfieri had relationships with the Toroteo' 
faction. 
The second commodity which the Alfieri confederation provided 
in particular for parliamentary elections is difficult to document: the 
financing of election campaigns. Although parties were publicly 
financed, extra money was always useful and the Camorra had an 
abundance of money which it could provide. Electoral campaigns had 
over the last thirty years become more and more sophisticated using 
different propaganda techniques and as a consequence, campaigns 
had become a costly affair. Although in Naples, the candidates tended 
to come from high social-economic status (see Allum, 1973a; Mindolft 
and Soverina, 1993) their personal fortunes had never been 
comparable to the wealth of a Lauro. 
The demands on political parties and politicians were such that 
they needed to seek financial support from elsewhere. During the 
1980s, politicians turned to both the business and criminal community. 
Politicians received money from businessmen in exchange for 
promises of public contracts. It was in particular, the new 
'businessman politicians', such as Vito and Pomincino, who set up 
such a system to finance their political careers. They also turned to 
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the Camorra: Alfieri recalls Pomincino asking for money for his 
campaign (Pr8) while Galasso describes the financial backing he gave 
to Senator Bargi in he early 1990s in Somma Vesuviana (Pr7: 19-4-93: 1 5). 
Much of the resources provided by the Camorra was similar to the 
Sicilian and American Mafias: the Stem syndicate of Wincanton in the 
19SO-60s, "financed the election campaigns of tolerant candidates" 
(Gardiner in Gardiner and Olson, 1974: 117) to be able work in peace 
and make money. 
The coming together in an 'iron pact' of political corruption 
between the DC and the Alfieri confederation, in a functional exchange 
was probably inevitable because of the three factors they had in 
common. Firstly, they had common territories and centres of power: 
Alfieri's criminal territory coincided with Gava's political territory: "the 
commune of SantAntonio Abate, together with Castellammare and 
Gragnano constituted the heart of his power system "(Pr 10: 07-0 5-93). 
Secondly, there were existing relationships based on a corrupt 
clientelistic exchange. Even before Carmine Alfieri's rise to criminal 
power, the Alfieri family as well as the Galasso family and others were 
capi elettori for the DC, thus the final transition from simple capi 
elettori to Camorra grandi elettori and controllers in the 1980s was 
very simple. Thirdly, they had common friends, usually businessmen 
because they were from the same zones. This reinforced their 
relationship and these friends became their middlemen, people like 
Francesco Catapano ("for many years DC general secretary or the zone 
and friend of Carmine Alfieri". P5.1: scheda 60) or businessmen EIpidio 
Rondone and Francesco Alfieri. 
11.4, Conclusion 
The 1980s proved to be the era of the Camorra's 'take over' of 
the exchange with corrupt politicians. This chapter has furnished the 
documentation of the different commodities, resources, services and 
favours which it provided politicians and businessmen. In the next 
chapter, we look at the favours and rewards which politicians and 
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businessmen had to provide in return in their lucrative relationship 
with the Camorra. 
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Chavter Twelve 
Political and Business 'Obligations' 
"Gava... vi dico: per sua grande intelligenzi4 almeno negli ultimi annt non credo che 
Gava per la sua intelligenza andava a fare rfunioni con dei camorristi" 
Pasquale Galasso, (CPA1.1: 142) 
12.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we examined the services provided by 
Camorra gangs; in this chapter, we consider the other components of 
this corrupt exchange (see Figure 12.1): what politicians and 
businessmen must Provide in return. 
e 12.1: pordcal and Ruiness Re ' ocities 
Politician 
camorrtrg -4 Businessman 
The clientelistic exchange analysed hitherto creates a framework of 
reciprocal obligations: criminal, political and economic. In this chapter, 
the focus is centred, firstly, on the favours and rewards provided by 
politicians. W. F. Whyte (1981) has labelled these 'political obligations': 
"the nature of the obligations existing between politicians and their 
7-9 4 
constituents [in our case camorristil depends upon whether the 
services performed on either side are paid for or furnished free of 
charge. The politician has obligations to particular people, and he 
maintains his organisation by discharging a certain number of these 
obligations"(1981 (1955): 240-246). Whereas the resources which the 
Camorra provided came from its domination of civil society, the 
'obligations' and favours which the politicians had to fulfill in return 
came from their role within the political system and from the 
privileges that they derived from it. 
We will then look at the new business favours, obligations which 
appeared in the 1980s. Business obligations emanated from the 
businessmen's position in the economic system and their potential to 
be manipulated and provide cover for illegal activities and 'laundering' 
of money. 
12.1 PoRtical 'Oblieations' in the 1950s 
In the 1950s, political favours and rewards were fairly basic. They 
consisted of general favours, legal help and what Bell has called 
'political accommodation(1967: 193) in other words, political protection 
either by allowing guappi a certain amount of freedom of action or by 
having a general attitude of tolerance towards their illegal activities. 
Lauro was able to provide money and goods from his own 
fortune while other politicians started to distribute favours gained 
from their privileged position. For example, the widow of the 
notorious businessman guappo Antonio Esposito was "[ ... 
I able to 
obtain a job in the Prefecture"(Ottone, 1965: 685). Indeed, Esposito 
appears to have been rather 'well-connected'33 as at his funeral, 
12 MI's sent their limousines and many bouquets". (Enzenberger, 
1998: 117). When il guappo Giuseppe Navara, il re di Poggioreale, was 
due to pay at least 40 milion lire in taxes on his numerous business 
ventures, he was able to reduce the sum simply by protesting heartily 
33 It is suggested by some that Antonio Esposito was the capo elettore of Giovanni 
Leone, the DC deputy from Pomigliano DArco and later, Prime Minister and 
President of the Republic. 
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(Isabella, 1980: 212). 
Another political service which politicians provided was legal 
help. Many lawyers (both penal and civil) who defended guappi were 
also potential candidates and in some cases local councillors and 
MPs; thus the client-lawyer relationship was no ordinary relationship, it 
went beyond the purely formal professional relationship and became a 
friendship based on kindness and reciprocity. Both parties could 
expect something in return and the lawyer/politician who had enjoyed 
Camorra support had to do a good job in court not only in terms of 
clever legal argument but also by seeking to apply informal pressure 
on judges. There are many examples of this complex and precarious 
relationship: during the famous 'Orlando-Maresca trial', Pasquale De 
Gennaro, vice-mayor of Naples and liberal DC local councillor (1946-60) 
defended Pupetta Maresca and Roberto Gava appeared as parte civile 
for the Simonetti family while Senator De Marsico, Giuseppe Di 
Giovanni, provincial councillor and Nicola Foschini, Monarchist MP 
defended the Esposito family ( IlMattino of 4 April. 1959). 
The last favour politicians provided the Camorra is probably the 
hardest to detect; that is, political protection. Indeed, "the gangster 
depends upon political protection for his criminal and illicit activities" 
(Landesco, 1968: 183) and politicians could impose, on the public 
authorities they influenced, a tolerant attitude towards the quappi's 
illegal activities. 
Two good examples of this are Catello Di Somma and Alfredo 
Maisto. Catello Di Somma, a notorious camorrista from Castellammare 
di Stabia, was sent into 'banishment' on the island of Ustica as 
punishment, but left the island, being sent first to Vibo Valenzia (for 
health reasons) and later to Acquaviva delle Fonti (Ba); his banishment 
was reduced and he only served half the original sentence (Questura di 
Napoli, telegram n. 0293505 of 12 September 193734). This episode 
suggests that Di Somma had a high level political protection. Alfredo 
Maisto also enjoyed a permanent state of immunity throughout his 
criminal career: "Maisto was never found guilty; often he was freed 
34 In 1973 Catello di Somma after an active criminal career of forty years only had 
two convictions, both remitted on his police record (see 118: 1). 
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with the all too-easy, 'doubtful insufficient evidence' verdict and many 
grave suspicions of the crimes which he executed but for which he 
was never condernned" (IlMattino of the 26 of June 1976). This may be 
explained by the fact that he was said to be the capo elettore of an 
important DC deputy in the 1960s. 
12.3 Political 'ObIlizations' in the 1980s 
By the mid-1980s, the scale of political exchange had changed 
and the Camorra's demands became more and more important. The 
mechanism of political favours and obligations have begun to come to 
light now that the circle of protection and immunity has finally been 
broken and the actors have begun to talk. The simple 1950s 
clientelistic framework was no longer sufficient for all the business 
deals which had developed and its simplicity cannot account for the 
complexity of the exchange. After the 1980 earthquake and Cirillo 
Affair, the politicians rendered a mixture of old and new services: 
traditional immunity and political protection with new large-scale 
business and irregular deals. 
During the 1970s, politicians provided traditional clientelistic 
services. For example, those which the politicians provided the NCO 
were still very basic, although after the 1980 earthquake and the Cirillo 
affair, a change took place in the nature of these services and they 
became more sophisticated for all Camorra groups. 
The basic political 'obligations' which politicians, both national and 
local, provided, once involved with the Camorra, were threefold: 
political protection-, legal immunity; and favours. As Faenza has 
explained "to believe the words of the first Camorra pentito, Antonio 
Galluccio, Cutolo has contacts with a Senator from Sorrento who 
procured him many special favours - including that of transferring 
prisoners from one prison to another". The boss - explained the 
pentito - even managed to get the three year sentence in a work house 
of a friend from Casal di Principe reduced to conditional freedom 
(sorveglianza speciale). The Carabinieri checked the details and 
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discovered that it was true (in Aa. Vv, 1988: 119-120). This is only one 
example of what was suspected, and now proven, to be the case in 
the whole of the Campania region for Camorra groups in the late 
1970s and 1980s: the opportunity for certain people to break the law 
without the fear of ever being prosecuted. When there was a 
prosecution or a trial against Camorra clans, powerful politicians 
exerted pressure on the judges to favour Camorra groups: "the 
judiciary was controllable" has claimed the pentito Pasquale Galasso 
"through political and Camorra channels" (Pr7: 18-03-93: 4). The pentito 
Carmine Alfieri has revealed how in 1976 he contacted the DC 
politician Francesco Patriarca to ask him to intervene in his trial for 
the murder of a rival, Glorioso (Pr8: 14-2-1994: 1); or again Pasquale 
Galasso who explained how he contacted the DC politician Alfredo 
Vito to ask him to fix his trial for Camorra Association in 1988. During 
the Torre Annunziata Massacre trial (la strage di Torre Annunziata) 
Alfieri contacted Vincenzo Meo, lieutenant of Gava: "I wish to stress 
that my request for intervention was fully legitimate as our organisation 
had provided constant electoral support for the 'Doroteo' faction and 
therefore, I believed I had the right to ask Gava for his help, especially 
arter he had become Minister or the Interior" (R4). 
The Torre Annunziata Massacre trial is the most blatant example 
of 'trial-fixing' and was only possible thanks to judge Armando 
Lancuba3S "who was a Christian Democrat close to Gava and Scotti and 
who could be contacted through them" (S09). Indeed, Lancuba's 
"availability was well-known to the prison community". Many pentiti have 
now confirmed how he helped to 'fix` many of their trials, in particular 
for the Alfieri confederation as well as the Vollaro, Gionta, Ammaturo, 
Mariano clans. This legal immunity, a clear political service, guaranteed 
politicians solid Camorra contacts. 
The same traditional resources were provided for all gangs as 
politicians sought to guarantee their dominance. Antonio Gava and his 
DC political machine according to the pentiti (see CPAI) had a variety 
of Camorra contacts with rival gangs; thus both the NCO and the 
35 Other judges, such as Lamberti, demanded money and goods in return for 
favourable decisions (CPAI. 1). 
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Nuvoletta enjoyed these traditional legal and political protections, as 
Pasquale Galasso has recalled: "the same Lorenzo Nuvoletta [ .. I told us 
that he was operating through his friendship with Antonio Gava MP to 
favour the release of Luciano Liggio, using a medical certificate" (Pr7: 2 2- 
04-93). Many camorristi were very suspicious of the fact that the 
Nuvoletta gang organised such important criminal summits without 
police control. This was put down to the political protection provided 
by Antonio Gava as Pasquale Galasso, Corrado Iacolare and Carmine 
Schiavone all have confirmed: 
the relationship between Nuvoletta and Gava was obvious. 
For example, I remember that in those days the pressure that 
the police exerted on us was enormous: given the hundreds of 
murders that had already been committed, we would be 
subjected, one day yes one day no, to raids in our houses. 
Whereas during the course of these meetings when many cars 
came to the Nuvoletta's ranch, we were never disturbed. 
Indeed, some Carabinieri's cars could even be seen at the 
Poggio Vallesana's gate" (ibid). 
We thought that Lorenzo Nuvoletta must have contacts [ .. ] 
which explains why nobody troubled them [ .. ] It was believed 
that it was because he was protected"(Pr1: 11-2,282). 
I knew that Gava had good relations with the Nuvolettas. For 
example, I can cite various episodes which I personally witnessed 
during meetings held at Poggio Vallesana, the Nuvoletta ranch. 
During these meetings, many armed criminals met and yet the 
police and Carabinieri never intervened; I noticed that police 
cars which were patrolling the area never intervened, never 
took the cars' number nor identified the criminals. I believe that 
this was a direct consequence of the political protection which 
the Nuvolettas eqjoyed in virtue of the support which they 
received from Gava and other politicians (Schiavone, 17-12-93 
in SO 12). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as a trial document made clear: "the 
reeling between Gava and the Nuvolettas was solidly based on a 
functional exchange or electoral support - guaranteed impunity" 
(P5.1: scheda 26: 40). 
Another form of political protection and leniency can be seen in 
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Antonio Gava's behaviour while Minister of the Interior in 1989-90. He 
made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 'Criminality in 
Campania' in which he discussed the situation and activities of the 
different Camorra gangs in great detail but failed to mention the 
activities of the two most powerful and dangerous clans of the time: 
the Alfieri confederation and the Fabbrocino clan (Pr7: 21-3-94: 1) clearly 
fulfilling his obligation towards them. 
The third form of traditional political obligations were favours 
and in particular, jobs. Both national and local politicians could easily 
provide these by manipulating rules or contacting the right people: for 
example, Antonio Gava during the time he was Post Office Minister, 
appointed 3,808 people from the Province of Naples (almost 20% of all 
Post Office staff [P11: 272]36) or again securing a job for a friend's 
daughter in a local newspaper. Local politicians were also well placed 
to distribute jobs in municipal offices. Indeed, many Camorra gangs 
expected this political obligation since it was rather easy for 
politicians to provide it. Thus, in many communes, many employees 
were either related to local Camorra families or had penal records. For 
example, in a small town like Pagani in the Province of Salerno, 34 
municipal employees had criminal records or were involved with the 
Camorra in the early 1990s (Prot. n. 12B. 1.851/Gab). 
As we have already seen, the 1980 earthquake and the Cirillo 
affair changed the nature of the terms of the Camorra's exchange with 
the politicians. A modern exchange with new terms and new political 
obligations developed due to the huge sums of money which were 
flowing into the region. It was an elaboration and sophistication of the 
traditional obligations and took the form of the development of a new 
functional business exchange based initially around the earthquake 
funds and then around all local public contracts. Politicians became 
important targets for Camorra gangs as they had access to public 
money, a resource which provided the basis of new political 
'obligations' which were fully developed by the Nuvoletta clan and the 
Alfieri confederation. 
3G Ilis political secretary during the same period also appointed 40 'disabled' 
people from his home-town (Ibid). 
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The two new key political 'obligations' pinpointed here were 
interconnected and directly linked to the politicians' access to public 
funds: firstly, they provided privileged information; and secondly, they 
influenced decisions which allocated state contracts to Camorra 
companies. Camor? 1sti thus sought and demanded these political 
'obligations' "in order to bring water to our mill" (Pr6: 8-8-94: 2) and put 
into place "an efficient 'drinking fountain' for the mechanism of the 
distribution of public contracts" (Pr7). 
Although it might seem an obvious political favour, privileged 
information about municipal business deals was an important service 
as it enabled Camorra gangs to use this information and to be one 
step ahead of their rivals in their economic activities and planning. In 
other words, it enabled Camorra gangs to be ready to take advantage 
of any economic opportunity which came along. This privileged 
information, a collusive act, distorted both the local market and the 
democratic decision-making process and meant that Camorra gangs 
had total control over decisions and a monopoly on all economic 
activities. Good examples are contracts for the construction of the 
water purification plant in Pompeii or the coastline motorway from 
Sorrento to Amalfi. 
There are also instances of privileged information being used for 
other types of crimes such as extortion: Antonio Tarallo, for instance, 
used such privileged information to promote an important extortion in 
Torre Annunziata. On behalf of the limelli clan, he had established 
contacts with Umberto Caliendo, a PSDI town councillor who was 
responsible for the municipality's finances and with whom the clan 
organised a three-way functional exchange; but Caliendo also gave 
Tarallo privileged information regarding companies which the 
municipality dealt with so that the clan could go and extort them As 
the Court made clear: "we only need to recall that Caliendo gave 
Tarallo information about the dates when companies were paid by the 
town-hall, thereby enabling [the clan] 'to go and ask for the money'only 
when the companies had some" (P7: 5). Caliendo knew exactly what he 
was doing and what the clan was doing with his information "I must 
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admit that I knew perfectly well what they were using the information 
for, I knew what they could do with it and the use they could make or 
it"(P7: 6). 
The second kind of new political 'obligation' is, however oblique 
and indirect, the most significant one for the Camorra, since it 
enabled it to make inroads into the legal economy and become legal 
while making huge profits. It consisted of giving public contracts to 
the Camorra via sponsored Camorra companies. This took place both 
at national and local level but became predominant at local level 
where it was easier to openly contravene regulations on a smaller 
scale: local politicians were in a position to control the whole public 
tendering process and thus could distribute public contracts as they 
wished, without public accountability by private citizens or the 
opposition parties. 
Many examples of this practice occurred in the Commune of 
Sarno which was the fiefdom of the Galasso clan in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. The case of Sarno is emblematic of many of the 
Municipalities of Campania which have either been disbanded for 
Camorra infiltration or suspected of it. Between 1984-90, Sarno was 
dominated by a DC junta which was very close to the local Galasso 
clan and it has been established that that politicians provided clear 
and precise political favours in the form of public contracts, Council 
concessions, grants, permits, supplies and services. 
The allocation of a public contract for the supply of food and 
general goods to school canteens in the Commune, for example, 
shows how the collusion between politicians and camorristi 
functioned, how the former broke all the rules in favour of the 
Camorra clan to meet their political 'obligations'. The competitive 
tendering appears on the surface to have been done correctly. The 
administration seems to have followed the right rules and regulations; 
however, on closer inspection it is clear that "there was a clear 
decision to favour 'friendly' companies imposed from the outside" 
(Prerettura di Salerno, 1993: 4). Indeed, even when there were about 100 
companies for the local Council to choose from, the number was 
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always reduced to a few, among which the winner was clearly 
identifiable from the contacts it had with the local Camorra clan. 
Politicians would violate all the necessary rules to make sure that their 
political 'obligations' were fulfilled. For example, the junta frequently 
used the less democratic method of tendering, the 'private deal', la 
trattativa priv=37, to pick and choose the companies which it wished 
to win the contract. In some cases, legitimate companies that wanted 
to participate in the competitive tendering process were discouraged 
from doing so by local criminals and officials. If 'unfriendly' companies 
won, they would have to offer a huge bribe both to politicians and the 
local Camorra clan. 
Another example is highlighted in a Prefectural document on the 
tendering for the supply of bread to schools in Sarno: although there 
was initially competitive tendering with 94 companies invited to 
compete, only one participated (offering a price of 3,500 lire per kilo 
of bread). The junta decided that this deal was not satisfactory and 
on the same day a 'private deal' was employed to pass the contract 
to another company; it later claimed that it had contacted four 
companies by phone and accepted the one which offered the lowest 
price (2,200 lire per kilo); although witnesses suggest that in fact only 
one company was contacted. What is interesting to note here is that 
the deal offered to the new company was different from the one 
offered for competitive tendering. It was no longer a four-month 
contract for the school term but a contract for an unspecified period. 
This new deal was much better for the company. Thus, politicians not 
only violated administrative rules and procedures in favour of 
Camorra-sponsored companies but also manipulated the situation so 
that the latter got very favourable deals. 
Often, in these tendering processes, many decisions were 
'predetermined' and 'conditioned' in favour of Camorra gangs and 
37 The 'trattativa privata'is a way of using a private deal for the distribution of a 
public contract. It takes place when the junta decides that the open public tendering 
competition has not produced a satisfactory result. The junta therefore decides to 
undertake a private deal and asks directly a company to accept the terms or may 
negotiate new terms. The point is that there is no democratic procedure and that 
the junta can decide to give the contract to the company of a friend without having 
to justify the choice to anyone. 
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their economic activities. In other words, politicians in the junta were 
not acting as democratically elected representatives of the people but 
as 'economic agents' for the Camorra, fulfilling their political 
'obligations'. 
A major area of local Council business where the corrupt 
influence of politicians' was important was the housing sector (ediftzia) 
of Sarno. All building construction was decided by a 'Building 
Committee', which was formed unelected members appointed by the 
local Junta. By choosing business representatives or friends of the 
local underworld, politicians provided favourable conditions for the 
Committee to favour the powerful Camorra clan. Indeed, these 
unelected members violated rules and procedures. For example, they 
held meetings infrequently (see table 12.1); and when these were held, 
they voted for the projects that their friends had interests in, either 
as owners, constructors, planners or middlemen. No one objected and 
the Galasso clan profited from the political services rendered. 
Table 12.1: Number of Meetings of the Building Committee 
in Sarno 1988-92 
Meetin, qs called MeetinRs held Meetinjis not held 
1988 22 6 16 
1989 30 17 13 
1990 44 is 29 
1991 117 11 106 
1992 77 2 75 
Source: Prefeff ura di Salerno (1993: 10). 
Last but not least, is the case of the Urban Development Plan 
(piano regolatore). In any commune, it is the biggest business affair as 
it outlines the various future planning projects. In Sarno in 1992, local 
politicians were either passive or actively involved in helping the 
Galasso clan to impose its agenda in terms of urban development. 
Indeed, the initial project was modified to include expansion and 
development of residential areas in the town centre to be managed by 
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estate agencies close to the Galasso clan, as well as new roads 
specifically serving local officials' houses. As the official Prefectoral 
document stated: "the plan was entirely conditioned to favour the 
Galasso clan and the personal family interests of the local councillors 
or groups of businessmen close to one or the other" (Prefettura di 
Salemo, 1993: 24). 
This case-study illustrates how politicians provided political 
favours and services in different forms either through the supply of 
privileged information or through influencing the awarding of public 
contracts. The same analysis can be applied to Communes such as 
Casal di Principe, Quindici, Nocera Inferiore, Pagano, Sant' Antonio 
Abate, Poggiomarino, Nola, Marano di Napoli, Acerra, etc. 
This pattern reappeared at national level for substantial 
construction or infrastructural projects in the region. MPs provided 
the same modern political services in terms of privileged information, 
influence, pressure and public contracts. In this cartel arrangement, 
there was a clear coming together of traditional forms of corrupt 
clientelism and organised crime, but at the same time politicians gave 
camorristi and their economic activities a certain amount of social 
legitimation and prestige in the community. 
12.4 Business 'Obligations' in the 1980s 
The new aspect of the Camorra's relationship with the political 
elite in the 1980s was the introduction of the business class. During 
the 1950s, the guappi had relationships with businessmen, as was the 
case of Pascalone 'e Nola who was friendly with a building constructor 
Troncone, but not as part of a three-way relationship with politicians. 
In the 1980s, instead, businessmen formed a fundamental part of the 
Camorra's modern triangular three-way exchange, since their presence 
provided the Camorra with the excuse for the exchange as well as 
easy access to the legal economy. 
The business sector was chosen not only because of the sums of 
money it controlled but also and, most importantly, - because of the 
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special relationships which it had developed with both politicians and 
camorristL Businessmen had developed a close relationship with 
politicians because of similar political convictions whereas with the 
Camorra, their relationship was based on economic interests and the 
Camorra's ability to subvert, corrupt, infiltrate and penetrate 
business. Investigating magistrate Mancuso (1990) has explained that 
this was possibly due to the lack of a solid business culture in the 
region. In the 1970s, businessmen were only used as middlemen and 
front men but in the 1980s they became directly involved. 
We may note that there were two types of businessmen who 
became involved with the Camorra and provided business obligations: 
ordinary businessmen and businessmen caniorHstl. Ordinary 
businessmen were usually co-opted through the use of violence and 
intimidation, when they really had no choice in the matter. These 
tended to be companies from Northern Italy which accepted that 
contacts with the Camorra were part of the 'local' conditions and 
therefore paid the bribe. 38 For example, the Cooperatives from 
Bologna, which helped build the Sarno Canal and 653 houses in 
Boscoreale and 1590 in Ponticelli (La Repubblica, of 16 December 1994) 
paid the Alfieri confederation for the right to do so. 
Camonisti imposed themselves on businessmen or bought 
bankrupt companies thus becoming Company Directors in legitimate 
businesses. These camorristi were 'camorristi businessmen' as in the 
case of Pasquale Galasso's cement company PRO. CAL There was also 
another type of businessmen who could be called 'businessmen 
camorristil, they were businessmen who knowingly became involved 
with camorristi and their criminal projects, befriending different 
Camorra groups and their accomplices in the triangular exchange with 
politicians. This happened both for the Supermarket CIS di Nola and 
the high speed train (TAV) link from Naples to Rome in the Casertano, 
where many companies which won public contracts had Camorra 
38 For a literary account which anticipated this development, see Carlo Bernari's 
novel (19G4), Era I'Estate del Sole Quieto Mano: Mondadori). 
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contacts and accomplices39. 
Both these types of businessmen provided the same services 
and resources for Camorra gangs but such a relationship also 
conferred on the Camorra a certain amount of social legitimacy and, 
more importantly, loyal front men and access to the legal economy 
through their legal businesses. This was a significant aspect of the 
Camorra's relationship with businessmen as it enabled Camorra gangs 
to penetrate civil society and legal markets to such a point that it 
became difficult to distinguish between 'clean' and 'legitimate' 
businesses and 'shady' ones. 
The main 'obligation' which businessmen had towards Camorra 
gangs was to hand over a percentage of the money emanating from 
the public contracts it won thanks to Camorra intervention. In criminal 
terms, this was a subtle and new form of extortion but in business 
terms, it was as a cartel deal distributing public funds among the 
different partners. Indeed, businessmen gave money both to 
camor7lsti and politicians: this was usually 3-5% of all the work done to 
the Camorra and 5% to politicians; therefore huge sums of money. 
Indeed, Pasquale Galasso, has argued that his clan's major economic 
activity was extortion and public contracts rather than drugs (CPA1.1) 
because of the huge sums of money that it could make in this way. For 
example, the Schiavone clan asked for 10% on road constructions, 5% 
on houses and 2-3% on big works (SO13: 236). 
Another aspect of this business obligation was giving the smaller 
sub-contracts to legal Camorra companies and using Camorra 
suppliers and services. There are many examples of this: for example, 
Camorra companies would demand that their cement be used as well 
as their lorries and diggers. 
We should not underestimate how fundamental the link 
businessmen provided in the three-way functional Camorra exchange 
was. It was a necessary and indispensable element for the Camorra as 
it provided the excuse, the very reason and means by which the whole 
Ju Typical examples of these business accomplices were Bruno and Matteo 
Sorrentino, Antonio Agizza, Giovanni Punzo and Luigi Romano (see S010 and E). 
Businessmen who have been prosecuted for their involvement with Camorra gangs. 
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of the functional Camorra exchange could take place: without 
business being the receiver of public funds, the Camorra could not 
have appropriated public funds. It would not have been possible to do 
this without business providing an ideal cover and being a key 
accomplice in the exchange. In these conditions, the Camorra's 
activities and identities were concealed, allowing organised crime to 
advance in civil society and the legal economy without being detected. 
12. S Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have sought to identity at the micro-level the 
political and business 'obligations' which were given to the Camorra as 
part of the three-way functional exchange. From this analysis, it is 
clear that political 'obligations' have dramatically changed: in the 
1950s, it is not clear whether what the politicians provided could 
actually be called 'obligations' or rather favours in the normal wider 
clientelistic framework. In the 1980s, however, politicians provided 
clear 'obligations' in new modern conditions and no longer just simple 
favours. Politicians were now taking more risks to fulfil their 
'obligations' which went far beyond the traditional clientelistic 
framework; they became involved in a criminal project to deviate 
public funds to organised crime groups, businessmen and themselves 
and thus, acted undemocratically both in politics and in the market 
place. 
Moreover, business 'obligations' were an innovation in the 
modern 1980s exchange. From the evidence available, there may have 
been some friendly contacts between guappi and businessmen in the 
1950s; but this relationship became formal and solid during the 1970s 
when Camorra groups turned to businesses to help 'launder' their 
drugs money. By the 1980s, many businessmen had become close to 
Camorra groups and this helped when, in the mid 1980s, the three-way, 
triangular functional exchange was put into operation by Camorra 
groups. Businessmen were threatened, or asked to play a part in this 
exchange and they supplied a significant element of legitimation and 
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money. 
12.6 General Conclusion 
In this part, we have analysed the C amorra-p olitic s-bu sines s 
exchanges of the 1950s and 1980s at a micro-level. By doing this, it 
has been possible to show the clear differences between the two 
types of exchange: in the 1950s, it was an unorganised, casual, 
informal and unsystematic exchange between individual agents and 
was dominated by politicians. In the 1980s, it became an efficient, 
systematic and effective money-making exchange between systems 
and dominated by the Camorra clans and there was a new dynamics 
behind the exchange. By the 1980s, the Camorra had taken over, had 
brought in businessmen as the justification for the deviation of public 
funds and come to dominate the politicians' corrupt clientelistic 
exchange. Their economic interests were in complete symbiosis; their 
exchange was an 'iron pact' between systems. But, the Camorra 
dominated this exchange very much because of the money and 
violence that it could freely use to manipulate and intimidate the 
exchange. 
This intimate money-making exchange lasted for more than a 
decade (1980-93), until the balance of the different systems was 
broken; in particular when the DC machine lost its grass-root support 
and could not count on Camorra support alone. Thus, when one of the 
representatives of the different systems changed, the exchange lost 
its dynamic and the Camorra needed to rebuild and find new 
representatives. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
Conclusion 
"Why should a political scientist study a bunch of gangsters? " 
(Anon) 
The initial and primary aim of this thesis was to analyse the 
relationship between the Camorra and Neapolitan politicians of the 
1950s and the 1980s to see whether and how it had changed over the 
four decades. Its most challenging objective was to try and 
understand the dynamics of change both theoretically and empirically. 
who were the actors? Where did power lie? How did the different 
types of exchange in this relationship develop? how was the shift in 
power, if any, to be explained? Why did this change, if any, occur when 
it did? With hindsight, we can say that it was not an easy task as it 
involved, in particular, asking a number of preliminary questions 
regarding the social and economic aspects of the Camorra. 
Initially, parts two and three, examining Camorra membership and 
its transformation, were meant to be necessary preludes to the 
central themes which were discussed in part four. But they became 
significant in themselves, providing, at the empirical level, an insight 
into the mentality of camorristi and, at the theoretical level, an 
exploration of the concept of 'subject' or 'agent'. To try and 
disentangle the complicated puzzle of the Camorra, we adopted an 
interactive model, which helped elaborate the argument that the 
Neapolitan Camorra of the 1950s consisted of isolated criminal 
agents undertaking simple social-criminal practices, whereas in the 
1980s, it was first an association undertaking a social-criminal 
practice (the NCO), then a business engaged in an economic-criminal 
practice (the NF-Nuvoletta clan) and finally, a cartel pursuing a 
political-criminal practice (the Alfieri Confederation). We also sought 
to understand the relationship of the Camorra with politics and its 
development from a simple clientelistic type of exchange between 
individuals in the 19SOs to a more sophisticated exchange between 
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systems in the 1980s. 
As we saw in Part Two, the agent's criminal value did not 
fundamentally change but gradually evolved between the 1950s and 
1980s, parallel to society becoming more violent, assertive, aggressive 
and precarious, less loyal and more money-oriented. What did change 
dramatically though was the role of the family. In the 1950s, it was 
practically insignificant; in the 1980s, on the other hand, it had become 
a strategic and functional value: the members of the clans used the 
members of their family as front-men, accessories or protectors. 
It was, however, the macro- environment which changed more 
radically. In the 1980s, it was a definite motivating factor for a young 
man to become a camorrista: changes within the context, the state, 
the family and the Camorra itself were all external factors pushing the 
agent towards specific life-choices. Within these macro- environmental 
changes, it was the Camorra as a social institution which played the 
most pervasive and powerful role in influencing the agent. It acted, in 
fact, as a well-established institution which in some cases was much 
more effective and powerful than the public authorities in the 
everyday life of citizens. We reached the conclusion that in the 1950s, 
the individual was the most important motivating factor whereas in 
the 1980s, it was the structure which prevailed. 
Part Three explains the interaction between the micro- and macro- 
structures which produced the Camorra and its activities and traces 
its transformations during the post-war period using an adapted 
version of Giddens's structuration theory. Our interaction model 
tested and confirmed the hypothesis that the Camorra's practice 
changed from a simple recurring social-criminal practice to a complex 
recurring political-criminal one. The case-studies illustrated the nature 
of the changes - social, economic and political - which took place 
during the last thirty years' modernisation process. Using these case- 
studies to pinpoint the factors which were vital in the Camorra's 
transformation (smuggling, international drug trafficking and a new 
class of politicians), we concluded that modernisation in Southern 
Italy, with its unique characteristics, produced political opportunities 
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which organised crime groups seized upon and exploited to the full. 
The South adapted to 'progress' as it could, with its own values, 
means, traditions and resources; this produced specific conditions, 
both economically and politically, for organised crime gangs. It was 
both the combination of general economic modernisation and specific 
Southern modernisation which enabled the Camorra to transform 
itself from a mass Camorra into a business and then a political 
Camorra. 
Part Four explicitly addresses our central research question of 
the relations of the Camorra with politics. We adopted a systems 
analysis approach inspired by Easton (1965) which was used in 
conjunction with the interaction model to study the nature of the 
political exchange between the criminal groups and the politicians in 
the 1950s and in the 1980s. In the 1950s, there was a simple 
clientelistic exchange of votes for favours between powerful 
politicians and individual guappi as well as ordinary law-abiding 
citizens. This was a simple classic two-way system of political 
exchange similar to that employed, for example, by the American 
political machines of the 1900s. It was not necessarily illegal and 
formed part of a social interaction between individuals belonging to a 
given political system. 
We found that, by the 1980s, the dynamics of this exchange had 
changed, like politics, society and the Camorra itself. The Camorra 
was no longer a loose network of individual guappi acting in the social 
system but a coherent and organised sub-system of this same social 
system. Within this criminal sub-system, we established that the 
Camorra had transformed itself from a rich, powerful and highly 
organised association into a business and then a cartel, in the late 
1970s, taking advantage of the fact that its political counterparts, 
allies and partners were losing power, support and votes. Thus, at 
that time, the Camorra was ready to take over the simple clientelistic 
political exchange of the 1950s and transform it into a functional, 
hugely profitable and successful three-way exchange. Votes were 
exchanged for legal favours and protection, money and public 
312 
subcontracts, businessmen being introduced as a third component in 
the equation and guaranteed public contracts and peaceful working 
conditions in exchange for perceptual commissions and extensive use 
of Camorra companies for subcontracts. Corrupt businessmen were 
brought in as an excuse for the appropriation of public funds, but at 
times it was the ambitious politicians themselves who invented the 
excuse to embezzle the funds. 
By using original sources (both oral and documentary), we were 
able to identify more precisely the different services, favours and 
goods exchanged between camorristi, politicians and businessmen. 
What appears clear from the analysis was that power changed hands 
over the period. In the 1950s, it was in the hands of the politicians; in 
the 1980s, it was in the hands of the camorristi, as they controlled 
what the politicians needed: money, votes and if, and when things got 
out of control, free use of violence. 
As well as producing important conclusions, our interaction 
model enabled us to elaborate and investigate the concepts of 'rules 
and resources', which was extremely useful, the 'general structure', 
'system-interaction' and of course that of 'agent'. We cannot but note 
at this point how exciting it was to discover, in the course of this 
research, the potential of the model and not only the extent of its 
applicability to other fields of social, economic and political 
behaviour, but above all to realise how important it is, as a political 
scientist, to be flexible, to cross the boundaries of disciplines when 
necessary. 
The concepts of rules and resources (structuring properties) 
were important to the analysis as they enabled us to connect the 
agent and the macro-environment. The agent assimilates internal and 
external rules and resources through the 'general structure' and 
transforms them into agency. These concepts are simple and easy to 
use as they can apply to many different forms of behaviour. By 
analysing the different rules and resources of any given agent, one can 
understand and explain the elements which contribute to action and 
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also to long-term change, as we have tried to do with the Camorra. 
Closely related to the concepts of rules and resources, is 
Giddens's concept of 'structure'. We adapted it for our own use and it 
became the 'general structure', in which we incorporated both the 
micro-level of the agent's perspective (internal structure) and the 
macro- environment (the precise context made up of different 
systems producing the external structure) which represented the 
external input into agency. The 'general structure' represented for us 
the point of interaction between the agent and the macro- 
environment, after internal and external influences. This interaction 
produced 'agency', in our case the Camorra and its activities ('agency' 
being the output of the system). 
The most original concept used in this thesis was that of the 
'agent'. The 'agent' has the transformative capacity for action but it is 
only through the 'general structure' that this takes place. This notion 
was particularly relevant to the type of documentation collected as it 
enabled us to evaluate thoroughly the role of the 'Camorra agent' but, 
even more importantly, to analyse the subjectivity of the criminal. This 
is quite an innovative step in the field of study, as organised crime 
studies are usually limited to using legal and judicial documents which 
are for obvious reasons very one-sided. Thus, we were able to enter 
into the 'discursive consciousness' of the agent, at least, and to get a 
clearer picture of his possible motives for action. 
There are more general lessons to be learnt from this study as 
regards civil society, organised crime and democracy, in Naples and 
elsewhere. Our conclusions, for instance, enable us to tackle some of 
the questions addressed by Putnam in an important book, Making 
Democracy Work (1993) relating to Southern Italy, and suggest our own 
answers. In linking empirical data to a historical perspective, Putnam 
asked whether traditions of association and civic engagement 
affected political behaviour. Studying the historical development of 
institutions in Northern and Southern Italy, he came to the conclusion 
that Southern Italy was prey to civic incompetence and therefore to a 
lack of civic involvement because of the lack of -social capital, 
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whereas in the North, where social capital flourished, democracy 
thrived. 
From what we have seen in this study of the private and public 
spheres in Naples, we can say that the absence of civic capacity in the 
public sphere is more a by-product of a certain form of politics and 
the role of politicians who have adapted to modernisation with their 
traditions, means, resources and service and thus contributed to 
distancing and alienating citizens, more than to institutions per se. 
Moreover, the investigations of Manipulite in the North of Italy have 
established that the phenomenon of political corruption and 
organised crime are not limited to Southern Italy, as Putnam's analysis 
implies. 
Our conclusions also lead us to consider more generally the 
relationship between politics, organised crime and democracy. Our 
study confirms the thesis put forward by Siebert (1993,1996) for 
example, that such organisations as the Mafia are mortal enemies of 
democracy but flourish in democratic spaces (1996: 9-13). It shows 
how organised crime needs democracy and a democratic political 
system to prosper, thus posing a serious danger for democracies in 
the world and not only in Italy, or Southern Italy in particular. It also 
shows that, when politicians accept and tolerate the existence of 
organised crime or enter into pacts with criminals, a new style of 
democratic politics may become operational, "democracy, criminal 
style", in which it becomes impossible to distinguish between the 
lawful and the unlawful, the honest, and the dishonest and who is 
really in power. 
Finally, what is the future of organised crime in Campania, in Italy 
and in the world? Five years ago, there were high hopes that both the 
Camorra and the Mafia had seen their day. The Italian authorities 
seemed to have organised an effective and focussed effort against 
organised crime. But five years is a long time for organised crime 
gangs under pressure; they have had time to consider their mistakes, 
reorganise and recreate new links with the 'new' politicians. With both 
Andreotti's trials concluded and Andreotti acquitted of 'Mafia 
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conspiracy'l on a verdict of 'unproven' and the Gava trial soon likely 
to come to a similar conclusion, many former politicians are beginning 
to argue that the accusations against the DC of 'Mafia conspiracy' 
were politically motivated. However, "there is no smoke without fire" 
and as Pasquale Galasso pointed out (CPA1.1: 142), Antonio Gava 
never dealt directly with the Camorra; he was not that stupid; he acted 
through middlemen, his faithful lieutenants. 
Moreover, it was virtually impossible for the Courts to judge the 
politicians on the basis of the pentiti's declarations for the simple 
reason that the evidence was often indirect and confused. These 
politicians should have been judged by their peers and eventually by 
their fellow-citizens in the wake of a thorough debate. But the 
politicians have always refused such a debate and left it to the judges 
who did not really have appropriate instruments - only the pentiti, 
often reticent and ambiguous - to accomplish this task satisfactorily. 
Somehow the public authorities seem to have lost their bite in the 
fight against organised crime, or is it, as Tommaso Buscetta recently 
claimed, that "the Mafia has won" ? (1999). As far was we are 
concerned, we can only suggest that the politicians seem not to know 
how to change systems. 
The future looks bleak and it would be easy to become cynical 
like Tommaso Buscetta, who observed: I see an old story destined to 
repeat itself and this is why I am so pessimistic: I have the sensation 
that in Italy, there is the desire, at all cost, day after day, to close the 
chapter on the Mafia with the aim, certainly not declared, of ending the 
state's fight against the Mafia. Why is this happening? I ask myself this 
question often" (1999: 146). But it is to be hoped that by continuing, 
steadily and methodologically, to uncover the "poison" in our 
advanced democracies, one may heighten the political scientist's 
awareness and sense of responsibility. In the words of Agnes Heuer (in 
her 1999 PSA keynote address): "Let us not forget that we are in 
charge". 
I The crime in Italian is "associazione a definquere di tipo marloso", article 416 bis of 
the Criminal code. 
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Primary Sources 
Legal documents 
1950s Assize Court Sentences : 
CD'Al La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La. II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento formale 
contro Antonio Spavone + 3, RS 13/53,19-2- 
1953. 
CUA2 La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La I Sezione II, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento fonnale 
contro Maisto Alfredo + 6, RS 40/54, RG 
26/53,25-4-1954. 
CD'A3 La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento forniale 
contro fabbrocino Francesco +Z RS 30/57, 
RG69/55,16-3-1957. 
CD'A4 La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento forniale 
contro Aprivitold Antonio + 11, RS 61/5 7, RG 
3 0/5 5,4-8-19 5 7. Police file of Luigi Mallardo: 
61/57. 
CUAS La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento fonnale 
contro Adinolfl Giuseppe + 6, RS 1/5 9, RG 
61/57,15-1-1959. 
CUAG La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento formale 
contro Orlando Carlo Gaetano + 3, RS 
29/59, RG 89/57,16-5-1959. 
CD'A6.1 La Corte d'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Procedura penale contro Orlando Gaetano + 
3, Atti Correnti (General Folder), 1959. 
CUA7 La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La I Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento fonnale 
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contro Mallardo Francesco + 1, RS 36/51, RG 
22/54,26-6-1961 
CD'A8 La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento formale 
contro Spavone Antonio +Z RS 12/75RG 
106/74,31-1-1975. 
1980s Preliminarv Investheations bv theProcura delta 
Repubblica di Ngpqlt 
Pi La Procura Della Repubblica pressoil 
Tribunale di Napoli, Richiesta di rinvio a 
giudizio nei conrronti di Galasso Pasquale + 
13,9086/92 R. G DDA, notizie di reato. 
P2 La Procura Della Repubblica presso fl 
Tribunale di Napoli, Richiesta \per 
I'applicazione di misure cautelari nei conrronti 
di Galasso Pasquale + 1Z 9086/92 R. G DDA, 
notizie di reato. 
P3 La Procura Della Repubblica presso il 
Tribunale di Napoli, Rkhiesta di Hnvio a 
giudizio nei confronti di Moccia Angelo + 20, 
Notizie di reato, n 9086/r/1992 DDA. 
P4 La Procura Della Repubblica presso il 
Tribunale di Napoli, Direzione Distrettuale 
Antirnafia, Ordinanza custodia cautelare in 
carcere nei confronti di Gionta Valentino +16, 
Proc 5773/R/93 
Ps La Procura Della Repubblica presso il 
Tribunale di Napoli, Richiesta di tnisura 
cautelare nei conrronti di Agizza Antonio + 
altri, 9086/1992; 
P5.1 DDA (Scheda 26) 
ordinanza di custodia cautelare in carcere a 
carcio di Agizza Antonio + 100,399/94 
R. M. C, 24 September, 1994. (MAGIIO) 
PG La Procura della Repubblica presso il 
Tribunale di Napoli, verbale di interrogatorio, 
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Silvio De Falco, 15-6-92; 17-6-92 (PM: A. 
D'Alterio) 
P7 La Procura della Repubblica presso il 
Tribunale cli Napoli, Direzione Distretuale 
Antünafia, Richiesta di rinvio a giudizo nei 
confronti di Nuvoletta Angelo + 54, verbale di 
udienza preliminare, Donnarumma Gabriele, 
RG 15554/R/93. 
P8 La Procura della Repubblica presso il. 
Tribunale di Napoli, Direzione Distretuale 
Antimafia, Verbale di interrogatorio di 
Antonio Tarallo 20-10-94,27-7-94,8-8-94,8-9- 
94 (confronti con F. Staiano, L. Raiola, 9-1- 9 5; 
L. Piccolo, 11-4-95, M. Serpico, 24-1-95, G. 
Serpico, 24-1-95, A. Stiano, 25-1-95, F. 
Nencini, 1-2-95, M. Agliate, 1-2-95, S. Rocco, 1- 
4-95, A. Rispoli, 10-4-95, S. Lombardi, 10-4- 
95). 
P9 La Procura della Repubblica presso il 
Tribunale di Napoli, Direzione Distretuale 
Antiinafta, Richiesta per IApplicazione di 
Misure Cautelare nei confronti di Avolo Luca 
+ 19, RG 18728/R/92. 
P10 La Procura della Repubblica presso Il 
Tribunale di Napoli, Richiesta di Hinvio a 
guidizio nei confronti di AlfleH Carmine + 
103, RG 9086/1992,11-3-95. 
P11 La Procura della Repubblica. presso Il 
Tribunale di Napoli, DDA, Richiesta di Hinvio a 
guidizid nei confronti di Alfieri Carndne + 22, 
notizie di reato, 638/93,30-11-93. 
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1980s Preliminarv Sentences: 
Sol 11 Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio Istruzione 
Sezione 30, Sentenza-Ordinanza contro 
Abbate Antonio + 13Z RGGI n 1933/84,29-3- 
1985. 
S02 11 Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio Istruzione, 
Sezione 30, Sentenza di Proscoglimento e 
Ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio contro 
Nuvoleffa Lorenzo + 11, RG 16540/37A/87, 
16-3-88. 
S03 11 Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio Istruzione 
Sezione 30, Sentenza- Ordinanza contro 
Lorenzo Nuvoletta + 29, RGGI n 18 73/84, 
28-7-89. 
S04 II Tribunale di Salerno, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Inclagini Preliminari, Ordinanza custodia 
cautelare in carcere nei confronti di Giordano 
Sergio, RG 3396/90 notizie di reato. 
S05 11 Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Inclagini Preliminari, Ufficio XV, Ordinanza 
Custodia Cautelare in carcere nei conrronti di 
Pdroccione Giulio Antonio Maria + 14, n 
3140/93,19-5-93. 
S06 II Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Indagini Preliminari, Ordinanza Custodia 
Cautelare in carcere nei confronti di Bertone 
Domenico, notizie di reato, 1-7-93. 
S07 11 Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Indagini Preliminari, Ordinanza Custodia 
Cautelare in carcere nei confronti di Gionta 
Valentino + 16, n5 7/63/R/93,14-10-93. 
S08 II Tribunale di Napoli, Ufftcio del Giudice per 
le Inclagini Preliminari, Ufficio M, Ordinanza 
Custodia Cautelare in carcere nei confronti di 
Auriccio Angelo Giuseppe, RG 20/R/93, 
7-12-93. 
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S09 11 Tribunale di Salerno, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Indagini Preliminari, Sentenza Decreto di 
riinvio a giudizio nei confronti di Lancuba 
Annando + 13,4 March 1994. 
solo It Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Indagini Preliminari, Procedimento n 
9086/1992 DDA nei conrronti di 
Agizza Antonio + 100,24-9-94 (Maglio trial - 
Gava trial). 
soil 11 Tribunale di Napoli, Sezione del Giudice 
delle Indagini Preliminari, Ufficio 1, Ordinanza 
Custodia Cautelare in carcere nei confronti di 
Punzo Giovanni + 13, RG PM 9086/92; 
22-11-94. 
S012 II Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Inclagini Preliminari, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nei conrronti di Abbate Antonio + 
14Z RG PM 361 S/R/93,27-7-95. 
S013 Il Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Indagini Preliminari, La II Sezione, 
Ordinanza custodia cautelare in carcere e agli 
arresti domiciliari nei confronti di 
Baldasacino Antonio + 85, Reg. PM 
3615/R/93,27-5-96. 
S014 Il Tribunale di Napoli, Ufficio del Giudice per 
le Indagini Prelinlinari, Ufficio 12, Sentenza 
nei confronti di Caliendo Umberto + 5, RS 
724/97. 
sols 11 Tribunale di Napoli, Sezione del Giudice 
delle Indagini Preliminari, Ufficio X, 
Ordinanza Custodia Cautelare in carcere nei 
conrronti di Donnarurnma Gemma +Z RS 
71/98, RG notizie di reato 10977/R/96 + 
14968/R/97,7-2-98. 
S016 Il Tribunale di Napoli, Sezione del Giudice 
delle indagini Preliminarl, Ordinanza custodia 
cautelare in carcere nei confronti di Alfieri 
Carmine + 22, RS 638/93,3-11-93. 
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S017 11 Tribunale di Palermo, Ufficio del Giudice 
delle Indagini Prelin-dnari, Ordinanza. Sentenza 
contro Abel Azizi, 198 6. 
1980s Tribunal Sentences: 
si Il Tribunale di Napoli, La VH Sezione, Sentenza 
nei confronti di Anunaturo Umberto + 5, RG 
1359, RG4990-11-75,24-2-76. 
S2 Il Tribunale di Avellino, La III Sezione, 
Sentenza nei Confronti di Cutolo Roberto + 8, 
RS 639, RG 465/84,10-7-84. 
S3 Il Tribunale di Napoli, Sentenza nei confronti 
di Saviano Sabato + 143, - RS 2012/83, 
1367/83 + RG, 2243/83,30-3-85. 
S4 Il Tribunale di Napoli, La X Sezione Penale, 
Sentenza nella causa penale contro Acquaviva 
Luigi, RG n 9712/2 2/84, RS 9483,17-9-8 S. 
ss II Tribunale di Napoli, La I Sezione Penale, 
Sentenza nella causa penale contro Abbate 
Enrico + 4, RG n 7331/20/85,9-6-86. 
S6 Il Tribunale di Napoli, Sentenza nei confronti 
di D'Alessandro Michele + 15, RS 9581, RG 
1214/4/90,22-12-90. 
S7 Il Tribunale di Napoli, La V Sezione Penale, 
Sentenza nei confronti di AlfleH Camine + 9, 
n 1704/4R/90 RG notizie di reato, 
16/17-11-94. 
S8 Il Tribunale di Napoli, La. V Sezione Penale, 
Sentenza nei confronti di Abbate Filippo + 24, 
RS 2929, RG 4252/12/93,23-9-96. 
S9 11 Tribunale di Napoli, La X Sezione Penale, 
Sentenza nei conrronti di D'Alessandro 
Michele + 67, RS 261/97,14-3-97. 
sio Il Tribunale di Napoli, La I Sezione Penale, 
Sentenza nei confronti di Gionta Valentino + 
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10, RS 24/60, RG 3976/12/95,14-5-97. 
1980-90s Assize Court Sentences: 
CD'A9 Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La III Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento formale 
contro Vollaro Luigi + 1, RS 61/84, RG20/80, 
12-6-1984. 
CUA10 Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La III Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento fonnale 
contro Pasquale DAmico + 10, RS 19/8 5, 
RG69/55,26-2-1985. 
CD'Al 1 Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento fomiale 
contro Puca Giuseppe + 7, RS 9/91, RG13/91, 
10-OS-91 
CD'A12 Corte d'Assise di Napoli, La. IV Sezione, 
Sentenza nei contro di Imparato Francesco + 
19, RG 17/94, RS 33/94,12-11-94. 
CUA13 Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II sezione, RG 
64/96, Sentenza nei confrond di Nuvoletta 
Angelo + 14, RG 64-96. 
CD'A14 Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La II Sezione, 
Sentenza nella causa a procedimento formale 
contro Baccante Luigi+ 14, RS 21/97, 
RG 64/96,14-4-97. 
Trial Interrogations (verbale di udienza) 1980-90s 
CYA15 La Corte DAssise di Napoli, La 11 sezione, 
RG 23/92, Contro Mariano Ciro + 62, 
- verbale di udienza: 
a18-05-93: Bernasconi Umberto. 
b26-05-93: Labonia Giovanni. 
c08-06-92: Frajese Pasquale. 
CD'A16 La Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La I sezione, 
Procedura penale contro Archetti Biaggio 
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81, RG 11/95 
CUA17 MAGLIO RG 3952/11/92 + 9086/R/92: 'Gava 
trial'. 
- verbale di udienza: a31-10-96, b18-10-96 
(Piero Pugliese), c04-03-97, d09-04-97 
(Salvatore Rosa), e26-03-97, f27-03-97 
(Andrea Delli Paoli), g01-04-97 (Alessandra 
Mainetti), h08-04-97, i09-04-97, j15-04-97, k22- 
04-97,123-04-97, m29-04-97, nl 3-05-97, o10- 
09-97, p4/19-03-98 (Cuomo, R. Palmieri), q25- 
3-98 (Martino Galasso), r07-05-98 (Domenico 
Galasso), s05-05-98 (Angelo Moccia), t16-4-98 
(Luigi D'Avino), w20-O5-98 (Pietro Pianese) 
A. Vito: v13-04-94 
Rosanova Ferrara junior: x20-5-93, yl 2.04.97 
CD'AI8 Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La. II sezione, RG 
64/96, Sentenza nei conrronti di Nuvoletta 
Angelo + 14, RG 64-96. 
verbale d'udienza: a8-4-95; b6-11-96; c18-11- 
96, d19-1-97; e20-1-97; f29-1-97. 
CD'A19 Corte D'Assise di Napoli, La IIII sezione, RG 
38/95, Contro Adinolfi Umberto + others, 
verbale d'udienza: 1997. 
a24-3-97, b17-03-97, (Ammaturo Umberto), 
c14-3-97 (Federico Giovanni), d11-3-97. 
S7 11 Tribunale di Napoli, La V Sezione Penale, 
RG 3952/11/92, Contro AlfleH Carinine + 9, 
verbale di udienza: Pasquale Galasso (a15- 
11-93), Carmine Alfieri (b22-04-94, c04-05-94, 
d05-05-94), Mario Pepe (el3-04-94), 
Vinciguerra (fl 7-2-94), Carmine Schiavone, 
Umberto Ammaturo (dOS-03-94). 
Sil Il Tribunale di Napoli, La VII Sezione Penale, 
RG 2786/8/95, Procedimento a carico di 
Gargiulo Aldo + 34. 
verbale di udienza: 11-95a (Ciro Martisciello), 
27-05-96b. 
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Interroaadons bv the Procura di Navoli or theProcura di 
Salerno. 1980-90s: 
pri Transcripts of the interrogations of 
lacolare Corrado by the DDA of Naples, dr 
Mellilo, Uruguay, 9086/R/92, May 1994. 
Pr2 Transcripts of the interrogations of Prudente 
Aniello by Dr A. D'Alterio, Naples, 21-07-92. 
Pr3 Transcripts of the interrogations of Orto . Aurelio Luigi by Dr F. Cafiero De Raho, Caserta, 
21-04-93. 
Pr4 Transcripts of the interrogations of Pasquale 
Frajese by Dr. L Gay and Dr A. Barbarano, 
April 1991. 
Pr5 Transcripts of the interrogations of Migliorino 
Salvatore by Dr A. D'Alterio, Naples 27-08-93. 
M Transcripts of the interrogations of Antonio 
Tarallo, by Dr A. D'Alterio, Naples July, August, 
September, October, 1994. 
Pr7 Transcripts of the interrogations of Galasso 
Pasquale by Dr P. Mancuso, Dr Mellilo, Dr Gay and 
Dr Roberti (3952/11/92 RG), 1993-5. 
Pr8 Transcripts of the interrogations of Carmine 
Alfieri by Dr P. Mancuso, Dr Mellilo, Dr Gay and Dr 
Roberti, 1994 (including a confrontation between 
Galasso and Alfieri: 15-3-94). 
Pr9 Transcripts of the interrogations of Alfonso 
Rosanova. jr. by Dr P. Mancuso, Dr Mellilo, Dr Gay 
and Dr Roberti, 1994 (including a confrontation 
between Rosanova and Patriarca: 23-06-94). 
Prio Transcripts of the interrogations of Alfredo 
Vito and other politicians by Dr P. Mancuso, 
Dr Mellflo, Dr Gay and Dr Roberti, 1993-4 
pri 1 Transcripts of the interrogations of Mario 
Fenga by Dr A. D'Alterio, a2l-5-95; b8-1-96. 
Pr12 Transcripts of the interrogations of Aniello 
Prudente by Dr A. D'Alterio, a3-7-92; b18-7-92; c2l- 
7-92; d24-7-92; e28-7-92; f30-7-92. 
Pr13 Transcripts of the interrogation of Cutolo, b9-1- 
84 (Barra), c18-10-85 (Lettieri) by Dr C. Alemi (1984- 
85). 
Pr14 Transcripts of the interrogations of Matteo 
Graziano by Dr A. D'Alterio, 12-9-94 
Pr 17 Transcripts of the interrogation of Bruno 
Brancaccio by Dr G. Melillo and others, 23-9-94. 
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Procura di Palermo: 
PrI. 5 Transcripts of the interrogations of 
Tommaso Buscetta by G. Falcone, 23-4- 
1984, Procura di Palermo, Palermo, Italy 
Pr16 Transcripts of the interrogations by Dr G. 
Falcone of Antonio Calderone, Procura di 
Palermo, Palermo, Italy. 
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Police Documents: 
sm verbale della squadra mobile, Questura di 
Napoli, 30 May 1992 
R1 'Rapporto sul Fenomeno della Camorra, 
Dicembre 1988, Legione Carabinicri di Napoli, 
Gruppo Napoli I. 
R2 'Rapporto sul Fenomeno della Camorra, 
1988, Legione Carabinieri di Napoli, Gruppo 
Napoli II. 
R3 Settima Sezione Antimafia della Squadra 
Mobfle; appunto 6-2-91: 024435/1991. 
R4 Annotazione relativa agli accertanienti esperii 
sul conto di GAVA Antonio, n 12848/123-67 di 
Prot, 7.3.94 Roma, Raggruppamento 
Operativo Speciale Carabinieri, I reparto 
Investigativo (ROS CC). 
R5 Annotazione riepilogativa relativa alle ulterior! 
attivata di indagine esperito su delega e 
d'initiattva, sull'associazione di tipo inafloso 
gia capeggiata da Cannine Alfleri e sul 
conflitto di camorra fra la Nuova Carnorra 
Organizzata ed il sodalizio all'epoca dei fatto 
denominato Nuova Farniglia scaturito per 
conquitare il potere critninale con il 
conseguente controllo del ter7itorio e delle 
illecite attivitil attraverso la perpetrazione dei 
seguenti ratti delittuosi, n 12848-142 di Prot, 
18-6-94 Roma, Raggruppamento Operativo 
Speciale Carabinieri, reparto Investigativo, 3 
Sezione. 
R6 Ta situazione della CrlminalitA Organizzata in 
Campania', January 1993, Direzione 
investigativa Antimafia, I Reparto, 2 
Divisione. 
R7 Elenco dei Clan Carnor7isti, Napoli CittA 1995. 
R8 Compania dei Carabinieri di Castellammare 
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Official Documents 
Goverrument /Ministry documents: 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 2 Settembre 1991, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Sant'Antonio Abate c 
Allegato in La Gazzetta Ufficiale Della Repubblica Italiana, 6-9-93, 
n 209. 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 20 Settembre, 1991, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Poggiornarino (Napoli) 
e Allegato. 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 30 Settembre 1991, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Casal di Principe e 
Allegato in La Gazzetta Ufficiale Della Repubblica Italiana, 2-10- 
91, n 231. 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 30 Settembre 1991, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Marano, c Allegato in 
La Gazzetta Ufficale Della Repubblica Italiana, 2-10-9 1, n 23 1. 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 13 marzo 1993, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Agerola c Allegato in 
La Gazzetta Urficiale Della Repubblica Italiana, 24-3-93, n 69. 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 4 giugno 1993, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Torre Annunziata e 
Allegato in La Gazzetta Ufficiale Della Repubblica Italiana, 5-6- 
1993, n 130. 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 4 giugno 1993, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Casola di Napoli e 
Allegato in La Gazzetta Ufficale Della Repubblica Italiana, 5-6-93, 
n 130. 
Decreto del Presidente Della Repubblica, 1G Agosto 1993, 
Scioglimento del Consiglio Comunale di Nola e Allegato in La 
Gazzetta Ufficiale Della Repubblica Italiana, 18-8-9 1, n 193. 
Ministero Dell'Interno, Rapporto Annunale sul fenomeno della 
criminalitti organizzata per il 1993, aprile 1994, Dipartilliento 
della Pubblica Sicurezza - Direzione Investigativa Antimarla. 
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Prefecture Documents: 
Prefettura di Napoli, Ufficio di Gabinetto (Febbraio 1995), 
'Criminaliti), Ordine Pubblico e Situazione Socio-economica nella 
provincia di Napoli'. 
Prefettura di Salerno, Ufficio di Gabinetto, (1993) Relazione su 
Sarno, Comune di Sarno, Accertamenti ex-legge 726182 e legge 
486/88(12B. 1.2306). 
Prefettura di Salerno, Ufficio di Gabinetto (1993) Relazione sui 
Comuni di Nocera Inferlore, Pagani e Scarati - Accessi ispettivi 
ex art. I D. L 31.5.1991, n 164 - Risultanze, 20-2-93. 
Election results: 
Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale dellAmministrazione 
Civile, Servizio Elettorale, Divisione Organizzazione delle 
Consultazioni Elettorale: 
Local election results for 
Marano di Napoli: 1952,1953,1957,1960,1962,1980,1985, 
1990,1993. 
Torre Annunziata: 1952,1956,1957,1961,1981,1985,1990. 
Poggiomarino: 1952,1956,1957,1960,1963,1981,1985,1990, 
1993. 
Sant'Antonio Abate: 1952,1956,1960,1979,1983,1988,1993. 
Casal di Principe: 1953,1957,1961,1982,1988,1993. 
Nola: 1952,1956,1960,1980,1985,1989. 
S. Paolo Belsito: 1952,1956,1960,1978,1983,1988,1993. 
Parliamentarv Documents: 
RA Richiesta di autorizzazzione a procedere nei 
confronti di Cirino Poniincino. P, Meo V., Gava 
A., Vito A., Mastrantuono R., procedimento 
penale. 1391 O/R/l 992 AAA, 6-4-93. 
Om Senato, della Repubblica Giunta per le 
autorizzazioni a procedere, Osservazion! e 
Rilievi nell'interesse del Senato Antonio Gava, 
Memorla (1993). 
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Parliamentary Antimafia Conimittee: 
COMMISSIONE PARLAMENTARE DI INCHIESTA SUL FENOMENO 
DELLA NIAFIA E SULLE ASSOCIAZIONI CIUMINALI SIMILARI 
CPAl Parliamentary Antimafia Committee, * Rapporto 
sulla Camorra, (rapporteur. - Luciano Violante), 
Camera deiDeputat4 Roma, December 1993. 
CPAM Audizione of Pasquale Galasso to the 
Parliamentary Antimafia Committee, 13-7-93 
CPA1.2 and 21-9-93, Rome. 
CPA2 Audizione of Salvatore Migliorino to the 
Parliamentary Antimafia Committee, 25-11-93, 
Rome. 
CPA3 Audizione of Tommaso Buseetta to the 
Parliamentary Antimafia Committee, 1992. 
CPA4 Parliamentary Antimafia Committee, Mafia e 
potere politico, Caniera dei Deputati, Roma, 
1976. 
Doc XXIII, n2 Relazione Conclusiva, Relazione sul Traffico 
Mafioso di W Legislatura Tabacchi e 
Stupefacenti nonchi sui rappoilt fra Mafia e 
Gangsterismo Italo-Americano, communicate 
il 4-2-1976 (chapter 2: 'Il dorninio di Lucky 
Luciano') 
Allegato 1: Sintesi delle Conclusioni cui era pervenuto nel 
corso del la VLegislatura il Comitato per le 
Indagini sui casi di singoli inaflosi, sul traffico 
di stupefacenti e sul legame tra fenomeno 
mafioso e ganysterismo americano. 
Allegato 2: Cenni biografici su Gerlando, Alberti. ' 
Doc 1032 Relazione, Trasmessa il 28 Dicembre 1973 dal 
Comando della Legione della Guardia di 
Finanza di NapoI4 sui rapporl! fra Maf Zia, 
contrabbando di tabacchi e traffico di 
stupefacenti in Documentazione allegata alla 
Relazione Conclustva della Commissione 
Parlamentare DInchiesta sul Fenomeno della 
Mafia in Sicilia (doc MR, n2-W Legisla tu ra). 
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Doc NMII n9 Relazione sulle risultanze dell'indagine del 
gruppo di lavoro della Commissione 
incaricato di svolgere accertamenti sullo 
stato della lotta alla criminalitt! organizzata 
nella cittil di Napoli, approvata 12-7-1989. 
Doc MII n 12-ter/2 Documento di minoranza, 
Considerazioni Generali sulla Lotta 
Contro la Maria e sulla Questione 
Meridionale, communicato 24-1-1990. 
Doc NXII n1 5 Relazione sulle risultanze dellindagine 
preliminare di una delegazione della 
Commissione sugli arresti donikiliarl a 
Napoli, approvata il 13-7-1990. 
RCPA1 Relazione Conclusiva 'Relazione sui Traffico 
Marfoso di Tabacchi e Stuperacenti nonche sut 
rapporti fra Mafia e Gangsterismo Italo 
Americano'(relatore: Zuccala), Commissione 
Parlamentare DInchiesta sul Fenonieno della 
Maria in Sicilia (doc ýMff, n2-W Legislatura), 
4-2-1976, Camera dei Deputati, (Doc XaI, n2) 
W Legislatura. 
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Newspapers 
'The $500 million poverty line'in The Sunday Times, 22-11-70. 
'See Naples - before it dies' in The Sunday Times, 11-1-1970. 
La CittA Nuova, Rivista di Cultura Politica, 1986-1993. 
IlMattino, 20-6-82. 
IlMattino, 8-2-1992. 
Il Mattino, 9-2-92. 
La Repubblica, 17-4-93. 
La Repubblica, 29-11-95. 
La Repubblica, 2 2-3 -96. 
La Repubblica, 14-7-96. 
Il Cor7lere del Mezzogiorno, 4-9-97. 
IlMattino, 12-4-53. 
IlMattino, 7-4-54. 
Il Roma, 20-11-54. 
IlMattino, 5-54. 
IlMattino, 20-11-54. 
flMattino, 5-10-55 
Il Roma, 31-3-59 
La Stampa, 5-4-59 
IlMattino, 5-10-SS 
IlMattinp, 27-2-82. 
Paese Sera, 6/7-10-55. 
Paese Sera, 5/6-10-55. 
Il Mattino, 4-8-67. 
IlMattino, 19-8-67. 
IlMattino, 21-8-67. 
La Stampa, 5-4-59. 
IlMattino, 1-6-76. 
IlMattinp, 26-6-76. 
Il Roma, 26-6-76. 
IlMattino, 18-4-77. 
L'Espresso, 8-4-81. 
Panorama, 28-10-79. 
IlMattino, 12-9-81. 
Il Mattino, 4-11-9 2. 
IlMattinp, 11-12-90. 
LaRepubblica, 15-4-97. 
IlMattinp, 4-8-98 
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Films 
La Sfida (1959), Francesco Rosi. 
II Camorrista (1986), Salvatore Totora 
Le Mani sulla Ciffil (1963), Francesco Rosi. 
Lucky Luciano (196 ), Francesco Rosi. 
IMaghari (19 ), Francesco Rosi. 
The Mobster 
Statistical material: 
Censimento Generale della Popolazione published by ISTAT. 
Provincia di Napoli: 1951,1971,1981 and 1991. 
Provincia di Benevento: 1961,1971. 
Provincia di Avellino: 1961,1971. 
Provincia di Caserta: 1971,1981. 
La Regione di Campania: 1991 
11 Comune di Napoli: 1991 
ISTAT - Annunario di Statistiche Guidizaria penali 198513-94, 
Roma. 
=FERS 
Letters from Raffaele Cutolo [NCO leader]: 
letter 1: addressed to Dott. ssa Pina Bevilacqua, 3-2-9? 
Letters from Raffaele Cutolo addressed to his wife 
letter 2: Belluno, 30-8-94. 
letter 3: Belluno, Lettera di Pasqua 1993 
letter 4: Belluno, 2 5-7-9 S 
letter S: Belluno, 26-7-9S 
letter 6: addressed to his lawyers, Avv Lentini, Mazza, Trofino 
and Aufiero and deposed at the Maglio trial, 19-4-97. 
Letters from Michele Guardato [member of NCO, now pentito]: 
letter 2.1: interview via letter sent from Pescara prison, 7 
September 1998. 
Sources of Mavs 
Map 1: from Ginsborg (1990). 
Map 2: R2 
Map 3: 13 Censimento Generale della popolazione, 1991, Dati 
sulle Caratteristiche Strutturali della popolazione e delle 
abitazione, 63 - NapoI4 Caserta e Salerno, Roma: Istat. 
Map 4-7: 12 Censimento, Generale della popolazione, 1985, Dati 
sulle Caratteristiche Strutturali della popolazione e delle 
abitazione, 63 - Napoli, Caserta e Salerno, Roma: Istat. 
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Interviews 
Interviews with State-witnesses: 
A- Domenico Esposito (member of the Nuzzo clan, then 
the Alfieri confederation), Naples Courthouse, 
Poggioreale, 9 April 1994. 
B- Salvatore Migliorino (mafioso, Gionta Clan, Torre 
Annunziata), La Procura di Napoli, Naples, 22 September 
1997. 
C- Antonio Tarallo (mafioso, Limelli Clan, Torre 
Annunziata), La Procura di Napoli, Naples, 10 July 1998. 
D- Fernando Cataldo (mafioso, Gionta Clan, Torre 
Annunziata), La Procura di Napoli, Naples, 6 July 1999. 
Reporters: 
" Rosaria Cappocchone, reporter of IlMattino (Caserta), 7-9- 
96, Santa Maria Capua Vetere (CE). 
" Vito Faenza, reporter of LUnitil, 13-6-97, Naples. 
" Enzo Perez, reporter of IlMattino in the 1980s (cronaca nera 
- Naples), 6-9-96; 4-4-97, Naples. 
" Ottavo Ragione, reporter of La Repubblica, 15-1-96, Naples. 
Enzo Savanelli, reporter, 17-9-97, Marano di Napoli. 
Raffaele Sardo, director of the review Lo Spettro Magazine, 7- 
0-96, Santa Maria'Capua Vetere (CE). 
Pietro Treccegnoli, reporter of IlMattino, 17-6-96, Naples. 
Francesco Vasterella, reporter of IlMattino, (Naples), 14-1-98, 
Naples. 17-9-97, Marano. 
Lawvers: 
Aw F. Rossi, 11-6-97, Naples. 
Aw. A. Buongiovani, July 1998, Naples. 
Aw. P. Trofino, 6-7-98, Naples. 
Aw G. Garofalo, 1997, Naples. 
Aw. R. Pecoraro, 14-1-1998, Naples. 
Aw. Rascide Kamali, 19-6-97, Naples. 
Judges: 
Carlo Alerni, Investigating Magistrate in the Cirillo Aff* . now President of Caserta Tribunal, 10-9-96, Caserta. 
PierLuigi Ciarillo, judge, 22-6-98, Naples. 
Armando D'Altiero, Investigating Magistrate - casual 
conversations, 1996-8. 
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Rosamaria D'Antonio, Magistrate of Corte D'Assise D'Appello, 
La 11 Sezione, Tribunale di Napoli, 2-4-97, Salerno. 
Lucio Di Pietro, Antimafta Magistrate, DDA, DIA, 5-7-99, Naples. 
Antonella Troncone, Presidente della V Sezione Penale, 
Tribunale di Napoli, 10-9-1996, Napoli. 
Claudio Tringali, Presidente della X Sezione Penale, 11 Tribunale 
di Torre Annunziata, 2-4-97, Salerno. 
Paolo Mancuso, Coordinating Antirnafia Magistrate, DDA, 1993, 
Naples. 
Politicians. professors and businessmen: 
Giuseppe Galasso, historian and former councillor and deputy 
18-9-96, Pozzuoli.. 
Pasquale Collela, former magistrate and law professor, 2-7-97, 
Naples. 
Aldo Loris Rossi, prof of Architecture, 22-1-98, Naples. 
Gilberto Marselli, professor of Sociology, 13-9-96, Naples. 
Carlo Fermariello, former Pci Senator, 10-7-96, Naples. 
Andrea Geremica, former Pci councillor, assessore and deputy, 
, 
24-3-97, Naples. 
Maurizio Valenzi, former Pci Senator and mayor of Naples 
(1975-83), 15-9-96, Naples. 
Renato Natale, former Pci mayor and councilllor of Casal di 
Principe, 4- 7-97, Casal di Principe (CE). 
Enzo Giustino, leader of the Confederation of Neapolitan 
businessmen, 10-7-96, Naples. 
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Appendix One 
Historical Development of the Neapolitan Camorra 
The Neapolitan Camorra's history is not linear but more cyclical and 
its origins are unclear. Faenza (1997) has pointed out that the first 
time the Camorra is mentioned and identified historically is in 14th 
Century as 'a trade group' (see The Cambridge Economic History of 
Europe, Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages, 1965). 
However, this is the only evidence that we have for suggesting so early 
an existence. 
More generally, the Camorra's origin is dated from around 1800 
when it was a secret criminal organisation (known as la Societil d' 
omert, i), the direct expression of the pleb's interests and its only 
form of control, which dealt in petty crimes, prostitution, gambling, 
smuggling, extortions, etc. It was predominately a city-based 
phenomena which used prison as a recruitment centre and controlled 
the plebs' behaviour so efficiently that in 1860, the Bourbon police 
chief asked it to police to city when Garibaldi entered Naples. 
Between 1861 to 1900, the Camorra expanded and changed. The 
extension of the electoral suffrage (1882,1889) and the beginning of 
an administrative economy gave the Camorra the opportunity to move 
from the lower classes into the political and business worlds. After 
the Saredo Inquiry into corruption in 1901 the Camorra started to 
decline. The factors which explain this are: (1) the strong flux of 
immigration out of Naples towards the Americas; - (2), the slight 
improvement in living standards; and (3) new and alternative forms of 
organising pleb interests, such as political representation and trade 
unions appeared. The guappo (delinquent) and guapperia (delinquent 
gang) survived these changes as a form of popular resistance to the 
initial attempts at integrating the Neapolitan popular classes into the 
modern social system. The more organised form of the Camorra 
existed in the city (and became known as La Bella Societti Refonnata) 
while in the hinterland, the individual camorristi became the new kind 
of violent mediators in business transactions. 
Mussolini and the fascists (1922-45) sought to eliminate all forms of 
organised crime. This era thus, marked a low for both Mafia and 
Camorra's activities. The post-war period, however, witnessed the 
expansion for both these criminal organisations. The Mafia developed 
and expanded rapidly in the early years due both to its pre-war 
organisational structure, the business and political contacts it made 
during the war and its contact with the American Mafia. 
The Camorra's development, on the other hand, was slow and is 
examined in this thesis. It was dominated by La Nuova Caniorra 
Organizzata [NCO] led by Raffaele Cutolo which appeared in the mid- 
1970s. This organisation, which sought domination of over the region 
and all criminal activities, provoked the gangs close to the Sicilian 
3(04 
Mafia, who became known as La Nuova famiglia [NFI, into a bitter turf 
war between 1979-82. La Nuova Famiglia triumphed but then started a 
second war in which the Alfieri confederation conquered the region 
and all business activities. 
adapted from Sales (1988). 
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AwDendix Two 
List of case-studies used in Parts -Two and 
Three 
Case-studies 19SOs: Case-studies 1980s: 
Antonio Spavone Domenico Galasso 
Assunta Maresca Salvatore Rosa 
Antonio Orlando Mario Pepe 
Francesco Fabbrocino Federico Giovanni 
Alfredo Maisto Umberto Bernasconi 
Pasquale Simonetti Domenico Esposito 
Antonio Esposito Carmine and Salvatore 
Pio Vittorio Giugliano Alfieri 
Catello di Somma Angelo Moccia 
'art, 
qathtno C)V-IOAJ- C Luciano Aviello 
Espsiýo Carmine Schiavone 
So((Mýort J-KCCI-It; CL, Luciano Fiorillo 
Mr 11 JO 
Gerardo Intagliatore 
- 0 Los, Piero Pugliese 
Cýiwtqp, L. 
Ptclaw" Salvatore Migliorino 
Antonio Tarallo 
Ciro Martusciello 
Rosa Cutolo 
Alfonso Rosanova jr 
Luigi and Fiore D'Avino 
Corrado lacolare 
Giovanni Labonia 
Antonio Cuomo 
Michele Guardato 
Giuseppe Palillo 
Andrea Delli Paoli 
Mario Fenga 
Aniello Prudente 
Pasquale Galasso 
Stefano Reccia 
Giovanni Ferraro 
Gennaro Brasiello 
Raffaele PaIrnieri 
Rosario Giugliano 
Oreste Lettieri 
Antonio Gaglione 
Pasquale Loreto 
Costantino Laiola 
Pasquale Frajese 
Martino Galasso 
Gabriele Donnarumma 
Pietro Pianese 
Alfonso Annunziata/Domenico Cuomo 
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Appendix Three 
Picture of Pasquale Galasso's house in Poggiornarino. 
source: La Repubblica photographic archive, Naples. 
36f 
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Avvendix Four 
Extract from-Interview with Salvatore Mig-liorino (22-9-97) 
R: Salvatore Mighorino 
D: Felia Allum 
L: Lawyer. 
Salvatore Migliorino recalls how, when he was insulted by a local 
criminal, he had to defend himself and his honour and thus to murder 
the offender: 
R- Ma guarda per ine era un sinacco nel senso un sinacco collie collie 
rigura, portanni lo schirro a casa, perchi io frequentavo delle persone 
che retenevanio per la nostra inentalitd, 
L- respettato per il vostro anibiente? 
R- per il nostro anibiente era un fatto.... 
D- La vendetta era un fatto norniale e nizionale? 
R- Coine? 
D- Per la vostra mentalitil la vendetta enz una cosa razionale? 
L- un codice? 
R -Ma diciamo ... ecco piii un codice per6 ecco cerano anche delle cose dove si potevano anche survolare. 
D- CioO 
R- Cose lievi cosi per6 una figuraccia del genere che poi si poteva 
ripercuotere nel tuo camino quello che ha avulo gli schiffi da lizio e si e' 
stato zitto va be j un uonzo di niente, non vale niente. Ecco questo era 
una cosa che mi poteva assillare per tutta la vita. Pero io nlica pensavo 
che nii poteva assillare, non ho pensato solo "Come si ý, perinesso di 
schiaffegiarnii". Ecco dovevo andare li nel inio conibattiniento, per la 
inia nientalita di dare quello schiaffo in un altro inelodo. Solo cos! jo 
potevo rivalutare quella iniagine che stavo creando. Ma non che Ini 
stavo creando io che onnai ciavevanio creato con quel gruppo (B. 19). 
Appendix Five 
Stories about Pasquale Simonetti 
Episodes recalled by Arch. Aldo Loris Rossi, who met Pascalone 'e Nola 
in his student days, underline his role as a traditional guappo: 
"I have a friend who has a restaurant in Via Firenze where Pasquale 
Simonetti was murdered. So, Pasquale came to cat there nearly every 
evening. He was a tall man, nearly two meters, a gigantic man who 
always had 
,a way of 
behaving, a 'guappaesica'way of doing things, a 
self-assured man. So, I sometimes spoke to him as I was still studying 
at the time, he called me '0 studente' 'O'proll. Then one day, as I 
always heard that he slapped other caniorristi I was curious and asked 
him: "Excuse me Don Pasquale, why is it that when you slaps these 
people nobody ever reacts? " So, he gave me an answer which made 
me understand a lot about what we are/were dealing with and said 
"Professore, I slap those who deserve it" those who deserve it in the 
sense that the person who had done something he should not have 
done expected it and accepted it because in the code of honour there 
are those who don't deserve it and react. Instead he had the intuition 
to say "I slap those who deserve it" (interview of 22 January 1998). 
"I remember that at the beginning of the 1950s, we were burgled where 
I lived, where my father had his business. So burglars stole whatever 
they wanted, it thus was a problem of getting these goods back, you 
could not get them back if you went to the Police and reported it, 
you'd never get anything back. if on the other hand, you'd put yourself 
in touch with this person (Pasquale Simonetti), there was some hope 
because he would call the burglars that were around, the burglars 
would be given a percentage and they would give the stuff back. This 
could be useful for them, these people who stole something when 
they needed to sell them, they would sell them at a now price so the 
burgled is ready to pay more to have it back. So, my father got in 
touch with Pasquale Simonetti and we got the stuff back and paid a 
certain amount" (interview, ibid). 
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ppendix Six 
The Anatomv of Camorra clans in the 1980s 
Naples City (1988) 
Name: Alfano Clan Owith Vigilante clan) 
Geographical zones: Napoli-Arenella. 
Activities: legal: None. 
illegal: Drugs, clandestine lotto and extortions. 
links with other local clans: alliances with the Lo Russo clan from 
Secondigliano, i Vigilante and the Cocozza clan from the Campi 
Flegrea zone. 
links with other Campania clans. - part of the Nuova Famiglia, loyal 
to the Nuvoletta clan. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International Links: None. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external Conflicts. - Fighting against the Bardellini clans, 
D'Ausillo, Cavalcanti and Grimaldi, in the Flegrea zone. 
Political links: None 
Name: Vigilante clan (with Alfano clan). 
Geographical zones: Napoli-Vomero and Napoli- Pianura alta. 
Activities: legal: building construction. 
illegal: drugs, extortion and clandestine lotto. 
Links with local clans: alliances with the Lo Russo clan from 
Secondigliano, the Alfano clan from the Vomero, the Lago clan from 
Pianura and the Cocozza clan from the Alta Rione zone. 
links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Famiglia, loyal 
to the Nuvoletta. clan. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International links: None. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external Conflicts: Fighting against the Bardellini clans, 
D'Ausillo, Cavalcanti and Grimaldi, in the Flegrea zone. 
Political Links: None. 
Number of members: 22 (1988), 104 (Alfano, 1993); 49 (Alfano, 1995) 
Average age: 33. 
Sex: All male. 
In prison: 7. 
Name: Ammaturo-Maresca. VVIL 
Geographical zones: Napoli-Fuorigrotta, Castella I are 
di Stabia, Capri. 
Number of members: 11. 
average age: 41. 
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Sex: 1 woman, 1 Omen. 
In prison: 3 
On the run: 1 
Activities: legal: clothe , (shops, 
building,; and hotels. 
illegal: drugs (cocaine frordSouth America), stealing 
TIR (lorries) and illegal loans. 
links with local clans: alliances with other Bardellini clans (Malventi- 
Cavalcanti-D'Ausillo-Baratto) and the D'Alessandro clan from 
Castellarnmare and the Fabbrociano clan from Pomigliano clan. 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Famiglia, 
business links with the Zaza and Bardellino clans, cooler relations with 
the Nuovetta clan. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International Links: A base in Peru for its cocaine trade which it also 
distributes to other Neapolitan clans. 
links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: Part of the NF in the war against 
Cutolo's NCO. Then. with the Bardellino alliance in the Second Camorra 
war with an independent position. 
Political Links: Contacts with the bank, Cassa Popolare Stabiese, 
which gave it mortgages without when there was no 
permission/guarantee. 
Other: Linked to the murder of criminologist Aldo Semerari who 
worked for Cutolo and established that he was insane. 
Name: Baratto. 
Geographical zones: Napoli-Fuorigrotta. 
Number of members: 18 (1988), 68 (1993), 14 (1995). 
average age: 36 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: 3 
Activities: legal: None 
illegal: drugs (cocaine from South America), stealing 
TIR (lorries) and illegal loans. 
Links with local clans: alliances with D'Ausillo, Cavalcanti, Malventi, 
Crimaldi, Ammaturo clans. 
links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fandglia, 
Bardellino faction. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International Links: With South America for Cocain through the 
Malventi and Animaturo clans. 
links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external Conflicts: At war with loyal Nuovetta clans in the 
Flegrea zone, especially with the Cocozza clan. 
Political Links: None. 
ý7z 
Name: Bardellino. 
Geographical zones: Province of Caserta, low Lazio, 
Number of members: 484 
average age: 34. 
Sex: 14 women, 4 70 men. 
In prison: 213* 
On the run: 15 Antýý Ba,, Ud. ý 
Activities: legal: building and selling houses (compravenita di beni 
inu-nobilid 
illegal: drugs (cocaine from South America), arms 
trade, kidnapping stealing TIR (lorries), extortion, 
robberies, laundering 'dirty' money, exploitation of' 
prostitutes. 
Links with local clans: the clan with the largest control across the 
territory: 
De Angelis clan (Lazio), Esposito clan (Sessa Aurunca), La Torre clan 
(Mondragone), lovine clan (Castelvolturno), Delli Paoli-I)iccolo clan 
(Marcinise), Mirra Clan (S. Maria La Fossa), Busiello clan (Parete, Cesa, 
Lusciano, Gragnano, S. Arpino), Bovenzi clan (Capua), Delli Paoli 
(Caivano), Schiavone (Casal di Principe), Moccia clan (Afragola), Nuzzo 
clan (Acerra), Puca-Verde clan (S. Antimo, Frattamaggiore), lacolare- 
Maisto-Do Girolamo (Agro Giuglianese aversano), Mercurio clan (Torre 
Annunziata), Losco clan (Torre Annunziata), Cavalcan ti- D'Au sill io- 
Malventi-Baratto clan (Flegrea zone). 
Links with other Campania clans: Normal relations with the Zaza- 
Mazzarell clan, the Vollaro clan, the Fabbrocino clan, the Alfieri and 
D'Alessandro clan. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: Member of Cosa Nostra. 
Strong links with Palermitan Mafia because of the trade of hard drugs 
and also with the Calabrian 'Ndrangeta with which it manages the 
kidnapping of people. 
International Links: Contacts with Cosa Nostra and with South 
American and Spanish organisations through the international drugs 
trade. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external Conflicts: Splits with Mario lovine (b. 1938) 
although not yet degenerated. War against the Nuvoletta clan. 
Political Links: Strong links with many politicians in the Caserta 
province who have favoured all the legal activities of the clan. 
Other: The Main leaders Antonio Bardellino and Mario lovine are on 
the run. The strength of the clan is to have recuperated from the NCO 
many important camorristi: Carmine Di Girolamo, Corrado lacolare, 
Antonio Maisto, Nuzzo Nicola, Giuseppe Puca, Anna Mazza, etc. 
Antonio Bardellino is believed to have been murdered in Brasil in 198* 
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by Mario lovine who was also murder*ed in Spain. The Schiavone clan 
rook over the space left by the dedine of --this -dan after internal fighting. 
Name: Cavalcanti 
Geographical zones: Napoli-Rione Traiano. 
Number of members: 18. 
average age: 36 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: -3 Activities: legal: None 
illegal: drugs trade, arms trade, clandestine lotto and 
extortion. 
Links with local clans: alliances with Mario Savio 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fandglia, 
Bardellino faction. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International links: Contacts with South America with the Mercurio 
clan from Torre Annunziata. 
Links with terrorist groups: In the past, Giacomo Cavalcanti 
supplied arms to left wing terrorist groups in the Neapolitan region. 
Internal/external conflicts: At war in the second camorra warwith 
the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, the Cocozza clan, the Alfano- 
Vigilante clan from the Vomero-Arenella districts, the Grimaldi and 
D'Ausilio-Malventi clan. 
Political Links: None. 
Other: Members of this clan form part of Bardellino's most ferocious 
killers in the Neapolitan region. 
Name: Cocozza 
Geographical zones: Naples-Fuorigrotta, Traiano, Bagnoli. 
Number of members: 22 (1988), 34 (1993), 9 (1995). 
average age: 30. 
Sex: 4 women, 18 men. 
In prison: 5. 
Activities: legal: None 
illegal: drugs trade, extortion and clandestine lotto. 
Links with local clans: alliances with the Lo Russo clan from 
Secondigliano, the Alfano clan from Arenella and the Vigilante clan 
from the Vomero. 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fandglia, 
Nuvoletta faction. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International Links: None 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: At war with loyal Bardellino clans in the 
Flegrea zone, the D'Ausilio clan, the Cavalcand clan and Grimaldi clan. 
ýlq 
Political Links: None. 
Other: During the first Camorra war, it had a close alliance with the 
Giuliano clan from Forcella. In the second Camorra war, it had to 
become an ally of the Nuvoletta, clan, as a result of many losses. 
Name: Contini (Bosti-Botta - 1993). 
Geographical zones: Naples, Rione Vasto, Arenaccia, San Carlo 
all'Arena, Borgo Sant'Antonio, San Giovanniello 
Number of members: 15 (1988), 335 (1993), 111 (1995) 
average age: 37 
Sex: 2 women, 13 men. 
In prison: 2. 
On the run: 1. 
Activities: legal: Commercial services in the clothes business. 
illegal: gambling, smuggling of foreign cigarettes, 
drugs trade, extortion, clandestine lotto, robberies, 
Links with local clans: alliance with the Lo Russo clan from 
Secondigliano, and through this clan is linked with the Nuvoletta clans 
from the flegrea and Vomero-Arenella districts. 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fandglia, 
Nuvoletta faction. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International links: None 
links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: At war with the Giugliano clan from 
Forcella as it took over some of its territory. Undertakes war between 
Nuvoletta and Bardellino clans in the Flegrea zones. 
Political Links: Eduardo Contini's acquittal when he was arrested 
during a Camorra summit is very surprising. He has been prosecuted 
for mafia association as part of of the international drugs trade 
Other: The Contini clan's territory is very wealthy as it is 
characterised by small businesses and clothes shops (subjected to 
extortions). 
Name: Danaro 
Geographical zones: Naples, Santa Lucia, Greece-Pireo. 
Number of members: 3 (1988). 
average age: 50 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: None. 
On the run: 1. 
Activities: legal: Hotels (in Greece) 
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, international 
drugs trade and arms trade. 
Links with local clans: Works closely with the Potenza-Egizzo- 
Postiglione clan which is subordinate to the Zaza-Mazzarella clan and 
V7 ý 
Perrella clan. 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fainiglia but 
maintains independence 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: Strong links with the 
Catanese and Messinese Mafias 
International links: the clan's organisation base is in Pireo (Greece) 
from which it has business links with the Turkish Mafia for morphine 
restocking and arms from the Middle East. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal Conflicts: None 
Political Links: None. 
Other: The Danaro clan is an important reference point for all 
camorra and mafta families interested in the smuggling, drugs and 
arms trade in eastern Mediterranean. 
Name: D'Ausilio (vAth the Malventi clan) 
Geographical zones: Naples-Fuorigrotta and Bagnoli. 
Activities: legal: Food businesses - but relatively small. 
illegal: drugs trade, clandestine lotto and extortion. 
Links with local clans: alliances with the Baratto, Malventi, Grinaldi 
and Ammaturo clans. 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fainiglia, in the 
Bardellino faction. 
Links with Sicilian Mafla and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International Links: with South America for the drugs trade (cocaine) 
through the Malventi and Ammaturo clans. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal Conflicts: In clear contrast with the loyal Nuvoletta clans in 
the flegrea zone; in particular with the Cocozza clan. 
Political Links: None. 
Other: None. 
Name: Malventi (with the D'Ausilio clan). 
Geographical zones: Naples-Fuorigrotta. 
Activities: legal: different businesses/commerce and buildings. 
illegal: drugs trade and clandestine lotto. 
Links with local clans: close alliances with the D'Ausillo and 
Ammaturo clans. 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fandglia, in the 
Bardellino faction. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: Close connections with 
the Sicilian Mafia and other Mafias for its international drugs trade. 
International Links: constant contacted with South America and 
provides cocaine for its allies. 
links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: In clear contrast with the loyal Nuvoletta 
clans in the Flegrea zone; in particular with the Cocozza clan. 
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Political Links: None. 
Other: Aggressive acts are usually undertaken by members of the 
D'Ausilio and Grimaldi clans. 
Number of members: 29 (1988), 85 (1993). 
average age: 37 
Sex: 2 women and 27 men 
In prison: .9 On the run: 1. 
Name: Esposito Enrico 
Geographical zones: Naples-Chiaia and Loggetta. 
Number of members: 7 (1988), 
average age: 42 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: None. 
On the run: None. 
Activities: legal: ship building 
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, the drugs trade 
and extortion and laundering money. 
Links with local clans: the leader is specialised in the smuggling 
trade and is the main local distributor to all other clans. 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova r-andglia, but 
maintains an independent position. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: For the drugs trade, this 
clan must have links with the Sicilian Mafia. 
International Links: None 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: Not interested/involved in the Nuvoletta 
versus Bardellino conflict. 
Political Links: None. 
Other: None. 
Name: Giannuzzi. 
Geographical zones: Pozzuoli, Bacoli, licola, Lago Patria. 
Number of members: 4 (1988). 
average age: 34. 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: 2. 
On the run: None. 
Activities: legal: None. 
illegal: Extortion, robberies, and clandestine lotto. 
Links with local clans: alliance with the Lago clan 
Links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Faiidglia, 
Nuvoletta Faction. 
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links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None 
International Links: None 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: Only marginally involved in the Nuvoletta 
versus Bardellino conflict. 
Political links: None. 
Other: None. 
Name: Giuliano 
Geographical zones: Naples city (Forcella, and the harbour district) 
Number of members: 164 (1988), 378 (1993032 (1995). 
average age: 36. 
Sex: 5 women, 159 men. 
In prison: 46. 
On the run: 4. 
Activities: legal: many businesses kept under name lenders. 
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, drugs and arms 
trade, extortion, robberies, kidnapping, gambling, 
managing micro-delinquency. 
links with local clans: operates in the harbour district through its 
zone leader (capo-zona) Antonio Capuano and through the Mauro 
family in the Market district. 
links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fainiglia, but 
remains autonomous. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: In touch with Palermitan 
Mafia through its members who manage the international drugs trade 
(heavy drugs). 
International Links: None 
Links with terrorist groups: helped the terrorists who murdered the 
Questore Ammaturo. 
Internal/external conflicts: During the war with the NCO, it lost 
members and territory. Ciro Mariano from Spanish distinct gained his 
independence. It also lost control of the Vasto and Arenaccia districts 
to Eduardo Contini. At war, with Vincenzo Pisanelli, it also lost the 
Sanita district. 
Political links: The clan has a certain amount of political influence 
especially during the local elections because of the privileges it can 
distribute. 
Other: None. 
Name: Grimaldi. 
Geographical zones: Naples, Traiano and Soccavo 
Number of members: 19 (1988), 67 (199307 (1995). 
average age: 31. 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: 5. 
On the run: None. 
Activities: legal: some butchers. 
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illegal: drugs trade, clandestine lotto and extortion. 
Links with local clans: alliances with the D'Ausilio, Mariano, Baratto, 
Malventi and Ammaturo clans. 
links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fandglia, 
Bardelline faction. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International links: links with South America through the Malventi 
clan for the drugs trade. 
links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: in war with loyal Nuvoletta clans, the 
Lago, Vigliante-Alfano and Cavalcanti clans. 
Political Links: None 
Other: Ciro Grimaldi is considered one of the most ferocious killers. 
Name: Lago. 
Geographical zones: Naples, Low Pianura and Soccavo. 
Number of members: 9 (1988), 13 (1995). 
average age: 29. 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: 4. 
On the run: None. 
Activities: legal: construction. 
illegal: extortion, drugs trade and clandestine lotto. 
links with. local clans: Operates with the consensus of the Vigilante, 
Alfano and Cocozza clans. 
links with other Campania clans: part of the Nuova Fandglia, 
Nuovetta faction. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International Links: None 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: at war with Girmaldi clan (Bardellino 
faction) for supremacy of the Pianura-Soccavo districts. After this, its 
power is much reduced. 
Political links: None 
Other: hit by judicial investigations which targeted illegal construction 
in the Pianura district which the clan used to launder money. 
Name: Lo Russo 
Geographical zones: Naples: Seondigliano, Miano and Marianella 
districts. 
Number of members: 102 (1988), 190 (1993), 26 (1994) 
average age: 33. 
Sex: All men. 
In prison: 36. 
On the run: 3. 
Activities: legal: al : washing up goods, butchers and 
transport - name lenders. 
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illegal: extortion, drugs trade, clandestine Otto, 
stealing lorries, bodyguards. 
Links with local clans: alliances with the Nuvoletta clan from Marano, 
the Mallardo clan from Giugliano, Eduardo Contini from Vasto- 
Arenaccia district, the Afano-Vigliante clan from the Vomero-Arenella 
district and the Cocozza clan from Traiano. The Patriota clan is its 
subordinate. 
links with other Campania clans: During the first camorra war, it 
had to fight against the Maisto clan from Giugliano and the Puca clan 
from Sant'Antimo. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International Links: None 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external conflicts: is trying to expand into the Melito 
district and thus fighting against the Puca clan from Sant'Antimo. 
Supports the Nuvoletta clans against the Bardellino clans and the 
Contini clan against the Giugliano clan from Forcella. 
Political Links: Some contacts as it seeks to infiltrate legal activities. 
Other: Thanks to its alliance with the Nuvoletta clan, it has grown and 
expanded qualitatively and in terms of techniques and organisation. 
This has allowed the three groups (Lo Russo, Ricciardi and Patriota) to 
become a real Camorra clan. 
Name: Mariano 
Geographical zones: Naples: Montecalvario, San Giuseppe, Soccavo 
and Pianura districts. 
Number of members: 116 (1988), 447 (1993), 44 (1995). 
average age: 34. 
Sex: 2 women, 114 men. 
In prison: 63. 
On the run: 7. 
Activities: legal: None. 
illegal: extortion, robberies, smuggling of foreign 
cigarettes, clandestine lotto, drugs, gambling, managing 
micro-delinquency and exploiting prostitution. 
links with local clans: alliances with clans from the Pallonetto, the 
Santa Lucia district of Naples who are dominated by the Zaza and and 
Grimaldi clans. 
Links with other Campania clans: born as part of the NCO and then 
at war with clans loyal to the Giuliano clan. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International links: None 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/external Conflicts : as the clan's major figures are in prison, 
this has left space for new clans to form in the same territory. Not 
involved in the war that opposes the Bardellino clan to the Nuvoletta 
clan. 
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Political Links: None. 
Other: the detention of many of its mayor figures has meant that this 
clan has lost substantial territory and criminal prestige in Campania. 
Name: Nuvoletta 
Geographical zones: Mariano, Qualiano, Casoria, Naples-Chiaiano, 
Naples-Poggioreale and Naples-S. Pietro a Patierno. 
Number of members: 120 (1988) 
average age: 37. 
Sex: 1 woman and 119 men 
In prison: 31. 
On the run: 7. 
Activities: legal: building construction, commerce, 
businesses, horses. 
illegal: drugs trade, extortion and laundering money. 
Links with local clans: alliances with the MalIardo clan from 
Giugliano, Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano, the Contini clan from 
Vasto-Arenaccia, the Alfano-Vigilante clan from the Vomero-Arenella 
districts, the Cocozza clan from Rione Traiano, the Lago clan from 
the Pianura district and the Gionta clan from Torre Annunziata. 
Links with other Campania clans: fought against the NCO in the 
first camorra war and major protagonist in the second camorra war 
as it fights/fought against the Bardellino clan from Cipriano d'Aversa, 
in the Casertano. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and INdrangheta: Strong links with the 
powerful Greco Mafia family from Ciaculli and the Coreleonese family. 
Members of Cosa Nostra represented in Palermo by Greco Michele. 
International links: Lorenzo Nuvoletta, leader of the clan and on the 
run, deals personally with South America and the family's interests 
there, in particular the cocaine-heroin exchange with Cosa Nostra. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
External/Internal Conflicts: the Nuvoletta clan is all mighty and all 
its allies are fighting against Bardellino clans on all fronts: Torre 
Annunizata, Flegrea zone, Vomero-Arenella, Vasto-Arenaccia (Contini, 
Giuliano), Melito-Arzano (Lo Russo, Puca) Giugliano-Marano (Mallardo 
and Maisto). 
Political links: There is no doubt that the clan has contacts with the 
Neapolitan political class which has allowed it to have access to EU 
funds for agricultural products, to have loans from banks without the 
proper guarantees and public contracts where it can launder 'dirty' 
money. 
Other: the clan's economic position is very strong. The clan appears 
to be implicated in the disappearance of the boss Vittorio Vastarella, 
his son and other members. In this way, the clan is adopting classical 
Mafia methods, '1upara bianca' (disappearance without a trace). 
Name: Perrella. 
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Geographical zones: None. 
Number of members: 14 (1988), 
average age: 46. 
Sex: all men. 
In prison: 8. 
On the run: 1. 
Activities: legal: Import/export business managed by Renato 
Perrella. 
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, drugs trade and 
laundering of money made from illegal money. 
links with local clans: contacts with the Zaza-Mazzarella clan and 
all clans involved in the smuggling trade. 
Links with other Campania clans: Part of the NF, close to the Zaza- 
Mazzarella clan while maintaining a certain amount of autonomy 
(operational). 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: direct links with the 
Sicilian Mafia and Cosa Nostra through Michele Zaza and Gennaro 
Giarra. It might also have contact with the Calabrian "Ndrangheta due 
to its off-loading on that coastline. 
International Links: head quarters in Lugano (Switzerland), main 
meeting point for international organised crime. 
links with terrorist groups: None. 
Internal/External conflicts: the clan has adopted a position of 
neutral in the second camorra war. 
Political Links: None. 
Other: over time, it has built up an important economic empire. 
Name: Pisanelli-Misso. 
Geographical zones: Naples- Rione SanitA. 
Number of members: 49 (1988), 9(1995). 
average age: 36. 
Sex: I woman, 48 men. 
In prison: 25. 
On the run: 1. 
Activities: legal: businesses and leisure activities. 
filegal: drugs and arms trade, extortion, robberies, 
exploitation of prostitution clandestine lotto, gambling 
and managing micro-delinquency. 
links with local clans: the clan was born out due to a spilt with the 
Giulano clan. Vincenzo Pisanelli is related to the Giuliano clan through 
family ties. 
Links with other Campania clans: Part of the NF, but retains a 
neutral position towards the Nuvoletta and Bardellino clans. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: the bomb on the Naples- 
Milan trial showed that the clan had direct links with Pippo Calo, 
banker* of the Palermitana mafia. 
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International Links: many contacts with South America due to its 
international drug traffic. 
Links with terrorist groups: Giuseppe Misso is considered an 
extreme right winger. Before the strage of Natale*, he set up a fascist- 
camorra group called 'CiviltA Nuova'. 
External/Internal conflicts: after the arrest of Giuseppe Misso, the 
clan was under the sole leadership of Pisanellf who reelaborated ties 
with the Giuliano clan. Still at war with neighbours the Lo Russo clan 
(Secondigliano) and the Contini clan (Vasto-Arenaccia). 
the clan has adopted a position of neutrality in the second Camorra, 
war. 
Political Links: None. 
Other: involved in the 'massacre of Christmas' in 1984. 
Naine: PotenZa-Egizzo-Postiglione. 
Geographical zones: Naples- Santa Lucia. 
Number of members: 18 (1988), 
average age: 38 
Sex: 3 women, 15 men. 
In prison: 3. 
On the run: none. 
Activities: legal: fishing, public services, transport activities. 
illegal: snfuggling of foreign cigarettes, drug 
trafficking, exploitation of prostitution and managing 
micro-delinquency. 
Links with local clans: alliance with the Perrella and Mariano clans. 
Links with other Campania clans: is predominately subordinate to 
the Zaza-Mazzarella clan. 
links with Sicilian Mafia and 'N&angheta: None. 
International Links: None. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
External/Internal Conflicts: Part of the FN, but not involved in the 
war between the Bardellino and Nuvoletta clans. 
Political Links: None. 
Other: smuggling activities (off-loading in particular) take place from 
the coastline of Brindisi, high Lazio and Domizio coastline. 
Name: Savio 
Geographical zones: Naples - Montecalvario 
Number of members: 13 (1988), 49 (1993). 
average age: 29. 
Sex: all men. 
In prison: 4. 
On the run: 4. 
Activities: legal: none 
illegal: smuggling of foreign cigarettes and drug 
trafficking 
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Links with local clans: operates with the common consensus of the 
Pisanelli-Misso clan, the Giuliano clan from Forcella and Perrella clan 
from Santa Lucia. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: None. 
International links: None. 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
External/Internal conflicts: rivals of the Mariano clan. The 
coexistence of the two clans is not clear and is still subject of 
debate. 
Political links: None. 
Other: None. 
Name: Zaza-Mazzarella 
Geographical zones: Naples -San Giovanni a Teduccio, the provinces 
of Brindisi, Lazio and Lombardia. 
Number of members: 216 (1988), 144(1993), 28(1995). 
average age: 3 7. 
Sex: 4 women, 212 men. 
In prison: 46. 
On the run: 7. 
Activities: legal: national businesses and commerce. 
illegal: international drugs trade, smuggling of foreign 
cigarettes, export, laundering money 
clandestine lotto and extortion. 
links with local clans: many clans and families are subordinate to 
this clan: the Barbarossa, Guida, Potenza, Egizzo, Postiglione, Adamo, 
De Gais, Presutto, De Crescenzo, Dannaro, lengo, Russo, Maur!, 
Anastasio, Mollo, Belflore clans. 
Links with other Campania clans: within the NF it maintains a 
Position of neutrality; has good relations with the Bardellino, 
Nuvoletta, Perrella, Ammaturo-Maresca, Vollaro and Leveque clans. 
Links with Sicilian Mafia and 'Ndrangheta: relations with the 
American Mafia families, the Boni, the Enea, and Monti clans and Cosa 
Nostra families to launder drugs and smuggling money. Is represented 
by Michele Greco in Palermo. 
International Links: The clan's activities are transnational: in 
Switzerland (Perrella Gennaro), Greece and the Middle East (Mazzarella 
Ciro and Danaro Adam), France (Barbarossa Nunzio), England 
(Cuntrera family), South America (Bardellino families), North America 
(Bonanno family) and Canada (Cotrone family). 
Links with terrorist groups: None. 
External/Internal Conflicts: has adopted a clear neutral position in 
the second Camorra. War. 
Political Links: None. 
Other: thanks to the clan's smuggling and drugs trade, it has built up 
an important economic empire. 
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Clan Name: Nuvoletta 
Leader: Lorenzo (01-01-31). 
Geographical zones: Marano, Calvizzano, Qualiano, Guighano ii-i 
Campania, S. Antimo, Mugnano di Napoli and various centres in the 
province of Caserta. Moreover, it has great influence over other clans 
in the rest of Campania. 
Number of Members: 141 (1988), 78 (1995). 
Sex: I woman, 140 men. 
Average age: 36. 
Activities: drugs trade, extortion, EC frauds. 
Alliances: the Mallardo clan of Giugliano, the Lo Russo clan of' 
Secondigliano. Ali clans at war with Bardellini clans, have the Nuvoletta 
clan as their ideological reference point. Alliances also with the Sicilian 
Mafia and the 'Ndrangheta. 
Fxternal Conflicts: After war with the NCO, at war with its own ex-ally 
Antonio Bardellino, consequently at war with all his new allies. Very 
violent and bitter war. 
Internal Conflicts: Lorenzo Nuvoletta's control over members is 
absolute: his charisma but also the fear of vendetta mean that 
tradimenti* or leaving the clan are practically impossible. 
Political links: Clear political links at local and national level. 'I he 
clan controls a mass of local votes. This gives the clan access to El I 
funds and getting bank loans without guarantees. 
Other: the clan employs district leaders to control (lifferent zones in 
the region. 
Clan Name: lovine, ex-Bardellino clan. 
Leader: Mario (15-03-51). 
Geographical zones: Giugliano, Villaricca, Marano, S. Antinio. 
Number of Members: 45. 
Sex: all rnen. 
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Average age: 3 5. 
Activities: extortion, drugs and arms trade. 
Alliances: alliances not clear after the murder of Bardellino. 
Necessary to find new alliances and reference points. 
External Conflicts: part of the NF fighting against the NCO. 
Internal Conflicts: a violent spilt with Antonio Bardellino. Mario lovine 
is believed to have murdered Antonio Bardellino. Internal conflicts are 
vague and not confirmed. 
Political Links: No political links in the province of Naples but does 
have some in the province of Caserta, especially in Casal di Principe, 
Aversa, and Caserta. 
Other: the clan employs district leaders to control different zones in 
the region. 
Clan Name: Mallardo. 
Leader: Feliciano (20-11-51). 
Geographical zones: Guigliano in Campania 
Number of Members: 4 (1988), 73 (1995). 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 34. 
Activities: manages clandestine lotto, drugs trade, stealing TIR 
lorries, extortion, imposing illegal security on building sites. 
Alliances: Lo Russo clan of Secondigliano and close and subordinate 
alliance with the Nuvoletta clan. 
External Conflicts: with Antonio Bardellino and allies. 
Internal Conflicts: None. 
Political Unks: the clan controls many votes at local level which are 
distributed among different parties. 
Other: the clan makes most of its money from extortions from 
building constructors. 
Clan Name: Puca 
Leader: Pasquale (09-07-1964). 
Geographical zones: S. Antimo. 
Number of Members: 19. 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 29. 
Activities: drugs trade and extortion. 
Alliances: subordinate to Mario Iovine's clan. 
External Conflicts: conflicts with the Lo Russo clan from 
Secondigliano. 
Internal Conflicts: None. 
Political Links: the clan controls important local votes which gives it 
political influence in the communes of S. Antimo and Casandrino. 
Other: none. 
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Clan Name: Lo Russo. 
Leader: Mario (23-08-56). 
Geographical zones: Melito, Naples-Secondigliano. 
Number of Members: 19. 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 3 5. 
Activities: drugs trade and extortions. 
Alliances: close alliance with the Mallardo clan from Giugliano and is 
subordinate to Lorenzo Nuvoletta. 
External Conflicts: conflicts with Mario Iovine's allies. 
Internal Conflicts: none. 
Political Links: none. 
Other: Secondigliano is its headquarters and has a capo zona in 
Melito. 
Clan Name: Nappo. 
Leader: Pietro (15-09-48). 
Geographical zones: Giugliano and villaricca. 
Number of Members: 13. 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 40. 
Activities: drugs trade, extortions, stealing TIR lorries and bank 
robberies. 
Alliances: close alliance with the Lo Russo clan from Secondigliano. 
External Conflicts: conflicts with Mario Iovine's allies. 
Internal Conflicts: none. 
Political Links: some contacts. 
Other: A new clan which Nappo has set up with his brother-in-law. 
Clan Name: Moccia. 
Leader: Anna Mazza (28-02-37). 
Geographical zones: Afragola, Casoria, Arzano, Formia (LT). 
Number of Members: 52 (1988), 37 (1995). 
Sex: 3 women and 49 men. 
Average age: 3 2. 
Activities: drugs trade, extortions, robberies, loan sharking, public 
contracts, selling of land. 
Alliances: close to the Bardellino faction and has links with the Verde 
Clan from S. Antimo, the Gaglione clan from Caivano, the Alfieri and 
Fabbrocino clans from Nola and Lo Russo from Secondigliano.. 
External Conflicts: the clan has been at war with the Magliulo clan and 
won this war. 
Internal Conflicts: some internal conflicts as members are no longer 
considered loyal or want more independence. 
Political Links: the clan has backed its 'own men' to enter politics: 
Salvatore Caputo (PSDI) and Augusto lazzetta (DQ. 
3gG 
Othernone. 
Clan Name: Magliulo 
Leader: Vincenzo (01-01-48). 
Geographical zones: Afragola, Formia (LT) and surrounding 
communes.. 
Number of Members: 20. 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 29. 
Activities: business activities in the public and private construction 
sector, compravendita di terreni/ land. robberies and extortion. 
Alliances: was protected by Antonio Bardellino and now seeking 
protection from the Nuvoletta clan after isolation due to war with the 
Moccia clan. 
External Conflicts: war with Moccia clan. Defeated. 
Internal Conflicts: none. 
Political Links: the clan has numerous political contacts: Paolo Sibilio 
and Francesco Salzano (DC). The leader himself was once DC 
councillor in Afragola responsible for state services. Close contact 
with Manfredi Bosco, MP. 
Other: Although many members have committed serious crimes, they 
have always managed to avoid prosecution. 
Clan Name: Gaglione 
Leader: Antonio (12-09-51). 
Geographical zones: Caivano, Cardito, Crispano and Frattamaggiore. 
Number of Members: 33. 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 30. 
Activities: selling drugs, extortions and robberies. 
Alliances: close alliance the Moccia clan for whom it, together with 
the Verde clan from S. Antimo, undertakes the most ferocious criminal 
acts. Reference point: Antonio Bardellino and allies. 
External Conflicts: none, did not participate in the Moccia versus 
Magliulo war. 
Internal Conflicts: none. 
Political links: none. 
Other: none. 
Clan Name: Verde. 
Leader: Antonio (14-01-60). 
Geographical zones: S. Antimo, Casandrino and Grumo Nevano. 
Number of Members: 13. 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 29. 
Activities: selling drugs, extortions, robberies and control of public 
contracts. 
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Alliances: close alliance with the Moccia clan from Afragola and 
Gaglione clan from Caivano. Reference point: Antonio Bardellino and 
allies. 
External Conflicts: none. 
Internal Conflicts: none. 
Political Links: close links with the local DC. 
Other: none. 
Clan Name: Alfieri. 
Leader: Carmine (18-02-43). 
Geographical zones: Nola, Cicciano, Margliano, Miriglianella, 
Brusciano, Pomigliano d'Arco, Poggiomarino, S. Giuseppe Vesuviano, S. 
Gennaro Vesuviano. 
Number of Members: 21(1988), 54(1995). 
Sex: all men. 
Average age: 41. 
Activities: drugs and arms trades, extortions, managing clandestine 
lotto. Through name lenders, the clan manages butchers and meat 
selling of all kinds. 
Alliances: close alliance with the Bardellino clan. It also has close 
links and works with Mario Fabbrocino. It also collaborates with the 
Nuzzo clan of Acerra, the Galasso clan of Poggiomarino, the Moccia 
clan of Afragola, the Ammaturo clan of Naples, the Langella clan of 
Boscoreale. 
External Conflicts: at war with the Nuvoletta faction, in particular 
with the Gionta clan of Torre Annunizata and D'Alessandro di 
Castellammare di Stabia for the domination of illegal activities. 
Internal Conflicts: none to speak of. Carmine Alfieri's power is 
absolute. 
Political Links: no evidence of this but it is possible that it 
conditions local politics. 
Other: Alfieri's criminal power goes beyond Naples and Campania. 
Carmine Alfieri has great prestige which makes him much respected in 
the local community. 
Clan: Fabbrocino 
Leader: Mario (05-01-43). 
Number of members: 20(1988), 35(1995). 
Average age: 30 
Sex: all men 
Geographical zones: S. Gennaro Vesuviano, Ottaviano, S. Giuseppe 
Vesuviano, Pomigliano dArco. 
Activities: drugs trafficking, extortion, robberies, managing 
clandestine lotto. 
Alliances: Bardellino faction, close collaboration with the Alfieri clan. 
External conflicts: at war with Salvatore Foria from Pomigliano 
d'Arco and together with the Alfieri clan, at war with the Gionta clan. 
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Internal conflicts: None. 
Political contacts: None. 
Other: controls butchers and illegal meat selling. 
Clan: Egizio 
Leader: Antonio Egizio (19-0153). 
Number of members: 19 
Average age: 32 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Casalnuovo di Napoli, Acerra, Ponligliano 
d'Arco, Castello di Cisterna, Cercola, Volla e Brusciano. 
Activities: drugs trafficking, extortions and robberies. 
Alliances: after spilt with Salvatore Foria, has lost the protection of 
Carmine Alfieri and Mario Fabbrocino and has sought alliances with 
the Camorra from Marano and Giugliano. 
External conflicts: at war with Salvatore Foria from Pomigliano 
d'Arco and Aniello Anastasio from S. Anastasio. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: the brother of a clan member, Giovanni Romano is 
a DC councillor of the comune of Casalnuovo while another member 
Gennaro Veneruso was a PSI councillor in the comune of Volla. 
Other: the Egizio clan is seeking to make peace with Foria clan in 
order to avoid physical elimination. 
Clan: Foria 
Leader: Salvatore (05-01-54). 
Number of members: 13 
Average age: 33. 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Pomigliano d'Arco, S. Anastasia, Castello di 
Cisterna. 
Activities: extortion, robberies, drug trafficking. 
Alliances: alliance with Alfieri clan and collaborates with the 
Anastasio clan. 
External conflicts: at war with Egizio clan from Casalnuovo from 
Naples. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none notified. 
Other: for certain activities, uses members from the Anastasio clan. 
Clan: Nuzzo, aka Carusiello 
Leader: Giovanni (01-10-54). 
Number of members: 22 (1988), 22 (1995). 
Average age: 27 
Sex: aU men. 
Geographical zones: Acerra. 
Activities: extortion, robberies, drugs trafficking. 
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Alliances: after the murder of Nicola Nuzzo in Roma and Raffaele in 
Acerra, Giovanni Nuzzo decided to form an alliance with the Egizio 
clan from Casalnuovo, losing some power. 
External conflicts: at war with the Marinello, aka Amurristiello clan 
. 
and also with the Sorrentino clan (which has remained loyal to Raffaele 
Cutolo). 
Internal conflicts: two members Salvatore Andretta and Pasquale 
Scudiero would like to form their own new clan and therefore, there 
are certain tensions. 
Political contacts: daughter of Nicola Nuzzo and niece of actual 
leader, Teresa Nuzzo is engaged with the son of Attilio Tortora, 
director of public works in the comune for the DC. 
Other: none. 
Clan: Anastasio 
Leader: Aniello Anastasio (15-06-50). 
Number of members: 23. 
Average age: 31 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Madonna dell'Arco, S. Anastasia, Cercola, 
Pollena Trocchia. 
Activities: international drugs trafficking, arms trade, robberies, 
extortion, clandestine lotto. 
Alliances: alliances with the D'Avino clan from Somma Vesuviano, the 
Foria clan from Pomigliano d'Arco and the Ascione clan from 
Sebastino al Vesuvio. 
External conflicts: at war with the Mauri clan for supremacy of the 
territory. Through its friendship with Foria, the clan also has contact 
with the Egizzo clan from Casalnuovo. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none although the brother of the clan leader is a 
PSDI councillor on the council of S. Anastasia. 
Other: its legal cover are car salons. 
Clan: 'Cuniello Capasso' 
Leader: Cuomo Grimaldi (29-09-54). 
Number of members: 13. 
Average age: 27 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Acerra 
Activities: international drugs trafficking, robberies, extortion, 
clandestine lotto. 
Alliances: Cuomo Grimaldi was Nicola Nuzzo's man (Caruzziello clan) 
but when this clan had internal conflicts, Grimaldi left with other 
associates to set up his own group. He is also subordinate to Mario 
Fabbrocino's can from S. Gennaro Vesuviano. 
External conflicts: at war with Davide Sorrentino's clan as well as the 
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Camurristillo clan both from Acerra. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: trying to get to become close to the Nuzzo clan. 
Clan: Sorrentino 
Leader: Davide Sorrentino (15-03-61). 
Number of members: 9. 
Average age: 34 
Sex: 1 woman, 8 men. 
Geographical zones: Acerra. 
Activities: extortion, robberies and international drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: this is last NCO group remaining after the first Camorra 
war, close to Rosa Cutolo who is only the run. Its loyalty to the NCO 
does not appear to bother other clans otherwise it would have been 
destroyed a long time ago. 
External conflicts: it is tolerated by the NF clans. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: will disappear with time because of its work methods and also 
because it is limited to work within a certain territory. 
Clan: Russo 
Leader: Luigi Russo (05-02-56). 
Number of members: 12. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Marigliano, Mariglianella, Brusciano, Castello di 
Cisterna. 
Activities: extortions, robberies and international drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: alliance, in a subordinate position, with Carmine Alfieri 
from Piazolla di Nola. 
External conflicts: at war with the Egizzo clan from Caselnuovo di 
NapolL 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: at the moment, the clan is interested in the public contracts 
for the realisation for the second track of the Circumvesuviana. 
Clan: Camurristiello 
Leader: Gennaro Marinello (05-04-51). 
Number of members: 16. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Acerra. 
Activities: extortions, robberies, international drugs trafficking and 
organising clandestine lotto. 
Alliances: under the influence of Antonio Bardellino 
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External conflicts: was at war with the Nuzzo clan from Acerra. Now 
at peace but still at war with the Sorrentino clan. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: at the moment, the clan is rather limited in its activities as 
more than half of members are in prison. 
Clan: Mauri 
Leader: Vincenzo Mauri (22-01-53). 
Number of members: 12. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: S. Anastasia. 
Activities: extortions, robberies, loan harking and international drugs 
trafficking. 
Alliances: alliance with the Vollaro clan from Portici. 
External conflicts: none. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. The clan has never had the means to 
influence local politics. 
Other: at the moment, the clan is in decline as the leader and his 
bother are in prison and hospital. 
Clan: Zaza 
Leader: Michele Zaza (10-04-45). 
Number of members: 10. 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Portici, Naples-S. Giovanni, Torre del Greco, 
other regions in Italy. 
Activities: smuggling of foreign cigarettes, clandestine lotto and 
international drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: the clan operates beyond Naples and its province and has 
alliances with smaller clans such as the Anastasio clan of Anastasia, 
the Barbarosso, the Egizzo clan and the Adamo-Daiano clan. It also 
has close links with the Sicilian mafia (drugs and laundering money). 
External conflicts: Neutral position in the second camorra war. A 
conflict with the Vollaro clan of Portici. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: although Michele Zaza is frequently being prosecuted and 
recognised as 'socially dangerous', he manages to be freed because 
of bad health and thus escapes. 
Clan: VoRaro 
Leader: Luigi VoHaro (05-02-56). 
Number of members: 24 (1988), 62 (1995). 
Average age: 
392. 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Portici. 
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs 
trafficking. 
Alliances: Bardellino sympathies. 
External conflicts: conflicts with the Zaza clan. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
other: violent war with the Zaza clan. 
Clan: Gargiulio 
Leader: Eugenio Gargiulio (14-10-46). 
Number of members: 17 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Torre del Greco. 
Activities: extortion and drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: contacts with the Ascione clan from Ercolano and the 
Gionta clan from Torre Annunziata. 
External conflicts: at war with the Mennella clan also from Torre del 
Greco. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: its development is parallel and similar to that of the Mennella 
clan. Both clans originated from the same clan and then split forming 
two separate clans. 
Clan: Improta 
Leader: Luigi Improta (04-04-54). 
Number of members: 8 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: S. Sebastiano al Vesuviano. 
Activities: extortion, clandestine lotto and drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: alliances with the Anastasio clan from Anastasia. 
External conflicts: none. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: in S. Sebastiano al Vesuviano, there was not one clear camorra 
clan but micro delinquency which undertook robberies and extortions. 
It is only recently that Luigi Improta with the help Gaetano Ascione has 
been able to organise a real camorra clan. 
Clan: Ascione 
Leader: Raffaele Ascione (29-01-54). 
Number of members: 16 (1988), 99 (1995). 
Average age:? 
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Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Ercolano. 
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs 
trafficking. 
Alliances: collaborates with the Gargiulio clan from Torre del Greco 
and the Gionta clan from Torre Annunziata. 
External conflicts: conflicts with the Ascione clan for control of the 
territory. The enemies of the Ascione clan and also enemies of the 
Esposito clan although this has not broken out into full blown war. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: the clan might have some contacts. 
Other: none. 
Clan: Esposito 
Leader: Antonio Esposito (10-12-55). 
Number of members: 23 (1988), 66 (1995). 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Ercolano. 
Activities: extortion, clandestine lotto and international drugs 
trafficking. 
Alliances: alliances with the MennelIa clan from Torre del Greco, the 
Vangone clan from Torre Annunziata and the D'Alessandro clan from 
Castellammare di Stabia. 
External conflicts: problems with the Ascione clan 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: none. 
Clan: Abate 
Leader: Filippo Abate (oCavallaro)(02-08-57). 
Number of members: 14(1988), 60(1995). 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: S. Giorgio a Cremano. 
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs 
trafficking. 
Alliances: a working alliance with the licciardi clan from 
Secondigliano and the Norcaro* clan from Naples-Barra. 
External conflicts: the clan dominates S. Giorgio a Cremano 
completely, not allowing other clans to emerge. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: the local population is constantly terrorised by this clan as it 
is particularly violent and ferocious. Its leader, Filippo Abate was 
arrested in Spain in 1987. 
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Clan: Nappo 
Leader: Salvatore Nappo (01-02-50). 
Number of members: 10. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Volla. 
Activities: extortions to building sites, clandestine lotto and 
international drug trafficking. 
Alliances: alliance, although in a subordinate position, with the 
Anastasio clan from S. Anastasia. 
External conflicts: at war with the Egizio clan. 
and its allies. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: after the arrest of Salvatore Nappo, the leader of the clan, his 
brother-in-law, Lucano De liguori became the leader. He was murdered 
on 14-11-88. 
Clan: Troise 
Leader: Luigi Troise (05-03-48). 
Number of members: 13. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Cercola. 
Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto and international drugs 
trafficking. 
Alliances: alliances with the Anastasia clan from S. Anastasia and the 
Foria clan from Pomigliano d'Arco, although in a subordinate position. 
External conflicts: 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: previously, Camorra clans from this commune 
have had contacts with local politicians although for this clan it does 
not seem to be the case. 
Other: its rivals are those of its allies, in particular, the Egizio clan. 
Clan: Riccardi 
Leader: Antonio Riccardi, (o'nasone) (big nose) (15-09-58). 
Number of members: 6. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Pollena Trocchia. 
Activities: extortions to building sites, clandestine lotto and 
international drug trafficking. 
Alliances: alliances with the Anastasio clan from S. Anastasia and the 
Foria clan from Pornigliano dArco, although in a subordinate position. 
External conflicts: it has the rivals of its allies, in particular, the 
Egizio clan from Casalnuovo 
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Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: none. 
Clan: Mennella 
Leader: Giuseppe Mennella (03-05-48). 
Number of members: 19. 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Torre del Greco. 
Activities: extortions and drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: alliances with the Esposito clan from Ercolano, the 
Vangone clan from Torre Annunziata and the D'Alessandro clan from 
Castellammare. 
External conflicts: at war with the Gargiulio clan from Torre del 
Greco. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: in decline because of its war with the Gargiulio clan. During a 
massacre in Torre del Greco on the I April 1988, it lost 3 members. 
Clan: Gionta 
Leader: Valentino Gionta (14-01-53). 
Number'of members: 24(1988), 59(1995).. 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Torre Annunziata 
Activities: clandestine lotto, smuggling of foreign cigarettes, 
international drugs trafficking, public contracts. 
Alliances: Nuvoletta sympathies, working alliance with the Lo Russo 
clan from Secondigliano and the Cozza clan from the Flegrea area. 
External conflicts: at war with the Leveque and Visciano clans. in the 
past at war with the Alfieri clan where it suffered a bad defeat 
especially after a massacre in Torre Annunziata in 1984. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: is in a position to influence politics and control 
the distribution of public contracts in the commune. The clan can 
control a certain amount of votes for their candidates. 
Other: at the moment, the clan is interested in the flower markets of 
Pompeii and Castellammare, markets which are controlled by the 
Alfieri clan. This may be cause conflicts. 
Clan: Vangone 
Leader: Giovanni Vangone(19-09-52). 
Number of members: 9. 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
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Geographical zones: Boscotrecase. 
Activities: drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: until two years ago, the Vangone clan formed with the 
limelli clan, one clan. No alliances with other clans. 
External conflicts: only maybe with the limelli clan. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: not sought for. 
Other: none. 
Clan: Leveque 
Leader: Ernesto Leveque (01-03-28). 
Number of members: 11. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Torre Annunziata. 
Activities: extortions, international drugs trafficking, smuggling of 
foreign cigarettes, 'clothes and electrical appliances shops where the 
clan recycles its illegal earnings. 
Alliances: Zaza sympathies because of its smuggling of foreign 
cigarettes. 
External conflicts: conflicts with the Gionta clan for territorial 
reasons. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: its main activity has been the smuggling of foreign cigarettes 
although it has not tried to win public contracts within the Earthquake 
Reconstruction programme (law 219/81). 
Clan: limelli 
Leader: Luigi limelli (02-01-49). 
Number of members: 11 (1988), 31 (1995). 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Boscotrecase and Trecase. 
Activities: extortions and international drug trafficking. 
Alliances: working relationships with the Gionta and Leveque clans. 
External conflicts: conflicts with the Vangone clan. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: the clan has been seeking to infiltrate itself into the business 
of public state contracts. 
Clan: Galasso 
Leader: Pasquale Galasso (17-05-55). 
Number of members: 16. 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Poggiomarino 
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Activities: extortions, clandestine lotto, international drugs and arms 
trafficking, building sector. 
Alliances: alliance with the Langella clan from Boscoreale. 
External conflicts: none. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: clear political influence due to its threats and 
presence. 
Other: important members of the clan are under state arrest and 
have had their property sequestered. 
Clan: Langella 
Leader: Pasquale Langella (18-03-54). 
Number of members: 11. 
Average age: 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Boscoreale. 
Activities: extortions, 'recycling' stolen cattle, clandestine lotto and 
international drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: alliance with Pasquale Galasso. 
External conflicts: none. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: none. 
Clan: Pescane 
Leader: Francesco Pescane (15-09-54). 
Number of members: 10. 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Boscoreale. 
Activities: extortions and international drugs trafficking. 
Alliances: alliances with the LangelIa clan. 
External conflicts: conflicts with the Visciano clan for territorial 
reasons. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: the clan is rather less organised due to the fact that the 
leader, Francesco Pescane and his brother, Pasquale, are on the run. 
Clan: Visciano 
Leader: Angelo Visciano (02-09-48). 
Number of members: 13 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Boscoreale and Boscotrecase. 
Activities: extortions and international drug trafficking. 
Alliances: subordinate to the Alfieri clan. 
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External conflicts: conflicts with the Gionta clan for the monopoly of 
the drugs trade and with the Pescane clan for territorial reasons. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: the clan is also active in Battipaglia and Salerno. 
Clan: N. C. 0 (Nuova Camorra Organizzata) 
Leader: Raffaele Cutolo (10-12-41). 
Number of members: 19 (1988) 
Average age: ? 
Sem 3 women and 16 men. 
Geographical zones: Ottaviano and other Vesuviani towns. 
Activities: extortions. 
Alliances: No real alliances. The only ally clan remaining is that of 
Davide Sorrentino from Acerra. 
External conflicts: conflicts with the all clans which explains the 
formation of the NF. 
Internal conflicts: not really as the clan is so small. 
Political contacts: not really as it does not really have the power to 
do so. 
Other: the fact that Rosa Cutolo, the boss's sister has been on the 
run for so long shows that she has some form of protection (arrested 
in 1993). 
Clan: D'Alessandro 
Leader: Michele D'Alessandro (24-05-45). 
Number of members: 122 (1988) 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men 
Geographical zones: Castellarnmare di Stabia, Gragnano, Pimonte, 
Casola di Napoli, Sorrentine Coast. 
Activities: extortions, drugs trafficking, smuggling, clandestine 
lottery, laundering money into building sector. 
Alliances: No real alliances. Good relations with the Nuvoletta clan 
from Marano di Napoli and the Alfieri clan from Pizzolla di Nola. 
External conflicts: conflicts with the Muollo clan which is also from 
Castellarnmare di Stabia. After a bitter war, the Muollo clan 
disappeared. 
Internal conflicts: conflicts with Mario Imparato who became leader 
while Michele D'Alessandro was in prison. They became enemies 
because Imparato was unable to justify his use of the clan's money. 
The clan split forming two rival clans. 
Political contacts: no clear contacts although with 120 members 
there is a great potential for electoral support. 
Other: None. 
Clan: Imparato 
338 
Leader: Mario Umberto Imparato (28-04-46) 
Number of members: 29 (1988) 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Castellammare di Stabia, Pimonte, Gragnano 
and S. Antonio Abate. 
Activities: extortions and robberies. 
Alliances: isolated position because of its principal rival the 
D'Alessandro clan which is very strong. 
External conflicts: split with D'Alessandro clan for money reasons. 
Internal conflicts: none 
Political contacts: none 
Other: Catello Fontanella is one of its members. 
Clan: Saturnino 
Leader: Catello Saturnino (08-09-45). 
Number of members: 10 (1988) 
Average age: ? 
Sex: all men. 
Geographical zones: Castellammare di Stabia. 
Activities: extortions. 
Alliances: none. 
External conflicts: none. 
Internal conflicts: none. 
Political contacts: none. 
Other: One two members are free. One of the last NCO clans and 
thus, does not really undertake serious criminal acts across the 
territory because it does not have the man power. 
sources: Rl and R2 
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Associazionj di stampo mafioso 
84 
Persone deriunciate ex art. 416 bis c. p. 
(dati reiativi at l' trimestre per gli anni inteiessati) 
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I dati sopra evidenziati climostrano come continua e pressante sia 
I'azione clelle Forze di Pclizia sul territoric. 
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PROVINCIA-01 NAPOLI. CAR CLAN 
COGNOME NOME DATA POSIZIONE NUMERO CLAN 
(nasc. ) AFFILIATI 
ALCLAN 
ABATE FILIP'PO 3/8/57 LATITANTE 42 ABATE 
ALFANO GIOVANNI 4/10/57 DETENUTO 56 ALFANO 
ALFIERI CARMINE 18/2143 DETENUTO 179 ALFIERI 
AMMATURO UMBERTO 21/5/41 DETENUTO 35 AMMATURO 
ANASTASIO MICHELE 23/4/53 LIBERO 80 ANASTASIO-FORIA 
FORIA SALVATORE 5/1/54 DETENUTO 80 ANASTASiO-FORIA' 
ANDREOTTI ANDREA 13/6151 1 MIS. PREV. 35 ANDREOTTI 
ANNUNZIATA ALFONSO l/l/56 DETENUTO 18 ANNUNZIATA-CESARANO 
CESARANO FERDINANDO 26/8/54 DETENUTO 18 ANNUNZIATA-CESARANO 
APREA GIOVANNI 1/7/68 DETENUTO 25 
fAPREA 
ASCIONE RAFFAELE 29/1/54 DETENUTO 95 ASCIONE 
AVERSANO , VINCENZO 27/6/58 
LIBERO is 
J 
AVERSANO 
BARATTO 
I 
RAFFAELE 14/10/52 LIBERO 48 
I 
BARATTO 
BARDELLINO 1 ANTONIO 4/5/45 LATITANTE 179 BARDELLINO 
BENEDUCE GAETANO 1/1/52 LIBERO 60 BENEDUCE-LONG013AFIDI 
LONGOBARDI GENNARO 29/4/56 MIS. PREV. 60 BENEDUCE-LONGOBARDI 
. 
CASCONE GIUSEPPE 20/1/48 DETENUTO 48 CASCONE-MENNELLA 
MENNELLA GIUSEPPE 28/10/57 DETENUTO 48 CASCON E-M ENN ELLA 
CAVALCANTI GIACOMO 17/3/52 LIBERO 31 
ICAVALCANTI 
CAVALIERE GENNARO, 2/6/35 1 LIBERO 34 
1 CAVALIERE 
COCOZZA FRANCESCO 26/11/53 MIS. PREV. 26 COCOZZA 
CONTINI 
I 
EDOARDO 6f7155 DETENUTO CONTINI 89 
CRIMALDI CUONO 25/9/54 DETENUTO 29 CRIMALDI 
VALESSANDRO MICHELE 24/5/45 DETENUTO- 284 D'ALESSANDR0 
VAUSILIO DOMENICO 17/12/51 DETENUTO 72 D'AUSILIO 
DEL PRIETE CIRO 17/1144 
IDETENUTO 
13 DEL PRETE I 
EGIZIO ANTONIO 
. 
19/1/53 
IDECEDUTO -60 EGIZIO 
4o6 - 
ESPOSITO SALVATORE 6/5/60 1 UIBERO 25 ESPOSITO 
FABBROCINO MARIO 5/1/43 
1 
LATITANTE 81 FABBROCINO 
. 
AMBROSIO 
IFRANCO 
13/4/56 
IDETENUTO 
81 : '_ABF3ROCINO . 
FALANGA GIUSEPPE 28/6/53 LIBERO 19 FALANGA-01 GIOIA 
_ 
DI GIOIA GAETANO 20/1/55 DETENUTO 19 FALANGA-01 GIOIA 
. 
FORMICOLA BERNARDINO 516/54 UBERQ 11 FORMICOLA 
GAGLIONE ANTONIO 12/9/51 IDETENUTO 30 GAGLIONE 
GALASSO 
IPASQUALE 
17/5/55 DETENUTO 69 GALASSO 
GALLO IPASQUALE 14/3/55 DETENUTO 52 GALLO 
GARGIULO EUGENIO 14/10/46 DETENUTO 53 GARGIULO 
GIONTA VALENTINO 14/1/53 DETENUTO 124 GIONTA 
GIULIANO LUIGI 3/11/49 MIS. PREV. 236 
I-GIULIANO 
GRIMALDI CIRO 26/10/59 LIIBERO -54 GRIMALDI 
GUIDA 
! LUIGI 18/4/56 
1 
LIBERO 50 oUlOA-TOLOMELLWASTARELLA 
- 
TOLOMELLI 
I 
VINCENZO 30/4/25 
1 DETENUTO 50 GUIDA-TOLOMELLWASTARELLA 
VASTARELLA 
I _ 
RAFFAELE 1/10/32 
1 
LIIBERO 50 GUIOA-TOLOMFLUNASTARSUA 
IACOMINO I TOMMASO 31/5/47 MIS. PREV. 73 [ACOMINO-COZZOLINO 
COZZOLINO 
I 
RICCARDO 6/8/50 LATITANTE 73 IACCMINO-COZZOLINO 
IMPARATO UMBERTO MARIO 28/4146 DECEDUTO 65 IMPARATO 
IMPROTA LUIGI 4/4/54 LIBERO 12 IMPROTA-ASCIONE 
ASCIONE CIRO 14/10/45 LIBERO 12 IMPROTA-ASCIONE 
LAGO GIORGIO 8/6/53 LATITANTE 54 LAGO 
I 
LANGELLA ANIELLO 28/7/43 LIBERO 11 LANGELLA 
LEVEGUE ERNESTO 1/3/28 LIBERO 14 LEVEQUE 
LICCIARDI GENNARO 30/11/56 DECEDUTO 55 LICCIARDI 
LO RUSSO SALVATORE 18/2/53 DETENUTO 176 LO RUSSO 
MAGLIULO VINCENZO 111148 LIBERO 39 
IAAt-I till O_ 
MALLARDO FRANCESCO 1/4/51 DETENUTO 29 MALLARDO 
MALVENTI FELICE 7/10/61 LIBERO 32 
MARIANO CIRO 21/11/52 DETENUTO 255 MARIANO 
MARINIELLO GENNARO 5/4/51 DETENUTO 31 MARINIELLO 
IMAURI ANDREA 29/3/51 LIBERO 14 
I 
MAURI 
d 
I 
MAZZARELLA GENNARO 
1 
25/9/49 
1 
LIBERO 128 
1 
MAZZARELLA 
4o 
MINICHINI CIRO 15/2/62 DETENUTO 34 MINICHINI-NORCARO 
NORCARO SALVATORE 23/11/58 LIBERO 34 MINICHINI-NORCARO 
MISSO GIUSEPPE 617/47 DETENUTO 54 MISSO 
MAZZA ANNA MIS PREV. 2812J37 189 MOCCIA 
NAPPO ANTONIO 
f 
7/10/43 LiESER0 17 NAPPO 
NEMOLATO VINCENZO 9/4/53 IDSTENUTO 12 NEMOLATO 
NUVOLETTA LORENZO 1/1131 DECED UTO 199 NUVOLETTA 
- 
NUZZO GIOVANNI 1710/54 LIBERO 31 
F 
NUZZO 
PAESANO GIOVANNI 8/9/45 LIBERO 14 
IPAESANO 
PERRELLA MARIO 3/9/61 
IDETENUTO 
33 PERRELLA 
PESACANE FRANCESCO 15/9/54 
1 
LIBERO II PESACANE 
POSTIGLIONE MARIO 25/1/44 LIBERO 19 POS"nGLIONE-POTEN7A 
POTENZA MARIO 8/8/31 LIBERO 19 POSTIGLIONE-POTENZA 
PUCA PASQUALE 9/7/64 LATITANTE 21 
I 
PUCA 
PUCCINELLI SALVATORE 19/7/. 156 DETENUTO 41 PUCCINELLI 
RANIERI ANTONIO 30/3/57 DETENUTO 52 RANIERI-CARDILLO 
CARDILLO SALVATORE 21/9/58 
IDETENUTO 52 
_ 
LRANIERI-CARDILLO 
_ 
RINALDI VINCENZO 11/2/56 LIBERO 62 
1 
RINALDI 
RUSSO LUIGI 5/2/56 LIBERO 12 
I 
RUSSO 
SARNO CIRO 31/3/59 DETENUTO 104 SARNO 
SASSO GIOVANNI 5/11/55 LIBERO 8 SASSQ 
DI 131ASI MARIO 2/10/58 DETENUTO 36 SAVIO-DI BIASI 
SAVIO MARIO 1812J54 DETENUTO 36 SAVIO-DI BIASI 
SCOTTI PASQUALE 8/9/58 
1 
LATITANTE 26 SCOTTI 
SEBASTIANO DOMENICO 15/4/59 
IDETENUTO, 
54 S ESA STIANO-8 ELLO FIORE 
BELLOFIORE RAFFAELE 21/10/55 DETENUTO 54 SSBASTIANO. OELLORORE 
STOLDER RAFFAELE 5/3/58 DETENUTO 45 STOLDER 
VANGONE ANDREA 6059 MIS. PREV. 84 VANGONE-LIMELLI 
LIMELLI 
I 
LUIGI 2J1149 DETENUTO 84 VANGONE-LIMELLI 
VENERUSO 
I 
GENNARO 8/2/56 DETENUTO, 12 
IVENERUSO 
VERDE DOMENICO 9/7/51 DETENUTO 36 
! VERDE 
VISCIANO ANGELO 20/9/48 DETENUTO 14 VISCIANO 
VOLLASO LUIGI 18/12132 
1 
DETENUTO 140 VOLLARO 
408 
I 
ZA-ZA 
I 
SALVATORE 
1 
5/11/25 
1 
DECEDUTO 
1179 
-I 
ZAZA . 
-. 
-Tl 
CAPI TOT. 
LIBERI 
DETENUTI 44 
LATITANTI 7 
MIS. PREVENZIONE 7 
DECEDUTI 5 
TOTALE 
1 
94 
409 
NAPOLI 
POSIZIONE GIURIDICA DEI CAPI CLAN: VALORI IN PERCENTUALE 
7 ý', 
43ý', 
MDECEDUTI 13MIS-PREV. OLATITANTI 13DETENUTI 13LI13ERI 
qla 
PROVINCIA 01 CASERTA: CAP[ CLAN. 
COGNOME NOME DATA POSIZIONE NUMERO CLAN 
nasc. AFFILIATI 
AL CLAN 
AUTIERO 
IANDREA 114/4/60 
LATITANTE 24 AUTIERO 
BARDELLINO NTON10 4/5/45 LATiTANTE 24 BARDELLINO 
BARDELLIN 20 ET 
- 
E=- RNE: S TO: R ES 0 13/2/43 LIBERO 24 BARDELLINO 
BELFORTE DOMENICO 3/5/57 LISERO 64 1 PELFORTE-81FONE-MUSONFIETMA 
BIFONE 
I 
ANTONIO 
14/1/54 
LIBERO 64 'SELF0RTE-8[F0NE. MUSCNE. LGTrZIA 
_ 
MUSONE VITTORIO 15/11/51 DETENUTO 64 LIELFORTE-81FONE. M SONE-LETrZ% 
LETIZIA BIAGO 27/3/49 DETENUTO 64 SSLF0RTF-8IFCNr-MUS0NE4. ETIZIA 
BENENATO ROSARIO 29/8/55 DETENUTO 22 
. _BENENATO 
BOCCOLATO 
I 
EMILIO 6/10/49 OETENUTO 11 BOCCOLATO 
CANTIELLO ANTONIO 24/3/58 LIBERO 21 CANTIELLO 
DEFALCO NUNZIO 
119/3/50 
LIBERO 23 DE FALCO 
DI PAOLO 
I 
MARIO 
117110/5,7 
1 LATITANTE 154 DIPAOLO 
CARFORA CLEMENTE 111148 
IDETENUTO 154 
DIPAOLO 
ESPOSITO MARIO 27/1/59 
1 
LATITANTE 
187 
ESPOSITO 
GAROFALO ROSARIO 20/7/12 LISERO, 6 GAROFALO 
GRAVANTE VINCENZO 
1 
25/3/50 LIBERO 7 GRAVANTE 
GIUSTI ALFONSO 
1 
1216/27 LISERO 4 GiUSTI 
IOVINE SALVATORE 
1 
19/10/651 LIBERO 31 IOVINE 
izzo TOMMASO LIBERO 8 Izzo 
.. 
LA TORRE 
_ 
AUGUSTO DETENUTO 96 
_LA 
TORRE 
LA TORRE I I TICE;; I0F=4NCESC0 2/3/30 LIBERO 6 9 LA TORRE 
- 
LUBRANO 
_ 
VINCENZO 1 14/5/38 
1 . LISERO 31 LU13RANO-PAPA 
PAPA GIROLAMO 14/4138 LIBERO 31 
1 LU13RANO-PAPA 
MAZZARA AMEDEO 
1 
29/3/48 nETENUTO 14 
FMAZZARA 
MILONE GIOVANNI 25/5/53 LATITANTE 17 MILONE 
. 
MORRONE GIULIO 2/8/52 DETENUTO 22 MORRONE-LUISE 
qll :.. 
WISE GIULIO 
J 
15/11/60 LIBERO 22 MORRONE-LUISE 
MUSTO GAETANO 5/8/54 LIBERO 45 MUSTO 
PERRECA ANTIMO 8/1/57 LIBERO 21 PERRECA 
PICCA ALDO 17/11/56 DETENUTO 
18 
PICCA 
PICCOLO 
IANGELO- 
21/5/51 DETENUTO 21 PICCOLO-DELLI PAOLI 
DELLI PAC)LI 
I 
ANTONIO 2/1/50 
'LATIýANTJ-= 
21 PICCOLO-DELLI PAOLI 
SCHIAVONE 
I 
FRANCESCO 3/3/54 DETENUTO 219 SCHIAVONE 
TAVOLETTA 
I 
ANTONIO 25/3/56 DETENUTO 
1 
57 TAVOLETTA 
TESSITORE 
I FRANCESCO 8/2/46 DETENUTO 12 TESSITORE 
UCCIERO 
I 
ADOLFO 5/8/63 DETENUTO 10 UCCIERO 
IVENOSA LUIGI 28/11/53 DETENUTO 50 VENOSA-CATERINO 
CATERINO SE13ASTIANO 1 8/11/55 I DETENUTO 
1 
50 VENOSA-CATERINO 
CAPI TOT. 
DETENUTI 16 
LISERI 16 
LATITANTI 6 
, TOTALE 
tf IL 
CASERTA 
POSIZIONE GIURIDICA DEI CAPI CLAN: VALORI IN PERCENTUALE 
. ý- I 
1 
C3 LATITANTI M DETENUTI 3 LIBERI I 
41? 
PROVINCIA DI SALERNO: CAPI CLAN. 
COGNOME NOME DATA POSIZIONE 
nasc. 
NUMERO 
AFFILIATI 
ALCLAN 
CLAN 
DE FEO PASQUALE 27/1/61 DETENUTO 
. 
34 DE FEO 
DI MAIO SALVATORE 22/6/58 LIBEO. 0 
163 
DI MAIO-BENIGNO 
BENIGNO ANTONIO 1/1/37 DETENUTO 
163 
DI MA10-13ENIGNO 
FORTE ANTONIO 112/6/50 DETENUTO 19 FORTE . 
GENOVESE FRANCESCO 
127/6/65 
LIBERO 32 
_GENOVESE . 
GRIMALDI LUCIO 14/7/48 
IDETENUTO, 
94 GRIMALDI 
MAIALE GIOVANNI 25/1/53 
IDETENUTO 
71 MAIALE 
. 
MARANDINO GIOVANNI 5/11/37 
7 
DETENUTO 47 MARANDINO 
LA BROCCA CARMINE 16/7/47 MIS. PREV. 47 MARANDINO 
MATRONE 
I 
FRANCESCO DETENUTO 63 MATRONE-LORETO 
LORETO 
1 
18/4/61 DETENUTO 63 MATRONE-LORETO 
_ 
PANELLA AMEDEO 26/4/55 IDETENUTO 51 MIRABfLE-PANELLA 
_ 
NOCERA TOMMASO 1/6/49 MIS. PREV. 75 NOCERA 
OLIVIERI GIUSEPPE 10/12/46 DECEDUTO 84 CLIVI ERI-CITAR ELLA 
_ 
CITARELLA GENNARO 29/8/41 DECEDUTO 84 OLIVIER[-CITARELLA 
_ 
PECORARO ALFONSO 30111/61 , LIBERO 89 PECORARO JPEPE 
MARIO 26/5/49 
IDETENUTO 1 
17 PEPE 
CAR TOT. 
DETENUTI 9 
LIBERI 3 
MIS. PREV. 2 
DECEDUTI 2 
LATITANTI 0 
ITOTALE 17 
If ILj. 
SALERNO 
POSIZIONE GIURICICA DEI CAPI CLAN: VALORI IN PERCENTUALE 
13% 13% 
19 -, Ilý 
ý15 
JUDETENUTI 
GILIBERI ; 3, MIS. PREIJ. E2 DE 
Appendix Seven: Camorra-Related Activities in the 1980s 
416 bis - Mafia Association 
Number of 416 bis crimes in Campa 
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'I ýý 
. 
People Denounced for Smuggling in Campania 1983-93 
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ý1983-93 
sources: Rea (1994), Sales (1988) and ISTAT - Annunarlo di Statistiche Guidizaria 
penali 198513-94, Roma. 
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Avvendix Ei-ght: Antonio Gava and The Cirillo Affair 
Antonio Gava has been a major DC player in Neapolitan and 
national politics in the post-war period following in his father, Silvio 
Gava's footsteps (see Chapter Ten). During the 1980s, he held a 
number of important ministerial posts including that of minister of the 
Interior. Ciro Cirillo's kidnapping was potentially dangerous for him as 
Cirillo was his right-hand man and knew all his political secrets, 
especially those about his clientelistic deals. 
Ciro Cirillo, a DC regional councillor in charge of the Earthquake 
Distribution Fund, was kidnapped by the Neapolitan 'column' of the 
Red Brigades (BR) on the 27 April 1981. The local DC, in particular 
members of the 'Dorotei' faction (Gava jr, Patriarca, Russo, Piccoli, 
realising that he be a victim of the Moro scenario contacted the 
Camorra. They believed that the Camorra could help them contact the 
BR and negotiate his liberation. Different Camorra groups were asked 
to intervene as Pasquale Galasso makes clear "during the Cirillo 
kidnapping, I -was contacted by Antonio Gava, W, through Raffaele 
Boccia, his loyal representative in Poggiomarino, and he asked Boccia to 
ask me and the Alfleris whether we could do something to free Cirillo" 
(Pr7). 
The Alfieri confederation refused because it did not want to be 
used by the politicians; but Cutolo, on the other hand, saw this 
request as his opportunity to stabilise and consolidate his political 
influence as well as have access to a percentage of the Earthquake 
Funds (votes in exchange for political, social and business 
opportunities). Ciro Cirillo was freed on 25 July 1981, with the help of 
Cutolo and his NCO. He had calculated that this would increase his 
political returns, but, as his organisation was weakened in criminal 
importance, the DC politicians who had made the original promises, 
abandoned him for the new emerging Camorra. He was thus never 
really able to benefit from what he considered his due (see Chapter 
Twelve). This episode demonstrated that political contacts developed 
parallel to criminal power and that politicians sought contacts with the 
most powerful criminal gang in order to obtain what they needed. This 
untimely created intricate relations and exchanges. 
It has been very difficult for magistrates to establish exactly what 
happened. But, investigating judge Carlo D'Alemi in his case was able 
to show that there had been quite clear links between the Neapolitan 
DC and the NCO. Judge D'Alemi was discredited for the conclusions 
that he came to in this case but they were later judged to be correct 
by the Appeal Court. 
For more detailed explanations see Vasile (1993) and Aa. Vv (1988). 
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